The Comprehensive agreement on Iranian nuclear program is a topic in a series of negotiations among Iran and the P5+1 — United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom and Germany.
The prospective agreement is to be achieved based on the context of the Geneva agreement, officially titled the Joint Plan of Action (JPA). The Geneva agreement was an interim deal forged on 24 November 2013,[1] under which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear program for relief from some sanctions. The interim agreement went into effect on 20 January 2014.[2] Later the parties agreed to extend their talks. The first extension deadline was set to 24 November 2014[3] and, when it expired, the second extension deadline was set to 1 July 2015.[4]
The following is a partial list of nuclear facilities in Iran (IAEA, NTI and other sources):
The first round of negotiations was held at the UN's center in Vienna from 18-20 February 2014. A timetable and framework for negotiating a comprehensive agreement was achieved, according to Catherine Ashton and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.[7]
Diplomats from the six nations, as well as Ashton and Zarif, met again in Vienna on 17 March 2014. A series of further negotiations were to be held before the July deadline.[8]
This fourth round of Vienna negotiations ended on 16 May 2014. The Iranian and U.S. delegations headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsWendy Sherman held a bilateral meeting. Both sides intended to begin drafting a final agreement, but made little progress. A senior U.S. official said "We are just at the beginning of the drafting process and we have a significant way to go," while Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi told reporters that "the talks were serious and constructive but no progress has been made" and "we have not reached the point to start drafting the final agreement." The U.S. official emphasized that negotiations had been "very slow and difficult," saying talks would resume in June and all parties want to keep the 20 July deadline and adding: "we believe we can still get it done." Negotiators had made progress on one issue, the future of Iran's planned Arak reactor, but remained far apart on whether Iran's capacity to enrich uranium should shrink or expand. The U.S. delegation also raised the issues of Iran's ballistic missile program and military dimensions of its past nuclear research. EU High RepresentativeCatherine Ashton conducted negotiations with Zarif and Wendy Sherman joined the talks at the end the last meeting.[9][10][11]
The fifth round of talks ended on 20 June 2014, "with substantial differences still remaining." The negotiating parties will meet again in Vienna on 2 July. Under Secretary Sherman noted after the talks that it was "still unclear" whether Iran would act "to ensure the world that its nuclear program was strictly meant for peaceful purposes."[12] Foreign Minister Zarif said the United States was making unreasonable demands of Iran, saying "the United States must take the most difficult decisions."[13]
Under the Geneva interim agreement Iran agreed to convert some of its up to 5 percent LEU into an oxide powder that is not suitable for further enrichment. According to the monthly IAEA report released during this round the conversion of LEU has not been started yet. This means that Iran's LEU stockpile "is almost certainly continuing to increase for the time being, simply because its production of the material has not stopped, unlike that of the 20 percent uranium gas."[14]
The sixth round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group started in Vienna on 2 July 2014. The parties are headed by Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the EU's foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.[15]
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and other Western foreign ministers arrived at Vienna to break a deadlock in the nuclear talks with Iran,[16] but their joint efforts failed to advance the negotiations. "There has been no breakthrough today," said British Foreign Secretary William Hague on 13 July 2014 after meetings with the foreign ministers of USA, France, Germany and Iran. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said: "It is now time for Iran to decide whether they want co-operation with the world community or stay in isolation."[17] The European foreign ministers left Vienna the same day. The Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that the talks had "made some important headway." [18] After three days of talks with the Iranian Foreign Minister Secretary of State Kerry headed back to Washington where he will consult with President Barack Obama and Congress leaders. No decision on an extension of negotiations beyond the 20 July deadline has been taken yet.[19] In order to continue talks a decision of each member of P5+1 is required.[20]
Wrapping-up the sixth round the Foreign Minister Zarif said that the achieved progress convinced the sides to extend their talks and the ultimate deadline would be November 25. He also expressed the hope that the new British foreign secretary Philip Hammond "will adopt a constructive diplomacy" towards Iran.[21] Several sources reported that all parties were prepared to extend negotiations but extension faced opposition in the United States Congress. Republicans and Democrats in Congress made it clear that they view a prolongation of the talks as allowing Iran to play for time. The Republican chairman of the United States House Committee on Foreign AffairsEd Royce said he hoped "the administration will finally engage in robust discussions with Congress about preparing additional sanctions against Iran".[22][23]
Before the expiration of the six months imposed by the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) the sides agreed to extend negotiations by four months with a final deadline set for 24 November 2014. Additionally, in exchange for Iranian consent to convert some of its 20% enriched uranium into fuel for a research reactor, United States will unblock $2.8 billion in frozen Iranian funds. Negotiations will resume in September. John Kerry said that tangible progress had been made, but "very real gaps" remained. Ed Royce stated that he did not see "the extension as progress".[3][24][25]
Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has testified before the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the status of the talks. At her testimony on 29 July 2014 she said: "We made tangible progress in key areas, including Fordow, Arak, and IAEA access. However, critical gaps still exist..." Both Republicans and Democrats have insisted that a final agreement be put to a vote.[26]
Negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran over Iran's nuclear program were resumed on 19 September 2014. They started on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and Secretary of State John Kerry and his counterparts were given the opportunity to join the talks.[27][28] The talks were planned to last until September 26.[29][30]
