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1. (C) Summary: Embassy Kinshasa hereby requests a feasibility study on the potential use in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of non-lethal, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as a means to influence negative forces and asks that a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) be dispatched to the DRC as quickly as possible. End summary. 2. (C) The GDRC is striving to exert control over its largely ungoverned eastern region through the reduction and eventual elimination of illegal foreign and domestic armed groups. This effort is directed at a large number of armed groups, including the FARDC, a mainly foreign (Rwandan) group made up of many ex-FAR/Interhamwe members; the Lord's Resistance Army, with members mostly from Uganda; the force led by renegade General Laurent Nkunda; and independent "Mai-Mai" groups. 3. (C) Note: the FDLR, formerly known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, is on the U.S. government,s terrorist exclusion designation list as a terrorist organization, subject to relevant sanctions. It is an organized militia of the larger group of ex-FAR/Interhamwe still in the Congo, promoting an extremist ideology through armed violence. The LRA is also on the U.S. government,s Terrorist Exclusion List. End Note. 4. (C) Military pressure is clearly a necessary component to impose the Government's authority over the area in conflict and to achieve peace and stability in the region, which includes Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. In addition to conventional military action, however, non-lethal, Psychological Operations -- PSYOP -- could be an effective means to influence negative forces. The primary goal of PSYOP is to improve efforts to entice members of illegal armed groups to desert and enter DDR programs. Secondary goals include reinforcing the importance of respecting human rights, the protection of civilian populations, and prevention of gender-based violence, including plans to end impunity and bring to justice the worst perpetrators of crimes. (NOTE: the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies has an ongoing program to strengthen the DRC military justice system. END NOTE.) Additionally, messages should provide objective information that reinforces support for democracy and the democratically-elected Government DRC. 5. (C) The restoration of central authority cannot be achieved through bilateral aid alone. Instead, this effort must be undertaken in collaboration with our multilateral partners, including MONUC, EUSEC, the AU, and, where possible, with individual partners. We should keep in mind that to be most successful an information program must showcase the incentives in place for DDR. We must also reinforce the message that deserters are well-treated and integrated into local society or repatriated, as appropriate. We would seek to work closely with MONUC, GDRC/FARDC, and other donors to ensure that the DDR process works well, supporting and feeding success stories back into the information operations plan. 6. (C) We should also develop and support new ways to communicate this message to isolated areas where ex-FAR/Interhamwe are still active, including by expanding the Department of State,s Rewards for Justice Program as it applies to the senior leadership of the ex-FAR/Interhamwe LRA, and others, and through better coordination with the Government of Rwanda on spreading the message inviting ex-FAR/Interhamwe repatriation. Additionally, the team should look at ways to provide PSYOP support to FARDC military operations in order to improve their effectiveness. 7. (C) We note that PSYOP is well suited for Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), and can be used to help the democratically-elected government and its institutions gain popular support, publicize beneficial reforms and programs that are being implemented, shift the loyalty of domestic negative forces and their supporters towards the government. PSYOP can also deter negative forces from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of MONUC and the international community. Furthermore, PSYOP can promote the cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transition to post-hostilities while reinforcing favorable attitudes and behavior towards MONUC and the international community. 8. (C) Embassy Kinshasa recommends that we make no effort to publicize this program, at least in its initial stages, but neither would it be compartmentalized. If successful, this approach would buttress USG efforts to bring peace and stability to the region through non-lethal means, with corollary benefits for the humanitarian situation. 9. (C) Lastly, Embassy Kinshasa recognizes that PSYOP programs, plans, and products all stem from a staff process that requires input from a variety of agencies such as the CIA, DOS, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as well as others. Furthermore, AMEMB Kinshasa recognizes that the combatant commander (Commander, EUCOM/AFRICOM) is responsible for the conduct of all PSYOP operations within his command,s area of responsibility. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) approves all PSYOP programs (unless delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD(SO/LIC))). Once the program is approved, all plans must synchronize military PSYOP with national information programs. Finally, the COM or his designated representative must approve all products prior to publication in order to ensure that they meet his intent. BROCK