Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
This report was produced by The Rockefeller Foundation and Global Business Network. May 2010
Contents Letter from Judith Rodin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Letter from Peter Schwartz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 W H Y SCENA R IOS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 W H Y T ECH NOLOGY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 T H E FOC A L QU EST ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 ENGAGING YOU R I M AGINAT ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 The Scenario Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 CHOOSING T H E CR I T IC A L U NCERTA IN T I ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 GLOBA L POLI T IC A L A N D ECONOM IC A LIGN M EN T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 A DA PT I V E C A PACI T Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 T H E SCENA R IO NA R R AT I V ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Lock Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 Clever Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 Hack Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 Smar t Scramble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
The Rockefeller Foundation suppor ts work that expands oppor tunit y and strengthens resilience to social, economic, health, and environmental challenges — affirming its pioneering philanthropic mission, since 1913, to “promote the well-being” of humanit y. We take a synergistic, strategic approach that places a high value on innovative processes and encourages new ways of seeking ideas, to break down silos and encourage interdisciplinar y thinking. One impor tant — and novel — component of our strategy toolkit is scenario planning, a process of creating narratives about the f uture based on factors likely to affect a par ticular set of challenges and oppor tunities. We believe that scenario planning has great potential for use in philanthropy to identif y unique inter ventions, simulate and rehearse impor tant decisions that could have profound implications, and highlight previously undiscovered areas of connection and intersection. Most impor tant, by providing a methodological str ucture that helps us focus on what we don’t know — instead of what we already know — scenario planning allows us to achieve impact more effectively. The results of our first scenario planning exercise demonstrate a provocative and engaging exploration of the role of technology and the f uture of globalization, as you will see in the following pages. This repor t is cr ucial reading for anyone interested in creatively considering the multiple, divergent ways in which our world could evolve. The sparks of insight inspiring these narratives — along with their implications for philanthropy as a whole — were generated through the invaluable collaboration of grantee representatives, external exper ts, and Rockefeller Foundation staff. I offer a special thanks to Peter Schwar tz, Andrew Blau, and the entire team at Global Business Net work, who have helped guide us through this stimulating and energizing process. Letter from Judith Rodin President of the Rockefeller Foundation 4 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Leading this effor t at the Rockefeller Foundation is our Research Unit, which analyzes emerging risks and oppor tunities and thinks imaginatively about how to respond to the complex, rapidly changing world around us. This out ward-looking intelligence f unction adopts a cross-cutting mindset that synthesizes and integrates knowledge that accelerates our abilit y to act more quick ly and effectively. It has also helped to shape and build the notion of “pro-poor foresight” that is committed to applying for ward-looking tools and techniques to improve the lives of poor and v ulnerable populations around the world. I hope this publication makes clear exactly why my colleagues and I are so excited about the promise of using scenario planning to develop robust strategies and offer a refreshing viewpoint on the possibilities that lie ahead. We welcome your feedback. Judith Rodin President The Rockefeller Foundation 5 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
We are at a moment in histor y that is f ull of oppor tunit y. Technology is poised to transform the lives of millions of people throughout the world, especially those who have had little or no access to the tools that can deliver sustainable improvements for their families and communities. From farmers using mobile phones to buy and sell crops to doctors remotely monitoring and treating influenza outbreaks in r ural villages, technology is rapidly becoming more and more integral to the pace and progress of development. Philanthropy has a unique and critical role to play in this process. By focusing its patience, capital, and attention on the links bet ween technology and international development, philanthropy will change not just lives but the ver y context in which the field of philanthropy operates. This repor t represents an initial step in that direction. It explores four ver y different — yet ver y possible — scenarios for the f uture of technology and development in order to illuminate the challenges and oppor tunities that may lie ahead. It promotes a deeper understanding of the complex forces and dynamics that will accelerate or inhibit the use of technology to spur growth, oppor tunit y, and resilience especially in the developing world. Finally, it will seed a new strategic conversation among the key public, private, and philanthropic stakeholders about technology and development at the policy, program, and human levels. The Rockefeller Foundation’s use of scenario planning to explore technology and international development has been both inspired and ambitious. Throughout my 40-plus-year career as a scenario planner, I have worked with many of the world’s leading companies, governments, foundations, and nonprofits — and I know firsthand the power of the approach. Scenario planning is a powerf ul tool precisely because the f uture is unpredictable and shaped by many interacting variables. Scenarios enable us to think creatively and rigorously about the different ways these forces may interact, while forcing us to challenge our own assumptions about what we Letter from Peter Schwartz Cofounder and Chairman of Global Business Network 6 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
believe or hope the f uture will be. Scenarios embrace and weave together multiple perspectives and provide an ongoing framework for spotting and making sense of impor tant changes as they emerge. Perhaps most impor tantly, scenarios give us a new, shared language that deepens our conversations about the f uture and how we can help to shape it. The Rockefeller Foundation has already used this project as an oppor tunit y to clarif y and advance the relationship bet ween technology and development. Through inter views and the scenario workshops, they have engaged a diverse set of people — from different geographies, disciplines, and sectors — to identif y the key forces driving change, to explore the most critical uncer tainties, and to develop challenging yet plausible scenarios and implications. They have stretched their thinking far beyond theoretical models of technology innovation and diff usion in order to imagine how technology could actually change the lives of people from many walks of life. This is only the star t of an impor tant conversation that will continue to shape the potential of technology and international development going for ward. I look for ward to staying a par t of that conversation and to the better f uture it will bring. Peter Schwartz Cofounder and Chairman Global Business Net work 7 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
For decades, technology has been dramatically changing not just the lives of individuals in developed countries, but increasingly the lives and livelihoods of people throughout the developing world. Whether it is a community mobile phone, a solar panel, a new farming practice, or a cutting- edge medical device, technology is altering the landscape of possibility in places where possibilities used to be scarce. And yet looking out to the f uture, there is no single stor y to be told about how technology will continue to help shape — or even revolutionize — life in developing countries. There are many possibilities, some good and some less so, some known and some unknowable. Indeed, for ever y thing we think we can anticipate about how technology and international development will interact and inter t wine in the next 20 years and beyond, there is so much more that we cannot yet even imagine. For philanthropies as well as for other organizations, this presents a unique challenge: given the uncer taint y about how the f uture will play out, how can we best position ourselves not just to identif y technologies that improve the lives of poor communities but also to help scale and spread those that emerge? And how will the social, technological, economic, environmental, and political conditions of the f uture enable or inhibit our abilit y to do so? The Rockefeller Foundation believes that in order to understand the many ways in which technology will impact international development in the f uture, we must first broaden and deepen our individual and collective understanding of the range of possibilities. This repor t, and the project upon which it is based, is one attempt to do that. In it, we share the outputs and insights from a year-long project, under taken by the Rockefeller Foundation and Global Business Net work (GBN), designed to Introduction 8 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
explore the role of technology in international development through scenario planning, a methodology in which GBN is a long-time leader. This repor t builds on the Rockefeller Foundation’s growing body of work in the emerging field of pro-poor foresight. In 2009, the Institute for A lternative Futures published the repor t Foresight for Smart Globalization: Accelerating and Enhancing Pro-Poor Development Opportunities, with suppor t from the Rockefeller Foundation. That effor t was a reflection of the Foundation’s strong commitment to exploring innovative processes and embracing new pathways for insight aimed at helping the world’s poor. With this repor t, the Foundation takes a f ur ther step in advancing the field of pro-poor foresight, this time through the lens of scenario planning. WHY SCENARIOS? The goal of this project was not to affirm what is already known and knowable about what is happening right now at the intersections of technology and development. Rather, it was to explore the many ways in which technology and development could co-evolve — could both push and inhibit each other — in the f uture, and then to begin to examine what those possible alternative paths may imply for the world’s poor and v ulnerable populations. Such an exercise required project par ticipants to push their thinking far beyond the status quo, into unchar ted territor y. Scenario planning is a methodology designed to help guide groups and individuals through exactly this creative process. The process begins by identif ying forces of change in the world, then combining those forces in different ways to create a set of diverse stories — or scenarios — about how the f uture could evolve. Scenarios are designed to stretch our thinking about both the oppor tunities and obstacles that the f uture might hold; they explore, through narrative, events and dynamics that might alter, inhibit, or enhance current trends, often in sur prising ways. Together, a set of scenarios captures a range of f uture possibilities, good and bad, expected and sur prising — but always plausible. Impor tantly, scenarios are not predictions. Rather, they are thoughtf ul hy potheses that allow us to imagine, and then to rehearse, different strategies for how to be more prepared for the f uture — or more ambitiously, how to help shape better f utures ourselves. 9 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