Negotiating teams of Iran and the P5+1 have held their eighth round of talks in Vienna on 16 October 2014. The meeting was led jointly by Foreign Minister Zarif and High Representative Ashton and the parties made an effort to sort out their differences.[31] Ashton's spokesman stated: "Diplomatic efforts to find a resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue are now in a critical phase".[32]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov pointed that the issues of Iran’s enrichment programme, the schedule for sanction lifting and the future of the reactor in Arak were not settled and the subjects of inspection and transparency, duration of the agreement and some others were not completely agreed yet. Ryabkov expressed his opinion that a comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran will require no ratification. "We are negotiating a binding document, but under a generally recognized doctrine international political liabilities are equated with legal," he said and admitted that some resolutions of the Security Council on Iran will need to be adjusted.[33]
The round of talks took place on November 11 in the Omani capital Muscat and lasted one hour. At the meeting, Iranian deputy foreign ministers Abbas Araqchi and Majid Takht Ravanchi exchanged views with their counterparts from the P5+1.[34] The round, chaired by former EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, was scheduled to brief the P5+1 members on Kerry and Zarif's talks.[35] Local media reported that some representatives of the parties remained in Muscat to continue the talks.[36]
Nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed in Vienna on 18 November 2014 with participation of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif, EU chief negotiator Catherine Ashton, and foreign ministry officials. The talks were supposed to continue until the 24 November 2014 deadline.[37][38]
Secretary of State John Kerry, after meeting British and Omani foreign ministers in London and Saudi and French foreign ministers in Paris, will arrive in Vienna for talks with Zarif and Ashton. Kerry's meetings with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal were considered critical.[39] After his Paris talks with Kerry Saudi Foreign Minister was due to meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow.[40]
At IAEA meeting held on 20 November in Vienna the agency's Director General Yukiya Amano, referring to allegations related to Iran's engagement in weaponization activities, said that "Iran has not provided any explanations that enable the agency to clarify the outstanding practical measures."[41] The same day at a press conference in Brussels The International Committee in Search of Justice (ISJ) presented its 100-page investigation report and claimed that Iran was hiding its nuclear military program inside a civil program. The report was endorsed by John Bolton and Robert Joseph and authored by ISJ President Alejo Vidal‐Quadras, a professor in nuclear physics and the former Vice-President of the European Parliament.[42][43][44][45]
The tenth round of nuclear negotiations and the first extension of the Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 have ended on November 24. The two sides have failed to cut a deal at this round of talks and agreed to extend the Joint Plan of Action for the second time. The new deadline for a comprehensive deal was set to 1 July 2015. British foreign secretary Philip Hammond said it was not possible to meet the November deadline due to wide gaps on well-known points of contention. He stressed that while 1 July was the new deadline, the expectation was that broad agreement would be in place by March 1. According to Hammond, expert level talks will resume in December and Iran will receive about $700 million per month in frozen assets.[46][4]
Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in a press conference after the Vienna talks: "Today the Iranian nuclear program is internationally recognized and no one speaks about our enrichment right..."[47] While answering a question about "fundamental gaps over how much enrichment capacity Iran would be allowed to retain", Secretary of State John Kerry said in a news conference: "I’m not going to confirm whether or not there’s a gap or not a gap or where the gaps are. There obviously are gaps. We’ve said that."[48]
Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were resumed on 17 December 2014 in Geneva and lasted one day. No statements were issued after the closed-door talks either by the U.S. negotiating team or by EU spokesmen. Deputy foreign minister Araqchi said that it was agreed to continue the talks "next month" at a venue to be decided. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov said that Arak heavy-water reactor and sanctions against Iran were the two key outstanding issues in the nuclear talks.[49][50]
The round, held at the level of political directors of Iran and the P5+1, took place on 18 January 2015 following the four-day bilateral talks between the United States and Iran.[51] EU political director Helga Schmid chaired the meetings. After the talks France's negotiator Nicolas de la Riviere told reporters: "The mood was very good, but I don't think we made a lot of progress."[52] "If there is progress it is a very slow one and there are no guarantees that this progress will transform into a decisive shift, breakthrough, into a compromise," Russian negotiator Sergei Ryabkov told journalists, adding that "major disagreements remain on the majority of disputed issues." [53]
Representatives of Iran and the P5+1 met on 22 February at the EU mission in Geneva. Nicolas de la Riviere said after the meeting: "It was constructive, we will know results later."[54][55]
According to a statement of the United States Department of State bilateral nuclear consultations between the U.S. and Iranian officials "will take place in the context of the P5+1 nuclear negotiations". The talks were held on 7 August in Geneva and only few details about them were provided. The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and included Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Jake Sullivan, national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden. The Iranian delegation included Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araqchi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi.[56][57]
Deputy Minister Abbas Araqchi said that the bilateral talks were useful and focused on "the existing differences" in the negotiations.[58] Deputy Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi made it clear that Iran will not accept a weak enrichment programme, while saying "we will not accept that our uranium enrichment programme becomes something like a toy".[59]
The second round of the bilateral talks between representatives from the USA and Iran took place in Geneva on September 4–5. The negotiations consisted of 12 hours long political talks and 8 hours long expert talks.[60] The third round of the bilateral talks between the two countries took place in New York on 18 September 2014.[61]
According to The Associated Press, the United States has turned negotiations with Iran into a series of bilateral talks between the two countries that "race to seal a deal".[62]Gary Samore, former White House coordinator for arms control and WMD, participating in a panel, said: "Any deal will have to be struck between Washington and Tehran and then ratified by the P5+1 and ultimately the UN Security Council."[63]
On 14 October, Iranian negotiators headed by the deputy foreign minister held a bilateral meeting with senior U.S. officials William Burns and Wendy Sherman in Vienna. Among other issues the negotiators set the stage for the trilateral meeting with Secretary Kerry, Baroness Ashton, and Foreign Minister Zarif that was convened for the next day.[64][65]
The U.S. and Iranian delegations met on December 15 to 16 in Geneva in preparation for the multilateral talks, led by the US Acting Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. A member of Tehran's team told IRNA that uranium enrichment and how to remove sanctions were sticking points in the bilateral talks.[49][50]
