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After 6 years of tremendous progress, America has fought its way back from the worst recession of our lifetimes. With the grit and determination of working families, we have rebuilt our economy, retooled the auto industry, and revitalized American manufacturing. Our economy is growing and creating jobs at the fastest pace in over a decade, and as this progress continues, we must ensure that all Americans can share in our Nation's prosperity. This conviction is at the core of middle-class economics, and few things are as vital to ensuring that our economy benefits all Americans as trade. Trade allows our people to work, our businesses to thrive, and our goods and services to compete on a global scale. This week, we reaffirm the importance of trade, and we redouble our efforts to position our workers, farmers, manufacturers, and businesses at the center of the 21st-century global economy.
America's future depends on unlocking economic opportunities beyond our borders, where 95 percent of the world's customers live. Last year was the fifth straight record-breaking year for United States exports, supporting 11.7 million American jobs and contributing nearly one-third of our country's overall economic growth since 2009. Continuing this steady progress will strengthen America's middle class because businesses that export tend to hire more, pay their workers more, and invest more in innovation and research.
Americans prosper when foreign markets are open and our trading partners play by the rules. My Administration's efforts to advance trade are focused on opening markets to American products and ensuring the rules of the trading system are fair and reflect our values, including on issues such as workers' rights and the environment. That is why I am committed to leading on trade -- creating a race to the top for higher wages and better working conditions -- with a progressive, values-driven agenda that will ensure the United States is able to shape the rules of the global economy to benefit our workers and create economic opportunities for our people and all those around the globe.
In the Asia-Pacific, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement will open new doors of opportunity for American workers and businesses in the world's fastest growing region. Through the TPP, the United States is updating NAFTA, instituting stronger, fully enforceable labor and environmental standards, and ensuring our trade partners play by the rules.
With American leadership, this agreement will remove trade barriers and provide our Nation's exporters and innovators access to these markets. And to protect our workers and improve the lives of workers across the globe, it will advance labor protections -- including a minimum wage, a prohibition on child labor and forced labor, and the right to form unions. This agreement will level the playing field for our workers and increase exports of products stamped "Made in the USA."
Smart trade agreements are important to helping middle-class families get ahead. My Administration has redoubled our efforts to enforce existing trade agreements, and we are working to ensure all Americans have the knowledge and skills to succeed in an export-driven economy. Our work has produced real results, protecting jobs here at home and making it easier for businesses to reach consumers living outside our borders, and it has demonstrated that when the playing field is level, American workers and businesses do not just compete -- they win.
During World Trade Week, we renew our commitment to leading on trade in order to support more jobs and increase wages here at home. For nearly a century, a key component of this leadership has been strong bipartisan support for trade negotiating authority, which the Congress now has an opportunity to upgrade and, in so doing, shape how the United States and our trading partners engage on trade in the 21st century. Generations of hardworking Americans have made our economy the greatest in the world, and together, we can ensure that trade safeguards our country's promise as a land of opportunity where everyone can make it if they try.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim May 17 through May 23, 2015, as World Trade Week. I encourage all Americans to visit www.WhiteHouse.gov/Trade and to observe this week with events, trade shows, and educational programs that celebrate and inform Americans about the benefits of trade to our Nation and the global economy.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand fifteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-ninth.
At the heart of our Nation is the idea that we are each endowed with certain unalienable rights. We hold this truth to be self-evident, but from the moment a small band of patriots first came together to declare independence, we have never believed it to be self-executing. From Lexington and Concord to Iraq and Afghanistan, brave women and men have fought to defend the blessings of liberty and freedom and to protect the way of life we cherish. On Armed Forces Day, we salute the unbroken chain of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who have continuously secured and renewed the promise of our Nation.
This year, as we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, we honor the generation that triumphed over tyranny and laid a foundation for peace around the world. In the face of oppression, more than 16 million Americans left everything they knew and everyone they loved to fight for freedom far from home. Today, this legacy of extraordinary service is carried forward by patriots who protect the same liberties our parents and grandparents fought for. Year after year, tour after tour, the members of our Armed Forces serve with honor and distinction. Their sacrifice makes our Nation more free and more safe, and in their example, we see the best of America.
As we pay tribute to today's servicemen and women, we acknowledge the obligations we have to all who serve in our name. This sacred trust requires that we fulfill our promise and guarantee that these patriots, and the families who serve alongside them, have all the resources and benefits they have earned and deserve -- supporting them as they carry out their missions and ensuring they get their shot at the American dream they helped to defend. As a Nation, we are called to recognize the enormous debt of gratitude we owe the members of our Armed Forces, and we must never forget those who laid down their lives to safeguard our freedoms, or their loved ones who carry their legacies forward.
Today and every day, let us celebrate the women and men who make our military the greatest fighting force the world has ever known. As a grateful Nation, let us show our appreciation by working to uphold the values they protect every day and by continuing to strive to build a country worthy of their enormous sacrifice.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, continuing the precedent of my predecessors in office, do hereby proclaim the third Saturday of each May as Armed Forces Day.
I direct the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and the Secretary of Homeland Security on behalf of the Coast Guard, to plan for appropriate observances each year, with the Secretary of Defense responsible for encouraging the participation and cooperation of civil authorities and private citizens.
I invite the Governors of the United States and its Territories, and appropriate officials of all units of government, to provide for the observance of Armed Forces Day within their jurisdiction each year in an appropriate manner designed to increase public understanding and appreciation of the Armed Forces of the United States. I also invite veterans, civic leaders, and organizations to join in the observance of Armed Forces Day.
Finally, I call upon all Americans to display the flag of the United States at their homes on Armed Forces Day, and I urge citizens to learn more about military service by attending and participating in the local observances of the day. I also encourage Americans to volunteer at organizations that provide support to our troops and their families.
Proclamation 9129 of May 16, 2014, is hereby superseded.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand thisfifteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand fifteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-ninth.
BARACK OBAMA
Presidential Proclamation -- Emergency Medical Services Week, 2015
Few moments are as terrifying as those when medical emergencies strike. But thanks to the courageous efforts of all who provide emergency medical services (EMS), Americans know they and their loved ones will be cared for in their hours of greatest need. As we mark Emergency Medical Services Week, we thank these selfless women and men, and we recommit to upholding an EMS system that is ready every day for every emergency.
Time and again, our Nation has witnessed the critical role EMS professionals play in the lives of our people. Whether 911 dispatchers, emergency medical technicians, paramedics, EMS medical directors, law enforcement officers, firefighters, or nurses, they are dedicated first responders who operate at the crossroads between health care, public safety, and public health -- often without pay as volunteers. In intense, high-stress situations, these professionals and volunteers come to the aid of their fellow Americans, easing suffering and frequently making the difference between life and death.
This week, we celebrate the EMS providers who risk their own lives and health to protect the well-being of others. At scenes of accidents and natural disasters, in times of personal crisis and national tragedy, they offer essential services and demonstrate the strength and resilience of the American people. As these heroes rush forward for us, may we remember to stand for them, and may we never forget that an efficient, high-quality EMS system is crucial to ensuring care during any emergency.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim May 17 through May 23, 2015, as Emergency Medical Services Week. I encourage all Americans to observe this occasion by showing their support for their local EMS providers and taking steps to improve their personal safety and preparedness.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand fifteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-ninth.
BARACK OBAMA
Presidential Proclamation -- National Safe Boating Week, 2015
America's waterways are conduits to creating lasting memories, to discovering worlds of adventure, and to generating economic opportunity. On our rivers, lakes, and oceans, a father brings his daughter fishing for the first time, and a young man learns his ancestors' trade; a family takes a hard-earned vacation, and a captain cares for her prized vessel. During National Safe Boating Week, we remember that protecting the promise of our waterways rests on each of us.
Before embarking on any journey on the water, Americans should prepare for potential hazards by remembering to check the forecast, filing a float plan with a family member or friend, performing a vessel safety check, and confirming their boat has essential safety equipment and communications tools, including life jackets, fire extinguishers, and weather radios. Operators should also be ready for sudden weather changes that can affect a voyage -- fog, thunderstorms, and wind shifts can often occur without warning, and knowing how to respond to dangerous weather can save lives. By always wearing life jackets and never drinking while boating, boaters and passengers can further ensure their safety and well-being and help guarantee a great day out on the water does not end in tragedy.
At times, disaster still strikes, even when we are prepared. But thanks to the courageous women and men who serve our Nation and protect our waters, the United States Coast Guard stands always ready to help keep Americans safe at sea. As we look forward to spending time with loved ones this summer and taking advantage of all our scenic waterways have to offer, I encourage everyone to visit www.USCGBoating.org to learn more about responsible boating. Together, we can enjoy the beauty and bounty of the water and avoid preventable injuries and property damage.
In recognition of the importance of safe boating practices, the Congress, by joint resolution approved June 4, 1958 (36 U.S.C. 131), as amended, has authorized and requested the President to proclaim annually the 7-day period prior to Memorial Day weekend as "National Safe Boating Week."
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 16 through May 22, 2015, as National Safe Boating Week. I encourage allAmericans who participate in boating activities to observe this occasion by learning more about safe boating practices and taking advantage of boating education.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand fifteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-ninth.
BARACK OBAMA
Statement by the President on the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia
Michelle and I join our fellow Americans and others around the world in commemorating the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia tomorrow, May 17. We take this opportunity to reaffirm that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights are human rights, to celebrate the dignity of every person, and to underscore that all people deserve to live free from fear, violence, and discrimination, regardless of who they are or whom they love.
We work toward this goal every day. Here at home, we are working to end bias-motivated violence, combat discrimination in the workplace, and address the specific needs of transgender persons. Overseas, I am proud of the steps that the United States has taken to prioritize the protection and promotion of LGBT rights in our diplomacy and global outreach.
There is much more to do, and this fight for equality will not be won in a day. But we will keep working, at home and abroad, and we will keep fighting, for however long it takes until we are all able to live free and equal in dignity and rights.
Statement by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice on LGBT Rights | The White House
Tomorrow, the international community will mark the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia. This day and every day, the United States stands in solidarity with members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community and all those around the world who work to advance the unassailable principle that LGBT rights are human rights.
The recent unconscionable comments by Gambian President Yahya Jammeh underscore why we must continue to seek a world in which no one lives in fear of violence or persecution because of who they are or whom they love. We condemn his comments, and note these threats come amid an alarming deterioration of the broader human rights situation in The Gambia. We are deeply concerned about credible reports of torture, suspicious disappearances '' including of two American citizens - and arbitrary detention at the government's hands.
The United States in late 2014 acted on The Gambia's crackdown against its LGBT community and wider human rights violations by ending trade preferences, and we are reviewing what additional actions are appropriate to respond to this worsening situation.
We repeat our call for the Gambian government, and all governments, to lead inclusively, repudiate intolerance, and promote respect for the universal rights and fundamental freedoms of all people.
Smith Mundt Act - A reminder that you are living in a Smith-Mudt Act repealed media landscape
NDAA and Overturning of Smith-Mundt Act
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) allows for materials produced by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to be released within U.S. borders and strikes down a long-time ban on the dissemination of such material in the country.[14][15][16]
Propaganda in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Propaganda in the United States is propaganda spread by government and media entities within the United States. Propaganda is information, ideas, or rumors deliberately spread widely to influence opinions. Propaganda is not only in advertising; it is also in radio, newspaper, posters, books, and anything else that might be sent out to the widespread public.
Domestic[edit]World War I[edit]The first large-scale use of propaganda by the U.S. government came during World War I. The government enlisted the help of citizens and children to help promote war bonds and stamps to help stimulate the economy. To keep the prices of war supplies down, the U.S. government produced posters that encouraged people to reduce waste and grow their own vegetables in "victory gardens." The public skepticism that was generated by the heavy-handed tactics of the Committee on Public Information would lead the postwar government to officially abandon the use of propaganda.[1]
World War II[edit]During World War II the U.S. officially had no propaganda, but the Roosevelt government used means to circumvent this official line. One such propaganda tool was the publicly owned but government funded Writers' War Board (WWB). The activities of the WWB were so extensive that it has been called the "greatest propaganda machine in history".[1]Why We Fight is a famous series of US government propaganda films made to justify US involvement in World War II.
In 1944 (lasting until 1948) prominent US policy makers launched a domestic propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the U.S. public to agree to a harsh peace for the German people, for example by removing the common view of the German people and the Nazi party as separate entities.[2] The core in this campaign was the Writers' War Board which was closely associated with the Roosevelt administration.[2]
Another means was the United States Office of War Information that Roosevelt established in June 1942, whose mandate was to promote understanding of the war policies under the director Elmer Davies. It dealt with posters, press, movies, exhibitions, and produced often slanted material conforming to US wartime purposes. Other large and influential non-governmental organizations during the war and immediate post war period were the Society for the Prevention of World War III and the Council on Books in Wartime.
Cold War[edit]During the Cold War, the U.S. government produced vast amounts of propaganda against communism and the Soviet bloc. Much of this propaganda was directed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar Hoover, who himself wrote the anti-communist tract Masters of Deceit. The FBI's COINTELPRO arm solicited journalists to produce fake news items discrediting communists and affiliated groups, such as H. Bruce Franklin and the Venceremos Organization.
War on Drugs[edit]The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, originally established by the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988,[3][4] but now conducted by the Office of National Drug Control Policy under the Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998,[5] is a domestic propaganda campaign designed to "influence the attitudes of the public and the news media with respect to drug abuse" and for "reducing and preventing drug abuse among young people in the United States".[6][7] The Media Campaign cooperates with the Partnership for a Drug-Free America and other government and non-government organizations.[8]
Iraq War[edit]In early 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense launched an information operation, colloquially referred to as the Pentagon military analyst program.[9] The goal of the operation is "to spread the administrations's talking points on Iraq by briefing ... retired commanders for network and cable television appearances," where they have been presented as independent analysts.[10] On 22 May 2008, after this program was revealed in the New York Times, the House passed an amendment that would make permanent a domestic propaganda ban that until now has been enacted annually in the military authorization bill.[11]
The Shared values initiative was a public relations campaign that was intended to sell a "new" America to Muslims around the world by showing that American Muslims were living happily and freely, without persecution, in post-9/11 America.[12] Funded by the United States Department of State, the campaign created a public relations front group known as Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU). The campaign was divided in phases; the first of which consisted of five mini-documentaries for television, radio, and print with shared values messages for key Muslim countries.[13]
NDAA and Overturning of Smith-Mundt Act[edit]The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) allows for materials produced by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to be released within U.S. borders and strikes down a long-time ban on the dissemination of such material in the country.[14][15][16]
Ad Council[edit]The Ad Council, an American non-profit organization that distributes public service announcements on behalf of various private and federal government agency sponsors, has been labeled as "little more than a domestic propaganda arm of the federal government" given the Ad Council's historically close collaboration with the President of the United States and the federal government.[17]
International[edit]Through several international broadcasting operations, the US disseminates American cultural information, official positions on international affairs, and daily summaries of international news. These operations fall under the International Broadcasting Bureau, the successor of the United States Information Agency, established in 1953. IBB's operations include Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Alhurra and other programs. They broadcast mainly to countries where the United States finds that information about international events is limited, either due to poor infrastructure or government censorship. The Smith-Mundt Act prohibits the Voice of America from disseminating information to US citizens that was produced specifically for a foreign audience.
During the Cold War the US ran covert propaganda campaigns in countries that appeared likely to become Soviet satellites, such as Italy, Afghanistan, and Chile.
Recently The Pentagon announced the creation of a new unit aimed at spreading propaganda about supposedly "inaccurate" stories being spread about the Iraq War. These "inaccuracies" have been blamed on the enemy trying to decrease support for the war. Donald Rumsfeld has been quoted as saying these stories are something that keeps him up at night.[18]
Psychological operations[edit]The US military defines psychological operations, or PSYOP, as:
planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.[19]
The Smith-Mundt Act, adopted in 1948, explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public.[20][21][22] Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and information from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Or, in the words of Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003, in the Washington Post:
There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment.[23]
Agence France Presse reported on U.S. propaganda campaigns that:
The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.[24]
Former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved the document referred to, which is titled "Information Operations Roadmap." [22][24] The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect PSYOP programs have on domestic audiences.[20][21][25]
Several incidents in 2003 were documented by Sam Gardiner, a retired Air Force colonel, which he saw as information-warfare campaigns that were intended for "foreign populations and the American public." Truth from These Podia,[26] as the treatise was called, reported that the way the Iraq war was fought resembled a political campaign, stressing the message instead of the truth.[22]
See also[edit]References[edit]^ abThomas Howell, The Writers' War Board: U.S. Domestic Propaganda in World War II, Historian, Volume 59 Issue 4, Pages 795 - 813^ abSteven Casey, (2005), The Campaign to sell a harsh peace for Germany to the American public, 1944 - 1948, [online]. London: LSE Research Online. [Available online at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000736] Originally published in History, 90 (297). pp. 62-92 (2005) Blackwell Publishing^National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988 of the Anti''Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100''722, 102 Stat. 4181, enacted November 18, 1988^Gamboa, Anthony H. (January 4, 2005), B-303495, Office of National Drug Control Policy '-- Video News Release, Government Accountability Office, footnote 6, page 3 ^Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998 (Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999), Pub.L. 105''277, 112 Stat. 268, enacted October 21, 1998^Gamboa, Anthony H. (January 4, 2005), B-303495, Office of National Drug Control Policy '-- Video News Release, Government Accountability Office, pp. 9''10 ^Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub.L. 105''277, 112 Stat. 268, enacted October 21, 1998^Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109''469, 120 Stat. 3501, enacted December 29, 2006, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1722^Barstow, David (2008-04-20). "Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon's Hidden Hand". New York Times. ^Sessions, David (2008-04-20). "Onward T.V. Soldiers: The New York Times exposes a multi-armed Pentagon message machine". Slate. ^Barstow, David (2008-05-24). "2 Inquiries Set on Pentagon Publicity Effort". New York Times. ^Rampton, Sheldon (October 17, 2007). "Shared Values Revisited". Center for Media and Democracy. ^"U.S. Reaches Out to Muslim World with Shared Values Initiative". America.gov. January 16, 2003.
Everybody is mad at the ABC News anchor; nobody can explain why.