WHY TECHNOLOGY? Technology was chosen as a focal point of this project because of its potentially transformative role — both in a positive and negative way — in addressing a wide range of development challenges, from climate change, healthcare, and agriculture to housing, transpor tation, and education. Yet while there is little doubt that technology will continue to be a driver of change across the developing world in the f uture, the precise trajector y along which technological innovation will travel is highly uncer tain. For example, will critical technological advances come from the developed world, or will innovators and their innovations be more geographically dispersed? Or, how might the global economic and political environment affect the pace of technology development? It is impor tant to state that in focusing on technology, this project did not set out to identif y a set of exact, yet-to-be-invented technologies that will help shape and change the f uture. Rather, the goal was to gain a broader and richer understanding of different paths along which technology could develop — paths that will be strongly influenced by the overall global environment in which the inventors and adopters of those technologies will find themselves working and dwelling. Technology, as a categor y, cannot be divorced from the context in which it develops. The scenarios shared in this repor t explore four such contexts, each of which, as you’ll see, suggests ver y different landscapes for technology and its potential impacts in the developing world. Finally, a note about what we mean by “technology.” In this repor t, we use the term to refer to a broad spectr um of tools and methods of organization. Technologies can range from tools for basic sur vival, such as a treadle pump and basic filtration technologies, to more advanced innovations, such as methods of collecting and utilizing data in health informatics and novel building materials with real-time environmental sensing capabilities. This repor t focuses on themes associated with the widespread scalabilit y, adoption, and assessment of technology in the developing world. W hile the scenarios themselves are narratives about the global environment, we have paid par ticular attention to how events might transpire in sub- Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and India. 10 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
THE FOCAL QUESTION Ever y scenario project has a focal question — a broad yet strategic quer y that ser ves as an anchor for the scenarios. For this project, the focal question was: How might technology affect barriers to building resilience and equitable growth in the developing world over the next 15 to 20 years? In other words, what new or existing technologies could be leveraged to improve the capacit y of individuals, communities, and systems to respond to major changes, or what technologies could improve the lives of v ulnerable populations around the world? A 15- to 20-year timeframe was chosen on the assumption that it is both sufficiently long enough that significant technological change is plausible and sufficiently shor t enough that we can imagine some possibilities for the kinds of technologies that could be developed and applied. Focusing on how to overcome a set of obstacles associated with the application of technology to the challenges of development helped to both bound the inquir y and promote a problem-solving approach that seeks to identif y potential, systematic intervention oppor tunities. ENGAGING YOUR IMAGINATION It is our hope that these scenarios help inspire the same f uture-orientation in other initiatives that are broadly concerned with technology and international development. Of course, there is no hard data about the f uture — nobody yet knows precisely what technologies will be successf ul at addressing new and evolving development needs. Rather, as you read the scenarios, think of them as a journey — four journeys — into a f uture that is relevant, thought-provoking, and possible. Imagine how the world will f unction and how it will be organized to tack le the challenges it faces. W ho will be responsible for driving local and global development initiatives and what would that require? And what is your own role in leading your organization, communit y, or region to a preferred f uture? A Note on Terminology The Foundation’s work promotes “resilience and equitable growth.” Resilience refers to the capacity of individuals, communities, and systems to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of changes, even catastrophic incidents. Equitable growth involves enabling individuals, communities, and institutions to access new tools, practices, resources, services, and products. 11 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenarios are a medium through which great change can be not just envisioned but also actualized. The more closely you read them, the more likely it becomes that you will recognize their impor tant but less obvious implications to you, your work, and your communit y. We strongly encourage you to share and discuss this repor t widely, use it as a springboard for f ur ther creative thinking about how technology could shape development, and test and adjust your strategies or personal actions accordingly. It is also our hope that these scenarios help to identif y potential areas of f uture work for governments, philanthropies, cor porations, and nonprofits, and that they illuminate choices and commitments that a wide range of organizations may want to make in these areas in the f uture. This repor t adds to a growing body of literature focusing on the relationship bet ween technology, development, and social systems. W hile not a comprehensive list, the following readings offer additional insights on this topic. •Caroline Wagner, The New Invisible College: Science for Development, 2008. •Institute for the Future, Science and Technology Outlook: 2005-2055, 2006. •R A N D Cor poration, The Global Technology Revolution 2020, In-Depth Analyses, 2006. •World Bank, Science, Technology, and Innovation: Capacity Building for Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduction, 2008. •U N Millennium Project, Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation, Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development, 2006. •W. Brian A r thur, The Nature of Technology: W hat It Is and How It Evolves, 2009. •ST EPS Centre Working Papers, Innovation, Sustainability, Development: A New Manifesto, 2009. FURTHER READING ON TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 12 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
The Rockefeller Foundation and GBN began the scenario process by surfacing a host of driving forces that would affect the future of technology and international development. These forces were generated through both secondary research and in-depth interviews with Foundation staff, Foundation grantees, and external experts. Next, all these constituents came together in several explorator y workshops to f ur ther brainstorm the content of these forces, which could be divided into t wo categories: predetermined elements and critical uncer tainties. A good star ting point for any set of scenarios is to understand those driving forces that we can be reasonably cer tain will shape the worlds we are describing, also known as “predetermined elements.” For example, it is a near geopolitical cer taint y that — with the rise of China, India, and other nations — a multi-polar global system is emerging. One demographic cer taint y is that global population growth will continue and will put pressure on energy, food, and water resources — especially in the developing world. Another related cer taint y: that the world will strive to source more of its energy from renewable resources and may succeed, but there will likely still be a significant level of global interdependence on energy. Predetermined elements are impor tant to any scenario stor y, but they are not the foundation on which these stories are built. Rather, scenarios are formed around “critical uncer tainties” — driving forces that are considered both highly impor tant to the focal issue and highly uncer tain in terms of their f uture resolution. W hereas predetermined elements are predictable driving forces, uncer tainties are by their nature unpredictable: their outcome can be guessed at but not known. The Scenario Framework 13 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
W hile any single uncer taint y could challenge our thinking, the f uture will be shaped by multiple forces playing out over time. The scenario framework provides a str uctured way to consider how these critical uncer tainties might unfold and evolve in combination. Identif ying the t wo most impor tant uncer tainties guarantees that the resulting scenarios will differ in ways that have been judged to be critical to the focal question. CHOOSING THE CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES During this project’s scenario creation workshop, par ticipants — who represented a range of regional and international perspectives — selected the t wo critical uncer tainties that would form the basis of the scenario framework. They chose these t wo uncer tainties from a longer list of potential uncer tainties that might shape the broader contextual environment of the scenarios, including social, technology, economic, environmental, and political trends. The uncer tainties that were considered included, for example, the per vasiveness of conflict in the developing world; the frequency and severit y of shocks like economic and political crises, disease, and natural disasters; and the locus of innovation for cr ucial technologies for development. (A f ull list of the critical uncer tainties identified during the project, as well as a list of project par ticipants, can be found in the Appendix.) The t wo chosen uncer tainties, introduced below, together define a set of four scenarios for the f uture of technology and international development that are divergent, challenging, internally consistent, and plausible. Each of the t wo uncer tainties is expressed as an axis that represents a continuum of possibilities ranging bet ween t wo endpoints. ADAPTIVE CAPACITYHIGHLOW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ALIGNMENTWEAKSTRONG 14 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
GLOBAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ALIGNMENT This uncer taint y refers to both the amount of economic integration — the flow of goods, capital, people, and ideas — as well as the extent to which enduring and effective political str uctures enable the world to deal with many of the global challenges it faces. On one end of the axis, we would see a more integrated global economy with high trade volumes, which enables access to a wider range of goods and ser vices through impor ts and expor ts, and the increasing specialization of expor ts. We would also see more cooperation at the supra-national level, fostering increased collaboration, strengthened global institutions, and the formation of effective international problem-solving net works. At the other axis endpoint, the potential for economic development in the developing world would be reduced by the fragilit y of the overall global economy — coupled with protectionism and fragmentation of trade — along with a weakening of governance regimes that raise barriers to cooperation, thereby hindering agreement on and implementation of large- scale, interconnected solutions to pressing global challenges. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY This uncer taint y refers to the capacit y at different levels of societ y to cope with change and to adapt effectively. This abilit y to adapt can mean proactively managing existing systems and str uctures to ensure their resilience against external forces, as well as the abilit y to transform those systems and str uctures when a changed context means they are no longer suitable. Adaptive capacit y is generally associated with higher levels of education in a societ y, as well as the availabilit y of outlets for those who have educations to f ur ther their individual and societal well-being. High levels of adaptive capacit y are t y pically achieved through the existence of tr ust in societ y; the presence and tolerance of novelt y and diversit y; the strength, variet y, and overlap of human institutions; and the free flow of communication and ideas, especially bet ween and across different levels, e.g., bottom-up and top-down. Lower levels of adaptive capacit y emerge in the absence of these characteristics and leave populations par ticularly v ulnerable to the disr uptive effects of unanticipated shocks. 15 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Once crossed, these axes create a matrix of four ver y different f utures: LOCK STEP – A world of tighter top-down government control and more authoritarian eadership, with limited innovation and growing citizen pushback CLEVER TOGETHER – A world in which highly coordinated and successf ul strategies emerge for addressing both urgent and entrenched worldwide issues HACK ATTACK – An economically unstable and shock-prone world in which governments weaken, criminals thrive, and dangerous innovations emerge SMART SCRAMBLE – An economically depressed world in which individuals and communities develop localized, makeshift solutions to a growing set of problems 16 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