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif met with Secretary of State John Kerry on 14 January in Geneva and on 16 January in Paris.[66] According to Al-Monitor the negotiators have worked intensively to try draft a joint document called the Principles of Agreement. The document is supposed to be an element of the framework agreement between Iran and P5+1, which is to be completed by March.[67]
Two rounds of bilateral negotiations between Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif and Secretary of State John Kerry occurred on 6 and 8 February on the sidelines of the Security Conference in Munich.[68][69] During the conference, Mohammad Zarif gave an interview in which he claimed that IAEA inspected Iran for 10 years or more and found no evidence that Iran’s program wasn't peaceful. He also claimed that JPA did not imply step-by-step removal of sanctions and the removal of sanctions has been "a condition for an agreement". Foreign Minister Zarif stated: "I don’t think if we don’t have an agreement, it’ll be the end of the world. I mean, we tried, we failed, fine."[70] IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, who also took part in the conference, pointed out that Iran must provide urgent clarification on key aspects of its nuclear program. Making this more specific Yukiya Amano said: "Clarification of issues with possible military dimension and implementation of the Additional Protocol and beyond is essential."[71]
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif held three bilateral meetings in Geneva on 22 and 23 February.[72]The Associated Press reported progress on a deal that would freeze Iran's nuclear activities for at least 10 years but then "ease restrictions on programs that could be used to make atomic arms." After the talks Mohammad Zarif spoke about "a better understanding" between the parties and John Kerry said: "We made progress."[73] The columnist Charles Krauthammer commented on the leaked "sunset clause" that an agreement, containing this and other concessions to Iran, will mean "the end of nonproliferation."[74]
Iran and U.S. foreign ministers and their teams continued the bilateral nuclear talks on 2-4 March in the Swiss city of Montreux.[75][76] Iran's foreign minister has rejected as "unacceptable" President Barack Obama's demand to freeze sensitive nuclear activities for at least 10 years, saying "Iran will not accept excessive and illogical demands."[77] After the talks, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry flew to Riyadh, where he will meet separately the Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and the foreign ministers of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.[78]
Another bilateral meeting between Iran's Foreign Minister Zarif and US Secretary of State Kerry took place on 16 March in Lausanne. Among the issues discussed at the meeting was the open letter to Iranian leaders, signed by 47 Republican U.S. senators. After the talks a senior U.S. official told reporters it was not clear if the end-March deadline for a framework agreement could be met.[79][80]Los Angeles Times reported that it was also unclear whether the framework, if reached in March, would be a detailed document or a vague one. The sides were still divided on some crucial issues and Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei said he wanted no written agreement until all details are settled.[81]
Iran, the EU and the United States held two trilateral meetings at the foreign minister level in New York in September 2014. The U.S. Department of State has argued that there are points when it makes sense for the foreign ministers at the trilateral level to get together to talk. "In part because the majority of the sanctions are EU and US, the trilateral makes sense."[65]
On 15 October, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Secretary of State John Kerry have met again, this time in Vienna. A senior U.S. Department of State official said at a briefing with reporters that the parties were focused on the November 24 deadline and had not discussed an extension of the talks. The negotiators were working on a full agreement – the understandings and the annexes to them. "This is a situation where unless you have the detail, you do not know that you have the agreement," explained the official.[82][83]
Secretary of State John Kerry, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif and former EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton have held talks on November 9–10 in Muscat seeking to bridge differences on a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Officials from all delegations have abstained from briefing reporters.[84] The talks ended without an imminent breakthrough.[85]
After arriving in Viena on 20 November John Kerry met for more than two hours with Mohammad Zarif and Catherine Ashton. It was not reported whether they made any headway.[86][87]
Iran's nuclear enrichment capacity is the biggest stumbling block in the negotiations on a comprehensive agreement.[11][59][88][89][90][91] The Security Council in its resolution 1929 has required Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program.[93] For many years the United States held that no enrichment program should be permitted in Iran. In signing the Geneva interim agreement the United States and its P5+1 partners shifted away from zero enrichment to limited enrichment objective. Additionally, they have determined that the comprehensive solution will "have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon" and once it has expired Iran's nuclear program will not be under special restrictions.[96]
Limited enrichment would mean limits on the numbers and types of centrifuges. Shortly before the comprehensive negotiations began, Iran was estimated to have 19,000 centrifuges installed, mostly first generation IR-1 machines, with about 10,000 of them operating to increase the concentration of uranium-235. The Iranians strive to expand their enrichment capacity by a factor of ten or more while the six powers aim to cut the number of centrifuges to no more than a few thousand.[97]
Olli Heinonen, former deputy director general of the IAEA, said in a radio interview that the agency does not have a complete picture of Iran’s nuclear profile since inspectors have been kept out of some sites. In particular, IAEA has not been able to assess "how much uranium has been produced in Iran over these years" and to verify the completeness of Iran's declaration about the number of its centrifuges. Heinonen also pointed out that Iran has an "unfortunate history of misleading and not disclosing all its nuclear material."[98]
Western analysts argued there were two distinct paths to deal with Iran's nuclear program: complete dismantling or allowing limited activities while preventing Iran from a nuclear "breakout capability". The measures that would lengthen breakout timelines include "limits on the number, quality and/or output of centrifuges". The former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security AffairsRobert Joseph has argued that attempts to overcome the impasse over centrifuges by using a malleable SWU metric "as a substitute for limiting the number of centrifuges is nothing more than sleight of hand." He has also quoted former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton saying "any enrichment will trigger an arms race in the Middle East."