George StephanopoulosPhoto: Donna Svennevik/ABCABC News anchor George Stephanopoulosdisclosedtoday that he has donated $50,000* to the Clinton Foundation. Everybody agrees this is terrible. Stephanopoulos has apologized and ABC has accepted his apology. Republicans believe his gestures of abjection have not gone far enough.Rand Paulproposes that Stephanopoulos recuse himself from moderating the 2016 presidential debates. Senator Mike Lee, through his spokesman,demandsthat he recuse himself from all 2016 coverage. Clinton Cash'' author Peter Schweizercalls ita ''massive ethical breach.''
But '... why? Paul accuses Stephanopoulos of harboring a ''conflict of interest.'' But donating money to a charitable foundation is not an interest. His money is gone regardless of what happens to Clinton's presidential campaign. It's true that some donors have an incentive to use the Foundation to get close to the Clintons in a way that might benefit their business interests. And yes, asI've argued, the Clintons have handled those conflict-of-interest problems really poorly. But none of those problems reflects poorly on Stephanopoulos. The mere fact that a donation might come with an ulterior motive does not taint all donations. If Stephanopoulos needed some angle to get in the room with the Clintons, donating to their foundation would not be the way to do it.
In the absence of a material conflict, is there some symbolic conflict? It is hard to imagine what. The Clinton Foundation has taken on nefarious connotations owing to conflict-of-interest problems that don't implicate Stephanopoulos. But it is, after all, a charity. It used to have non-partisan overtones.In the heat of the 2012 election, Mitt Romney spoke at the Clinton Global Initiative. News Corporation Foundation and Donald Trump, for goodness sake, donated to it.
Stephanopoulos's defense '-- that he just wanted to donate to the Foundation's work on AIDS prevention and deforestation '-- seems 100 percent persuasive. He is the victim of the ethical taint of the Clintons' poorly handled business dealings, combined with an underlying right-wing suspicion of the liberal media, but what his critics have yet to produce is a coherent case against him.
*Update: Stephanopoulos now says it was $75,000.
Longer update: A wave of critical media reporting has come out, and it has underscored my belief that there's no real case against Stephanopoulos. There's a justifiable stench emanating from the Clinton Foundation's relationship with its donors and the disclosure problems surrounding it, and that stench has engulfed Stephanopoulos, but the specific problem with his donation remains unclear and unexplained.
Politico's Jack Shafer, for instance, writes a column heaping abuse on Stephanopoulos, but which treats his guilt as self-evident. The closest Shafer comes to explaining what he did wrong is this: ''In his first statement to Byers, he said he gave to the foundation because he believes so deeply in the AIDS and deforestation programs administered by the Clintons. Surely, a politically neutered foundation that does equal or superior works in those areas would accept his philanthropy.'' The premise here seems to be that the Clinton Foundation is so political that donating to it amounts to a declaration of partisan loyalty. But if that's the case, why have Republican candidates spoken for it and donated to it?
I agree that Stephanopoulos erred by failing to disclose his donation during an interview about the Clinton Foundation. But the case against him goes far beyond that.
Fox News'Howard Kurtzwags his finger (''cloud of suspicion '... grave error in judgment'') and assails Stephanopoulos for his general liberalism and bias without bothering to substantiate his case that his donation was wrong.
The Washington Post'sErik Wempledoes make an argument, but not much of one. ''The problem with Stephanopoulos's donations to the Clinton Foundation is that it gives him a stake '-- even if it's a small one '-- in the operations and success of the charity,'' he writes, ''Like any donor, Stephanopoulos wants his money put to good use and, all else being equal, wants the foundation to prosper as it invests his money in good works.'' But how does this bias Stephanopoulos's campaign coverage? If anything, the Clinton Foundation is more likely to prosper if Hillary Clinton loses, and she and her husband return to managing it full time. Even if this is somehow a ''stake,'' it's not a financial stake or even a career stake. Wanting your AIDS prevention donation to do more good is not exactly the kind of bias that seriously compromises one's journalistic integrity.
Wemple acknowledges that the Clinton Foundation was, until recently, quote bipartisan. He bizarrely discounts this defense on the grounds that Stephanopoulos did not make this argument with his own mouth:
Perhaps Stephanopoulos's best defense would be to mention that the Clinton Foundation has developed some bipartisan muscles. Christopher Ruddy, the former Clinton antagonist and boss of conservative media outlet Newsmax, is a Clinton Foundation donor and fan. Bill Clinton welcomed New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie for a2013 chat at a Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) meeting in Chicago. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romneyaddressed CGI in 2012. But Stephanopoulos isn't mounting this defense, so we won't either.
Wait, what? The defense only counts if the defendant says it himself? What kind of standard is that, anyway?
There are lots of reasons why Stephanopoulos is in a defensive crouch. The Clinton Foundation is in a bad odor. He has spent his journalistic career (effectively) rebutting the presumption that he remains loyal to the president that made him famous. The best strategy for Stephanopoulos and ABC is to repent rather than mount a defense critics are in no mood to accept. But that doesn't make him guilty.
The Great Stephanopoulos Mess - Jack Shafer - POLITICO Magazine
Former Clintonland insider George Stephanopoulos, who has excelled at both politics and journalism, appears to have failed both professions with a single transgression.
As my POLITICO colleague Dylan Byers reported today, ABC News' ''This Week'' and ''Good Morning America'' host Stephanopoulos has donated a total of $75,000 to the Clinton Foundation, something he had not previously disclosed to viewers or his employers. In a statement to Byers, Stephanopoulos apologized for not disclosing the gifts. ABC News called the oversight an ''honest mistake,'' a sentiment Stephanopoulos amplified in an afternoon interview with Byers.
''We stand behind him,'' the network also offered, which is corporate-speak for we will bind George in barbed wire and dump him into a surging storm sewer and drive off into the night the minute he becomes an intolerable distraction.
The donation corrodes much of the journalistic credibility Stephanopoulos has labored so carefully to build since joining ABC News as a correspondent and analyst in December 1996. Stephanopoulos critics were many at the time of his appointment, predicting his crack-up even before he completed his first assignment. The Los Angeles Times' Howard Rosenberg spoke for many when he prophesied that Stephanopoulos would not be able to ''shed his intense loyalty for Clinton in his new role.'' Stephanopoulos worked hard to do just that through his 1999 memoir about his time as an adviser to President Bill Clinton, ''All Too Human: A Political Education.'' In the book, he distanced himself from the president, much to the disparagement of Clinton loyalists like Mandy Grunwald and to the disappointment of Clinton himself.
In transmogrifying from politician to journalist, Stephanopoulos defied the pundits' predictions, drawing only the occasional charge that he was in the bag for the Clintons, as Byron York writes today in the Washington Examiner.
One reason Stephanopoulos made such a graceful switch from pol to pressie is because there isn't much to making the switch. As long as you can do the work, the journalism profession doesn't care if your last port of call was a federal penitentiary. Other politicians who have successfully crossed over to the TV news racket include Mike Huckabee, Joe Scarborough, Tim Russert, John Kasich, Jerry Springer, Susan Molinari, Diane Sawyer, Mary Matalin, Chris Matthews, Bill Moyers, Bay Buchanan, Al Sharpton, Bill Bradley, Dee Dee Myers, Dana Perino, Lawrence O'Donnell, Nicolle Wallace, Karl Rove and others.
Most politicians cross over to media with the understanding that they will continue their partisan ways. But others, such as Stephanopoulos, Sawyer and Russert agree implicitly and explicitly to leave that baggage behind. In shelling out $75,000 to the politically identified Clinton Foundation, Stephanopoulos has betrayed that compact, torched the journalism-cred he has acquired in the past two decades, and obviously forgotten the lessons in political savvy he learned as a member of Bill Clinton's inner circle. He knew going into ABC News that his reporting and his personal actions would be extra scrutinized for bias. I find it implausible that he did not understand in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (the years he gave the Clinton Foundation cash), that his contributions would be an issue with his employers and his viewers once discovered'--even if they were just sitting there buried on a website for anyone to stumble upon.
As we conduct the dumb, dumber and dumbest inventory of Stephanopoulos' humiliation, we must ask why it was necessary for him to give anything to the Clinton Foundation? In his first statement to Byers, he said he gave to the foundation because he believes so deeply in the AIDS and deforestation programs administered by the Clintons. Surely, a politically neutered foundation that does equal or superior works in those areas would accept his philanthropy. Surely, when Stephanopoulos cross-examined Peter Schweizer, the author of the Clinton Foundation expos(C) ''Clinton Cash,'' on the April 26 edition of ABC's ''This Week,'' the meta aspect of the segment must have occurred to him! But, no! Stephanopoulos bowls right through the interview without any acknowledgment of his cash endorsement of the Clinton Foundation!
Wounded by the revelation of his donation, will Stephanopoulos survive in his role as ABC News chief anchor and chief political correspondent? Already he has agreed to forfeit his role as moderator of the GOP primary debate in February, but the demands for additional concessions are a certainty. Both parties love to run against the press, but the Republicans take special glee in it. By donating so handsomely to the Clinton Foundation, Stephanopoulos has handed the Republicans a cudgel that they won't stop using against him and ABC News until he exits the arena. You can't be your network's chief anchor and a late night punchline at the same time. Just ask Dan Rather.
A worthy side note to the Stephanopoulos expos(C) is contained in its genesis. The story appears to have originated at the Washington Free Beacon, which asked ABC News for comment about the Stephanopoulos contributions last night. The next thing the Free Beacon knew, POLITICO had broken the story this morning. Free Beacon writer Andrew Stiles and site editor Matthew Continetti accused Stephanopoulos' office and ABC of shipping the scoop to POLITICO. I sent email to ABC News seeking clarification on this point and did not hear back. I also asked Byers about the origin of his scoop to which he responded, ''I'm not going to be able to talk about matters related to sourcing.''
If ABC News shopped the scoop, as the Beaconites claim, it wouldn't be the first time that a news organization has been so preempted. Government and business play this retaliatory game all the time when journalists surprise them with a request for comment. What's unbecoming is that a news organization might engage in this practice.
Come to think of it, that's precisely the type of thing you could imagine the Stephanopoulos-era Clinton administration doing without compunction.
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SEE ALSO: Gazprom to Claim 100% of Germany's OPAL Gas Pipeline Capacities
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Russian Nord Stream gas to Germany doubles to 100 mil cu m/dayLondon (Platts)''9/Mar/2015
By Alex Froley
Russian gas flows through the Baltic Sea Nord Stream pipeline to Germany have doubled in recent days to rates around 100 million cu m/day, according to latest flow data from German system operators.
The increase comes at the same time as a similar change has been observed in Russian gas flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
Latest hourly physical flow data from German grid operators NEL Gastransport and OPAL Gastransport show Germany receiving gas at rates around 100 million cu m/day at Greifswald, the landing point for Nord Stream gas on Germany's northeast coastline.
Hourly rates have been recorded over 90 million cu m/day since last Friday.
Before the increase at the end of last week, flow rates had been averaging at a fairly constant rate of around 48 million cu m/day since mid-January.
The increase puts flows back in line with where they were at the start of January.
Russian natural gas supply to European consumers06/05/2015
Berlin hosted a working meeting between Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee and Rainer Seele, Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors of Wintershall Holding.
The meeting addressed the issue of Russian natural gas supply to European consumers. It was noted that direct gas transmission routes, particularly, Nord Stream played a key role in increasing the reliability of the blue fuel export supplies. In this regard the parties stressed the importance of obtaining full access to the OPAL gas pipeline transit capacities.
BackgroundNord Stream is a two-string 1224 km export gas pipeline with the annual capacity of 55 billion m3 of gas running under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. Nord Stream is operated by the Nord Stream joint venture (Gazprom owns a 51% stake, Wintershall Holding and E.ON Global Commodities '' 15.5% each, Gasunie and GDF Suez '' 9% each).
The OPAL and NEL gas pipelines connect Nord Stream with the European gas system. The OPAL gas pipeline is operated by OPAL Gastransport (Gazprom owns a 49.98% stake and Wintershall Holding '' 50.02%).
A wholly-owned subsidiary of BASF, Wintershall Holding has been focused on oil and gas exploration and production for over 80 years.
Politics02:10 17.05.2015(updated 02:17 17.05.2015)Get short URL
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MOSCOW (Sputnik) '-- During her visit, Nuland will meet with senior Russian government officials and civil society representatives. In addition to the Ukraine peace process, she is set to discuss bilateral US-Russian issues.
Nuland's Moscow visit follows her May 14-16 trip to Ukraine's capital Kiev, and State Secretary John Kerry's recent visit to the Russian resort city of Sochi.Relations between Russia and the United States have soured over the last year amid the situation in Ukraine. Washington has accused Moscow of meddling in the armed conflict in Ukraine's southeast, a claim repeatedly denied by the Russian side.
After numerous breaches of a previous ceasefire agreement, signed in September 2014 in Minsk, Ukraine's warring sides signed a new truce deal in mid-February.
The new agreement was outlined during lengthy talks between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany, who met in the Belarusian capital in a bid to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis.
Abuse of Power: Ukraine's Poroshenko Exposed in $25 Mln Land Deal Cover-up
The US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has dug into President Poroshenko's misuse of his presidential power.
The revelations come as Poroshenko, soon to mark his first year in office, faces growing criticism, both within the country and abroad, for his failure to rein in the oligarchs and their tight grip on power.
Poroshenko's land in Kyiv
The report questions the president's role in a high-value Kiev land deal, accusing him of putting his personal interests and those of his close allies above the interests of the state.
The report reveals that over the course of seven years ''Poroshenko quietly appropriated more than a hectare of protected land in Kyiv's elite Pechera district and recently quashed an inquiry into the damage of an 18th-century structure caused by construction work on his plot''.
The investigation mainly focuses on two plots of land in an area, recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site and protected under Kiev city law.
One, it says, undeveloped and strewn with debris, belongs to Poroshenko. The other, across the street, already boasts a fenced-in mansion and tennis court. It belongs to one of Poroshenko's closest friends and business partners, Ihor Kononenko.
Kononenko is a lawmaker who currently serves as deputy head of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc's faction in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament. Bald and solidly built, RFE/RL says, he is sometimes referred to as the bloc's "gray cardinal."
In 2009, he was a member of the Kiev government and an ally of then-Mayor Leonid Chernovetskyy, who presided over a city vote handing the plots to a company co-founded by Kononenko '' for free.
The investigation then shows how the protected state land with a market value of more than $25 million got handed free of charge to a little-known company run by a city lawmaker.
As it turns out, the oligarch, who apparently set his eye on the valuable land as early as 2003, used a land-acquisition scheme based on a fake housing cooperative society.
RFE/RL follows the path the site has taken from being a state-run greenhouse to a luxury-home.
Kononenko helped to create a private limited company, Zelenbudservis-K, which assumed control of the state landscaping service responsible for the site.
Until then, the landscapers had operated out of a series of greenhouses and storage facilities located conveniently close to the monastery complex within the area.
Almost immediately, Zelenbudservis-K began hatching plans for a new greenhouse facility and within five years, the landscapers had been moved to their new location, far from the Pechera district in a dreary section of industrial Kiev.
While the grounds being vacated, in 2007 Zelenbudservis-K quietly dropped its private status and reregistered as a housing cooperative society.
That switch, under Ukraine's land code, allowed Zelenbudservis-K to receive ownership of the land for free '' the transaction was later approved by a voting majority of Kiev city lawmakers in April 2009.
The report also pointed at numerous irregularities in the land acquisition, including the fact that none of the 12 members of the Zelenbudservis-K cooperative society was on the housing register, a legal step meant to ensure that free land is going to those in need;
'-- of the 12, at least six have close ties to Poroshenko and Kononenko, including Kononenko's sister and a Poroshenko political adviser,
'-- in addition, Oles Dovhy, the city council secretary who agreed to initiate the process of transferring the land to Zelenbudservis-K, has close ties to Poroshenko,
'-- and Ukrsel, the company that officially purchased the land from Zelenbudservis-K before selling it to Poroshenko and Kononenko, was an Odesa-based shell company liquidated shortly after the final transfer of the land in late 2009.
Most worrying to critics, however, are suggestions that Poroshenko may have since used his presidential power to shut down a probe into his use of the land.
The report also revealed the damage inside a UNESCO buffer zone and within meters of an early 18th-century fortress that is part of the site's historic properties caused by the digging works at the plot belonging to Poroshenko. The works have partially destroyed one of the fortress's lunettes'' structural walls in the shape of a half-moon.
Kiev Monastery of the Caves
At the time construction started, Poroshenko had not received the necessary permission from either the Culture Ministry or the National Academy of Science, the institutions responsible for regulating construction in the area.
A Pechera district prosecutor quickly opened a criminal case into the lunette's destruction, citing national laws protecting monuments of cultural heritage.
On November 6, 2014, five months after Poroshenko's presidential inauguration, the proceedings however were closed.
Eighteen days later, on November 24, Poroshenko signed off on a new declaration to resume construction at the plot.
RFE/RL says that Poroshenko's failure to honor his campaign pledge to divest himself of his assets, as well as the new findings about his property holdings, may add to questions about his commitment to separating politics from property and money.
KUMANOVO, Macedonia '-- An armed group attacked special forces police Saturday in a town in northern Macedonia in a clash that killed five police officers and injured more than 30, officials said, amid a political crisis that has raised concern about the stability of the Balkan nation.
Interior minister Gordana Jankulovska told reporters late Saturday that the police casualties occurred during a sweep operation in Diva Naselba, a neighborhood in western Kumanovo. Police had come under attack from automatic guns and bombs.
A weeping Jankulovska described the five slain police officers as "heroes who gave their lives today for the Republic of Macedonia."
She added that the "terrorist group," which had entered Macedonia from an unspecified neighboring country, planned to "use the current political situation to perform attacks on state institutions."
Jankulovska said more than 20 members of the armed group had surrendered, but added that the police operation is still ongoing because other attackers have refused to give up.
Jankulovska said some of the attackers had been killed, without specifying the number. She was not able immediately able to confirm whether there were any civilian casualties.
Saturday's clashes come as Macedonia is grappling with its deepest political crisis since its independence from former Yugoslavia in 1991. The government and the opposition have accused each other of planning to destabilize the country to take or preserve power, and some analysts fear leaders on both sides are ready to provoke ethnic clashes as leverage.