THE SCENARIO NARRATIVES The scenarios that follow are not meant to be exhaustive — rather, they are designed to be both plausible and provocative, to engage your imagination while also raising new questions for you about what that f uture might look and feel like. Each scenario tells a stor y of how the world, and in par ticular the developing world, might progress over the next 15 to 20 years, with an emphasis on those elements relating to the use of different technologies and the interaction of these technologies with the lives of the poor and v ulnerable. Accompanying each scenario is a range of elements that aspire to f ur ther illuminate life, technology, and philanthropy in that world. These include: •A timeline of possible headlines and emblematic events unfolding during the period of the scenario •Shor t descriptions of what technologies and technology trends we might see •Initial obser vations on the changing role of philanthropy in that world, highlighting oppor tunities and challenges that philanthropic organizations would face and what their operating environment might be like •A “day in the life” sketch of a person living and working in that world Please keep in mind that the scenarios in this repor t are stories, not forecasts, and the plausibilit y of a scenario does not hinge on the occurrence of any par ticular detail. In the scenario titled “Clever Together,” for example, “a consor tium of nations, NGOs [non- governmental organizations] , and companies establish the Global Technology Assessment Office” — a detail meant to symbolize how a high degree of international coordination and adaptation might lead to the formation of a body that anticipates technology’s potential societal implications. That detail, along with dozens of others in each scenario, is there to give you a more tangible “feel” for the world described in the scenario. Please consider names, dates, and other such specifics in each scenario as proxies for t y pes of events, not as necessar y conditions for any par ticular scenario to unfold. We now invite you to immerse yourself in each f uture world and consider four different visions for the evolution of technology and international development to 2030. 17 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
LOCK STEP Scenario Narratives A world of tighter top-down government control and more authoritarian leadership, with limited innovation and growing citizen pushback In 2012, the pandemic that the world had been anticipating for years finally hit. Unlike 2009’s H1N1, this new influenza strain — originating from wild geese — was extremely vir ulent and deadly. Even the most pandemic-prepared nations were quick ly over whelmed when the vir us streaked around the world, infecting nearly 20 percent of the global population and killing 8 million in just seven months, the majorit y of them healthy young adults. The pandemic also had a deadly effect on economies: international mobilit y of both people and goods screeched to a halt, debilitating industries like tourism and breaking global supply chains. Even locally, normally bustling shops and office buildings sat empt y for months, devoid of both employees and customers. The pandemic blanketed the planet — though dispropor tionate numbers died in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America, where the vir us spread like wildfire in the absence of official containment protocols. But even in developed countries, containment was a challenge. The United States’s initial policy of “strongly discouraging” citizens from flying proved deadly in its leniency, accelerating the spread of the vir us not just within the U.S. but across borders. However, a few countries did fare better — China in par ticular. The Chinese government’s quick imposition and enforcement of mandator y quarantine for all citizens, as well as its instant and near-hermetic sealing off of all borders, saved millions of lives, stopping the spread of the vir us far earlier than in other countries and enabling a swifter post- pandemic recover y. 18 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
China’s government was not the only one that took extreme measures to protect its citizens from risk and exposure. During the pandemic, national leaders around the world flexed their authorit y and imposed air tight r ules and restrictions, from the mandator y wearing of face masks to body-temperature checks at the entries to communal spaces like train stations and supermarkets. Even after the pandemic faded, this more authoritarian control and oversight of citizens and their activities stuck and even intensified. In order to protect themselves from the spread of increasingly global problems — from pandemics and transnational terrorism to environmental crises and rising pover t y — leaders around the world took a firmer grip on power. At first, the notion of a more controlled world gained wide acceptance and approval. Citizens willingly gave up some of their sovereignt y — and their privacy — to more paternalistic states in exchange for greater safet y and stabilit y. Citizens were more tolerant, and even eager, for top-down direction and oversight, and national leaders had more latitude to impose order in the ways they saw fit. In developed countries, this heightened oversight took many forms: biometric IDs for all citizens, for example, and tighter regulation of key industries whose stabilit y was deemed vital to national interests. In many developed countries, enforced cooperation with a suite of new regulations and agreements slowly but steadily restored both order and, impor tantly, economic growth. Across the developing world, however, the stor y was different — and much more variable. Top-down authorit y took different forms in different countries, hinging largely on the capacit y, caliber, and intentions of their leaders. In countries with strong and thoughtf ul leaders, citizens’ overall economic status and qualit y of life increased. In India, for example, air qualit y drastically improved after 2016, when the government outlawed high- emitting vehicles. In Ghana, the introduction of ambitious government programs to improve basic infrastr ucture and ensure the availabilit y of clean water for all her people led to a shar p decline in water-borne diseases. But more authoritarian leadership worked less well — and in some cases tragically — in countries r un by irresponsible elites who used their increased power to pursue their own interests at the expense of their citizens. There were other downsides, as the rise of vir ulent nationalism created new hazards: spectators at the 2018 World Cup, for example, 19 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP “IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL SOME SOCIETIES FOR SOME TIME, BUT NOT THE WHOLE WORLD ALL THE TIME.” – GK Bhat, TARU Leading Edge, India wore bulletproof vests that spor ted a patch of their national flag. Strong technology regulations stifled innovation, kept costs high, and curbed adoption. In the developing world, access to “approved” technologies increased but beyond that remained limited: the locus of technology innovation was largely in the developed world, leaving many developing countries on the receiving end of technologies that others consider “best” for them. Some governments found this patronizing and ref used to distribute computers and other technologies that they scoffed at as “second hand.” Meanwhile, developing countries with more resources and better capacit y began to innovate internally to fill these gaps on their own. Meanwhile, in the developed world, the presence of so many top-down r ules and norms greatly inhibited entrepreneurial activit y. Scientists and innovators were often told by governments what research lines to pursue and were guided mostly toward projects that would make money (e.g., market-driven product development) or were “sure bets” (e.g., f undamental research), leaving more risky or innovative research areas largely untapped. Well-off countries and monopolistic companies with big research and development budgets still made significant advances, but the IP behind their breakthroughs remained locked behind strict national or cor porate protection. Russia and India imposed stringent domestic standards for super vising and cer tif ying encr y ption-related products and their suppliers — a categor y that in realit y meant all I T innovations. The U.S. and EU str uck back with retaliator y national standards, throwing a wrench in the development and diff usion of technology globally. Especially in the developing world, acting in one’s national self-interest often meant seeking practical alliances that fit with those 20 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP interests — whether it was gaining access to needed resources or banding together in order to achieve economic growth. In South America and Africa, regional and sub-regional alliances became more str uctured. Kenya doubled its trade with southern and eastern Africa, as new par tnerships grew within the continent. China’s investment in Africa expanded as the bargain of new jobs and infrastr ucture in exchange for access to key minerals or food expor ts proved agreeable to many governments. Cross-border ties proliferated in the form of official securit y aid. W hile the deployment of foreign securit y teams was welcomed in some of the most dire failed states, one-size-fits-all solutions yielded few positive results. By 2025, people seemed to be growing wear y of so much top-down control and letting leaders and authorities make choices for them. W herever national interests clashed with individual interests, there was conflict. Sporadic pushback became increasingly organized and coordinated, as disaffected youth and people who had seen their status and oppor tunities slip away — largely in developing countries — incited civil unrest. In 2026, protestors in Nigeria brought down the government, fed up with the entrenched cronyism and corr uption. Even those who liked the greater stabilit y and predictabilit y of this world began to grow uncomfor table and constrained by so many tight r ules and by the strictness of national boundaries. The feeling lingered that sooner or later, something would inevitably upset the neat order that the world’s governments had worked so hard to establish. • 21 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP Philanthropic organizations will face hard choices in this world. Given the strong role of governments, doing philanthropy will require heightened diplomacy skills and the abilit y to operate effectively in extremely divergent environments. Philanthropy grantee and civil societ y relationships will be strongly moderated by government, and some foundations might choose to align themselves more closely with national official development assistance (ODA) strategies and government objectives. Larger philanthropies will retain an outsized share of influence, and many smaller philanthropies may find value in merging financial, human, and operational resources. Philanthropic organizations interested in promoting universal rights and freedoms will get blocked at many nations’ borders. Developing smar t, flexible, and wide-ranging relationships in this world will be key; some philanthropies may choose to work only in places where their skills and ser vices don’t meet resistance. Many governments will place severe restrictions on the program areas and geographies that international philanthropies can work in, leading to a narrower and stronger geographic focus or grant-making in their home countr y only. ROLE OF PHILANTHROPY IN LOCK STEP HEADLINES IN LOCK STEP 22 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development 20102030 2025 2020 2015 Quarantine R In-PCellular Networks Overloaded\(2013\) Italy Addresses 'Immigrant Car Gap with R \(2017\) Vietnam \221 on Every Home\222 \(2022\) African Leaders Fear R Government Collapse \(2028\) Intercontinental T P \(2015\) Will Africa of Authoritarian Capitalism a la China Continue? \(2018\) P Networks in Eastern and Southern Africa Strengthen R \(2023\)