In order to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes, constraints should be put on its uranium enrichment. This should include the number and quality of centrifuges, research and development of more advanced centrifuges, the size of low-enriched uranium stockpile. The constraints are interrelated with each other - the more centrifuges Iran would have, the less stockpile the United States and P5+1 can accept, and vice versa. Colin Kahl, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, estimated in May 2014 that Iran's stockpile was large enough to build 6 nuclear weapons and it had to be reduced.[103] Lengthening breakout timelines requires a substantial reduction in enrichment capacity and many experts talk about an acceptable range of about 2000-6000 first-generation centrifuges. But Iran stated that it wants to extend its capability substantially. In May 2014 Robert J. Einhorn, former Special Advisor on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the U.S. Department of State, expressed confidence that if Iran will continue to insist on that huge number of centrifuges, there would be no agreement, since this robust enrichment capacity would bring the breakout time down to weeks or days.[104]
Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, said that a good deal will be one that cuts off Iran's uranium, plutonium and covert pathways to obtain nuclear weapon.[26] Secretary of State John Kerry has testified before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs and expressed great concerns about the Arak nuclear reactor facility. "Now, we have strong feelings about what will happen in a final comprehensive agreement. From our point of view, Arak is unacceptable. You can’t have a heavy-water reactor," he said.[105] President Barack Obama, while addressing the House of Representatives and Senate, emphasized that "these negotiations do not rely on trust; any long-term deal we agree to must be based on verifiable action that convinces us and the international community that Iran is not building a nuclear bomb."[106]
Despite these statements, some analysts have feared that Obama administration might accept dangerous concessions to achieve a deal with Iran. For example, Fred Fleitz, a former CIA analyst and Chief of Staff to Undersecretaries of State for Arms, believed that such concessions were being proposed, and, as he explained: "... most dangerous is that we are considering letting Iran keep the Arak heavy water reactor which will be a source of plutonium. Plutonium is the most desired nuclear fuel for a bomb, it has a lower critical mass, you need less of it which is important in building missile warhead."[107]
The head of Atomic Energy Organization of IranAli Akbar Salehi said in an interview that the heavy water reactor of Arak was designed as a research reactor and not for plutonium production. It will produce about 9 kg of plutonium but not weapons-grade plutonium. Dr. Salehi explained that "if you want to use the plutonium of this reactor you need a reprocessing plant". "We do not have a reprocessing plant, we do not intend, although it is our right, we will not forgo our right, but we do not intend to build a reprocessing plant." Further in the interview Salehi expressed his opinion that the pressure on Iran has not been genuine, it has been just an excuse to put "political pressure" and the concern about developing nuclear weapons was "fabricated".[108]
According to information provided by the Federation of American Scientists, a sizable research program involving the production of heavy water might raise concerns about a plutonium-based weapon program, especially if such program was not easily justifiable on other accounts.[109] Gregory S. Jones, a senior researcher and a defense policy analyst, warned that if the heavy-water-production plant at Arak was not dismantled, Iran would be granted a "plutonium option" for acquiring nuclear weapons in addition to the dangerous centrifuge enrichment program.[110]
According to an editorial in the Washington Post, the most troubling part of the Geneva interim agreement has been the "long-term duration" clause. This provision means that when the duration expires, "the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party" to the NPT. Thus, once the comprehensive agreement expires, Iran will be able to install an unlimited number of centrifuges and produce plutonium without violating any international accord."[111] Many Western analysts have referred to the comprehensive agreement as a "final" nuclear agreement with Iran "but clearly it will only be a long-term interim agreement".[96]
Iran wants any agreement to last for at most 5 years while the United States prefers 20 years.[112] The twenty years is viewed as a minimum amount of time to develop confidence that Iran can be treated as other non-nuclear weapon states and allow the IAEA enough time to verify that Iran is fully compliant with all its non-proliferation obligations.
The Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in May 2014: "Battle and jihad are endless because evil and its front continue to exist. … This battle will only end when the society can get rid of the oppressors' front with America at the head of it, which has expanded its claws on human mind, body and thought."[114] This and other declarations of jihadist principles by Ayatollah Khamenei[115] leave no doubt about Iran's adoption of religiously-inspired combat against the United States and the West.[116] These principles include aramesh (hudna)[117] and such a truce cannot exceed 10 years.[118]
Some analysts suggested that if a single 20-year duration for all provisions of the agreement is too constraining, it would be possible to agree on different durations for different provisions. Some provisions could have short duration, and others could be longer. A few constraints, like enhanced monitoring at specific facilities, could be permanent.[119]
Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. "We have never pursued or sought a nuclear bomb and we are not going to do so," Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani said, according to a translation of an interview with him.[120] Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has pronounced a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.[121] Some observers, however, have questioned the fatwa's actual existence.[122]
The Iranian uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz (FEP and PFEP) and Fordow (FFEP) were constructed covertly and designed to operate in a similar manner. The facilities were declared by Iran only after they were revealed by other sources. Thus, only in September 2009, Iran notified the IAEA about constructing the Fordow facility.[123] The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions stated among the key judgments : "We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons." Additionally the Estimate stated that after 2003 Iran has halted the covert enrichment for at least several years.[125][126]
The Estimate also stated: "We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities — rather than its declared nuclear sites — for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon."[126] Despite this assessment some analysts have argued that negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, as well as most public discussions, were focused on Iran's overt nuclear facilities while there existed alternative paths to obtain fissile material. Graham Allison, former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Oren Setter, a research fellow at Belfer Center, compared this approach with Maginot's fixation on a single threat "that led to fatal neglect of alternatives". They have pointed out at least three additional paths to obtain such material:
William Tobey, former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, has outlined the possible ways to nuclear weapons as follows:[125]
Some sources published recommendations for agreement provisions relating to monitoring and verification in order to prevent covert activities and to provide tools to react if needed.[125] One of the sources warned the P5+1 that "if the monitoring elements that we recommend are not pursued now to diminish the risks of deception, it is difficult to envision that Iran would be compliant in the future, post-sanctions environment." According to the recommendations the agreement with Iran should include:
According to multiple resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929), enacted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Iran is obligated to cooperate fully with the IAEA on "all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA..." On 11 November 2013 the IAEA and Iran signed a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation committing both parties to cooperate and resolve all present and past issues in a step by step manner. As a first step, the Framework identified six practical measures to be completed within three months.[136] The IAEA reported that Iran had implemented those six measures in time.[137] In February and May 2014[138][139] the parties agreed to additional sets of measures related to the Framework.[140] In September the IAEA continued to report that Iran was not implementing its Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for the IAEA "to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities." Under those circumstances, the Agency reported it will not be able to provide "credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran"[133]