Kumanovo is an ethnically mixed town located about 40 kilometers (25 miles) northeast of the capital Skopje, near the border with Kosovo and Serbia. The region was the center of hostilities between ethnic Albanian rebels and government forces during the ethnic conflict in 2001.
Ethnic Albanians, who make up a quarter of Macedonia's 2 million people, took up arms in 2001 demanding more rights. The conflict ended after six months with a western-brokered peace deal that granted more rights to the minority group.
Saso Ordanovski, a political analyst, suggested in a debate on local TV station 24 Vesti Saturday that the members of the armed group in Kumanovo were mercenaries.
"Somebody has paid them to change the subject on what is going on at the moment in the country," Ordanovski said.
The EU delegation in Macedonia appealed for calm and said in a statement it is waiting "for facts to be established by the relevant authorities."
The U.S Embassy in Skopje issued a statement saying it "deeply regret(s) the loss of life."
"We are following the situation and are in close contact with the authorities and political leaders. We urge citizens to remain calm and allow the facts to be established," the embassy said in a statement.
Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov urgently ended his visit to Russia and traveled back home. The president's office said he will call for a National Security Council meeting in relation to the latest developments.
Serbia, Macedonia's northern neighbor, reacted by sending reinforcements of special police to the border region, apparently fearing a possible spillover of violence.
Jankulovska, the Interior Minister, said the armed group was "sheltered in the houses of supporters," but did not give any more details about the organization.
Local TV stations aired video footage showing black smoke rising from houses in western Kumanovo and many civilians fleeing the area.
On Friday, thousands of opposition supporters took part in nationwide protests against alleged police brutality in Macedonia. The protests started after opposition leader Zoran Zaev '-- citing illegally recorded conversations '-- accused the government of trying to cover up the 2011 police killing of a 22-year-old man.
The recordings are part of a series of wiretaps Zaev has been releasing that he says reveals corruption at the highest level of government in this country of 2 million people, including mismanagement of funds and criminal prosecutions of opponents.
Zaev claims Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski was behind the alleged illegal wiretapping and that he received the material from a source. Gruevski denies wrongdoing, claiming the recordings were fabricated with the help of foreign spies. He has accused Zaev of plotting a coup.
Zaev on Saturday appealed for calm, but had earlier called for a large anti-government protest on May 17.
The junior coalition partner in the conservative government, the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integrations, or DUI, has also expressed concern and appealed for calm. DUI urged people not to respond to provocations.
___
Testorides reported from Skopje. Jovana Gec in Belgrade, Serbia, contributed to this report
Color revolution in Macedonia and the Western-backed propaganda
Funeral for police officer killed in Kumanovo. 11 May 2015
Terrorists attacked the Macedonian city of Kumanovo on 9 May, but one wouldn't know that by reading the Western media's reaction to the tragedy, despite the fact that they typically mention that 8 police officers were killed and another 37 wounded during the firefight. The media's disingenuous 'reporting' reeks of ulterior motives, which is evidenced most visibly by their reluctance to use the word terrorist without putting it in questionable quotation marks, but also takes more subtle forms such as casting suspicion on the government for complicity in the attack and/or inferring that the attack was some type of legitimate protest reaction.Western institutions like the EU and NATO are actually worse since they confer equal responsibility for the violence on both the terrorists (which they don't even refer to as) and the Macedonian security services, and even the UN has taken to echoing their sly sentiments with all three entities questioning the official course of events and demanding a "transparent investigation". The US and its main Western European NATO allies escalate the rhetoric and actually engage in a form of victim shaming against the country during itsofficial two-day period of mourningby questioning its commitment to "democracy" and not showing any solidarity with it whatsoever in its fight against terrorism. This shameless act (and lack thereof) shows that they and all the previously mentioned actors are in fact implicit supporters of Albanian terrorism against Macedonia and strong proponents of the state destabilization.Part I of the research demonstrates how unipolar information sources purposely manipulate their coverage of the latest terrorist attacks in Macedonia, while Part II begins by showing how this is also the case for the Western and pro-Western institutions of the EU, NATO, and the UN. The series continues by addressing how the US and its allies have tried to shame and intimidate Macedonia, and then concludes by identifying probable scenarios for how they plan on punishing the proud country for resisting their aggression.
Media Manipulation
Western media has become the vanguard of a unified information offensive against Macedonia, presenting the latest terrorist attack against it as either a potentially justified reaction or as some type of hoax by the government itself. Let's look at how media outlets in the unipolar world have centralized their narrative about the events:
Al Jazeera:
Qatar's official soft power provocateur, always in line with Western grand strategy, had this to say about the situation:"The Macedonian government said eight police and 14 members of an "armed group" were killed after police staged a raid in the northern town of Kumanovo, seeking gunmen from Kosovo it claimed were planning to attack civilian and state targets... Kotevski named five leaders of the group, all citizens of Kosovo, as founders of paramilitary cells... However some residents in Kumanovo were deeply sceptical of the official version of events. "Me, like other citizens, we are surprised and no one knows what and why this happened. I know during the war in 2001 we were informed and we have supported these groups that were fighting for the Albanian cause but now it is the contrary," Kumanovo resident Xhelal Ademi told the Reuters news agency. "The people in this region were guarding their villages to not let anyone infiltrate from outside our villages," Ademi said... Authorities described [the earlier Gosince] incident as "very serious" and said Macedonia was the "target of a terrorist attack"."
They follow the 'quotation mark system' of putting certain phrases in quotes in order to signify no endorsement but present what they intimate may be a disputable claim on the part of the original source. Judging by Al Jazeera, the terrorists might not have even been an "armed group", but were rather paramilitary cells, thereby bestowing some layer of legitimacy to their violent activities. Then the Qataris allege some kind of broad conspiracy by selectively quoting local residents in order to create the impression that the attacks might not have happened at all. Finally, they use the quotation mark system once more to question whether the test-run attack from late-April was terrorist-related or even a serious matter in the first place, thus making it seem like it was of no more importance than a local football match.CBC:
The Canadian Broadcasting Company puts a novel spin on their reporting by trying to tie it in with "anti-police brutality" agitation ongoing on Skopje. This "protest" agitation is nothing more than a simple borrowing of aggressive American protest tactics perfected in Ferguson and Baltimore for the betterment of Color Revolution tactics abroad. Zoran Zaev's "revelations" are manipulated NSA-provided recordings designed to capitalize off of the global fawning of Snowden-like leakers, with the public now assuming that any "leaker" is unquestionably legitimate and not part of a carefully crafted information operation like Zaev and his cohorts are. It's telling how the Color Revolution against Macedonia began by exploiting the 'Snowden Effect' and is now exploiting America's latest protest craze against police violence, ironically by attempting to behave just as violently as some of the protesters in Baltimore in order to provoke the same 'police violence' they were supposedly protesting.In any case, here's how the Canadians try to con their audience about the terrorist attacks in Macedonia:
"An armed group attacked special forces police Saturday in a town in northern Macedonia in a clash that killed five police officers and injured more than 30, officials said, amid a political crisis that has raised concern about the stability of the Balkan nation... [The Interior Minister] added that the "terrorist group," which had entered Macedonia from an unspecified neighbouring country, planned to "use the current political situation to perform attacks on state institutions."...
Saturday's clashes come as Macedonia is grappling with its deepest political crisis since its independence from former Yugoslavia in 1991. The government and the opposition have accused each other of planning to destabilize the country to take or preserve power, and some analysts fear leaders on both sides are ready to provoke ethnic clashes as leverage...
On Friday, thousands of opposition supporters took part in nationwide protests against alleged police brutality in Macedonia. The protests started after opposition leader Zoran Zaev '-- citing illegally recorded conversations '-- accused the government of trying to cover up the 2011 police killing of a 22-year-old man... Zaev on Saturday appealed for calm, but had earlier called for a large anti-government protest on May 17."
As with Al Jazeera, they prefer to call the terrorists an "armed group", only using the phrase terrorist group in quotations when quoting the Interior Minister. The article then transitions towards casting suspicion on the government itself for provoking ethnic clashes, which is in reality the absolute last thing that the authorities need at the moment as they defend against a Color Revolution attempt. Finally, the Canadians end their information package by trying to justify the attack through their mentioning of the Color Revolution "anti-brutality protests" and Zaev's forthcoming call for chaos on 17 May.CNN:
America's premier propaganda outlet lives up to its reputation by strongly hinting that the terrorists might have been Slavic Macedonians unhappy with a 2001 ceasefire agreement:"At least 30 other officers were wounded in the clashes that erupted during a police raid early Saturday on a group of roughly 70 "terrorists" in the town of Kumanovo, Macedonia, the country's internal affairs ministry said... Albanian insurgents battled against the central government in 2001. Ethnic Macedonians became angry over the ceasefire agreement that ended the fighting and held violent protests that resulted in the President at the time, Boris Trajkovski, was evacuated. The ministry did not say who the "terrorists" authorities raided on Saturday were, nor if they were ethnic Albanians."
This high-level information diversion is meant to make Albanian Macedonians and the world think that rabid Slavic Macedonian nationalists might be to blame for the killings, which like their information counterparts in Canada and Qatar, they refuse to fully recognize as terrorism.The point here is to create panic and further divide Macedonian society along ethnic and religious lines, ergo the original intent of the terrorist attack in the first place.Guardian:
The British information bulldogs don't hold back any punches in jumping straight to the point by titling their lead story "Violence between Macedonia police and 'terrorists' increases scrutiny of PM". Their motive is to implicate democratically elected and legitimate Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski in the terrorist attacks themselves, obviously as a means of making the Color Revolutionary provocateurs look 'innocent' by comparison. Here's what the Guardian managed to gargle out about Macedonia:"Details about the raid remain hazy, but the conservative government of Nikola Gruevski faced immediate calls from Nato and the European Union for a "transparent investigation" of what went on. Gruevski's credibility with the west has already been called into question by months of opposition allegations of illegal wire-tapping and widespread abuse of power, leaving his government on the ropes with an opposition mass rally planned for 17 May.
The Albanian residents of Pero Ilievski Street in ethnically mixed Kumanovo, as well as Gruevski's political opponents, accused the government of trying to create a diversion and blunt the bid to unseat him. "The timing is too suspicious to not consider a connection," said Florian Bieber, a Balkans expert at the University of Graz, Austria. "This does not mean that it was not a terrorist attack, but it suggests that the government might have had a hand. The only obvious beneficiary of the violence is the ruling party.""
The above-cited quotations speak for themselves and are clear in advocating an anti-government agenda. The British hope that their perverted version of events catches on and becomes the official media narrative, since if that's the case, then sanctions against the country can then begin to be discussed by the unipolar bloc.Reuters:
This global brand, misleadingly thought of as being 'neutral' and 'non-biased', engages in a dangerous game of ideas by scarcely recognizing that the terrorists were even an armed group. Here's what they have to say about the situation:"The Balkan country's interior ministry said an unspecified number of gunmen were also killed, but that it had no information on civilian casualties during clashes that began before dawn and stretched into the evening. Police said that acting on information about an "armed group" they had launched an operation in an ethnic Albanian district of the northern town of Kumanovo 40 km (25 miles) north of the capital Skopje... Observers fear political leaders on either side may try to stoke ethnic tensions as leverage...
Opposition leader Zoran Zaev, who has been releasing damaging wire-taps he says were recorded by the government and leaked to him by a whistleblower, appeared to suggest Saturday's operation was carried out to create a diversion. "I call on Nikola Gruevski to immediately ... explain who wants to destabilize Macedonia, why and with what purpose," he said in a statement. "This dark scenario will not work. The citizens see who has an interest in such a scenario.""
On top of that, they've also tried to tie Gruevski to the attack by following the British blueprint and Zaev's false statements. Again, the objective here is to discredit the government and create further destabilization within the country, all with the intent of stimulating the Color Revolution forces and breaking the solidarity of those who have been resisting thus far, especially Albanian Macedonians.Part IIMay 14, 2015
Institutional Intrigue
Western institutions and their controlled appendages such as the UN are at the forefront of issuing veiled threats against the Macedonian government, and a simple glance at their copy-and-paste statements indicates the seamless level of strategic collaboration between them. In order of expanding scope and global importance, they are:
The EU:
Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn had this to say about the chaos in Kumanovo:
"I am deeply concerned at the unfolding situation in the Kumanovo region and possible injuries and loss of life. I urge the authorities and all political and community leaders to cooperate, to restore calm and fully investigate the events in an objective and transparent manner within the Law. I urgeall actorsfor utmost restraint. Any further escalation must be avoided, not the least in the interest of the overall stability in the country." (emphasis added)
Pay particular attention to the call for an "objective and transparent" investigation and for "all actors" and "political and community leaders" to demonstrate "utmost restraint" and "restore calm". This is a theme that will subsequently be repeated by NATO and the UN, and the final sub-section will describe what these euphemisms are meant to represent.NATO:
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Now let's take a look at what Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg thought about it:"I am following the developments in Kumanovo with great concern. I express my sympathy to the families of those who were killed or injured. It is important that all political and community leaders work together to restore calm and conduct a transparent investigation to establish what happened. I urge everyone to exercise restraint and avoid any further escalation, in the interest of the country and the whole region." (emphasis added)
Again, the same types of phrases are popping up, almost as if this statement was written by the exact same speech writer as the one who penned the EU's response.The UN:
Finally, check out Ban Ki-Moon's commentary (as expressed through a spokesperson) on Kumanovo and see if any similarities can be found:
"The Secretary-General is alarmed by the recent violence in the city of Kumanovo in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and extends his condolences to the families of those killed and injured. He strongly supports the calls by the European Union and other members of the international community urging the state authorities and all political and community leaders to cooperate to restore calm and to fully investigate the events in an objective and transparent manner.
At this sensitive time, the Secretary-General calls on all actors to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from any rhetoric and/or actions that may escalate tensions further. He also encourages the country's authorities to address the concerns voiced by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on 17 March 2015 and to reaffirm their commitment to fundamental human rights and the rule of law by fostering an environment in which opposing views can be expressed freely."(emphasis added)
Aside from mirroring the previously highlighted statements, the UN leader jumps into the foray of domesticUN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon
politics and Color Revolutionary rhetoric by trying to apply pressure against the Macedonian authorities. This shouldn't be surprising in the least, as the UN has largely mutated into a supranational appendage of Western influence, so it's unfortunately natural that this nominally neutral organization would become partisan to the West's geopolitical games. Furthermore, it'll be witnessed later on how Ban Ki-Moon's domestic tinkering attempt in Macedonia perfectly complements the US Ambassador and friends' victim shaming and intimidation from the day before.Birds Of A Feather:
As the saying goes, 'birds of a feather flock together', and this quip rings true when it comes to Western institutions and their de-facto subordinates. The joint message being conveyed is that the Macedonian authorities themselves are complicit in the destabilization, hence why "all actors" must "exercise maximum restraint" and why a follow-up "objective and transparent" investigation is necessary. Going even further, this implies that the state's resistance in combating terrorism helped contribute to it, implying that the country should have just rolled over and allowed the terrorists to take control of the city, or even worse, the entire country for that matter.
The invocation of "community leaders" is designed to create the sense that this was some kind of grassroots, local uprising, which itwasn't at all, and is meant to drive a wedge between the government and local municipalities with significant Albanian populations like Kumanovo. From the look of it, it appears as though the West and its puppet UN appendage don't support anti-terrorist operations unless they're the ones conducting them and they're being initiated for pro-Western geopolitical purposes. After all, this rhetoric against the Macedonian government is eerily reminiscent of the same type of statements being made against the Syrian one, which is also the regional anti-terrorism leader for its home area.
Attacking The Victim
Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski
Shaming:
The Ambassadors of the US, EU, France, UK, and Italy met with [Macedoniam PM Nikola] Gruevski two days after the attack as part of a prearranged meeting, during which they released a joint statement (read by US Ambassador Jess Baily, as it was) that can only be described as geopolitical victim shaming. As referenced by Reuters:
"In a statement read out by U.S. ambassador Jess Baily, the envoys criticised Skopje's failure to address the "many allegations of government wrongdoing arising from the disclosures" published by opposition leader Zoran Zaev. "This continued inaction casts serious doubt on the government of Macedonia's commitment to the democratic principles and values of the Euro-Atlantic community," they said, adding that a lack of concrete action "will undermine Macedonia's progress toward EU and NATO membership.""
What basically happened was that instead of showing solidarity with a European country in its fight againstMideast-trained(read: ISIL) terrorists that had just killed 8 police officers and injured a whopping 37 more, NATO (which is essentially what that group of governments collectively represent) took the opportunity to lambast the Prime Minister for not partaking in 'regime tweaking' and making it easier for the Color Revolution to succeed. One wouldn't be mistaken for thinking that NATO is actually pleased that the terrorist attack was as violent and impactful as it was, since they and their affiliated media have been alluding that this is some type of punishment for the government's 'anti-democratic' behavior as per the false Zaev allegations. It's also significant that the US chose this joint occasion to make its first official remarks on the situation (there were no official State Department press releases about it) in conjunction with its NATO allies, and this needs to be elaborated upon further.Intimidating:
Macedonia's pro-Atlantic opposition leader Zoran Zaev
The symbolism of the joint statement is that it's a semi-official declaration of regime change intent by the US and its allies, who in essence served Gruevski with an ultimatum: he must either capitulate to a form of 'organized' regime change ('regime tweaking' and procedural moves to allow Zaev to slowly seize power) or face the wrath of a combined EuroMaidan Color Revolution 2.0 and a Greater Albanian-focused Unconventional War in forcing destructive regime change on the country. Gruevski and the Macedonians demonstrated that they will fight back and resist this aggression, which as was stated earlier, makes them the Syria of the Balkans in leading their regional anti-terror war. Hopefully, all comparisons can end there, although given the US template of chaos perfected in the Mideast, it's likely that the struggle might become prolonged and internationalized, especially because of NATO-member Albania and NATO-protectorate "Kosovo's" direct ideological and physical involvement.Punishing:
Macedonia's resistance to the unipolar Color Revolution and Unconventional War being unleashed against it is thus going to come with severe consequences. Judging by the NATO members' joint statement on Macedonia annunciated by the bloc's de-facto leader, the US, Macedonia isn't 'democratic' enough for their liking and doesn't embody the same Euro-Atlantic 'values', meaning that it's slated to undergo the Syrian and Ukrainian 'treatment' to remedy these 'ailments'. It was just explained how the country is defending against joint Color Revolution and Unconventional War offensives, but these indirect methods are expected to eventually evolve into a direct NATO war on Macedonia.