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP W hile there is no way of accurately predicting what the important technological advancements will be in the future, the scenario narratives point to areas where conditions may enable or accelerate the development of certain kinds of technologies. Thus for each scenario we offer a sense of the context for technological innovation, taking into consideration the pace, geography, and key creators. We also suggest a few technology trends and applications that could flourish in each scenario. Technological innovation in “Lock Step” is largely driven by government and is focused on issues of national securit y and health and safet y. Most technological improvements are created by and for developed countries, shaped by governments’ dual desire to control and to monitor their citizens. In states with poor governance, large-scale projects that fail to progress abound. Technology trends and applications we might see: •Scanners using advanced f unctional magnetic resonance imaging (f M R I) technology become the norm at air por ts and other public areas to detect abnormal behavior that may indicate “antisocial intent.” •In the aftermath of pandemic scares, smar ter packaging for food and beverages is applied first by big companies and producers in a business-to-business environment, and then adopted for individual products and consumers. •New diagnostics are developed to detect communicable diseases. The application of health screening also changes; screening becomes a prerequisite for release from a hospital or prison, successf ully slowing the spread of many diseases. •Tele-presence technologies respond to the demand for less expensive, lower- bandwidth, sophisticated communications systems for populations whose travel is restricted. •Driven by protectionism and national securit y concerns, nations create their own independent, regionally defined I T net works, mimicking China’s firewalls. Governments have var ying degrees of success in policing internet traffic, but these effor ts never theless fracture the “World Wide” Web. TECHNOLOGY IN LOCK STEP 23 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP Manisha gazed out on the Ganges River, mesmerized by what she saw. Back in 2010, when she was 12 years old, her parents had brought her to this river so that she could bathe in its holy waters. But standing at the edge, Manisha had been afraid. It wasn’t the depth of the river or its currents that had scared her, but the water itself: it was murky and brown and smelled pungently of trash and dead things. Manisha had balked, but her mother had pushed her for ward, shouting that this river flowed from the lotus feet of Vishnu and she should be honored to enter it. A long with millions of Hindus, her mother believed the Ganges’s water could cleanse a person’s soul of all sins and even cure the sick. So Manisha had gr udgingly dunked herself in the river, accidentally swallowing water in the process and receiving a bad case of giardia, and months of diarrhea, as a result. Remembering that experience is what made today so remarkable. It was now 2025. Manisha was 27 years old and a manager for the Indian government’s Ganges Purification Initiative (GPI) . Until recently, the Ganges was still one of the most polluted rivers in the world, its coliform bacteria levels astronomical due to the frequent disposal of human and animal cor pses and of sewage (back in 2010, 89 million liters per day) directly into the river. Dozens of organized attempts to clean the Ganges over the years had failed. In 2009, the World Bank even loaned India $1 billion to suppor t the government’s multi-billion dollar cleanup initiative. But then the pandemic hit, and that f unding dried up. But what didn’t dr y up was the government’s commitment to cleaning the Ganges — now not just an issue of public health but increasingly one of national pride. Manisha had joined the GPI in 2020, in par t because she was so impressed by the government’s strong stance on restoring the ecological health of India’s most treasured resource. Many lives in her home cit y of Jaipur had been saved by the government’s quarantines during the pandemic, and that experience, thought Manisha, had given the government the confidence to be so strict about river usage LIFE IN LOCK STEP 24 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP now: how else could they get millions of Indian citizens to completely shift their cultural practices in relationship to a holy site? Discarding ritually burned bodies in the Ganges was now illegal, punishable by years of jail time. Companies found to be dumping waste of any kind in the river were immediately shut down by the government. There were also severe restrictions on where people could bathe and where they could wash clothing. Ever y 20 meters along the river was marked by a sign outlining the repercussions of “disrespecting India’s most treasured natural resource.” Of course, not ever yone liked it; protests flared ever y so often. But no one could deny that the Ganges was looking more beautif ul and healthier than ever. Manisha watched as an engineering team began unloading equipment on the banks. Many top Indian scientists and engineers had been recr uited by the government to develop tools and strategies for cleaning the Ganges in more high-tech ways. Her favorite were the submersible bots that continuously “swam” the river to detect, through sensors, the presence of chemical pathogens. New riverside filtration systems that sucked in dir t y river water and spit out far cleaner water were also impressive — especially because on the outside they were designed to look like mini-temples. In fact, that’s why Manisha was at the river today, to oversee the installation of a filtration system located not even 100 feet from where she first stepped into the Ganges as a girl. The water looked so much cleaner now, and recent tests suggested that it might even meet drinkabilit y standards by 2035. Manisha was tempted to kick off her shoe and dip her toe in, but this was a restricted area now — and she, of all people, would never break that law. 25 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
CLEVER TOGETHER A world in which highly coordinated and successful strategies emerge for addressing both urgent and entrenched worldwide issues The recession of 2008-10 did not turn into the decades-long global economic slide that many had feared. In fact, quite the opposite: strong global growth returned in force, with the world headed once again toward the demographic and economic projections forecasted before the downturn. India and China were on track to see their middle classes explode to 1 billion by 2020. Mega-cities like Sao Paulo and Jakar ta expanded at a blistering pace as millions poured in from r ural areas. Countries raced to industrialize by whatever means necessar y; the global marketplace bustled. But t wo big problems loomed. First, not all people and places benefited equally from this return to globalized growth: all boats were rising, but some were clearly rising more. Second, those hell-bent on development and expansion largely ignored the ver y real environmental consequences of their unrestricted growth. Undeniably, the planet’s climate was becoming increasingly unstable. Sea levels were rising fast, even as countries continued to build-out coastal mega-cities. In 2014, the Hudson River overflowed into New York Cit y during a storm surge, turning the World Trade Center site into a three-foot-deep lake. The image of motorboats navigating through lower Manhattan jarred the world’s most powerf ul nations into realizing that climate change was not just a developing-world problem. That same year, new measurements showing that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were climbing precipitously created new urgency and pressure for governments (really, for ever yone) to do something fast.26 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
In such an interconnected world, where the behaviors of one countr y, company, or individual had potentially high-impact effects on all others, piecemeal attempts by one nation here, one small collective of environmental organizations there, would not be enough to stave off a climate disaster — or, for that matter, to effectively address a host of other planetar y-scale problems. But highly coordinated worldwide strategies for addressing such urgent issues just might. W hat was needed was systems thinking — and systems acting — on a global scale. International coordination star ted slowly, then accelerated faster than anyone had imagined. In 2015, a critical mass of middle income and developed countries with strong economic growth publicly committed to leveraging their resources against global-scale problems, beginning with climate change. Together, their governments hashed out plans for monitoring and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the shor t term and improving the absor ptive capacit y of the natural environment over the long term. In 2017, an international agreement was reached on carbon sequestration (by then, most multinational cor porations had a chief carbon officer) and intellectual and financial resources were pooled to build out carbon capture processes that would best suppor t the global ecosystem. A f unctioning global cap and trade system was also established. Worldwide, the pressure to reduce waste and increase efficiency in planet-friendly ways was enormous. New globally coordinated systems for monitoring energy use capacit y — including smar t grids and bottom-up pattern recognition technologies — were rolled out. These effor ts produced real results: by 2022, new projections showed a significant slowing in the rise of atmospheric carbon levels. Inspired by the success of this experiment in collective global action, large-scale coordinated initiatives intensified. Centralized global oversight and governance str uctures sprang up, not just for energy use but also for disease and technology standards. Such systems and str uctures required far greater levels of transparency, which in turn required more tech-enabled data collection, processing, and feedback. Enormous, benign “sousveillance” systems allowed citizens to access data — all publically available — in real time and react. Nation-states lost some of their power and impor tance as global architecture strengthened and regional governance str uctures emerged. International oversight entities like the U N 27 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