The implementation of interim Geneva Accord has involved transparency measures and enhanced monitoring to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. It was agreed that the IAEA will be "solely responsible for verifying and confirming all nuclear-related measures, consistent with its ongoing inspection role in Iran". IAEA inspection has included daily access to Natanz and Fordow and managed access to centrifuge production facilities, uranium mines and mills, and the Arak heavy water reactor.[143] To implement these and other verification steps, Iran committed to "provide increased and unprecedented transparency into its nuclear program, including through more frequent and intrusive inspections as well as expanded provision of information to the IAEA."[145]
Thus, there have been two ongoing diplomatic tracks — one by the P5+1 to curb Iran’s nuclear program and a second by the IAEA to resolve questions about the peaceful nature of Iran’s past nuclear activities. Although the IAEA inquiry has been formally separate from JPA negotiations, Washington said a successful IAEA investigation should be part of any final deal and that may be unlikely by the deadline of 24 November 2014.[146]
One expert on Iran's nuclear program, David Albright, has explained that "It’s very hard if you are an IAEA inspector or analyst to say we can give you confidence that there’s not a weapons program today if you don’t know about the past. Because you don’t know what was done. You don’t know what they accomplished." Albright argued that this history is important since the "infrastructure that was created could pop back into existence at any point in secret and move forward on nuclear weapons."[147]
Iranian and IAEA officials met in Tehran on 16 and 17 August 2014 and discussed the five practical measures in the third step of the Framework for Cooperation agreed in May 2014.Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, made a one-day visit to Tehran on 17 August and held talks with President of Iran Hassan Rouhani and other senior officials.[149] After the visit Iranian media criticized the IAEA while reporting that President Rouhani and the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Salehi both tried "to make the IAEA chief Mr. Amano understand that there is an endpoint to Iran’s flexibility."[150] The same week Iranian Defense MinisterHossein Dehghan said that Iran will not give IAEA inspectors access to Parchin military base. Yukiya Amano has noted previously that access to the Parchin base was essential for the Agency to be in position to certify Iran's nuclear programme as peaceful.[151] Tehran was supposed to provide the IAEA with information related to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport calculations until 25 August, but it failed to address these issues.[152] The two issues are associated with compressed materials that are required to produce a warhead small enough to fit on top of a missile.[153] During its 7-8 October meetings with the IAEA in Tehran, Iran failed to propose any new practical measures to resolve the disputable issues.[154]
On 19 February 2015 IAEA has released its quarterly safeguards report on Iran.[155] While testifying before the United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, the ISIS's President David Albright commented on Iran's reaction to this report: "the Iranian government continues to dissemble and stonewall the inspectors and remains committed to severely weakening IAEA safeguards and verification in general."[156]
There are many steps toward nuclear weapons. However, an effective nuclear weapons capability has only three major elements:[158]
Evidence presented by the IAEA has shown that Iran has pursued all three of these elements: it has been enriching uranium for more than ten years and is constructing a heavy water reactor to produce plutonium, it has a well-developed ballistic missile program, and it has tested high explosives and compressed materials that can be used for nuclear warheads.
Some analysts believe that Iran's nuclear program should be negotiated in its entirety — it must include not only fissile material discussions but also ballistic missile development and weaponization issues.[160][161]
Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, has explained in his recent book (2014): "The best—perhaps the only—way to prevent the emergence of a nuclear weapons capability is to inhibit the development of a uranium-enrichment process ..."
Joint Plan of Action has not explicitly addressed the future status of Iran’s ballistic missile program. However, having been an interim agreement, it could not take into account all the issues that should be resolved as part of a comprehensive agreement. If a comprehensive agreement with Iran "does not tackle the issue of ballistic missiles, it will fall short of and may undermine ... UN Security Council Resolutions." Moreover, shifting "monitoring and prevention aims onto warheads without addressing Iran’s ballistic missile capacity also ignores U.S. legislation that forms the foundation of the sanctions regime against Iran".
Additionally, "monitoring warhead production is far more difficult than taking stock" of ballistic missiles and the US government is far less good at detecting advanced centrifuges or covert facilities for manufacturing nuclear warheads.
Anthony Cordesman, a former Pentagon official and a holder of the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), highlighted the view that the United States and other members of the P5+1, along with their attempts to limit Iran's breakout capability and to prevent it from getting even one nuclear device, should mainly focus "on reaching a full an agreement that clearly denies Iran any ability to covertly create an effective nuclear force."
Iran's ballistic missiles have been tied to its nuclear-weapons program. Security Council Resolution 1929 "decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons."[165] In May–June 2014 a United Nations panel of experts submitted a report pointing to Iran's engagement in ballistic missile activities. The Panel reported that over the last year Iran has conducted a number of ballistic missile test launches, which were a violation of paragraph 9 of the resolution.[166]
Director of U.S. National IntelligenceJames Clapper testified on 12 March 2013, that Iran’s ballistic missiles were capable of delivering WMD.[167] According to some analysts, the liquid-fueled Shahab-3 missile and the solid-fueled Sejjil missile have the ability to carry a nuclear warhead.[168] Iran’s ballistic missile program is controlled by IRGC Air Force (AFAGIR), while Iran’s combat aircraft is under the command of the regular Iranian Air Force (IRIAF).[169]
The United States and its allies view Iran's ballistic missiles as a subject for the talks on a comprehensive agreement since they regard it as a part of Iran's potential nuclear threat. Members of Iran's negotiating team in Vienna insisted the talks won't focus on this issue.[170]
A few days before 15 May, date when the next round of the negotiations was scheduled,[171] Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told the IRNA news agency that Western expectations on limits to Iran's missile program were "stupid and idiotic" and called on the country's Revolutionary Guards to mass-produce missiles.[172]
In his testimony before the United States House Committee on Armed Services, Managing Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Michael Singh argued "that Iran should be required to cease elements of its ballistic-missile and space-launch programs as part of a nuclear accord." This question was off the table since Iran's Supreme Leader has insisted that Iran's missile program is off-limits in the negotiations and P5+1 officials have been ambiguous.[160]
According to Debka.com, the United States in its direct dialogue with Iran outside the P5+1 framework demanded to restrict Iran’s ICBM, whose 4,000 kilometers range places Europe and the United States at risk. This demand did not apply to ballistic missiles, whose range of 2,100 km covers any point in the Middle East. These medium-range missiles may also be nuclear and are capable of striking Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.[173]
Iranian Defense MinisterHossein Dehghan stated at a press conference on August 2014 that Iran’s missile capability issue was not included in the comprehensive talks with the P5+1 countries and "will by no means be negotiated with anyone".[174]
In a Senate committee hearing former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz has expressed believe that Iran's missile program and its ICBM capability, as well as its support of the terrorism, should also be on the table.