One such scenario could see a repeat of the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, but given Macedonia's relatively smaller size and the denser concentration of Albanians along the country's border with Greater Albania (Albania and "Kosovo"), a more militarily 'efficient' model will likely be deployed. This envisions conventional Albanian troops, under cover of NATO airstrikes (likely after the imposition of a 'no-fly' zone [always preceded by the destruction of the target country's air force]), entering Macedonia and occupying the majority-Albanian-populated areas under the false pretexts of 'humanitarian intervention', 'responsibility to protect', and/or hypocritical anti-terrorism operations. A complement to this scenario could see irredentist Bulgarian troops in the east assist them by exploiting the chaos to indefinitely occupy territory that their nationalist politicians claim is historically their own as NATO's reward for their earlier rejection of South Stream. Finally, a variation of both of these could see an Albanian and/or Bulgarian (joint) intervention supported by other NATO members that would fully occupy the country, change the government, alter the country's constitutional name, and then partition the state between the Albanian and Slavic Macedonians.
Concluding Thoughts
The West has unequivocally launched a dangerous information war against the Republic of Macedonia, once which carries with it the threat of increasing violence and possible military occupation. While the conventional information consumer may not be aware of the importance of syntax and inference in reporting on geopolitical events, the fact remains that it's an extremely pivotal factor in shaping the context and overall framework related to an event. From the snide inferences that the government brought last weekend's horrible act of terror upon itself to shameless attempts at downplaying the atrocious militancy of the terrorists, each of these information offensives carry with them associated consequences in setting up the aggressors' next move. By combating their falsehoods and proving the erroneousness of their assertions and intimations, individuals can learn the truth behind the terrorist attacks that the mass media is obscuring. The War on Macedonia isn't a 'civil war' or 'grassroots anti-government uprising', but is contrarily part of a largerWestern-supported proxy waragainst Russia and itsBalkan Stream pipeline, one which has unfortunately taken the small geostrategic country of over two million people hostage and made it the West's latest geopolitical target for execution.
Andrew Korybko is the political analyst and journalist for Sputnik who currently lives and studies in Moscow, exclusively for ORIENTAL REVIEW.
Russia accuses West of trying to destabilize Macedonia | Reuters
An little girl stand in front of her destroyed house in Kumanovo ,Macedonia May 12, 2015.
Reuters/Ognen Teofilovski
MOSCOW - Russia accused "Western organizers" on Saturday of trying to foment a "color revolution" in the troubled former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, where political tensions are building ahead of an opposition rally on Sunday.
"Color revolution" is a term often used to describe popular uprisings in the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine, where Moscow also accuses the West of deliberately meddling in local politics to further its interests.
In a statement on the Macedonian crisis, Russia's foreign ministry cited Serbian media reports about the arrest of a citizen of Montenegro accused of helping what Moscow called "Albanian extremists" operating in Macedonia.
"(This is) convincing evidence ... of attempts to push the country into the abyss of 'color revolution'," it said.
"This is also evidence that Western organizers of such catastrophic scenarios prefer to realize them with the hands of others," the ministry said, drawing a parallel with Ukraine.
Moscow accuses the West of helping to engineer the overthrow of Ukraine's pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich after mass street protests in early 2014. He then fled to Russia.
In Macedonia, opponents of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski plan to hold a rally on Sunday to demand his resignation over wire-tap disclosures that appear to indicate widespread abuse of office by senior government officials.
The small Balkan state is also reeling from a bloody gun
battle last weekend during a police raid on an ethnic Albanian neighborhood of northern Macedonia that left 18 people dead -- 10 ethnic Albanians described by the government as "terrorists" and eight policemen.
The European Union and NATO have called for a transparent investigation into last week's killings.
Russia has often been critical of Western policy in the Balkans. It strongly backed the Serbs -- fellow Orthodox Christian Slavs -- in their conflict with their mainly Muslim ethnic Albanian minority in the 1990s.
Moscow opposed granting independence to Kosovo, formerly a Serbian province with a mainly ethnic Albanian population. Macedonia, just to the south of Kosovo, is also home to a large ethnic Albanian minority.
(Reporting by Jason Bush; Editing by Gareth Jones)
Tiny Macedonia Confronts a Supersize Scandal - NYTimes.com
PhotoPrime Minister Nikola Gruevski addressed Parliament in Skopje on Wednesday after the resignation of two cabinet ministers and a state security official.Credit Boris Grdanoski/Associated PressSKOPJE, Macedonia '-- An almost surreal scandal involving hundreds of thousands of secretly recorded conversations caught top government officials discussing everything from rigging votes to covering up killings.
Two ministers and the head of the secret services have resigned. Thousands have taken to the streets demanding the right-wing government's ouster. And last weekend, 25 miles north of the capital, a sudden burst of bloodshed left eight police officers and 14 ''terrorists'' dead and others wondering why it had happened, and why now.
Macedonia, a country about the size of Vermont with two million residents, an increasingly nationalistic temperament and a history that goes back only 24 years, is on the edge of cracking.
Once seen as a shining light among former Communist states, Macedonia has slowly, over the last decade, slipped into authoritarian rule under a party that has curtailed press rights, emboldened security forces, dominated the judiciary and once even ejected the opposition from Parliament.
PhotoAlbanians in Pristina, Kosovo, lit candles on Tuesday and displayed photos of destruction after fighting over the weekend in Kumanovo, Macedonia. Officials said more than 30 insurgents from Kosovo and Macedonia surrendered to the police.Credit Armend Nimani/Agence France-Presse '-- Getty ImagesAnd since Macedonia, with its volatile ethnic mix, sits at the crossroads of countless Balkan conflicts, and along one possible path of a proposed Russian natural gas pipeline, Western governments are paying close attention to its turbulent swirl of events and the steady flow of rumors and conspiracy theories.
''People don't laugh much about conspiracy theories here in the Balkans,'' said Marko Trosanovski, managing director of the Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis, a nongovernmental research group in Skopje, the capital. ''They have learned to take them seriously.''
Sweltering in a spring heat wave and ringed by mountains, some bearing the last shawls of snow, Skopje is perhaps the most idiosyncratic of European capitals.
In a burst of nationalistic energy, the powerful prime minister, Nikola Gruevski, embarked on an immense building program, only now coming to completion, lining the capital's riverfront with neo-Classical behemoths. Dozens of new statues fill nearly every public space.
But his efforts to build a movie-set version of a nation in the wreckage of the Soviet empire have been undercut by the recent events. For three months, the leftist opposition has been releasing a stream of what it calls ''bombs,'' snippets of recordings from 670,000 conversations from more than 20,000 telephone numbers secretly recorded by the government between 2007 and 2013 and leaked to them, they say, by patriotic civil servants.
The targets of the wiretaps were journalists, clerics, activists and foreign diplomats, but also some top officials in the government. Even the widely admired, and widely feared, Mr. Gruevski makes the occasional appearance, when he happens to be on the phone with one of the wiretap targets.
There have been 31 such disclosures since February, and a few more are promised before a mass protest scheduled for Sunday in Skopje. So far, no one has denied that the recordings are authentic, although the government insists that some have been taken out of context and severely edited.
Instead, the government has denied making the recordings, saying it was the handiwork of the ''intelligence service'' of some unnamed foreign country working with accomplices in the Interior Ministry to topple the government.
Six people, including a former chief of the secret services, have been imprisoned and charged with making and leaking the tapes, and Zoran Zaev, the opposition leader who has been spearheading the ''bombs'' campaign, has been charged with threatening violence against Mr. Gruevski.
But what has struck people almost as much as the content of the conversations is the tone, the callous way government ministers plot to punish their enemies. In one tape, the head of the secret police, who is also the prime minister's cousin, gleefully talks about having a political opponent raped in prison.
''They are so vulgar,'' said Jabir Deralla, president of a local human rights and elections-monitoring group called Civil. ''How easily they speak about human life and death.''
Neither Mr. Gruevski nor any of his top aides agreed to be interviewed.
But Aleksandar Pandov, a political analyst who is a former member of Parliament for the ruling party and who fervently supports the government, explained its view of the scandal.
''You may hear something that is maybe vulgar, but not evidence of a crime,'' he said. ''There are cuts in the conversations, things taken out of context. We do not know whether some of the things they were discussing actually happened.''
Mr. Pandov said the way forward was for those caught making intemperate comments to leave the government, anyone found guilty in the case to go to prison and Mr. Gruevski to remain in power.
''The whole situation is trending towards its conclusion,'' Mr. Pandov said.
For now, the opposition is feeling emboldened. In an interview, Mr. Zaev sat behind a long conference room table, gleaming with polish, and declined to go too deeply into the tactics for Sunday's rally '-- which he says will include many groups, not just his party members, and will draw around 70,000 people, maybe more.
He hinted that human cordons might be used to surround important government ministries and to block bridges, and that the protests would continue.
''We will use the Gandhi system,'' he said. ''We will make the whole process absurd.''
The resignation of the ministers of transport and interior and the security service chief does not change the plan, Mr. Zaev said in a Facebook post. If anything, it confirms what the opposition has been saying and the need to proceed, he said.
''It is not time to celebrate,'' Mr. Zaev said. ''It is only one more step towards the end of Nikola Gruevski's rule.''
Meanwhile, the first appearance of what the government is calling ''Albanian terrorists'' occurred last month, when a group was said to have seized a border watchtower on the Kosovo frontier and briefly taken four Macedonian officials hostage. The region had been the site of heavy fighting involving Albanian nationalists in 2001, but had calmed down since.
Many critics of the government scoffed, finding it suspiciously bloodless and conveniently timed to distract from the wiretapping scandal, but government officials insisted that it was a genuine threat from a well-trained gang of ethnic Albanians.
Last weekend's episode, though, in the Diva Naselba, or ''Wild Settlement,'' neighborhood of Kumanovo was markedly different. The town was sealed off and gunfire could be heard through the weekend. In the end, officials said, more than 30 insurgents from Kosovo and Macedonia surrendered to the police.
Mr. Gruevski said the group was plotting to attack public buildings and shopping malls in Macedonia, hoping to destabilize the government, and called for two days of national mourning. The opposition temporarily suspended the protests. But suspicions persisted that this was somehow orchestrated, or exploited, to distract attention from the scandal.
In a joint statement, the United States Embassy in Skopje, NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe called the episode ''an isolated phenomenon'' and urged the government to face up to its political crisis and enact much-needed changes.
Gordan Kalajdziev, president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia, said the core problem was that Macedonians had little experience with democracy and scant understanding of notions like checks and balances. The government, he suggested, has little incentive to change course or give up power.
''They will not resign because they know that if they do resign, they will be prosecuted,'' he said.
Mr. Pandov said the government was unconcerned about Sunday's planned demonstration or any of the protests that have taken place. ''The ruling party will have its own gathering later, and it will show whose support is greater,'' he said.
On one recent day, the first protesters gathered outside the main government building around 6 p.m., when the fierce sun was just losing its heat. They were a mix of ages, though predominantly young people. ''Resign!'' they shouted. When the police refused to allow them forward, the crowd of about 1,000 turned and began marching toward the Parliament building on the far side of the city center. ''Come with us!'' they shouted to pedestrians, and some did.
The crowd had swelled to about 5,000 by the time it reached the Parliament building. Another line of riot police officers waited for them there.
''I am not a member of any political party,'' said Tashe Strezovski, 28, who works at Skopje's airport. ''Neither are many of these people. We are just ordinary citizens who love their country.''
The only acceptable outcome, he said, is for Mr. Gruevski to step down.
''I am not afraid,'' Mr. Strezovski said. ''No one is afraid anymore. This government, it is demystified.''
Correction: May 16, 2015An earlier version of this article referred imprecisely to Macedonia. It was formed in 1991 as the Soviet Union disintegrated, but it had previously been part of Yugoslavia, not the Soviet Union.
Aleksandar Dimishkovski contributed reporting.
A version of this article appears in print on May 15, 2015, on page A4 of the New York edition with the headline: Secret Recordings Shake Macedonian Government .
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The new rally with violence will be held on 17 May | Macedonian News Agency | Kurir.mk
Zaev and SDSM rally, announced for 17 May is rally for saving the careers of its leadership and above all, the party leader.
It is certain that after the debacle achieved with political bombs and their failure to change the mood of the citizens, which is basically huge manipulation that has not passed, and revealing the plan for destabilization of Zaev will go on either all or nothing on the rally on 17. In public and in some media are already widely spread current information that SDSM is preparing for violent protests. For this purpose, SDSM already mobilized the membership with focus on collecting abusers and people with multiple file of offenders and former prisoners with series of crimes.
Something similar, but on smaller scale did on the protests on 5 before the Government where the great ones in the violence against the police were people with extensive criminal record. Their task for 17 is to lead groups should withdraw the mass of people and create incidents.
There are rumors that at the entrance to Skopje are already provided several truckloads with tools for fight i.e. stones, sticks, shingles, tiles and paving bricks and will welcome the groups that will arrive for the protest.
The already published part of the plan, several of these groups will be separated from the crowd that according the scenario will march on the main streets of Skopje and will begin rampage, in terms of breaking few shop windows and screaming toward the police that will provide the ground.
Despite police on target will be several state institutions with plan to forcibly take over. Mobilized are fans groups close to the SDSM and are called to help people from abroad, which are paid by the Soros Foundation with vast experience of making violent protests and creating chaos.
Ðhere are rumors that certain structures SDSM obtained weapons with firepower that is not exclude from being used on 17.
To get to all this SDSM has already made big field preparations in terms of maximum activation of the teams for violence for which there were photos in public while they were exercising at the headquarters of SDSM preparing for a fight and violence. Militant psychosis that is done by SDSM for the protests on 17th is seen in the information for making lists of people who are labeled as the strongest with rich criminal record and should practice violence and would practically sacrifice for SDSM and Zaev. Experts and people who follow such scenarios in regional context, especially the Ukrainian scenario is not excluded shooting on 17th by the armed mercenaries SDSM in order to create chaos.
The media already were reporting for very close ties and staggering indicative moments that SDSM and Zaev are part of the scenario of the terrorist group in Kumanovo and therefore does not exclude support of those militant Albanians who would play important role in implementing the script for violent protest of SDSM on May 17.
From what is known so far, the terrorist group that was cracked in Kumanovo had plan to act with terrorist acts precisely in the days when SDSM should hold the announced protest. Police in that case would be focused on gathering and terrorists would implement their plans. SDSM in way, excused the terrorist group for the attack on police station in Goshince for which claimed to be part of the scenario, and later, after previous confessions of the arrested terrorists themselves recognize where they have buried stolen weapons.
SDSM violent protests planned for May 17gets great help from the Soros Foundation that is here for financial support of the organization. Such gathering is estimated to cost half a million to a million euro, given the financial power of Soros, it will not present be problem.
On the other hand, SDSM is faced with low turnout and the rejection of the sobering membership SDSM who does not want to come out to protest and be part of the violence and the battle for personal salvation of Zaev, because there where SDSM is in power in Kumanovo, Strumica and supported by the Municipality Centar is making mass mobilization and lists of compulsory presence at the rally.
The pressures were so great, they yelled to the employees that the expulsion from work is the best solution, a penalty that will happen and that for their passivity can be punish even their loved ones. While estimates were if can collect all the means at their disposal, barely 10 thousand that would be a success which they would show at least 4 times more.
Macedonia: Western-sponsored opposition announces non-stop protests until the current government resigns -- Puppet Masters -- Sott.net
After Sunday's anti-government rally, thousands of opposition activists will camp out in front of the government HQ in Skopje until Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski resigns, the opposition said.Opposition Social Democrats, SDSM leader Zoran Zaev told a press conference on Friday that after the planned mass rally, a non-stop sit-in protest will maintain the pressure on Gruevski and his government.
"Some 4,600 activists have decided on their own initiative to sleep out in front of the government building and to continue the protest. Knowing that we are not the only organizers of this protest, we have decided that we will remain until the end, until Gruevski resigns," he said.
Zaev said his party was doing all it could to ensure a peaceful protest on Sunday and foil any attempts to provoke violence and incriminate the opposition.
"All SDSM members have got instructions to record every possible violent act. Let us open our eyes so that no one can frame us," Zaev said.
Tens of thousands of people - not just SDSM supporters, but also supporters of other smaller parties, both Macedonian and Albanian, as well as human rights activists, workers' unions, and students', professors' and teachers' movements - are expected to attend the rally on Sunday.At Friday's press conference, the opposition released the latest in a series of wiretapped conversations allegedly between government officials which have sparked a mass surveillance scandal in the country and highlighted claims of corruption and other serious wrongdoing within Gruevski's administration.The new tapes, the opposition claimed, illustrate the brutality and malice of senior state officials as well as their hatred towards the country's large Albanian minority.The tapes involve the alleged voices of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, outgoing Transportation Minister Mile Janakieski, outgoing interior minister Gordana Jankulovska, the PM's chief of staff Martin Protugjer, outgoing secret police chief Saso Mijalkov and police spokesperson Ivo Kotevski.
In one tape, the voices of Mijalkov and Jankuloska are allegedly heard plotting how to retaliate against a police officer who came out to protest against the arrest of rightist opposition leader Ljube Boskoski.
"Let's sack him," Jankuloska appears to suggest. "We should put him in the worst possible place," Mijalkov says.
In another tape, what is alleged to be the voice of the Prime Minister is heard instructing Transport Minister Janakieski to prepare to tear down a small park in central Skopje so that a new building, part of Gruevski's grand makeover plan of the capital dubbed 'Skopje 2014', can be erected.
After Janakieski warns that local residents may complain, Gruevski instructs him to check whether they are ruling party voters or not. "If they are 'commies' [a derogatory word for the opposition members], fuck them," Gruevski says.
The tapes also allegedly reveal that the Prime Minister's former chief of security, Dejan Mitrevski Urko, as well as several other high-ranking police officials have been picking up fights, brutally beating people up and even pulling guns on people for no reason.
Protugjer's voice is heard in one tape suggesting that Dragan Pavlovic, the chief editor of Sitel TV and one of the most prominent pro-government reporters, should be killed for allegedly working for Serbian interests.