“WHAT IS OFTEN SURPRISING ABOUT NEW TECHNOLOGIES IS COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM THAT YOU CAN CREATE BY SOLVING ANOTHER PROBLEM IS ALWAYS A BIT OF A SURPRISE.” – Michael Free, Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) took on new levels of authorit y, as did regional systems like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEA N), the New Par tnership for Africa’s Development (N EPA D), and the Asian Development Bank (A DB) . The worldwide spirit of collaboration also fostered new alliances and alignments among cor porations, NGOs, and communities. These strong alliances laid the groundwork for more global and par ticipator y attempts to solve big problems and raise the standard of living of ever yone. Coordinated effor ts to tack le long- entrenched problems like hunger, disease, and access to basic needs took hold. New inexpensive technologies like better medical diagnostics and more effective vaccines improved healthcare deliver y and health outcomes. Companies, NGOs, and governments — often acting together — launched pilot programs and learning labs to figure out how to best meet the needs of par ticular communities, increasing the knowledge base of what worked and what didn’t. Pharmaceuticals giants released thousands of dr ug compounds shown to be effective against diseases like malaria into the public domain as par t of an “open innovation” agenda; they also opened their archives of R&D on neglected diseases deemed not commercially viable, offering seed f unding to scientists who wanted to carr y the research for ward. There was a push for major innovations in energy and water for the developing world, as those areas were thought to be the key to improving equit y. Better food distribution was also high on the agenda, and more open markets and south-south trade helped make this a realit y. In 2022, a consor tium of nations, NGOs, and companies established the Global Technology Assessment Office, providing easily accessible, real-time information about the costs and benefits of various technology applications to developing and developed countries alike. A ll of these effor ts translated into real progress on real problems, opening up new oppor tunities Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER 28 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER to address the needs of the bottom billion — and enabling developing countries to become engines of growth in their own right. In many par ts of the developing world, economic growth rates increased due to a host of factors. Improved infrastr ucture accelerated the greater mobilit y of both people and goods, and urban and r ural areas got better connected. In Africa, growth that star ted on the coasts spread inward along new transpor tation corridors. Increased trade drove the specialization of individual firms and the overall diversification of economies. In many places, traditional social barriers to overcoming pover t y grew less relevant as more people gained access to a spectr um of usef ul technologies — from disposable computers to do- it-yourself (DI Y) windmills. Given the circumstances that forced these new heights of global cooperation and responsibilit y, it was no sur prise that much of the growth in the developing world was achieved more cleanly and more “greenly.” In Africa, there was a big push for solar energy, as the physical geography and low population densit y of much of the continent enabled the proliferation of solar farms. The Deser tec initiative to create massive thermal electricit y plants to supply both Nor th Africa and, via undersea cable lines, Southern Europe was a huge success. By 2025, a majorit y of electricit y in the Maghreb was coming from solar, with expor ts of that power earning valuable foreign currency. The switch to solar created new “sun” jobs, drastically cut CO2 emissions, and earned governments billions annually. India exploited its geography to create similar “solar valleys” while decentralized solar- powered drip irrigation systems became popular in sub-Saharan Africa. Reduced energy dependency enabled all of these countries and regions to better control and manage their own resources. In Africa, political architecture above the nation-state level, like the African Union, strengthened and contributed to a “good governance” drive. Regional integration through COM ESA (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and other institutions allowed member nations to better organize to meet their collective needs as consumers and increasingly as producers. Over the course of t wo decades, enormous strides were made to make the world less wastef ul, more efficient, and more inclusive. But the world was far from perfect. There were still failed states and places with few resources. Moreover, such rapid progress had created new problems. Rising consumption standards unexpectedly ushered in a new set of pressures: the improved food distribution system, for example, generated a food production crisis due to greater demand. Indeed, demand for ever y thing was growing exponentially. By 2028, despite ongoing effor ts to guide “smar t growth,” it was becoming clear that the world could not suppor t such rapid growth forever. • 29 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
In this world, philanthropic organizations focus their attention on the needs of the bottom billion, collaborating with governments, businesses, and local NGOs to improve standards of living around the globe. Operationally, this is a “vir tual model” world in which philanthropies use all of the tools at their disposal to reinforce and bolster their work. With par tnerships and net works increasingly key, philanthropies work in a more vir tual way, characterized by lots of wikis, blogs, workspaces, video conferences, and vir tual convenings. Smaller philanthropies proliferate, with a growing number of major donors emerging from the developing world. Systems thinking and knowledge management prove to be critical skills, as philanthropic organizations seek to share and spread best practices, identif y leapfrog oppor tunities, and better spot problems in failed or weak states. There are considerable flows of talent bet ween the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, and the lines bet ween these t y pes of organizations become increasingly blurred. ROLE OF PHILANTHROPY IN CLEVER TOGETHER Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER HEADLINES IN CLEVER TOGETHER 30 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development 20102030 2025 2020 2015 Global Economy T \(2011\) 'Info Cruncher' Is Grads' Job of Choice as Data Era Dawns \(2016\) A First: U P \(2020\) Consortium of Launches Third Green R Shortages Loom \(2027\) R Emission T New Er Change Negotiations \(2015\) Green Infrastructur R Landscape \(2018\) T R of Improved Governance \(2025\)
In “Clever Together,” strong global cooperation on a range of issues drives technological breakthroughs that combat disease, climate change, and energy shor tages. Trade and foreign direct investment spread technologies in all directions and make products cheaper for people in the developing world, thereby widening access to a range of technologies. The atmosphere of cooperation and transparency allows states and regions to glean insights from massive datasets to vastly improve the management and allocation of financial and environmental resources. Technology trends and applications we might see: •The cost of capturing data through nanosensors and smar t net works falls precipitously. In many developing countries, this leads to a proliferation of new and usef ul ser vices, including “sousveillance” mechanisms that improve governance and enable more efficient use of government resources. •Intelligent electricit y, water distribution, and transpor tation systems develop in urban areas. In these “smar t cities,” internet access is seen as a basic right by the late 2010s. •A malaria vaccine is developed and deployed broadly — saving millions of lives in the developing world. •Advances in low-cost mind-controlled prosthetics aid the 80 percent of global amputees who live in developing countries. •Solar power is made vastly more efficient through advances in materials, including polymers and nanopar ticles. An effective combination of government subsidies and microfinance means solar is used for ever y thing from desalination for agriculture to wi-fi net works. •Flexible and rapid mobile payment systems drive dynamic economic growth in the developing world, while the developed world is hampered by entrenched banking interests and regulation. TECHNOLOGY IN CLEVER TOGETHER Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER 31 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER Standing next to his desk at the World Meat Science Lab in Zurich, Alec took another bite of the steak that his lab assistants had just presented to him and chewed it rather thoughtf ully. This wasn’t just any steak. It was research. A lec and his research team had been working for months to fabricate a new meat product — one that tasted just like beef yet actually contained only 50 percent meat; the remaining half was a combination of synthetic meat, for tified grains, and nano-flavoring. Finding the “right” formula for that combo had kept the lab’s employees working around the clock in recent weeks. And judging from the look on A lec’s face, their work wasn’t over. “The flavor is still a few degrees off,” he told them. “And Kofi and A lana — see what we can do about enhancing this texture.” As A lec watched his team scramble back to their lab benches, he felt confident that it wouldn’t be long before they would announce the invention of an exciting new meat product that would be ser ved at dinner tables ever y where. And, in tr uth, A lec’s confidence was ver y well founded. For one, he had the world’s best and brightest minds in food science from all over the world working together right here in his lab. He also had access to seemingly infinite amounts of data and information on ever y thing from global taste preferences to meat distribution patterns — and just a few touches on his lab’s research screens (so much easier than the clunky computers and keyboards of the old days) gave him instant access to ever y piece of research ever done in meat science or related fields from the 1800s up through the present (literally the present — access to posted scientific research was nearly instantaneous, delayed by a mere 1.3 seconds) . A lec also had strong motivation. There was no doubt that meat science — indeed, all science — was much more exciting, challenging, and rewarding in 2023 than it was a few decades ago. The shift from “lone wolf ” science to globally coordinated and open-platform research had greatly accelerated the speed and spread of breakthrough ideas and developments in all fields. As a result, scientists were LIFE IN CLEVER TOGETHER 32 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER making real progress in addressing planet-wide problems that had previously seemed so intractable: people were no longer dying as frequently from preventable diseases, for example, and alternative f uels were now mainstream. But other trends were troubling — especially to a scientist who had spent his whole career researching food. In cities and villages around the world where children used to be hungr y, access to higher-calorie meals had produced alarming increases in the incidence of obesit y and diabetes. The demand for meat, in par ticular, was rising, but adding more animals to the planet created its own set of problems, such as more methane and spiking water demand. And that’s where A lec saw both need and oppor tunit y: why not make the planet’s meat supply go f ur ther by creating a healthier alternative that contained less real meat? “A lec, we have a new version for you to tr y,” yelled Kofi from across the lab. That was fast, thought A lec, as he searched around his desk for the fork. 33 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
HACK ATTACK An economically unstable and shock-prone world in which governments weaken, criminals thrive, and dangerous innovations emerge Devastating shocks like September 11, the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004, and the 2010 Haiti ear thquake had cer tainly primed the world for sudden disasters. But no one was prepared for a world in which large-scale catastrophes would occur with such breathtaking frequency. The years 2010 to 2020 were dubbed the “doom decade” for good reason: the 2012 Olympic bombing, which killed 13,000, was followed closely by an ear thquake in Indonesia killing 40,000, a tsunami that almost wiped out Nicaragua, and the onset of the West China Famine, caused by a once-in-a-millennium drought linked to climate change. Not sur prisingly, this opening series of deadly asynchronous catastrophes (there were more) put enormous pressure on an already overstressed global economy that had entered the decade still in recession. Massive humanitarian relief effor ts cost vast sums of money, but the primar y sources — from aid agencies to developed-world governments — had r un out of f unds to offer. Most nation-states could no longer afford their locked-in costs, let alone respond to increased citizen demands for more securit y, more healthcare coverage, more social programs and ser vices, and more infrastr ucture repair. In 2014, when mudslides in Lima buried thousands, only minimal help trick led in, prompting the Economist headline: “Is the Planet Finally Bankr upt? ” These dire circumstances forced tough tradeoffs. In 2015, the U.S. reallocated a large share of its defense spending to domestic concerns, pulling out of Afghanistan — where the resurgent Taliban seized power once again. In Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa, more and more nation- states lost control of their public finances, along 34 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