Since 2002, the IAEA has become concerned and noted in its reports that some elements of Iran's nuclear program could be used for military purposes. More detailed information about suspected weaponization aspects of Iran's nuclear program – the possible military dimensions (PMD) – has been provided in the IAEA reports issued in May 2008 and November 2011. The file of Iran's PMD issues included development of detonators, high explosives initiation systems, neutron initiators, nuclear payloads for missiles and other kinds of developments, calculations and tests. The Security Council Resolution 1929 reaffirmed "that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA."[123][176]
In November 2013 Iran and the IAEA have signed a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation committing both parties to resolve all present and past issues.[136] In the same month the P5+1 and Iran have signed the Joint Plan of Action, which aimed to develop a long-term comprehensive solution for Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA continued to investigate PMD issues as a part of the Framework for Cooperation. The P5+1 and Iran have committed to establish a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation of the Joint Plan and "to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern" with respect to Iran's nuclear program, including PMD of the program and Iran's activities at Parchin. Some analysts asked what happens if Iran balks and IAEA fails to resolve significant PDM issues. According to the U.S. Department of State, any compliance issues wouldn’t be discussed by the Joint Commission but would be dealt "at the expert level, and then come up to the political directors and up to foreign ministers if needed." Thus, an unresolved issue might be declared sufficiently addressed as a result of a political decision.[179]
Prior to the signing of an interim nuclear agreement, it was commonly understood in Washington that Iran must "come clean about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program," as Undersecretary Wendy Sherman testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011. The Iranians have refused to acknowledge having a weaponization program. Meanwhile, analysts close to the Obama administration begin to boost so-called limited disclosure option.[180] Nevertheless, 354 members of U.S. Congress were "deeply concerned with Iran’s refusal to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency." On 1 October 2014, they sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry stating that "Iran’s willingness to fully reveal all aspects of its nuclear program is a fundamental test of Iran’s intention to uphold a comprehensive agreement."[181]
Some organizations have published lists of suspected nuclear-weaponization facilities in Iran.[182] Below is a partial list of such facilities:
In September 2014 the IAEA reported about ongoing reconstructions at Parchin military base. The Agency has anticipated that these activities will further undermine its ability to conduct effective verification if and when this location would be open for inspection. A month later, The New York Times reported that according to a statement by Yukiya Amano, the IAEA Director General, Iran had stopped answering the Agency’s questions about suspected past weaponization issues. Iran has argued that what has been described as evidence is fabricated.[185] In his speech at Brookings Institution Yukiya Amano said that progress has been limited and two important practical measures, which should have been implemented by Iran two months ago, have still not been implemented. Mr. Amano stressed his commitment to work with Iran "to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme". But he also warned: "this is not a never-ending process. It is very important that Iran fully implements the Framework for Cooperation - sooner rather than later."[186]
Ali Khamenei, Iranian leader issued a Fatwa (religious edict) denouncing nuclear weapon and calling it as "Haraam" (Forbidden by religion). American officials noticed the topic several times and called it as a point to start discussions. In an interview in Jordan, Kerry said he respects the idea.[187] Some observers, however, have questioned the fatwa's actual existence.[122] Khamenei’s official collection of fatwas does not include banning nuclear weapons.[188]
The head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali Akbar Salehi said in April 2014 that a dispute between world powers and Iran over its heavy water reactor at Arak had been "virtually resolved" and the reactor will be redesigned to produce one-fifth of the plutonium initially planned for it.[189]
In May 2014, after the fourth round closing, Abbas Araqchi announced on Iranian TV that Arak reactor will remain a heavy water facility and would continue its work with 40 megawatts of power.[190]
In June 2014, Salehi announced that Iran was redesigning the Arak reactor to produce less than 1 kg of plutonium per year, compared to 9–10 kg per year with the original design. Princeton University experts had proposed a redesign involving changing the reactor's fuel and reducing its power level, with a similar effect on plutonium production. However, the concern remained that this redesign could be reversed.[191]
After the sixth round of negotiations Abbas Araqchi had made clear that "any agreement about Arak or Fordo nuclear facilities is denied".[192]
France's foreign minister Laurent Fabius said on 10 June 2014 that the biggest point of disagreement in the talks is how many centrifuges Iran will be allowed. The six powers say Iran may keep some hundreds of centrifuges while the Iranians say they require hundreds of thousands of centrifuges.[193] "...what is the purpose of having thousands of centrifuges if we're not heading towards an atomic bomb? So the question that will be asked in the coming weeks is whether Iran is really ready to accept to give up the atomic bomb or not," Fabius said.[91]
The United States and Iran cut off diplomatic ties in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution and the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, where 52 Americans were held hostage for more than a year. After Barack Obama's inauguration, he personally authorized talks with Iran in order to reach out to this country.[194]
The FATF has been "particularly and exceptionally concerned" about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing. Iran was included in FATF blacklist.[195] In 2014 Iran remained a state of proliferation concern. Despite multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran has continued to violate its international obligations regarding its nuclear program.[196]
Iran insists that its nuclear program is "completely peaceful and has always been carrying out under supervision of the IAEA".[197] Some analysts argue that "Iranian actions, including the evidence of work on weaponization, the development of long-range ballistic missiles, and the placement of the program within the IRGC" indicate that Iran's arsenal is not virtual.[198]
According to policy documents published by the Obama administration, it believes in the efficacy of traditional Cold War deterrence as the remedy to the challenge of states acquiring nuclear weapons. Another assumption of the administration is that the Iranian regime is "rational" and hence deterrable. Dr. Shmuel Bar, former Director of Studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, has argued in his research that the Cold War deterrence doctrine will not be applicable to nuclear Iran. The inherent instability of the Middle East and its regimes, the difficulty in managing multilateral nuclear tensions, the weight of religious, emotional, and internal pressures, and the proclivity of many of the regimes toward military adventurism and brinkmanship give little hope for the future of the region once it enters the nuclear age. By its own admission, the Iranian regime favors revolution and is against the status quo in the region.[199] Shmuel Bar has characterized the regime as follows:
"Since its inception, it has been committed to 'propagation of Islam' (tablighi eslami) and 'export of revolution' (sudur inqilab). The former is viewed by the regime as a fundamental Islamic duty and the latter as a prime tenet of the regime’s ideology, enshrined in the constitution and the works of the Imam Khomeini. Together they form a worldview that sees Islamic Iran as a nation with a 'manifest destiny': to lead the Muslim world and to become a predominant regional 'superpower' in the Gulf, the heart of the Arab world, and in Central Asia." [199]A quite different approach to Iran has been proposed by The Economist:
"The disastrous presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the failed Green revolution—which sought to topple him in 2009—and the chaotic Arab spring have for the moment discredited radical politics and boosted pragmatic centrists. The traditional religious society that the mullahs dreamt of has receded... Although this hardly amounts to democracy, it is a political marketplace and, as Mr Ahmadinejad discovered, policies that tack away from the consensus do not last. That is why last year Iran elected a president, Hassan Rohani, who wants to open up to the world and who has reined in the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps."[200]Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has declared on 4 September 2014 that the way forward for his regime is to ramp up its "eqtedar" (might). Ayatollah Jalal Ganje'i has explained that Iranian regime intended to achieve this by one of two ways: to expand regional influence through the export of terrorism, officially described as "export of revolution" or to develop nuclear weapons.[201]
The fighters from Hezbollah and Quds forces have been publicly operating in several foreign territories. Iran and pro-Iranian proxies have been military involved in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and other regional nations. Iranian state TV has been showing the pictures of the commander of Quds force in foreign territories and pointing to the Islamic Republic’s indispensable power and influence in the Middle East. Iranian leaders have been attempting to reassert their power and supremacy in the region more publicly and sending the signal to other states that "Iran is in fact the sole regional power to rely on rather than the United States and Western allies."[202]
Iran has developed a close and cooperative relationship with Cuba and Venezuela against the United States. Having limited military capabilities and substantial distance from the region, Iran, in case of a conflict with the United States, would be able to launch an asymmetrical offensive against the United States "through surrogate terrorist states and paramilitary organizations."[203] Iran and Hizbullah also maintain a considerable presence in other countries of Latin America.[204]
On 4 January 2015 President of Iran Hassan Rouhani pointed out that the Iranians cause was not connected to a centrifuge, but to their "heart and willpower". He added that Iran couldn't have sustainable growth while it was isolated. So he would like some economic reforms passed by referendum. These words could be considered as willingness to work with international powers.[205] But a few days later Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who makes final and conclusive decisions on all matters of Iranian national security, warned that "Americans are impudently saying that even if Iran backs down on the nuclear issue, all the sanctions will not be lifted at once." Iran should therefore "take the instrument of sanctions out of enemy's hands" and develop "economic of resistance."[206]
Former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, testifying in January 2015 before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, said about Iranian nuclear ambitions:
"They're trying to develop nuclear weapons. There is no sensible explanation for the extent, the money, the talent they've devoted to their nuclear thing, other than that they want a nuclear weapon. It can't be explained any other way.""They give every indication, Mr Chairman, that they don't want a nuclear weapon for deterrence, they want a nuclear weapon to use it on Israel. So it's a very threatening situation."In its Nuclear Posture Review in April 2010 the United States has stated that in Asia and the Middle East – where there were no military alliances analogous to NATO – it had mainly extended deterrence through bilateral alliances and security relationships and through its forward military presence and security guarantees. According to the Review Report: "The Administration is pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies and partners in East Asia and the Middle East to determine how best to cooperatively strengthen regional security architectures to enhance peace and security, and reassure them that U.S. extended deterrence is credible and effective."[207] Since 2010 the U.S. position has been less clear and it seems "to be deliberately lowering its profile - either because it might interference with negotiations by the 5+1 or because it has less support within the Obama Administration."
Two weeks after the Geneva interim deal was achieved, President Barack Obama disclosed in an interview that while taking office, he decided to "reach out to Iran" and open up a diplomatic channel. He emphasized: "the best way for us to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapons is for a comprehensive, verifiable, diplomatic resolution, without taking any other options off the table if we fail to achieve that." The President also expressed strong belief that an end state can be envisioned, where Iran will not have breakout capacity. Barack Obama, however, added: "If you asked me what is the likelihood that we’re able to arrive at the end state that I was just describing earlier, I wouldn’t say that it’s more than 50/50."[209][210]
About fourteen months after the Geneva interim agreement was signed, President Barack Obama reiterated his assessment that the chances to "get a diplomatic deal are probably less than 50/50."[211] Shortly afterwards, in his State of the Union presented to a joint session of the United States Congress, the President announced: "Our diplomacy is at work with respect to Iran, where, for the first time in a decade, we’ve halted the progress of its nuclear program and reduced its stockpile of nuclear material."[212] The accuracy of this statement has been challenged by some media sources. For example, based on experts' assessments Glenn Kessler from the Washington Post has come to the conclusion that between 2013 and 2014 the amount of nuclear material, which could be converted by Iran to a bomb, has been increased. Olli Heinonen observed that the interim agreement "is just a step to create negotiation space; nothing more. It is not a viable longer term situation." Jeffrey Lewis observed that Obama's statement was an oversimplification, and that while Iran's stockpiles of the "most dangerous" nuclear materials had declined, overall stocks had increased.[213] Right-wing publications The Federalist and The Washington Free Beacon have said that the Iranians have exploited loopholes in the interim agreement and made significant progress on all areas of their nuclear program. Right-wing commentator Fred Fleitz stated in The National Review Online that the "number of nuclear weapons Iran could make from its enriched uranium has steadily risen throughout Mr. Obama’s presidency".[214][215][216] Both, the mainstream Washington Post and the conservative National Review Online, presented the Center for Security Policy’s chart that illustrates Iran’s build-up of nuclear material since 2009.[217]
United Kingdom is interested in constructive relationship with Iran. For decades Iran has been regarded as a threat to the security of the UK and its regional partners in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf. The UK believes that negotiations in Vienna are the most appropriate framework for coping with Iranian nuclear intentions. The British Government is satisfied with the convergence of UK and US policy on Iran and with a united front maintained by the P5+1 countries. It also assures that the agreement with Iran does not imply any diminution in the commitments to the alliances in the region and to the struggle against terrorism. Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons expressed opinion that the comprehensive agreement should include the issues of Parchin Military Complex.[218]