"I will kill him! About ten people in this country should be killed so that all is well afterwards," Protugjer is heard saying.
In another recoording, Protugjer tells Jankulovska that he wants to visit the critically-inclined journalist Zoran Bozinovski in jail after the Serbian authorities arrest him and send him to Macedonia.
"Can I pay him a visit while the camera is turned off?" he asks Jankuloska, suggesting that she should put the journalist "in a cell together with some gypsy who has homosexual tendencies".
According to the opposition, another three conversations between Jankuloska and Kotevski reveal their plan how to exploit for media purposes the underage daughter of a policemen who was charged and later convicted of killing two people, both ethnic Albanians, in the town in Gostivar, so that they can stop a scandal hitting the police.
"It should be utterly pathetic," Kotevski explains as the two plot which journalists to engage to do the story and how the story should have the shocked girl as a central character, so that ethnic Macedonians sympathise with her ordeal.
The latest batch of tapes, the opposition said, show the government's hypocrisy when it talks about strengthening inter-ethnic relations and coexistence between the country's Macedonians and Albanians.
According to the opposition, in a conversation about the employment of Albanians in the police, Gordana Jankuloska and Saso Mijalkov are heard suggesting that the solution for the country's inter-ethnic issues with the Albanian minority is another armed conflict.
"There is a solution, but unfortunately we do not have a national consensus," Mijalkov says to which Jankuloska replies: "I support that kind of solution, to be honest". She adds that she thinks it would be good if "we settle things once and for all".
"There is no coexistence with them [Albanians]," Jankuloska tells Protugjer. He suggests: "What if we have a war?" Jankuloska responds: "If we were to show who is stronger, we would deal with them in an hour."
Zaev said that the tapes show that "this government is working to destroy [ethnic] coexistence in this country".
"Most people in Macedonia from all backgrounds do not think like this. They have one problem, and that problem is Nikola Gruevski," he said.
On April 26 Russia's main national TV station, Rossiya 1, featured President Vladimir Putin in a documentary to the Russian people on the events of the recent period including the annexation of Crimea, the US coup d'etat in Ukraine, and the general state of relations with the United States and the EU. His words were frank. And in the middle of his remarks the Russian former KGB chief dropped a political bombshell that was known by Russian intelligence two decades ago.
Putin stated bluntly that in his view the West would only be content in having a Russia weak, suffering and begging from the West, something clearly the Russian character is not disposed to. Then a short way into his remarks, the Russian President stated for the first time publicly something that Russian intelligence has known for almost two decades but kept silent until now, most probably in hopes of an era of better normalized Russia-US relations.
Putin stated that the terror in Chechnya and in the Russian Caucasus in the early 1990's was actively backed by the CIA and western Intelligence services to deliberately weaken Russia. He noted that the Russian FSB foreign intelligence had documentation of the US covert role without giving details.
What Putin, an intelligence professional of the highest order, only hinted at in his remarks, I have documented in detail from non-Russian sources. The report has enormous implications to reveal to the world the long-standing hidden agenda of influential circles in Washington to destroy Russia as a functioning sovereign state, an agenda which includes the neo-nazi coup d'etat in Ukraine and severe financial sanction warfare against Moscow. The following is drawn on my book, Amerikas' Heilige Krieg.
CIA's Chechen Wars
Not long after the CIA and Saudi Intelligence-financed Mujahideen had devastated Afghanistan at the end of the 1980's, forcing the exit of the Soviet Army in 1989, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself some months later, the CIA began to look at possible places in the collapsing Soviet Union where their trained ''Afghan Arabs'' could be redeployed to further destabilize Russian influence over the post-Soviet Eurasian space.
They were called Afghan Arabs because they had been recruited from ultraconservative Wahhabite Sunni Muslims from Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and elsewhere in the Arab world where the ultra-strict Wahhabite Islam was practiced. They were brought to Afghanistan in the early 1980's by a Saudi CIA recruit who had been sent to Afghanistan named Osama bin Laden.
With the former Soviet Union in total chaos and disarray, George H.W. Bush's Administration decided to ''kick 'em when they're down,'' a sad error. Washington redeployed their Afghan veteran terrorists to bring chaos and destabilize all of Central Asia, even into the Russian Federation itself, then in a deep and traumatic crisis during the economic collapse of the Yeltsin era.
In the early 1990s, Dick Cheney's company, Halliburton, had surveyed the offshore oil potentials of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and the entire Caspian Sea Basin. They estimated the region to be ''another Saudi Arabia'' worth several trillion dollars on today's market. The US and UK were determined to keep that oil bonanza from Russian control by all means. The first target of Washington was to stage a coup in Azerbaijan against elected president Abulfaz Elchibey to install a President more friendly to a US-controlled Baku''Tbilisi''Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, ''the world's most political pipeline,'' bringing Baku oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey and the Mediterranean.
At that time, the only existing oil pipeline from Baku was a Soviet era Russian pipeline that ran through the Chechen capital, Grozny, taking Baku oil north via Russia's Dagestan province, and across Chechenya to the Black Sea Russian port of Novorossiysk. The pipeline was the only competition and major obstacle to the very costly alternative route of Washington and the British and US oil majors.
President Bush Sr. gave his old friends at CIA the mandate to destroy that Russian Chechen pipeline and create such chaos in the Caucasus that no Western or Russian company would consider using the Grozny Russian oil pipeline.
Graham E. Fuller, an old colleague of Bush and former Deputy Director of the CIA National Council on Intelligence had been a key architect of the CIA Mujahideen strategy. Fuller described the CIA strategy in the Caucasus in the early 1990s: ''The policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of helping them against our adversaries worked marvelously well in Afghanistan against the Red Army. The same doctrines can still be used to destabilize what remains of Russian power.''6
The CIA used a dirty tricks veteran, General Richard Secord, for the operation. Secord created a CIA front company, MEGA Oil. Secord had been convicted in the 1980s for his central role in the CIA's Iran-Contra illegal arms and drugs operations.
In 1991 Secord, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, landed in Baku and set up the CIA front company, MEGA Oil. He was a veteran of the CIA covert opium operations in Laos during the Vietnam War. In Azerbaijan, he setup an airline to secretly fly hundreds of bin Laden's al-Qaeda Mujahideen from Afghanistan into Azerbaijan. By 1993, MEGA Oil had recruited and armed 2,000 Mujahideen, converting Baku into a base for Caucasus-wide Mujahideen terrorist operations.
General Secord's covert Mujahideen operation in the Caucasus initiated the military coup that toppled elected president Abulfaz Elchibey that year and installed Heydar Aliyev, a more pliable US puppet. A secret Turkish intelligence report leaked to the Sunday Times of London confirmed that ''two petrol giants, BP and Amoco, British and American respectively, which together form the AIOC (Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium), are behind the coup d'(C)tat.''
Saudi Intelligence head, Turki al-Faisal, arranged that his agent, Osama bin Laden, whom he had sent to Afghanistan at the start of the Afghan war in the early 1980s, would use his Afghan organization Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) to recruit ''Afghan Arabs'' for what was rapidly becoming a global Jihad. Bin Laden's mercenaries were used as shock troops by the Pentagon and CIA to coordinate and support Muslim offensives not only Azerbaijan but also in Chechnya and, later, Bosnia.
Bin Laden brought in another Saudi, Ibn al-Khattab, to become Commander, or Emir of Jihadist Mujahideen in Chechnya (sic!) together with Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev. No matter that Ibn al-Khattab was a Saudi Arab who spoke barely a word of Chechen, let alone, Russian. He knew what Russian soldiers looked like and how to kill them.
Chechnya then was traditionally a predominantly Sufi society, a mild apolitical branch of Islam. Yet the increasing infiltration of the well-financed and well-trained US-sponsored Mujahideen terrorists preaching Jihad or Holy War against Russians transformed the initially reformist Chechen resistance movement. They spread al-Qaeda's hardline Islamist ideology across the Caucasus. Under Secord's guidance, Mujahideen terrorist operations had also quickly extended into neighboring Dagestan and Chechnya, turning Baku into a shipping point for Afghan heroin to the Chechen mafia.
From the mid-1990s, bin Laden paid Chechen guerrilla leaders Shamil Basayev and Omar ibn al-Khattab the handsome sum of several million dollars per month, a King's fortune in economically desolate Chechnya in the 1990s, enabling them to sideline the moderate Chechen majority.21 US intelligence remained deeply involved in the Chechen conflict until the end of the 1990s. According to Yossef Bodansky, then Director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Washington was actively involved in ''yet another anti-Russian jihad, seeking to support and empower the most virulent anti-Western Islamist forces.''
Bodansky revealed the entire CIA Caucasus strategy in detail in his report, stating that US Government officials participated in,
''a formal meeting in Azerbaijan in December 1999 in which specific programs for the training and equipping of Mujahideen from the Caucasus, Central/South Asia and the Arab world were discussed and agreed upon, culminating in Washington's tacit encouragement of both Muslim allies (mainly Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and US 'private security companies'. . . to assist the Chechens and their Islamist allies to surge in the spring of 2000 and sustain the ensuing Jihad for a long time'...Islamist Jihad in the Caucasus as a way to deprive Russia of a viable pipeline route through spiraling violence and terrorism.''
The most intense phase of the Chechen wars wound down in 2000 only after heavy Russian military action defeated the Islamists. It was a pyrrhic victory, costing a massive toll in human life and destruction of entire cities. The exact death toll from the CIA-instigated Chechen conflict is unknown. Unofficial estimates ranged from 25,000 to 50,000 dead or missing, mostly civilians. Russian casualties were near 11,000 according to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.
The Anglo-American oil majors and the CIA's operatives were happy. They had what they wanted: their Baku''Tbilisi''Ceyhan oil pipeline, bypassing Russia's Grozny pipeline.
The Chechen Jihadists, under the Islamic command of Shamil Basayev, continued guerrilla attacks in and outside Chechnya. The CIA had refocused into the Caucasus.
Basayev's Saudi Connection
Basayev was a key part of the CIA's Global Jihad. In 1992, he met Saudi terrorist Ibn al-Khattag in Azerbaijan. From Azerbaijan, Ibn al-Khattab brought Basayev to Afghanistan to meet al-Khattab's ally, fellow-Saudi Osama bin Laden. Ibn al-Khattab's role was to recruit Chechen Muslims willing to wage Jihad against Russian forces in Chechnya on behalf of the covert CIA strategy of destabilizing post-Soviet Russia and securing British-US control over Caspian energy.
Once back in Chechnya, Basayev and al-Khattab created the International Islamic Brigade (IIB) with Saudi Intelligence money, approved by the CIA and coordinated through the liaison of Saudi Washington Ambassador and Bush family intimate Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Bandar, Saudi Washington Ambassador for more than two decades, was so intimate with the Bush family that George W. Bush referred to the playboy Saudi Ambassador as ''Bandar Bush,'' a kind of honorary family member.
Basayev and al-Khattab imported fighters from the Saudi fanatical Wahhabite strain of Sunni Islam into Chechnya. Ibn al-Khattab commanded what were called the ''Arab Mujahideen in Chechnya,'' his own private army of Arabs, Turks, and other foreign fighters. He was also commissioned to set up paramilitary training camps in the Caucasus Mountains of Chechnya that trained Chechens and Muslims from the North Caucasian Russian republics and from Central Asia.
The Saudi and CIA-financed Islamic International Brigade was responsible not only for terror in Chechnya. They carried out the October 2002 Moscow Dubrovka Theatre hostage seizure and the gruesome September 2004 Beslan school massacre. In 2010, the UN Security Council published the following report on al-Khattab and Basayev's International Islamic Brigade:
Islamic International Brigade (IIB) was listed on 4 March 2003. . . as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban for ''participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of'' Al-Qaida. . . The Islamic International Brigade (IIB) was founded and led by Shamil Salmanovich Basayev (deceased) and is linked to the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM). . . and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR). . .
On the evening of 23 October 2002, members of IIB, RSRSBCM and SPIR operated jointly to seize over 800 hostages at Moscow's Podshipnikov Zavod (Dubrovka) Theater.
In October 1999, emissaries of Basayev and Al-Khattab traveled to Usama bin Laden's home base in the Afghan province of Kandahar, where Bin Laden agreed to provide substantial military assistance and financial aid, including by making arrangements to send to Chechnya several hundred fighters to fight against Russian troops and perpetrate acts of terrorism. Later that year, Bin Laden sent substantial amounts of money to Basayev, Movsar Barayev (leader of SPIR) and Al-Khattab, which was to be used exclusively for training gunmen, recruiting mercenaries and buying ammunition.
The Afghan-Caucasus Al Qaeda ''terrorist railway,'' financed by Saudi intelligence, had two goals. One was a Saudi goal to spread fanatical Wahhabite Jihad into the Central Asian region of the former Soviet Union. The second was the CIA's agenda of destabilizing a then-collapsing post-Soviet Russian Federation.
Beslan
On September 1, 2004, armed terrorists from Basayev and al-Khattab's IIB took more than 1,100 people as hostages in a siege that included 777 children, and forced them into School Number One (SNO) in Beslan in North Ossetia, the autonomous republic in the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation near to the Georgia border.
On the third day of the hostage crisis, as explosions were heard inside the school, FSB and other elite Russian troops stormed the building. In the end, at least 334 hostages were killed, including 186 children, with a significant number of people injured and reported missing. It became clear afterward that the Russian forces had handled the intervention poorly.
The Washington propaganda machine, from Radio Free Europe to The New York Times and CNN, wasted no time demonizing Putin and Russia for their bad handling of the Beslan crisis rather than focus on the links of Basayev to Al Qaeda and Saudi intelligence. That would have brought the world's attention to the intimate relations between the family of then US President George W. Bush and the Saudi billionaire bin Laden family.
On September 1, 2001, just ten days before the day of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, Saudi Intelligence head US-educated Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, who had directed Saudi Intelligence since 1977, including through the entire Osama bin Laden Mujahideen operation in Afghanistan and into the Caucasus, abruptly and inexplicably resigned, just days after having accepted a new term as intelligence head from his King. He gave no explanation. He was quickly reposted to London, away from Washington.
The record of the bin Laden-Bush family intimate ties was buried, in fact entirely deleted on ''national security'' (sic!) grounds in the official US Commission Report on 911. The Saudi background of fourteen of the nineteen alleged 911 terrorists in New York and Washington was also deleted from the US Government's final 911 Commission report, released only in July 2004 by the Bush Administration, almost three years after the events.
Basayev claimed credit for having sent the terrorists to Beslan. His demands had included the complete independence of Chechnya from Russia, something that would have given Washington and the Pentagon an enormous strategic dagger in the southern underbelly of the Russian Federation.
By late 2004, in the aftermath of the tragic Beslan drama, President Vladimir Putin reportedly ordered a secret search and destroy mission by Russian intelligence to hunt and kill key leaders of the Caucasus Mujahideen of Basayev. Al-Khattab had been killed in 2002. The Russian security forces soon discovered that most of the Chechen Afghan Arab terrorists had fled. They had gotten safe haven in Turkey, a NATO member; in Azerbaijan, by then almost a NATO Member; or in Germany, a NATO Member; or in Dubai''one of the closest US Allies in the Arab States, and Qatar-another very close US ally. In other words, the Chechen terrorists were given NATO safe haven.
F. William Engdahl is strategic risk consultant and lecturer, he holds a degree in politics from Princeton University and is a best-selling author on oil and geopolitics, exclusively for the online magazine ''New Eastern Outlook''.
(C) Reuters/Bogdan CristelA view of U.S. Navy cruiser Vella Gulf in the Black Sea port of Constanta June 5, 2014.
While the war in Ukraine has raged on for more than a year, the growing conflict between the US-NATO and Russia has taken on new dimensions. From economic warfare waged by the West in the form of sanctions, to the diplomatic rows over the commemoration of Victory Day in Moscow, more and more it seems that relations between East and West are fraying beyond repair. Though it may seem that this conflict is escalating into simply an extension of what was once known as the Cold War, the potential exists for a hot war of global dimensions.Lost amid the cacophony of saber-rattling and chest-thumping in Washington and Brussels is the quietly emerging, and infinitely dangerous, military deployment in the Black Sea. Once seen as a no-go zone for the US and NATO, the Black Sea, with its expansive Russian shores, has recently become the site of a slew of provocative military moves by the US, and equally significant counter-moves by Russia. Adding fuel to this potential fire is the participation of Chinese naval assets in this quietly brewing cocktail of global conflict.
The presence of US military assets all throughout the Black Sea region is undoubtedly provocative as it is pushing perilously close to Russia's borders. The potential for escalation - premeditated or otherwise - puts the entire region, and indeed the entire world, at risk of catastrophe.
This article will focus on the US-NATO military developments in and around the Black Sea. While by no means a comprehensive listing of all of Washington's moves in the region, it is an attempt to provide a glimpse into a little discussed theater of deployment for the West - one that is regarded as a very serious threat by Moscow.
Washington Swimming in the Black Sea
There is no doubt that US strategy vis- -vis Russia places tremendous strategic importance on maintaining and expanding a robust military presence in and around the Black Sea. Recent moves by the US-NATO military forces make this fact all the more apparent. Having deployed a significant amount of forces to littoral countries, as well as initiating a series of critical military exercises and drills, Washington is demonstrating unequivocally its commitment to escalating the conflict with Russia.
Nearly a year ago, in June 2014, former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel laid bare US intentions. In the wake of President Obama's publicannouncementof $1 billion to expand the US military presence in Eastern Europe, Hagelstatedthat the billion dollar commitment was for a "stronger presence of US ships in the Black Sea," and that "[The US] will sustain that tempo going forward." Put in slightly more understandable terminology, the US committed a significant monetary investment to the permanentexpansion of its military presence in and around the Black Sea.
The permanence of this new commitment is what is striking because, unlike much of the bluff and bluster from Washington over Ukraine and related issues, this represents a military deployment with real tactical value. It is not mere rhetoric, it is military escalation. And, in the year since the announcement was made, this process has evolved in earnest.