with the capacit y to help their citizens and retain stabilit y and order. Resource scarcities and trade disputes, together with severe economic and climate stresses, pushed many alliances and par tnerships to the breaking point; they also sparked prox y wars and low-level conflict in resource-rich par ts of the developing world. Nations raised trade barriers in order to protect their domestic sectors against impor ts and — in the face of global food and resource shor tages — to reduce expor ts of agricultural produce and other commodities. By 2016, the global coordination and interconnectedness that had marked the post-Berlin Wall world was tenuous at best. With government power weakened, order rapidly disintegrating, and safet y nets evaporating, violence and crime grew more rampant. Countries with ethnic, religious, or class divisions saw especially shar p spikes in hostilit y: Naxalite separatists dramatically expanded their guerrilla campaign in East India; Israeli- Palestinian bloodshed escalated; and across Africa, fights over resources er upted along ethnic or tribal lines. Meanwhile, over taxed militaries and police forces could do little to stop growing communities of criminals and terrorists from gaining power. Technology-enabled gangs and net worked criminal enter prises exploited both the weakness of states and the desperation of individuals. With increasing ease, these “global guerillas” moved illicit products through underground channels from poor producer countries to markets in the developed world. Using retired 727s and other rogue aircraft, they crisscrossed the Atlantic, from South America to Africa, transpor ting cocaine, weapons, and operatives. Dr ug and gun money became a common recr uiting tool for the desperately poor. Criminal net works also grew highly skilled at counterfeiting licit goods through reverse engineering. Many of these “rip-offs” and copycats were of poor qualit y or downright dangerous. In the context of weak health systems, corr uption, and inattention to standards — either within countries or from global bodies like the World Health Organization — tainted vaccines entered the public health systems of several African countries. In 2021, 600 children in Cote d’Ivoire died from a bogus Hepatitis B vaccine, which paled in comparison to the scandal sparked by mass deaths from a tainted anti-malarial dr ug years later. The deaths and resulting scandals shar ply affected public confidence in vaccine deliver y; parents not just in Africa but elsewhere 35 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
“WE HAVE THIS LOVE AFFAIR WITH STRONG CENTRAL STATES, BUT THAT’S NOT THE ONLY POSSIBILITY. TECHNOLOGY IS GOING TO MAKE THIS EVEN MORE REAL FOR AFRICA. THERE IS THE SAME CELLPHONE PENETRATION RATE IN SOMALIA AS IN RWANDA. IN THAT RESPECT, SOMALIA WORKS.” – Aidan Eyakuze, Society for International Development, Tanzania began to avoid vaccinating their children, and it wasn’t long before infant and child mor talit y rates rose to levels not seen since the 1970s. Technology hackers were also hard at work. Internet scams and pyramid schemes plagued inboxes. Meanwhile, more sophisticated hackers attempted to take down cor porations, government systems, and banks via phishing scams and database information heists, and their many successes generated billions of dollars in losses. Desperate to protect themselves and their intellectual proper t y, the few multinationals still thriving enacted strong, increasingly complex defensive measures. Patent applications skyrocketed and patent thickets proliferated, as companies fought to claim and control even the tiniest innovations. Securit y measures and screenings tightened. This “wild west” environment had a profound impact on innovation. The threat of being hacked and the presence of so many thefts and fakes lowered the incentives to create “me first” rather than “me too” technologies. And so many patent thickets made the cross-pollination of ideas and research difficult at best. Blockbuster pharmaceuticals quick ly became ar tifacts of the past, replaced by increased production of generics. Breakthrough innovations still happened in various industries, but they were focused more on technologies that could not be easily replicated or re-engineered. And once created, they were vigorously guarded by their inventors — or even by their nations. In 2022, a biof uel breakthrough in Brazil was protected as a national treasure and used as a bargaining chip in trade with other countries. Verif ying the authenticit y of any thing was increasingly difficult. The heroic effor ts of several companies and NGOs to create Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK 36 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
recognized seals of safet y and approval proved ineffective when even those seals were hacked. The positive effects of the mobile and internet revolutions were tempered by their increasing fragilit y as scamming and vir uses proliferated, preventing these net works from achieving the reliabilit y required to become the backbone of developing economies — or a source of tr ust wor thy information for anybody. Interestingly, not all of the “hacking” was bad. Genetically modified crops (GMOs) and do-it- yourself (DI Y) biotech became backyard and garage activities, producing impor tant advances. In 2017, a net work of renegade African scientists who had returned to their home countries after working in Western multinationals unveiled the first of a range of new GMOs that boosted agricultural productivit y on the continent. But despite such effor ts, the global have/have- not gap grew wider than ever. The ver y rich still had the financial means to protect themselves; gated communities spr ung up from New York to Lagos, providing safe havens surrounded by slums. In 2025, it was de rigueur to build not a house but a high-walled for tress, guarded by armed personnel. The wealthy also capitalized on the loose regulator y environment to experiment with advanced medical treatments and other under-the-radar activities. Those who couldn’t buy their way out of chaos — which was most people — retreated to whatever “safet y” they could find. With oppor tunit y frozen and global mobilit y at a near standstill — no place wanted more people, especially more poor people — it was often a retreat to the familiar: family ties, religious beliefs, or even national allegiance. Tr ust was afforded to those who guaranteed safet y and sur vival — whether it was a warlord, an evangelical preacher, or a mother. In some places, the collapse of state capacit y led to a resurgence of feudalism. In other areas, people managed to create more resilient communities operating as isolated micro versions of formerly large-scale systems. The weakening of national governments also enabled grassroots movements to form and grow, creating rays of hope amid the bleakness. By 2030, the distinction bet ween “developed” and “developing” nations no longer seemed par ticularly descriptive or relevant. • Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK 37 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Philanthropy is less about affecting change than about promoting stabilit y and addressing basic sur vival needs. Philanthropic organizations move to suppor t urgent humanitarian effor ts at the grassroots level, doing “guerrilla philanthropy” by identif ying the “hackers” and innovators who are catalysts of change in local settings. Yet identif ying pro-social entrepreneurs is a challenge, because verification is difficult amid so much scamming and deception. The operational model in this world is a “for tress model” in which philanthropic organizations coalesce into a strong, single unit to combat fraud and lack of tr ust. Philanthropies’ biggest assets are their reputation, brand, and legal/financial capacit y to ward off threats and attempts at destabilization. They also pursue a less global approach, retreating to doing work in their home countries or a few countries that they know well and perceive as being safe. ROLE OF PHILANTHROPY IN HACK ATTACK Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK HEADLINES IN HACK ATTACK 38 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development 20102030 2025 2020 2015 Millennium Development Goals P \(2012\) Islamic T Networks Thrive in Latin America \(2016\) Doctors Without Borders Confined Within Borders \(2020\) W Medicines to Southeast Asian Communities \(2028\) Violence Against Minorities and Immigrants Spik \(2014\) Congo D 10,000 i Drug Scandal \(2018\) Nations Struggling with R to Scale Synthetic Biology \(2021\) India-P W \(2027\)
Mounting obstacles to market access and to knowledge creation and sharing slow the pace of technological innovation. Creative repur posing of existing technologies — for good and bad — is widespread, as counterfeiting and IP theft lower incentives for original innovation. In a world of trade disputes and resource scarcities, much effor t focuses on finding replacements for what is no longer available. Per vasive insecurit y means that tools of aggression and protection — vir tual as well as cor poreal — are in high demand, as are technologies that will allow hedonistic escapes from the stresses of life. Technology trends and applications we might see: •Echoing the rise of synthetic chemicals in the nineteenth centur y, synthetic biology, often state-f unded, is used to “grow” resources and foodstuffs that have become scarce. •New threats like weaponized biological pathogens and destr uctive botnets dominate public attention, but enduring technologies, like the A K-47, also remain weapons of choice for global guerrillas. •The internet is overr un with spam and securit y threats and becomes strongly associated with illicit activit y — especially on “dark webs” where no government can monitor, identif y, or restrict activities. •Identit y-verification technologies become a staple of daily life, with some hitches — a database of retina recordings stolen by hackers in 2017 is used to create numerous false identities still “at large” in the mid-2020s. •With the cost of cosmetic surger y dropping, procedures like the lunchtime facelift become routine among emerging middle classes. TECHNOLOGY IN HACK ATTACK Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK 39 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK Trent never thought that his past experience as a government intelligence officer would conver t into something…philanthropic. But in a world f ull of deceit and scamming, his skills at discerning fact from fiction and developing quick yet deep local knowledge were highly prized. For three months now he had been working for a development organization, hired to find out what was happening in the “grey” areas in Botswana — a countr y that was once praised for its good governance but whose laws and institutions had begun to falter in the last few years, with corr uption on the rise. His instr uctions were simple: focus not on the dysf unctional (which, Trent could see, was ever y where) but rather look through the chaos to see what was actually working. Find local innovations and practices that were smar t and good and might be adopted or implemented elsewhere. “Guerrilla philanthropy” was what they called it, a turn of phrase that he liked quite a bit. His trip into Botswana had been eventf ul — to put it mildly. On-time flights were rare these days, and the plane got diver ted three times because of landing authorization snaf us. At the Gaborone air por t, it took Trent six hours to clear customs and immigration. The air por t was bereft of personnel, and those on dut y took their time scr utinizing and re-scr utinizing his visa. Botswana had none of the high-tech biometric scanning checkpoints — technology that could literally see right through you — that most developed nations had in abundance in their air por ts, along their borders, and in government buildings. Once out of the air por t Trent was shocked by how many guns he saw — not just slung on the shoulders of police, but carried by regular people. He even saw a mother with a baby in one arm and an A K-47 in the other. This wasn’t the Botswana he remembered way back when he was stationed here 20 years ago as an embassy employee. The organization that hired him was probably more right than it realized in calling it guerrilla philanthropy. After many weeks spent chasing down leads in Gaborone, then an unfor tunate stint that had him hiking for miles alone through the Kalahari LIFE IN HACK ATTACK 40 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK Deser t, Trent found himself traveling deep into the Chobe Forest (a nice reprieve, he thought, from inhaling all that sand) . One of his informants had told him about a group of smar t youngsters who had set up their own biotechnology lab on the banks of the Chobe River, which ran along the forest’s nor thern boundar y. He’d been outfitted with ample f unds for grant-making, not the forest bribes he had heard so much about; regardless of what was taking place in the world around him, he was under strict orders to behave ethically. Trent was also caref ul to cover his tracks to avoid being kidnapped by international crime syndicates — including the Russian mafia and the Chinese triads — that had become ver y active and influential in Botswana. But he’d made it through, finally, to the lab, which he later learned was under the protection of the local gun lord. As expected, counterfeit vaccines were being manufactured. But so were GMO seeds. And synthetic proteins. And a host of other innovations that the people who hired him would love to know about. 41 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