Saudi Arabia fears that a deal with Iran could come at expense of Sunni Arabs. President Barack Obama paid a visit to Riyadh in March 2014 and assured King Abdullah that he is determined to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and that USA will not accept a bad deal. However, an editorial in Al Riyadh newspaper claimed that the president did not know Iran as the Saudis did, and could not convince them that Iran will be peaceful.[219]
After the meetings between Western foreign ministers and Iranian counterpart on 13 July 2014 Prime Minister of IsraelBenjamin Netanyahu in an interview with Fox News warned that "a bad deal is actually worse than no deal." He explained that allowing Iran to stockpile nuclear material or to preserve the capability of uranium enrichment in return for the presence of international inspectors would lead to a "catastrophic development".[220] At his meeting with Barack Obama in Washington in October 2014, Benjamin Netanyahu warned the U.S. President not to accept any Iran deal that would allow Tehran to become a "threshold nuclear power." Netanyahu's remark highlighted the long-standing disagreement between Israel and the Obama administration on the nuclear talks with Iran.[221]
In his speech presented to a joint session of the U.S. Congress on 3 March 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the negotiated deal was bad because of its two major concessions: leaving Iran with a vast nuclear program and lifting the restrictions on that program in about a decade. "It doesn't block Iran's path to the bomb; it paves Iran's path to the bomb," said the Prime Minister. Netanyahu also urged the leaders of the world "not to repeat the mistakes of the past" and expressed his commitment that "if Israel has to stand alone, Israel will stand."[222]
Iran needs oil at $136 a barrel to finance its spending plans. In 2013 it spent $100 billion on consumer subsidies, about 25% of GDP. "Sanctions mean it cannot borrow its way out of trouble".[223]
Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman warned that a failure of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will lead to a dangerous escalation by both Tehran and the West. "That is why I say the stakes are quite high here," she said on 23 October 2014. "The alternatives are quite terrible."[224]
Washington Post columnist David Ignatius has supposed that if the parties don't reach an agreement by the 30 June 2015, the United States may turn on its ability "to use cyberweapons to attack Iranian nuclear facilities" and Iran may turn on its ability "to wage covert war through its proxies in the Middle East."[225]
A deal "that removes the most important sanctions but does not extend Iran’s breakout scenario to at least six months, that does not address the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear work, that does not allow for rigorous monitoring and transparency, that places only short duration constraints that are easily reversible, and that unravels sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism and gross human rights violations as well" is a bad deal. This definition has been given by a former senior analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense J. Matthew McInnis at his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 18 November 2014.
A bad deal will leave everyone in the region uncertain about Iran’s intentions and potential nuclear weapons capabilities. It will lead other countries to take potentially dangerous decisions, such as acquiring nuclear weapons or making strategic accommodation with Iran. According to McInnis, "In the worst case scenario, we could eventually face a nuclear Iran, for whom classic containment and deterrence approaches are unlikely to be effective."
Testifying before the Committee David Albright said that in order to avoid a bad nuclear deal with Iran "the P5+1 must hold strong on achieving an agreement that limits Iran’s nuclear program to a reasonable civilian capability, significantly increases the timelines for breakout to nuclear weapons, and introduces enhanced verification that goes beyond the IAEA’s Additional Protocol."
Albright also highlighted at his testimony that a "sound deal" will require Iran to address IAEA’s concerns about PMD of its nuclear program before a deal is finalized or the economic or financial sanctions are relieved. To achieve a "verifiable solution" Iran will have to significantly reduce the number of its centrifuges and uranium stocks, as well as to limit its centrifuge R&D programs.
The President remains in overall control of foreign policy and defense. "Mr Obama would probably veto any bill that tightened sanctions against his wishes."[228]
According to Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School professor and a former Bush administration official, President Obama has the authority to "waive most if not all sanctions against Iran for the remaining two years of his term." If he does so, the deal with Iran "will be tenuous". The President believes that Congress will not cooperate on this issue now. "So if he wants a deal with Iran (which he clearly does), Obama must strike the deal on his own."[229] If President Obama suspends sanctions the entire sanctions regime will probably collapse. "The end result would be a deal that expires when Obama leaves and a sanctions regime in tatters. Iran will then have exactly what it wants — relief from sanctions, a deal that doesn’t block it from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability ... and a revived economy," has argued Jennifer Rubin, a lawyer and a columnist for The Washington Post."[230]
The lawyer Alan Dershowitz is of the view that if "Congress chooses to assert its constitutional power to participate in foreign policy decisions", Obama would not have a completely free hand in making a deal with Iran. In case of a constitutional conflict between these branches of government, the Supreme Court may resolve the conflict but it is unclear how the judges would deal with it.[231]
The Supreme Leader is the most powerful man in Iran. He has the ultimate say on Iran's foreign policy and nuclear programme. Iran’s Supreme Leader is appointed by the Assembly of Experts in the event of the death, resignation, or dismissal of the leader. While the Assembly of Experts has the formal role in the appointment, in practice the decision will be influenced by powerful lobbies. The most powerful political organization is Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) that has control over the military, politics, economy, and nuclear program. The IRGC and the office of the current Supreme Leader will be the key selecting players. Majid Rafizadeh, an Iranian-American scholar at Harvard University, has argued that the IRGC will attempt to choose an individual who serves its objectives: "obtaining nuclear capabilities, having a monopoly over economic and political affairs, having power in foreign policy and having the capability to intervene in other countries’ affairs without hurdles from any political figures including the Supreme Leader."[232][233]
Clifton W. Sherrill, an assistant professor of international relations at Troy University, has come to the conclusion that with "no consensus successor and with concerns that dividing power among a council may diminish the strength of the regime, the conditions are ripe for an IRGC power grab." Explaining the role of the IRGC, Sherrill has written (2011): "Today, it has its own air force, navy, and infantry; maintains its own intelligence service; runs strategic think tanks, defense research and development programs, and its own universities; coordinates Iranian support for Islamist terrorist groups abroad; and holds primary responsibility for the regime’s nuclear weapons program."[234]
Some sources reported on 5 March 2015 that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was to offer Gulf States a nuclear umbrella to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat.[235][236]
The United States has already offered its allies — European and such as Japan and South Korea — a nuclear umbrella. However, as it was stated before the United States Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, after the U.S. New START commitment some allies "are beginning to wonder if it leaks."[237]