The US Army is currently, or will soon be, leading a series of critical military exercises in the Black Sea. One notable one is known as Noble Partner. This series of exercises is being conducted with the de facto NATO member Georgia which has effectively become a forward arm of NATO military forces. As the official page of the US Army noted:
Noble Partner will support Georgia's contribution of a light infantry company to NATO Response Force, or NRF... The exercise will focus on unified land operations ... Exercise Noble Partner provides an opportunity for the U.S. military to continue its training relationship with the Georgian Armed Forces as the sponsor of Georgia's participation in the NRF. The NRF provides a rapid military response force to deploy quickly, wherever needed.... Exercise Noble Partner will include approximately 600 U.S. and Georgian Service members incorporating a full range of equipment... Georgian forces will operate alongside U.S. forces with their BMP-2 Infantry Combat Vehicle. The exercise will consist of both a field training exercise and a live-fire exercise.
However, as part of the US military training, a significant amount of military hardware is being shuttled across the Black Sea in an unprecedented move by the US which has never so brazenly treated this body of water as its own backyard. As the US Army page wrote:Fourteen Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicles and several wheeled-support vehicles, roughly 748 metric tons of steel and rubber, cut across the Black Sea...bound for the port in Batumi, Georgia, May 2. This is the first time that the U.S. Army has deployed a mechanized company worth of equipment across the Black Sea. The equipment will support the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division Soldiers, participating in Exercise Noble Partner.
Taken in combination with Hagel's comments a year ago, it is clear that the US is committed to escalating its military presence in the Black Sea. Of course, it is self-evident that such a strategic development must be seen as an attempt to both outgun and intimidate Russia in its traditional sphere of influence.Additionally, and concurrent to these military exercises, is the planned Trident Joust 2015, which according to US Navy Admiral Mark Ferguson, will "test the capability of the NRF [NATO Response Force] command and control element to work at full operational capacity in a deployed location...TRIDENT JOUST 15...will reinforce the NATO Readiness Action Plan from the Wales Summit and project assurance measures to all NATO allies." Trident Joust should be understood as an attempt to prepare NATO's military architecture for possible rapid deployment in the Black Sea region, ostensibly as a defense against so-called Russian aggression while in reality seeking to expand NATO military capability against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and increased tensions with Moscow.
At no time during the Cold War did the US engage in such openly hostile and belligerent actions designed more to provoke than to defend. It seems the policy now is to both prepare for war and work to ensure that it comes to fruition. As if to make it even more transparent what Washignton's intentions are with Trident Joust, Admiral Ferguson was quoted as saying "I appreciate the efforts of Romania as we work on other measures to transform the Alliance, such as the formation of the Multinational Division Southeast and the NATO Force Integration Unit."
There are other important military moves that the US-NATO have made in the Black Sea in recent months, all designed to send a stern warning to Russia. NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) recently completed its training exercises "designed to improve interoperability and enhance rapid integration of Alliance maritime assets... The force trained on anti-air, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare procedures during separate exercises with the Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian navies." As part of SNMG2, NATO deployed significant military assets to the Romanian port of Constanta, not coincidentally a short distance across the Black Sea from Crimea and Russia's fleet at Sevastopol. Participating in the SNMG2 was the USS Vicksburg with its Mark 41 Vertical Launching System, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and arsenal of guns. In addition were Canadian, Italian, and Turkish warships, all carrying significant firepower of their own.
Aside from these specific sets of naval exercises, the US has had major assets in and around the Black Sea to participate in a series of one-off maneuvers and a variety of drills in the past year, even before Secretary Hagel's public announcement in June 2014. These include the recently decommissioned USS Taylor which spent much of 2014 in the Black Sea. Perhaps not so coincidentally, this US frigate is now slated for sale to Taiwan in a move that is likely to be met with disapproval in Beijing. Additionally, the USS Donald Cook, a missile destroyer, conducted exercises with the USS Taylor and Romanian Navy. Also, the USS Truxton and USS Vella Gulf both logged significant time in the Black Sea in 2014, undoubtedly motivating Russia to move quickly to ramp up its naval and military capabilities.
It is interesting to note that Russia's moves in Crimea in 2014 came within a matter of days of the entrance into the Black Sea of these US naval assets. Anyone who doubts that Moscow's decision to support Crimea's vote for reunification with the Russian Federation was motivated by something other than military and strategic pragmatism would do well to examine this timeline of events.
All of this makes plain that the US and its NATO arsenal are gearing up for a "pivot" - to borrow the grossly overused terminology of the Obama administration and the Pentagon - that will see their forces focused on the Black Sea, just as they have shifted attention to the Baltic Sea even more so in recent months. It does not take exceptional powers of deduction to see what the US intends: continued escalation, force preparedness, and intimidation against Moscow. However, it is equally apparent that such provocative moves raise the risk of a misstep, an accident or misunderstanding that could touch off a major military conflict. Considering the players involved, such a blunder could spark World War 3.A forthcoming article will focus on the countermoves that Russia is employing to confront US-NATO aggression near Russia's borders. The article will focus specifically on the fast-developing military relationship between Russia and China.
Eric Draitser is an independent geopolitical analyst based in New York City, he is the founder of StopImperialism.org and OP-ed columnist for RT, exclusively for the online magazine "New Eastern Outlook".
Exercise Noble Partner 2015 demonstrates bilateral cooperation | Article | The United States Army
Georgian Brig. Gen. Giorgi Surmava, middle, Operational Planning Department, Georgian Armed Forces, and Brig. Gen. John Hort, left, chief of operations, U.S. Army Europe, discuss the final details of Exercise Noble Partner during a planning conference...
Georgian Col. Giorgi Shengelia, left, commander, Georgian Armed Forces 1st Infantry Brigade, briefs Brig. Gen. John Hort, right, chief of operations, U.S. Army Europe, during a planning conference for Exercise Noble Partner in Vaziani, Georgia, March...
WIESBADEN, Germany (May 1, 2015) -- U.S. Army and Republic of Georgia Soldiers will train together as part of Exercise Noble Partner at the Vaziani Training Area in Georgia, May 11-25. Noble Partner is a new exercise, and part of Army Europe's continuing military-to-military relationship with Georgia.
Noble Partner will support Georgia's contribution of a light infantry company to NATO Response Force, or NRF, 2015 and 2016. The exercise will focus on unified land operations and is based on NATO standard operating procedures.
The exercise is a bilateral effort focused on enhancing U.S. and Georgian NRF interoperability in the context of military-to-military relationships.
U.S. participation includes a mechanized infantry company, from 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, which is part of the U.S. Army's regionally-aligned force and the U.S. contribution to NRF 2015. Additional forces from Army Europe include a rifle company of paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade.
Exercise Noble Partner provides an opportunity for the U.S. military to continue its training relationship with the Georgian Armed Forces as the sponsor of Georgia's participation in the NRF. The NRF provides a rapid military response force to deploy quickly, wherever needed. In addition to its operational role, the NRF can be used for disaster relief and greater cooperation in education and training.
Exercise Noble Partner will include approximately 600 U.S. and Georgian Service members incorporating a full range of equipment, including the U.S. Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and several wheeled-support vehicles. Georgian forces will operate alongside U.S. forces with their BMP-2 Infantry Combat Vehicle. The exercise will consist of both a field training exercise and a live-fire exercise. The 173rd Airborne will also partner with Georgian forces for airborne operations as part of the training.
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About us: U.S. Army Europe is uniquely positioned in its 51 country area of responsibility to advance American strategic interests in Europe and Eurasia. The relationships we build during more than 1,000 theater security cooperation events in more than 40 countries each year lead directly to support for multinational contingency operations around the world, strengthen regional partnerships and enhance global security.
NAPLES, Italy - Allied Joint Force Command Naples personnel conducted mission rehearsal training 11 to 15 May, 2015, for the upcoming exercise TRIDENT JOUST 15.
The mission rehearsal training prepared members of JFC Naples for the upcoming NATO Response Force exercise, in which the headquarters will execute a change of control from Naples to its deployed exercise location in Cincu, Romania.
"TRIDENT JOUST will be a very demanding exercise," said Italian Army Lieutenant General Leonardo di Marco, JFC Naples Chief of Staff. "We are the first headquarters in NATO who has ever exercised the change of control."
Members of JFC Naples received information about the upcoming exercise, as well as simulated key procedures for the deployment.
The ultimate aim of the mission rehearsal was to ensure sound processes and identify all deployment requirements for the upcoming exercise.
TRIDENT JOUST 15 is scheduled to take place in June, and is part of a larger series of exercises called ALLIED SHIELD.
Twenty one nations and more than 1,000 personnel will participate in TRIDENT JOUST 15, which will reinforce the NATO Readiness Action Plan from the Wales Summit and project assurance measures to all NATO allies.
Story and photos by Allied Joint Force Command Naples Public Affairs
Nato to begin Allied Shield series of exercises next month - Naval Technology
Nato and its allies are set to conduct training events, called as the Allied Shield series of exercises, in June this year.
This military training programme will include Exercise Noble Jump, which is the first training deployment of Allied units under the new very high-readiness joint task force (VJTF) framework.
Noble Jump is aimed to test the deployment and employment of forces in a field training environment. It will test the alert procedures and deployment capabilities of the units that participated in the alert exercise conducted in April.
This training series also include Baltops, an allied naval exercise in Poland, Saber Strike, a significant land exercise in the Baltic States, as well as Trident Joust, a NRF command and control exercise in Romania.
Baltops exercise will focus on maritime and amphibious operations. Training under the programme will include maritime interdiction operations, boarding and search / seizure operations, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air, anti-surface warfare, maritime helicopter operations and amphibious landings.
"Noble Jump is aimed to test the deployment and employment of forces in a field training environment."
Saber Strike is a company level field training exercise (FTX) and brigade level command post exercise (CPX), aimed to promote regional stability and security, strengthen partner capacity.
Trident Joust is intended to offer continuation training for Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples, and to maintain NRF level of proficiency as well as demonstrate capability to plan and execute operations.
According to Allied Command Operations, this military exercise will see the involvement of approximately 11,000 troops from 19 different Allies and three partner nations.
These training events are part of Nato's assurance measures in response to challenges on its southern and eastern periphery, focusing on improving interoperability, readiness and responsiveness among Allied and partner nations.
Image: Noble Justification special operations teams carry out a simulated raid in AAV7 Armored Amphibious Vehicles during Nato exercise. Photo: courtesy of MARCOM Photo by Adjudant Cedric Artigues, FRAF.
Security researcher Chris Roberts. Photo: Fox News
A security researcher hijacked an airplane's engines after hacking its in-flight entertainment systems, according to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Chris Roberts, a well-known US security researcher, told FBI agents in February that he'd hacked in-flight entertainment systems on over a dozen flights and on one occasion hijacked an aircraft's thrust management computer and briefly altered its course.
"[Roberts] stated that he thereby caused one of the airplane engines to climb resulting in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of these flights," FBI agent Mark Hurley wrote in a warrant application filed in April and obtained by technology publication Wired on Friday.
The FBI seized Roberts' computers and questioned him after he was escorted off a United Airlines flight last month, because he'd posted a tweet '-- apparently in jest '-- hinting he could tap into the aircraft's crew alert system and cause passenger oxygen masks to drop.
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According to the document, during interviews in February and March, Roberts said he'd compromised in-flight entertainment systems on 15 to 20 flights between 2011 and 2014. Each time he'd pried open the cover of the electronics box located under passenger seats and would connect his laptop to the system with an ethernet cable. He'd also scan the network for security flaws and monitored communications from the cockpit.
Hurley said the FBI found that the electronics box under the seat in front of Roberts' showed "signs of tampering".
Roberts was removed from the flight on the same day the US Government Accountability Office released a report warning that hackers could bring down a plane by using onboard Wi-Fi systems.
Roberts' alleged admissions contradict earlier claims to the media that he'd only ever hacked virtualised aircraft network systems.
Peers in an industry that often pushes legal boundaries when probing for security flaws said Roberts had crossed a line.
"Connecting your laptop to an in-flight media system or anything on an actual plane with people on it is not the way to conduct security research," Ken Westin, a security analyst from Tripwire told Fairfax.
"To also tweet a 'joke' about hacking a plane using specific technical details is also incredibly irresponsible I think," he added.
Alex Stamos, chief information security officer of Yahoo, tweeted: "You cannot promote the (true) idea that security research benefits humanity while defending research that endangered hundreds of innocents."
Roberts hadn't responded to Fairfax's request for comment on Sunday, however, he noted on Twitter on Friday that comments in the warrant application were taken "out of context".
"That paragraph that's in there is one paragraph out of a lot of discussions, so there is context that is obviously missing which obviously I can't say anything about," he toldWired.
Details of the warrant emerged as United Airlines launched a new program that will reward researchers with up to one million frequent flyer miles when they report to it new security flaws in its apps, websites and portals but not in-flight systems.
The program takes a leaf from bug bounties run by Google and Microsoft, which collectively paid millions of dollars last year to researchers.
United's program is a first for the airline industry but also follows a similar program recently launched by US money transfer giant Western Union with Australian-founded BugCrowd.
BugCrowd's founder Casey Ellis told Fairfax that Australian companies think that paying hackers for reporting bugs is a "crazy" idea from Silicon Valley.
"Australian companies aren't doing it. If they are even aware of the idea, they still see it as a 'crazy valley tech company' thing," Ellis said.
Telstra, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Optus told Fairfax that they were not considering implementing a bug bounty program. Qantas did not respond to Fairfax's questions.
United Airline's program explicitly outlaws "any testing on aircraft or aircraft systems such as in-flight entertainment or in-flight Wi-Fi".
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Feds Say That Banned Researcher Commandeered a Plane | WIRED
A security researcher kicked off a United Airlines flight last month after tweeting about security vulnerabilities in its system had previously taken control of an airplane and caused it to briefly fly sideways, according to an application for a search warrant filed by an FBI agent.
Chris Roberts, a security researcher with One World Labs, told the FBI agent during an interview in February that he had hacked the in-flight entertainment system, or IFE, on an airplane and overwrote code on the plane's Thrust Management Computer while aboard the flight. He was able to issue a climb command and make the plane briefly change course, the document states.
''He stated that he thereby caused one of the airplane engines to climb resulting in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of these flights,'' FBI Special Agent Mark Hurley wrote in his warrant application (.pdf). ''He also stated that he used Vortex software after comprising/exploiting or 'hacking' the airplane's networks. He used the software to monitor traffic from the cockpit system.''
Hurley filed the search warrant application last month after Roberts was removed from a United Airlines flight from Chicago to Syracuse, New York, because he published a facetious tweet suggesting he might hack into the plane's network. Upon landing in Syracuse, two FBI agents and two local police officers escorted him from the plane and interrogated him for several hours. They also seized two laptop computers and several hard drives and USB sticks. Although the agents did not have a warrant when they seized the devices, they told Roberts a warrant was pending.
A media outlet in Canada obtained the application for the warrant today and published it online.
The information outlined in the warrant application reveals a far more serious situation than Roberts has previously disclosed.
Roberts had previously told WIRED that he caused a plane to climb during a simulated test on a virtual environment he and a colleague created, but he insisted then that he had not interfered with the operation of a plane while in flight.
He told WIRED that he did access in-flight networks about 15 times during various flights but had not done anything beyond explore the networks and observe data traffic crossing them. According to the FBI affidavit, however, when he mentioned this to agents last February he told them that he also had briefly commandeered a plane during one of those flights.
He told the FBI that the period in which he accessed the in-flight networks more than a dozen times occurred between 2011 and 2014. The affidavit, however, does not indicate exactly which flight he allegedly caused to turn to fly to the side.
He obtained physical access to the networks through the Seat Electronic Box, or SEB. These are installed two to a row, on each side of the aisle under passenger seats, on certain planes. After removing the cover to the SEB by ''wiggling and Squeezing the box,'' Roberts told agents he attached a Cat6 ethernet cable, with a modified connector, to the box and to his laptop and then used default IDs and passwords to gain access to the inflight entertainment system. Once on that network, he was able to gain access to other systems on the planes.
Reaction in the security community to the new revelations in the affidavit have been harsh. Although Roberts hasn't been charged yet with any crime, and there are questions about whether his actions really did cause the plane to list to the side or he simply thought they did, a number of security researchers have expressed shock that he attempted to tamper with a plane during a flight.
''I find it really hard to believe but if that is the case he deserves going to jail,'' wrote Jaime Blasco, director of AlienVault Labs in a tweet.
Alex Stamos, chief information security officer of Yahoo, wrote in a tweet, ''You cannot promote the (true) idea that security research benefits humanity while defending research that endangered hundreds of innocents.''
Roberts, reached by phone after the FBI document was made public, told WIRED that he had already seen it last month but wasn't expecting it to go public today.
''My biggest concern is obviously with the multiple conversations that I had with the authorities,'' he said. ''I'm obviously concerned those were held behind closed doors and apparently they're no longer behind closed doors.''
Although he wouldn't respond directly to questions about whether he had hacked that previous flight mentioned in the affidavit, he said the paragraph in the FBI document discussing this is out of context.
''That paragraph that's in there is one paragraph out of a lot of discussions, so there is context that is obviously missing which obviously I can't say anything about,'' he said. ''It would appear from what I've seen that the federal guys took one paragraph out of a lot of discussions and a lot of meetings and notes and just chose that one as opposed to plenty of others.''
History of Researching PlanesRoberts began investigating aviation security about six years ago after he and a research colleague got hold of publicly available flight manuals and wiring diagrams for various planes. The documents showed how inflight entertainment systems one some planes were connected to the passenger satellite phone network, which included functions for operating some cabin control systems. These systems were in turn connected to the plane avionics systems. They built a test lab using demo software obtained from infotainment vendors and others in order to explore what they could to the networks.
In 2010, Roberts gave a presentation about hacking planes and cars at the BSides security conference in Las Vegas. Another presentation followed two years later. He also spoke directly to airplane manufacturers about the problems with their systems. ''We had conversations with two main airplane builders as well as with two of the top providers of infotainment systems and it never went anywhere,'' he told WIRED last month.
Last February, the FBI in Denver, where Roberts is based, requested a meeting. They discussed his research for an hour, and returned a couple weeks later for a discussion that lasted several more hours. They wanted to know what was possible and what exactly he and his colleague had done. Roberts disclosed that he and his colleague had sniffed the data traffic on more than a dozen flights after connecting their laptops to the infotainment networks.
''We researched further than that,'' he told WIRED last month. ''We were within the fuel balancing system and the thrust control system. We watched the packets and data going across the network to see where it was going.''