SMART SCRAMBLE An economically depressed world in which individuals and communities develop localized, makeshift solutions to a growing set of problems The global recession that star ted in 2008 did not trail off in 2010 but dragged onward. Vigorous attempts to jumpstar t markets and economies didn’t work, or at least not fast enough to reverse the steady downward pull. The combined private and public debt burden hanging over the developed world continued to depress economic activit y, both there and in developing countries with economies dependent on expor ting to (formerly) rich markets. Without the abilit y to boost economic activit y, many countries saw their debts deepen and civil unrest and crime rates climb. The United States, too, lost much of its presence and credibilit y on the international stage due to deepening debt, debilitated markets, and a distracted government. This, in turn, led to the fracturing or decoupling of many international collaborations star ted by or reliant on the U.S.’s continued strength. A lso in trouble was China, where social stabilit y grew more precarious. Depressed economic activit y, combined with the ecological consequences of China’s rapid growth, star ted to take their toll, causing the shaky balance that had held since 1989 to finally break down. With their focus trained on managing the serious political and economic instabilit y at home, the Chinese shar ply cur tailed their investments in Africa and other par ts of the developing world. Indeed, nearly all foreign investment in Africa — as well as formal, institutional flows of aid and other suppor t for the poorest countries — was cut back except in the gravest humanitarian emergencies. Overall, economic 42 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
stabilit y felt so shaky that the occurrence of a sudden climate shock or other disaster would likely send the world into a tailspin. Luckily, those big shocks didn’t occur, though there was a lingering concern that they could in the f uture. Not that anyone had time to think about the f uture — present challenges were too pressing. In the developed world, unemployment rates skyrocketed. So did xenophobia, as companies and industries gave the few available jobs to native-born citizens, shunning foreign-born applicants. Great numbers of immigrants who had resettled in the developed world suddenly found that the economic oppor tunities that had drawn them were now paltr y at best. By 2018, London had been drained of immigrants, as they headed back to their home countries, taking their education and skills with them. Reverse migration left holes in the communities of depar ture — both socially and literally — as stores formerly owned by immigrants stood empt y. And their homelands needed them. Across the developing world and especially in Africa, economic sur vival was now firmly in local hands. With little help or aid coming through “official” and organized channels — and in the absence of strong trade and foreign currency earnings — most people and communities had no choice but to help themselves and, increasingly, one another. Yet “sur vival” and “success” varied greatly by location — not just by countr y, but by cit y and by communit y. Communities inside failed states suffered the most, their poor growing still poorer. In many places, the failures of political leadership and the stresses of economic weakness and social conflict stifled the abilit y of people to rise above their dire circumstances. Not sur prisingly, across much of the developing world the r ural-urban divide gaped wider, as more limited availabilit y and access to resources like I T and trade made sur vival and self-sufficiency much more challenging for non-urban dwellers. Communications and interactions that formerly ser ved to bridge one family or one village or one student with their counter par ts in other places — from emailing to phone calls to web postings — became less reliable. Internet access had not progressed far beyond its 2010 status, in par t because the investment dollars needed to build out the necessar y infrastr ucture simply weren’t there. W hen cellphone towers or fiber optic cables broke down, repairs were often delayed by months or even years. As a result, only people in cer tain geographies had access to the latest 43 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
“THE SPREADING OF IDEAS DEPENDS ON ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION, PEER GROUPS, AND COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE. EVEN IF SOMEONE HAS BLUEPRINTS TO MAKE SOMETHING, THEY MAY NOT HAVE THE MATERIALS OR KNOW- HOW. IN A WORLD SUCH AS THIS, HOW DO YOU CREATE AN ECOSYSTEM OF RESEARCH AMONG THESE COMMUNITIES?” – Jose Gomez-Marquez, Program Director for the Innovations in International Health initiative (IIH), MIT communication and internet gadgets, while others became more isolated for lack of such connections. But there were silver linings. Government capacit y improved in more advanced par ts of the developing world where economies had already begun to generate a self-sustaining dynamic before the 2008-2010 crisis, such as Indonesia, Rwanda, Turkey, and Vietnam. A reas with good access to natural resources, diverse skill sets, and a stronger set of overlapping institutions did far better than others; so did cities and communities where large numbers of “returnees” helped drive change and improvement. Most innovation in these better-off places involved modif ying existing devices and technologies to be more adaptive to a specific context. But people also found or invented new ways — technological and non-technological — to improve their capacit y to sur vive and, in some cases, to raise their overall living standards. In Accra, a returning Ghanaian M I T professor, working with resettled pharma researchers, helped invent a cheap edible vaccine against tuberculosis that dramatically reduced childhood mor talit y across the continent. In Nairobi, returnees launched a local “vocational education for all” project that proved wildly successf ul and was soon replicated in other par ts of sub-Saharan Africa. Makeshift, “good enough” technology solutions — addressing ever y thing from water purification and harnessing energy to improved crop yield and disease control — emerged to fill the gaps. Communities grew tighter. Micro- manufacturing, communal gardens, and patchwork energy grids were created at the local level for local pur poses. Many communities took on the aura of co-ops, some even launching Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE 44 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
currencies designed to boost local trade and bring communities closer together. Nowhere was this more tr ue than in India, where localized experiments proliferated, and succeeded or failed, with little connection to or impact on other par ts of the countr y — or the world. These developments were encouraging, but also fr ustrating. In the absence of enduring trade and FDI channels, local experiments and innovations could neither scale nor boost overall growth. For those looking, it was difficult to find or access creative solutions. Scaling was f ur ther inhibited by the lack of compatible technology standards, making innovations difficult to replicate. Apps developed in r ural China simply didn’t work in urban India. High-speed internet access — which gradually emerged in some areas despite weak government or philanthropic suppor t — did help, enabling students in isolated pockets in the developing world to access knowledge and instr uction through the written word and other media like video. But the development of tangible devices, products, and innovations continued to lag in places where local manufacturing skills and capacities had not yet scaled. More complex engineering solutions proved even more difficult to develop and diff use. By 2025, collaboration was finally improving, with ecosystems of research and sharing — many of them “vir tual” — beginning to emerge. Yet without major progress in global economic integration and collaboration, many worried that good ideas would stay isolated, and sur vival and success would remain a local — not a global or national — phenomenon. • Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE 45 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Philanthropic organizations look to f und at the grassroots level, in order to reach people more quick ly and solve shor t-term problems. The meta-goal in this world is to scale up: to identif y and build capacit y from the individual through the institutional, because without global coordination, innovation cannot scale on its own. Philanthropy requires a keen screening capacit y to identif y highly localized solutions, with specialized pockets of exper tise that make par tnerships more challenging and transitions bet ween sectors and issues harder to achieve. Philanthropy operations are decentralized; headquar ters are less impor tant, and the abilit y to quick ly access different par ts of the world and reconfigure teams on shor t notice is key. Office space is rented by the day or week, not the month or year, because more people are in the field — testing, evaluating, and repor ting on myriad pilot projects. ROLE OF PHILANTHROPY IN SMART SCRAMBLE Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE HEADLINES IN SMART SCRAMBLE 46 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development 20102030 2025 2020 2015 National Medical Labs in Southeast Asia Herald New D Native Diseases \(2013\) 'R Struggle to Expand S Beyond Home Mark \(2020\)VC Spending Within Sub Africa T \(2025\) Low- P Diarrhea Deaths in India \(2015\)Chinese Government P Spread to 250 Ci \(2017\) F Ethiopia \227Again \(2022\) Mak with \221Idol\222 F Spotlight Y \(2027\)