Eventually, Roberts and his research partner determined that it would take a convoluted set of hacks to seriously subvert an avionics system, but they believed it could be done. He insisted to WIRED last month, however, that they did not ''mess around with that except on simulation systems.'' In simulations, for example, Roberts said they were able to turn the engine controls from cruise to climb, ''which definitely had the desired effect on the system'--the plane sped up and the nose of the airplane went up.''
Today he would not respond to questions about the new allegations from the FBI that he also messed with the systems during a real flight.
The Tweet Heard Round the WorldRoberts never heard from the FBI again after that February visit. His recent troubles began after he sent out a Tweet on April 15 while aboard a United Airlines flight from Denver to Chicago. After news broke about a report from the Government Accountability Office revealing that passenger Wi-Fi networks on some Boeing and Airbus planes could allow an attacker to gain access to avionics systems and commandeer a flight, Roberts published a Tweet that said, ''Find myself on a 737/800, lets see Box-IFE-ICE-SATCOM,? Shall we start playing with EICAS messages? 'PASS OXYGEN ON' Anyone?'' He punctuated the tweet with a smiley face.
The tweet was meant as a sarcastic joke; a reference to how he had tried for years to get Boeing and Airbus to heed warnings about security issues with their passenger communications systems. His tweet about the Engine Indicator Crew Alert System, or EICAS, was a reference to research he'd done years ago on vulnerabilities in inflight infotainment networks, vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to access cabin controls and deploy a plane's oxygen masks.
In response to his tweet, someone else tweeted to him '''...aaaaaand you're in jail. :)''
Roberts responded with, ''There IS a distinct possibility that the course of action laid out above would land me in an orange suite [sic] rather quickly :)''
When an employee with United Airlines' Cyber Security Intelligence Department became aware of the tweet, he contacted the FBI and told agents that Roberts would be on a second flight going from Chicago to Syracuse. Although the particular plane Roberts was on at the time the agents seized him in New York was not equipped with an inflight entertainment system like the kind he had previously told the FBI he had hacked, the plane he had flown earlier from Denver to Chicago did have the same system.
When an FBI agent later examined that Denver-to-Chicago plane after it landed in another city the same day, he found that the SEBs under the seats where Roberts had been sitting ''showed signs of tampering,'' according to the affidavit. Roberts had been sitting in seat 3A and the SEB under 2A, the seat in front of him, ''was damaged.''
''The outer cover of the box was open approximately 1/2 inch and one of the retaining screws was not seated and was exposed,'' FBI Special Agent Hurley wrote in his affidavit.
During the interrogation in Syracuse, Roberts told the agents that he had not compromised the network on the United flight from Denver to Chicago. He advised them, however, that he was carrying thumb drives containing malware to compromise networks'--malware that he told them was ''nasty.'' Also on his laptop were schematics for the wiring systems of a number of airplane models. All of this would be standard, however, for a security researcher who conducts penetration-testing and research for a living.
Nonetheless, based on all of the information that agents had gleaned from their previous interview with Roberts in February as well as the Tweets he'd sent out that day and the apparent signs of tampering on the United flight, the FBI believed that Roberts ''had the ability and the willingness to use the equipment then with him to access or attempt to access the IFE and possibly the flight control systems on any aircraft equipped with an IFE systems, and that it would endanger public safety to allow him to leave the Syracuse airport that evening with that equipment.''
When asked by WIRED if he ever connected his laptop to the SEB on his flight from Denver to Chicago, Roberts said, ''Nope I did not. That I'm happy to say and I'll stand from the top of the tallest tower and yell that one.''
He also questions the FBI's assessment that the boxes showed signs of tampering.
''Those boxes are underneath the seats. How many people shove luggage and all sorts of things under there?,'' he said. ''I'd be interested if they looked at the boxes under all the other seats and if they looked like they had been tampered. How many of them are broken and cracked or have scuff marks? How many of those do the airlines replace because people shove things under there?''
Regardless of whether the authorities have a case against him, however, there has already been some fallout from the incident. Roberts told WIRED that today investors on the board of directors of One World Labs, a company he helped found, decided to withdraw their investments in the company. As a result, One World Labs had to lay off about a dozen employees today, half of its staff.
Roberts said there were other factors contributing to the board's decision but his legal situation ''was probably the final straw.''
''The board has deemed it a risk. So that was one factor in many that made their decision,'' he said. ''Their decision was not to fund the organization any further.''
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FBI: researcher admitted to hacking plane in-flight, causing it to ''climb'' | Ars Technica
A newly-published search warrant application shows that an aviation computer security researcher told the FBI that he briefly took control of at least one commercial airliner. The warrant, which was filed in a federal court in New York state, was first published Friday by APTN, a Canadian news site.
According to the affidavit for the warrant application, the researcher, Chris Roberts, told the FBI that he:
connected to other systems on the airplane network after he exploited/gained access to, or "hacked" the [in-flight entertainment] system. He stated that he then overwrote code on the airplane's Thrust Management Computer while aboard a flight. He stated that he successfully commanded the system he had accessed to issue the climb command. He stated that he thereby caused one of the airplane engines to climb resulting in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of these flights. He also stated that he used Vortex software after compromising/exploiting or "hacking" the airplane's networks. He used the software to monitor traffic from the cockpit system.
Roberts did not immediately respond to Ars' request for comment, but he told Wired on Friday that this paragraph was taken out of context.
Further Reading"It would appear from what I've seen that the federal guys took one paragraph out of a lot of discussions and a lot of meetings and notes and just chose that one as opposed to plenty of others," he said, declining to elaborate further.As Ars previously reported, Roberts was detained and questioned by the FBI in April 2015 after he landed on a United Airlines flight from Denver, Colorado to Syracuse, New York.
While on board that flight, he tweeted a joke about taking control of the plane's engine-indicating and crew-alerting system, which provides flight crews with information in real-time about an aircraft's functions including temperatures of various equipment, fuel flow and quantity, and oil pressure. In the tweet, Roberts jested: "Find myself on a 737/800, lets see Box-IFE-ICE-SATCOM, ? Shall we start playing with EICAS messages? 'PASS OXYGEN ON' Anyone ? :)"
FBI agents then questioned Roberts for four hours and confiscated his iPad, MacBook Pro, and storage devices.
Since this incident, United has instituted a bug bounty program.
After this revelation, Roberts was roundly criticized by his professional peers on Twitter.
Roberts has not been arrested, nor charged with a crime.
An assistant conductor on the Amtrak train that derailed on Tuesday believes she heard the engineer tell another regional train operator in a radio transmission that the train had been struck by something just before the accident, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.
At a news conference on Friday, Robert L. Sumwalt, the safety board official who is leading the investigation, said the F.B.I. had been asked to examine what he described as a fist-size impact area found on the lower left side of the train's windshield. Officials said that the F.B.I. had been called in because it has the forensics expertise needed for the investigation, but that it had not yet begun its analysis.
Mr. Sumwalt said investigators had interviewed all three crew members, including the engineer, whom they said was ''extremely cooperative'' and displayed good knowledge of the proper procedures and speeds for the rail line. He said the engineer had not been fatigued and was not ill.
''He recalls ringing the train bell as he went through North Philadelphia Station, as required,'' Mr. Sumwalt said. ''He has no recollection of anything past that.''
Map | Investigating the Philadelphia Amtrak Train Derailment The train's speed was normal until minutes before it derailed.
The assistant conductor, however, who was working in the cafe car, heard the engineer talking to his counterpart on a SEPTA regional line, who said his train had been ''hit by a rock or shot at,'' according to Mr. Sumwalt. The assistant conductor said she thought she heard the Amtrak engineer, Brandon Bostian, reply that his train had also been struck.
''Right after she recalled hearing this conversation between her engineer and the SEPTA engineer, she said she felt a rumbling, and her train leaned over and her car went over on its side,'' Mr. Sumwalt said.
The Northeast Regional train from Washington to New York City was traveling over 100 miles an hour, more than twice the speed limit at that point, when it derailed, killing eight people and injuring more than 200.
(C) Reuters/John AltdorferA freight train stand idle after a derailment involving at least 10 cars which left the tracks in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania May 14, 2015.
Two U.S. trains slipped off their routes on Thursday, two days after a deadly Amtrak accident near Philadelphia, according to reports.Parts of a freight train derailed in Pittsburgh on Thursday morning, leaving some cars overturned or detached from their wheels, according to local station WPXI. No injuries were immediately reported.
A minor derailment also took place in South Carolina with no injuries reported, according to Georgia outlet WRDW. The engine compartment of another Amtrak train caught fire in Milwaukee on Thursday afternoon, though no passengers were hurt.
The incidents come as the Philadelphia accident'--which left eight people dead and more than 200 injured'--places scrutiny on the state of America's infrastructure and railroads.
"If we are going to have safe transportation systems in America, you have to invest in them. You have to keep up with state-of-the-art infrastructure," former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood said in an interview with CNBC's "Power Lunch" on Wednesday.
"We haven't done that," he added.
National Transportation Safety Board investigators determined the Amtrak train was traveling at more than 100 mph'--twice the area's speed limit'--before it derailed while rounding a sharp curve Tuesday. The train may not have crashed if the stretch of rail had a congressionally-mandated pace control, NTSB board member Robert Sumwalt said Wednesday.
However, the NTSB stressed it could not yet conclude speed alone caused the accident.
LaHood on Wednesday called U.S. infrastructure'--including roads and bridges'--a "limp along, go along" system that Congress has a difficult time funding.
On Wednesday, the House Appropriations Committee voted in favor of transportation infrastructure legislation that would cut Amtrak funding by $252 million in fiscal 2016.
House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, on Thursday dismissed claims that a lack of Amtrak funding could have played a role in the crash.
Last night, at the President's direction, U.S. personnel based out of Iraq conducted an operation in al-Amr in eastern Syria to capture an ISIL senior leader known as Abu Sayyaf and his wife Umm Sayyaf. During the course of the operation, Abu Sayyaf was killed when he engaged U.S. forces.
Umm Sayyaf was captured and is currently in U.S. military detention in Iraq. The operation also led to the freeing of a young Yezidi woman who appears to have been held as a slave by the couple. We intend to reunite her with her family as soon as feasible.
No U.S. personnel were killed or injured during this operation.
Abu Sayyaf was a senior ISIL leader who, among other things, had a senior role in overseeing ISIL's illicit oil and gas operations '' a key source of revenue that enables the terrorist organization to carry out their brutal tactics and oppress thousands of innocent civilians. He was also involved with the group's military operations. We suspect that Umm Sayyaf is a member of ISIL, played an important role in ISIL's terrorist activities, and may have been complicit in the enslavement of the young woman rescued last night.
The President authorized this operation upon the unanimous recommendation of his national security team and as soon as we had developed sufficient intelligence and were confident the mission could be carried out successfully and consistent with the requirements for undertaking such operations. This operation was conducted with the full consent of Iraqi authorities and, like our existing airstrikes against ISIL in Syria, consistent with domestic and international law.
We are working to determine an ultimate disposition for the detainee that best supports the national security of the United States and of our allies and partners, consistent with domestic and international law. We will follow our usual practice with respect to giving the ICRC notification and access to the detainee.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President is grateful to the brave U.S. personnel who carried out this complex mission as well as the Iraqi authorities for their support of the operation and for the use of their facilities, which contributed to its success. The United States will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our Iraqi partners in our effort to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.
There have been reports Baghdadi has been injured in air strikes, but none has been confirmed Islamic State (IS) has released an audio message it says is from its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which if confirmed would be the first in months.
The message urges Muslims to emigrate to the "caliphate" it has proclaimed in areas of Syria and Iraq. A reference to the Yemen conflict means it is recent.
Analysts say the voice appears to be Baghdadi's but this is not verified.
Baghdadi's fate has been unclear amid reports of air strikes by the US-led coalition that is opposing IS.
The message came as IS advanced to within 2km (1.2 miles) of the Unesco World Heritage site of Palmyra, one of the archaeological jewels of the Middle East.
Syria's antiquities chief warned that if IS seized Palmyra it would destroy everything that exists there.
The latest message was released by the group's al-Furqan media outlet and appeared on several websites.
Analysis: BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner
The voice on the audio recording is clear, assured and, in places, almost melodic. If it is indeed, as is claimed, the voice of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then it will put paid to previous rumours of his death.
Since we don't actually see him he could, of course, be physically incapacitated. But the lengthy, 33-minute speech does not sound like one made by someone in failing health. The speaker, who makes continual use of religious quotations, exhorts Muslims around the world to join forces with his group.
Most significantly, he mentions the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen which began on 26 March, meaning this recording can be no more than seven weeks old.
US government linguistic experts will have doubtless been quick to analyse the voice patterns on the tape to see if they match earlier recordings of Baghdadi when he appeared in vision last year.
The speaker says: "There is no excuse for any Muslim not to migrate to the Islamic State... joining [its fight] is a duty on every Muslim. We are calling on you either to join or carry weapons [to fight] wherever you are."
Islamic State fighters wave the group's flag near a Syrian fighter jet exhibit in Raqqa in Syria He adds: "Islam was never a religion of peace. Islam is the religion of fighting. No-one should believe that the war that we are waging is the war of the Islamic State. It is the war of all Muslims, but the Islamic State is spearheading it. It is the war of Muslims against infidels."
IS declared a "caliphate" over parts of Iraq and Syria in June 2014.
The speaker in the message says: "There is no might nor honour nor safety nor rights for you except in the shade of the caliphate."
The speaker also makes references to the recent Saudi-led air campaign against Shia rebels in Yemen, which began on 26 March. He condemns the Saudi royal family and says the conflict in Yemen will lead to the end of its rule.
Baghdadi's last message was in November.
His only public appearance was to deliver a sermon in Mosul in Iraq after IS took the city last July.
An Iraqi interior ministry spokesman said in April that Baghdadi had been seriously wounded in a coalition air strike in March.
However, the Pentagon said it had no information on that, and other reports last year of him being injured proved to be inaccurate.
The Iraqi ministry of defence said on Wednesday that the second-in-command of IS, Abdul Rahman Mustafa Mohammed, was killed in an undated coalition air strike on a mosque in northern Iraq.
But the US said coalition planes had not attacked a mosque.
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AuthorMolly O'Toole is the politics reporter for Defense One. O'Toole previously worked as a news editor at The Huffington Post. She has covered national and international politics for Reuters, The Nation, the Associated Press and Newsweek International, among others, from Washington, New York, Mexico ... Full Bio
A bit more than one thousand days into the captivity of American journalist and Marine Corps veteran Austin Tice, the House passed an amendment late Thursday to require President Obama to pick a coordinator to manage hostage recovery across federal agencies.
Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., perhaps the loudest critic of the Obama administration's strategy toward hostages, pushed hard for the bipartisan proposal, which passed on a voice vote as an amendment to the House's version of the annual defense authorization bill, or NDAA. It would create a federal ''Interagency Hostage Recovery Coordinator'' to ''coordinate efforts to secure the release of United States persons who are hostages of hostile groups or state sponsors of terrorism.''
Hunter introduced the proposal as a separate bill in March. The House's fiscal 2016 NDAA, which now carries the measure, will be conferenced with its counterpart in the Senate. The NDAA is considered must-pass, must-sign legislation.
The U.S. government has established a policy of ''not negotiating with terrorists,'' or paying for the release of U.S. citizens taken hostage, arguing that such payments would simply lead to more kidnappings.
But this policy has drawn increasing criticism in the wake of high-profile killings of hostages taken by the Islamic State and other terrorist groups '-- and most recently, the inadvertent killing of two hostages, one American, by a U.S. drone strike. Hunter and other critics have derided the government's efforts to free hostages as insufficiently resourced, poorly organized and insensitive to the families of kidnapping victims.
The amendment seeks to establish and maintain ''correct lines of authority'' for a central, inter-agency ''fusion cell'' of personnel overseeing each hostage situation. It also would require a plan to keep family members informed in such a way that doesn't ''compromise the national security of the United States.'' The authority of the leading officer would be limited to ''countries that are state sponsors of terrorism and areas designated as hazardous for which hostile fire and imminent danger pay are payable to members of the Armed Forces for duty performed in such area.'' The coordinator would be required to report to Congress quarterly on the status of hostage cases.
While the White House has defended its hostage policy, the administration announced in April it had undertaken a review. A few weeks ago, White House spokesman Josh Earnest announced the administration is considering a similar ''fusion cell,'' a team made up of officials from the FBI, Defense Department and Intelligence Community to both communicate with the families of hostages and work toward their release.
On Tuesday, National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan marked Tice's 1,000th day in captivity, saying, ''The United States government will continue to work tirelessly to bring Austin home to his parents, Debra and Marc, and his brothers and sisters, who have endured anguish and suffering since Austin's abduction.''
In a Thursday speech on the Senate floor, Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, the majority whip, indicated some support for legislative reforms to the U.S. hostage policy. ''I join the Tice family encouraging the federal government to do everything we can to possibly secure Austin's safe return home,'' he said. ''And I also want to say once again to his family: We haven't given up, we will continue to stand by you, and we will never give up until we find your son and bring him safely home.''
Tice's case, in particular, is complicated by the belief he may be held by the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, as indicated by Meehan's thanks to the Czech government's work on the U.S. government's behalf. The Czechs serve as the U.S.protecting power in Syria, as the U.S. has broken off diplomatic relations with Assad.
In answer to security concerns and perhaps anticipating opposition from intelligence agencies such as the FBI, under whose purview many hostage cases fall, Hunter's amendment included the following language: ''Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the Federal Government to negotiate with a state sponsor of terrorism or an organization that the Secretary of State has designated as a foreign terrorist organization.''
In March, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told Hunter, ''We do need a choreographer when that time comes to bring all those pieces together.''
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AuthorMolly O'Toole is the politics reporter for Defense One. O'Toole previously worked as a news editor at The Huffington Post. She has covered national and international politics for Reuters, The Nation, the Associated Press and Newsweek International, among others, from Washington, New York, Mexico ... Full Bio
Smugglers hide IS militants on boats filled with migrants, Abdul Basit Haroun says Islamic State (IS) fighters are being smuggled into Europe by gangs in the Mediterranean, a Libyan official has told the BBC.
Government adviser Abdul Basit Haroun said smugglers were hiding IS militants on boats filled with migrants.