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE Economic and political instabilit y fracture societies in the developed world, resources for technology development diminish, and talented immigrants are forced to return to their countries of origin. As a result, capacit y and knowledge are distributed more widely, allowing many small pockets of do-it-yourself innovation to emerge. Low-tech, “good enough” solutions abound, cobbled together with whatever materials and designs can be found. However, the transfer of cutting-edge technology through foreign direct investment is rare. Str uctural deficiencies in the broader innovation ecosystem — in accessing capital, markets, and a stable internet — and in the proliferation of local standards limit wider growth and development. Technology trends and applications we might see: •Energy technology improvements are geared more toward efficiency — getting more from existing sources of power — than new-generation technologies, though some local improvements in generating and distributing wind and geothermal energy do occur. •Breakdowns in the global medicine supply chain accelerate the emergence of locally bioengineered super-strength homeopathic remedies, which replace antibiotics in the dispensaries of many developing-world hospitals. •Widespread micro-manufacturing, using 3D printers, enables the fabrication of replacement components for engines and machines, allowing “per petual maintenance” to compensate for broken trade links. •Garden allotments proliferate in mega-cities as new urban-dwellers seek to supplement a scarce food supply and maintain their agricultural heritage. •Technically advanced communities use mesh net works to ensure high-speed internet access, but most r ural poor remain cut off from access. TECHNOLOGY IN SMART SCRAMBLE 47 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE The beat-up six-seater plane in which Lidi was the lone passenger lurched suddenly. She groaned, grabbed the armrests, and held on as the plane dipped shar ply before finally settling into a smooth flight path. Lidi hated small planes. But with ver y few commercial jets crisscrossing Africa these days, she didn’t have much choice. Lidi — an Eritrean by bir th — was a social entrepreneur on a mission that she deemed critical to the f uture of her home continent, and enduring these plane flights was an unfor tunate but necessar y sacrifice. Working together with a small team of technologists, Lidi’s goal was to help the good ideas and innovations that were emerging across Africa to spread faster — or, really, spread at all. In this, Lidi had her work cut out for her. Accelerating and scaling the impact of local solutions developed for ver y local markets was far from easy — especially given the patchiness of internet access across Africa and the myopic perspective that was now, in 2025, a widespread phenomenon. She used to worr y about how to scale good ideas from continent to continent; these days she’d consider it a great success to extend them 20 miles. And the creative redundancy was shocking! Just last week, in Mali, Lidi had spent time with a farmer whose co-op was developing a drought-resistant cassava. They were extremely proud of their effor ts, and for good reason. Lidi didn’t have the hear t to tell them that, while their work was indeed brilliant, it had already been done. Several times, in several different places. During her many flights, Lidi had spent hours looking out the window, gazing down on the villages and cities below. She wished there were an easier way to let the innovators in those places know that they might not be inventing, but rather independently reinventing, tools, goods, processes, and practices that were already in use. W hat Africa lacked wasn’t great ideas and talent: both were abundant. The missing piece was finding a way to connect those dots. And that’s why she was back on this ricket y plane again and heading to Tunisia. She and her team were now concentrating on promoting mesh net works across Africa, so that places lacking internet access could share nodes, get connected, and maybe even share and scale their best innovations. LIFE IN SMART SCRAMBLE 48 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
As you have seen, each of the scenarios, if it were to unfold, would call for different strategies and have different implications for how a range of organizations will work and relate to changes in technology. But no matter what world might emerge, there are real choices to be made about what areas and goals to address and how to drive success toward particular objectives. We hope that reading the scenario narratives and their accompanying stories about philanthropy, technology, and people has sparked your imagination, provoking new thinking about these emergent themes and their possibilities. Three key insights stood out to us as we developed these scenarios. First, the link bet ween technology and governance is critical to consider in better understanding how technology could be developed and deployed. In some f utures, the primacy of the nation-state as a unit of analysis in development was questioned as both supra- or sub-national str uctures proved more salient to the achievement of development goals. In other f utures, the nation-state’s power strengthened and it became an even more powerf ul actor both to the benefit and to the detriment of the development process, depending on the qualit y of governance. Technologies will affect governance, and governance in turn will play a major role in determining what technologies are developed and who those technologies are intended, and able, to benefit. A second recurring theme in the scenarios is that development work will require different levels of inter vention, possibly simultaneously. In some scenarios, philanthropic organizations and other actors in development face a set of obstacles in working with large institutions, but may face a yet-unfolding set of oppor tunities to work with nontraditional par tners — even individuals. The organization that is able to navigate bet ween these levels and actors may be best positioned to drive success. Concluding Thoughts 49 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
DEVELOPMENT-LED INTERVENTIONS ARE OFTEN NOT CAREFUL ENOUGH ABOUT WHAT THE TECHNOLOGY NEEDS IN ORDER TO WORK ON A THREE, FIVE, OR SEVEN YEAR CYCLE. WHAT SCALE IS REQUIRED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO BE SUCCESSFUL? WHAT LEVEL OF EDUCATION IS NEEDED TO BE SUSTAINABLE IN TERMS OF MAINTENANCE? HOW DO THESE REQUIREMENTS EVOLVE OVER TIME? – Isha Ray, Professor, University of California-Berkeley School of Information, Energy, and Resources Group Concluding Thoughts The third theme highlights the potential value of scenarios as one critical element of strategy development. These narratives have ser ved to kick-star t the idea generation process, build the f uture-oriented mindset of par ticipants, and provide a guide for ongoing trend monitoring and horizon scanning activities. They also offer a usef ul framework that can help in tracking and making sense of early indicators and milestones that might signal the way in which the world is actually transforming. W hile these four scenarios var y significantly from one another, one theme is common to them all: new innovations and uses of technology will be an active and integral par t of the international development stor y going for ward. The changing nature of technologies could shape the characteristics of development and the kinds of development aid that are in demand. In a f uture in which technologies are effectively adopted and adapted by poor people on a broad scale, expectations about the provision of ser vices could f undamentally shift. Developing a deeper understanding of the ways in which technology can impact development will better prepare ever yone for the f uture, and help all of us drive it in new and positive directions. 50 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES The following is a list of the 15 critical uncer tainties presented to par ticipants during this project’s primar y scenario creation workshop. These uncer tainties were themselves selected from a significantly longer list generated during earlier phases of research and extensive inter viewing. The uncer tainties fall into three categories: technological, social and environmental, and economic and political. Each uncer taint y is presented along with t wo polar endpoints, both representing a ver y different direction in which that uncer taint y might develop. TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES new technologies technologies with the most impact on developmentexisting technologies both developed and developing worlds origin of technology innovations critical to development developed world and some BR ICs slow the adoption of novel technologiessocial and cultural norms allow for rapid adoption of novel technologies few new innovations that substantially reduce child and infant mor talit y (vaccines, treatments, cures) many SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES static, traditional communit y identit y in the developing world dynamic, open to the novel and nontraditional restricted educational and employment oppor tunities for womenexpanding infrequent and manageable occurrence of “shocks” like disease, famine, and natural disasters frequent and highly disr uptive poor and worsening qualit y of the local environment in the developing world (air, water, sanitation, built environment, etc.) improved and improving de-prioritized global climate change awareness and actionprioritized Appendix 51 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
ECONOMIC & POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES worse than expected global economic performance, 2010-2015improves significantly inhibiting r ules and norms around entrepreneurial activit ysuppor tive static education and training oppor tunities in the developing worldincreasing marginal and contained conflict in the developing worldper vasive and widespread weak, with barriers to cooperation international economic and strategic relationships strong, with more supranational cooperation worse and more prone to disr uptions food securit y in the developing worldbetter and more secure LIST OF PARTICIPANTS This repor t is the result of extensive effor t and collaboration among Rockefeller Foundation initiative staff, Foundation grantees, and external exper ts. The Rockefeller Foundation and GBN would like to extend special thanks to all of the individuals who contributed their thoughtf ulness and exper tise throughout the scenario process. Their enthusiastic par ticipation in inter views, workshops, and the ongoing iteration of the scenarios made this co-creative process more stimulating and engaging that it could ever have been other wise. ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION STAFF Project Leads Claudia Juech, Managing Director Evan Michelson, Senior Research Associate Core Team Karl Brown, Associate Director Rober t Buck ley, Managing Director Lily Dorment, Research Associate Brinda Ganguly, Associate Director Veronica Olazabal, Research Associate Gar y Toenniessen, Managing Director Thank you as well to all Foundation staff who participated in the scenario creation workshop in December. A special thank you also to Laura Yousef. 52 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION GRANTEES G.K. Bhat, TA RU Leading Edge, India Le Bach Duong, Institute for Social Development Studies, Vietnam Aidan Eyakuze, Societ y for International Development, Tanzania Michael Free, PAT H, Seattle, WA Namrita Kapur, Root Capital, Boston, M A Paul Kukubo, Kenya ICT Board, Kenya Joseph Mureithi, Kenyan Agriculture Research Institute, Kenya EXTERNAL EXPERTS Stewar t Brand, Cofounder of GBN and President of the Long Now Foundation Rober t de Jongh, Managing Regional Director, SN V Latin America José Gomez-Marquez, Program Director for the Innovations in International Health initiative (IIH), Massachusetts Institute of Technology Natalie Jeremijenko, Experimental Designer and Director of xdesign Environmental Health Clinic, New York Universit y Athar Osama, Visiting Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston Universit y Isha Ray, Professor, School of Information (Energy and Resources Group), Universit y of California-Berkeley Enrique Rueda-Sabater, Director of Strategy and Business Development for Emerging Markets, Cisco Caroline Wagner, Senior Analyst, SR I International and Research Scientist, Center for International Science and Technology Policy, The George Washington Universit y GLOBAL BUSINESS NETWORK Andrew Blau, Co-President Tara Capsuto, Senior Practice Associate Lynn Carr uthers, Visual Practitioner Michael Costigan, Practitioner Jenny Johnston, Senior Editor Barbara K ibbe, Vice President of Client Ser vices, Monitor Institute Brie Linkenhoker, Senior Practitioner Peter Schwar tz, Chairman 53 Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
The Rockefeller Foundation 420 Fifth Ave New York, NY 10018 tel +1 212 869 8500 fax +1 212 764 3468 www.rockefellerfoundation.org Global Business Network 101 Market Street Suite 1000 San Francisco, CA 94105 tel +1 415 932 5400 fax +1 415 932 5401 www.gbn.com