He based his claim on conversations with boat owners in parts of North Africa controlled by the militants.
He alleged that IS was allowing them to continue their operations in exchange for 50% of their income.
The UN estimates that 60,000 people have already tried to cross the Mediterranean this year.
IS operates in several parts of Libya, including the eastern city of Derna More than 1,800 people are feared to have died making the journey in often overcrowded and unseaworthy boats in 2015 - a 20-fold increase on the same period in 2014.
'Not scared'In an interview with BBC Radio 5 live Investigates, Mr Haroun said IS used the boats "for their people who they want to send to Europe, as the European police don't know who is from IS and who is a normal refugee or not".
The militants often sat separately from the other migrants and were not scared of the crossing, he said, adding that they were "for IS - 100%".
Mr Haroun added that IS allowed boat owners to operate - but demanded a 50% cut of whatever they made from each ship.
2014 - Migrants in numbersAt least 218,000 reached Europe by the Mediterranean SeaItaly received more than 140,000 of the arrivals3,500 people died attempting the journey - compared with just over 600 in 2013Source: The UN refugee agency
Militants, migrants and the Med
How strong is IS in Libya?
He also suggested that the jihadists were planning ahead for future attacks in Europe.
Earlier this year, the EU's border control agency, Frontex, warned that it was "possible" that foreign fighters were using irregular migration routes to get into Europe.
IS - which controls large parts of Iraq and Syria - has been active in recent months in Libya, exploiting a power struggle between rival groups after the fall of Col Muammar Gaddafi.
In March, IS also claimed responsibility for the attack in Tunisia's capital Tunis, in which 22 people were killed.
Local Dutch broadcaster RTV Noord Holland recently launched an advertising campaign involving posters with the question: "Are other jihad families living in Het Gooi?". The poster refers to two families with children living in the area who, last year, were alleged to be planning to move to Syria and help ISIS. The posters were hung at bus stops in the cities Huizen and Hilversum (Het Gooi is the area around Hilversum). The Muslim community in the Netherlands, as well as non-Muslims have responded with shock, many voicing their concerns that this campaign increases Islamophobia and encourages the assumption that islam and terrorism are one and the same thing.Several people have compared the campaign with the persecution of the Jews during the Second World War. Ali Osman, board member of Moslims in Dialoog, for instance, said: "It is not the same, but back then it also happened in steps. First the Jews were not wanted anymore, then they became second-rate citizens. That also seems to be the case here."
As a reaction to this recent uproar, Paul van Gessel, director of RTV Noord Holland that is responsible for the campaign of bigotry and jingoism, told the current affairs show Dit is de Dag:
'We focus on a theme which is important in a region,' 'Jihad fighters are an issue in Het Gooi. We are a journalistic organisation and we ask questions.'
Poster reads: "Are other jihad families living in 't Gooi?"
How exactly a handful of alleged IS-supporters in an area with approx. 220,650 inhabitants (or about 0.005% of the population in the area) translates to "Jihad fighters" being ''an issue'' in the region is beyond me. If there truly was a Jihad-issue in Het Gooi, the problem could have been dealt with in a different manner. Instead of hanging up posters that exacerbate the disadvantageous social and economical position in which Muslims in Holland find themselves, they could have made efforts to educate people (Muslims and non-Muslims) about the real origins and purpose of ISIS. Investment could also have been in spreading information about the difference between someone committing violent acts in the name of a religion and the other peaceful followers of that same religion. This would have helped to alleviate the stress that the average Dutch Muslim has to deal with and discourage young adults of Muslim faith from falling prey to ISIS propaganda.Alas, Paul van Gessel and others appear to have a different goal in mind.
(C) Twitter/Moslims in DialoogInterestingly, this poster was hung in a street named 'Laan 1940-1945'. Coincidence?
Tweet: "Do we truly want this to happen again in the Netherlands? #Holocaust #Muslimhatred"Image (a German sign) on the right reads: "Jews are not wanted in our region."
Parallels between then and nowIn January this year, news site DutchTurks published a short article entitled (translated): "Propaganda! - What is the PVV trying to tell us?". PVV is the anti-Islamic political party called 'Party For Freedom' led by Geert Wilders, who is infamous for his rabid anti-Muslim stance. In this article several pictures are shown that present parallels between the anti-Jew propaganda during World War Two and the current anti-Muslim propaganda. Author Yunus writes (translated):
Under the guise of freedom of speech, every opportunity is seized by the PVV nowadays to dehumanize and to present Muslims as inferior. This is similar to what the Nazis did to the Jews in the past. Because I am against anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and any other form of hatred, I find it my duty to take a closer look at the propaganda spewed by PVV. See and judge for yourself.
Disclaimer: The pictures below do not have the function to serve as propaganda, but to show that there are parallels to be drawn between hate propaganda of the past and the present. Lest we never forget.
Here they are:Left tweet: Martin Bosma, Dutch politician and former journalist, and member of the PVV, tweets: "Inbreeding among Muslims and its consequences.", he links to this article: "Muslim Inbreeding: Impacts on intelligence, sanity, health and society". The author of this article, Nicolai Sennels, dislikes Muslims and Islam in a similar manner as the political party PVV does. For a critical look at his 'Muslim inbreeding' article, and more, see this article. Here's an interesting bit:Bryan Fischer of the American Family Association wrote an incredibly bigoted article coming to the conclusion that American Muslims should be deported. In the article Fischer discusses a book by Nicolai Sennel and Sennel's conclusions which Fischer says he agrees with. "His [Sennel's] sobering conclusion, with which I agree: the integration of Muslims into Western societies is "impossible."
Right tweet: Tweeter asks Bosma: "Where did we see this before Martin? Ah, that's right:"Storm : blad der Nederlandsche SS 06-06-1941 [Paper of the Dutch SS]1. Judaism is for all European nations equally racially strange. Its historical and mental danger can therefore not be abolished by any "adjustment". The risk of its presence in Europe can only be countered by its complete expulsion from European space.2. Judaism is due to the uniqueness of inbred-determined racial blending also strange to the so-called "Semitic people".3. Therefore, based on racial-political considerations, nor a migration to an European country, nor a migration to for example a country that belongs to the Arabs outside Europe, is eligible.
Above left: Screenshot of an article entitled: Wilders wants an anti-sharia declaration. Geert Wilders wants Dutch citizens with a passport from a Muslim country to sign an anti-Sharia declaration in which they denounce the violent form of Islam.Above right: A picture of an anti-Jewish declaration from 1942. This is a document issued by the government or by an agency designated by the government stating that the candidate filling the form has no Jewish parents.(Above) image top left and right: Harm Beertema, Dutch politician and former educator, and member of the Party for Freedom, tweets "St. Geert defeats the Islamic dragon."(Above) bottom left and right: Nazipropaganda: Two images showing Nazis defeating the 'Jewish dragon'.Above left: Nazipropaganda depicting the worm as the Jew.Above right: Image by cartoonist Steph Bargol depicting a Muslim as a worm.As Yusuf wrote, see and judge for yourself...
"Let them drown."
On Sunday April 19th this year, a boat carrying hundreds of Libyan refugees on its way to Italy, capsized off the coast of Libya. Approximately one thousand innocent people drowned. Any normal person with a conscience was horrified at this "tragedy". But there are those who are not only indifferent to these deaths, but applaud them.
(C) ANPWhile some say Rest In Peace, others say Good Riddance.
Most Dutch people are familiar with the mindset of a particular group of Dutch citizens who despise immigrants and want nothing to do with them, many of them proud supporters of the political party PVV. Wilders' followers, and others, not only lobby for less Muslims in Holland, in particular Moroccan citizens, but want immigrants from anywhere and everywhere to be sent back home.Shortly after the mass drowning was reported in mainstream media, the Facebook page 'Nederland mijn Vaderland' [Netherlands my Fatherland] shared the following update on its page (translated): "Breaking news: around 400 refugees have drowned!". Facebook page 'PVV Nederland' shared this status but removed the exclamation mark: "400 immigrants drowned..............". Reactions on both these statuses from members of the FB pages were shocking to say the least. They included:
'great', '400 is too low', 'saves us a lot of money', 'well, at least they won't be able to come our way now', 'more, more, more', 'party timeee.....', 'Whooohoo!', 'we can send 400 new ones to that region', 'enjoy drowning, you parasites', 'Let them drown, these fortune hunters. Potential welfare recipients, that's what they are.' etc.
Many such posts were deleted by the administrators of the pages who wrote: "Of course we'd rather not have them [refugees] in Europe. But applauding their death is stretching it! According to me they're just normal people..." Considering what these Facebook pages ultimately stand for, one may wonder whether the administrators' motive behind deleting these reactions had to do more with being 'politically correct' and staying out of trouble than with any real concern for the victims.Wilders fights for "freedom" in Texas
(C) Youtube/PVVpersGeert Wilders at Muhammad Cartoon Contest, Garland, Texas, 3 May 2015
While some of Wilders' supporters were celebrating the death of hundreds of innocent people, Wilders himself recently attended a Cartoon Contest in Dallas, Texas that supported 'artists' who enjoy mocking Muslims and Islam in their cartoons. Wilders was there to award the best Muhammad cartoonist with $10,000. Because nothing says 'freedom of speech' like being able to doodle something sectarian about a religion's prophet; the practice of which deserves recognition and a rich reward.Never mind that in reality U.S. citizens have lost and continue to lose their freedom in many ways at the hands of psychopathic individuals in positions of power. Never mind the freedom Americans have lost by having the NSA keep track of everything they write and say. Shouldn't the violation of human rights in the form of religious hatred be condemned by people who claim to stand for freedom for all? Or how about highlighting the real threat? But I forget, that's "conspiracy theory and therefore not important. According to Wilders the real and only threat to freedom lies with Islam.
Speech Geert Wilders at Muhammad Cartoon Contest, Galrland, Texas, 3 May, 2015
... Your statement, my statement, the statement of every single person present in this room here tonight is clear: We will never allow barbarism, we will never allow Islam to rob us of our freedom of speech! Never!
I know from my own experience how dangerous it is to stand for this freedom. I know how dangerous it is to speak the truth about Islam.
I am on death lists of Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban and terrorists from ISIS because I tell people the truth about Islam. Islam has declared war on us, on our Judeo-Christian civilization. Islam wants to rob us of the freedoms and liberties. Islam and freedom are totally incompatible. ...
It's hard to take Wilders' radical ideas seriously, considering that less than 2 percent of terrorist attacks in the E.U. are religiously motivated. As for the U.S.:Islamist militants lag far behind other groups when it comes to carrying out terrorist attacks in the U.S. too. According to FBI data compiled by the Princeton University's Loon Watch, Islamist extremists were responsible for just 6 percent of terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2005 '-- falling behind Latino groups, Extreme left-wing groups, and Jewish extremists.
Charles Kurzman, a sociology professor at the University of North Carolina, hascalledMuslim Americans "a minuscule threat to public safety."
Wilders is nothing but a Dutch pawn with a horrible hair-do, useful only to keep people ignorant of important matters, to have them believe they have freedoms while in reality most of them have already been stripped away by their government. Wilders' job may be to instill unnecessary fear and hatred into people and thereby further the divide-and-conquer agenda of the "elite". What better way to shift the blame from the snakes in suits on top, by blaming a minority group that in reality poses little or no threat to anyone?(C) Sott.netMore worthy of a prize.
Another 'attack' on our freedomAs the above mentioned draconian doodle contest was ending, two gunmen drove up to the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, where the contest was held, and opened fire, injuring one security officer. Both gunmen were killed by the Garland police, with no other casualties. Even before the motive of these gunmen became clear, Wilders was confident enough to write to Dutch public broadcaster NOS:
"I had just spoken for half an hour at the event on Freedom of Speech and cartoons and the dangers of Islam and had just left when it happened. Terrible. It was very close. I hope that the wounded officer is doing well. It is an attack on freedom of expression. Unacceptable. The only appropriate answer is going on. But it is not easy."
By now, ISIS (which, as most of us know, is a Western-created proxy army) supposedly has taken responsibility for the attack. It is interesting to note that at least one of the two suspects has been "under FBI surveillance and investigation since as early as 2007", and yet was still able to carry out this attack. Sounds fishy, and it is. If you haven't already, do read this article by Tony Cartalucci for more information about the Garland shooting: Spreading hatred and Islamophobia - Western Gladio networks behind Garland, Texas shooting.Cartalucci explains:
[...] it is clear that "free speech" is a canard used by both the "left" and "right" to distract from the real purpose of the Garland shooting, and other acts of provocation like it. It distracts from the fact that all of the perpetrators have been well-known to security agencies for years, even sentenced and/or imprisoned by various courts, as well as investigated and kept under surveillance. It distracts from the fact that the event at the center of the attacks was organized and carried out by those who themselves have actively sought to curtail the freedoms of others, not to mention foster wars that have ended or otherwise destroyed the lives of millions.It distracts from the fact that the very Neo-Cons telling the world to fear "Islam" represent the same special interests arming and funding literal Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists across North Africa, the Middle East, and even Central and East Asia.
Violence, racism, threats, and discrimination(C) Tom van der Put / MaricMediaTwo weeks ago, a swastika was drawn on one of the pillars at the entrance of a mosque in Breda.
All of the above, whether it's RTV Noord Holland's 'keep your eyes on those Muslims' campaign, the outrageous 'let those Libyans drown' posts by some Dutch citizens, or Wilders' actions causing anti-Islamic sentiment here and abroad, they all affect Muslims' daily lives negatively, in one way or another - and attacks on mosques have been no exception. A recent (April 26, 2015) published report entitled Monitoring Muslim Discrimination by Dr. Ineke van der Valk concludes the following:The research reveals several numbers related to anti-Muslim Discrimination. 39% of the 475 mosques in the Netherlands have experienced discriminatory aggression, for example arson. 68% of the mosque organizations that filled in a survey stated they have experience with aggression, mainly the smashing of windows. This has caused both material and psychological damage to these specific Muslim communities. 85% of the mosques reported the incidents to the police, but 51% didn't feel they were helped or taken seriously. One can thus state that anti-Muslim discrimination is a serious issue. The research further delves into the reasons behind the aggression. Reasons that are mentioned are for example the presentation of Muslims/Islam in the media, lack of knowledge about Islam among the public and reactions to terrorist attacks.
To name one example of mosque harassment, on the morning of January 19th this year, Muslim practitioners were shocked to find the following threatening letter at the Gultepe mosque in Rotterdam:Threatening letter addressed to the Gultepe mosque in Rotterdam
"You are the most ungrateful and disgusting people in the world! You have your own schools, shops, butchers... because Dutch [education, cuisine] is not good enough for you cockroaches! It's over now... Go away if you still want to live. In the meantime, everyone hates you! No fireman will save you from a fire. No policeman will save you when you're in need. No hospital, no doctor would want to heal you. And the pharmacists... they will give you the wrong medicine so that you will become even more ill... You cannot trust anyone anymore. So go away now while you still can, because "death" is in your mosque! In every mosque the wind will come in while the windows and doors are closed! That's death!! It's PayDay!"
Harassment, threats, and discrimination not only take place in and around places of worship for Muslims, but also at work, on the street, at school, pretty much anywhere. For example, the Dutch Chief of Police, Gerard Bouman, wrote in an intern blog that Muslim cops are excluded, belittled and treated without respect by their colleagues. Bouman further pointed out that Muslims on the street are similarly treated in an unfair manner. For instance, they will be approached because "they might be wearing an explosive belt", and even if there's no threat at all, they "still are labeled as potential terrorists." In addition, at the request of theAnne Frank FoundationandFORUM, research institute Panteia conducted a survey, entitled 'Muslim discrimination in secondary education', among 498 teachers,whichrevealedthat two out of three Muslim teachers experienced discrimination in the class last year.Final thoughts
Some may argue that discrimination is 'normal' as it takes place virtually anywhere and against different ethnic groups or different religion practitioners. However, it is as clear as day that discrimination against Muslims has been on the rise ever since the 9/11 attacks and the following attacks thereafter in the West. If we turn a blind eye to this increase, we may indeed, at some point re-experience yet another racially and religiously-motivated pogrom - and this time the target will be Muslims. Luckily there are many Dutch citizens who treat one another with respect, decency, support, and understanding. Nonetheless, it is worrying that "Muslims/Islam, asylum seekers and foreigners" are high on the list of concerns among Dutch citizens, when the real threat to Dutch citizens, and the citizens of the world, comes from the same people and institutions that are encouraging them to hate Muslims.
MOVE is a Philadelphia-based black liberation group founded by John Africa (born Vincent Leaphart) in 1972. The group lives communally and frequently engages in public demonstrations related to issues they deem important.
Origins[edit]MOVE was originally called the Christian Movement for Life when it was founded in 1972. Its founder, John Africa, was functionally illiterate[1] so he dictated a document called The Guideline to Donald Glassey, a social worker from the University of Pennsylvania. Africa and his contemporary, mostly African-American followers wore their hair in dreadlocks. They advocated a radical form of green politics and a return to a hunter-gatherer society while stating their opposition to science, medicine, and technology.[2] As John Africa himself had done, his devotees changed their surnames to Africa to show reverence to what they regarded as their mother continent.[3][4][5]
John Africa's MOVE members lived in a commune in a house owned by Glassey in the Powelton Village section of West Philadelphia. They staged bullhorn-amplified, profanity-laced demonstrations against institutions that they opposed, such as zoos (MOVE had strong views on animal rights), and speakers whose views they opposed. MOVE made compost piles of garbage and human waste in their yards which attracted rats and cockroaches; they considered it morally wrong to kill the vermin with pest control. MOVE attracted much hostility from their neighbors, the majority of whom were African-Americans. MOVE activities drew close scrutiny from law enforcement authorities.[6][7]
1978 shoot-out[edit]On August 8, 1978, a deadly end came to an almost year-long standoff with police over a court order requiring MOVE to vacate their Powelton Village house.[8] When police attempted entry, shooting erupted and Philadelphia Police Department officer James J. Ramp was killed by a shot to the back of the head. MOVE representatives claimed that he was facing the house at the time and deny MOVE responsibility for his death. Seven other police officers, five firefighters, three MOVE members, and three bystanders were also injured. Nine MOVE members were each sentenced to a maximum of 100 years in prison for third degree murder for Ramp's killing. Seven of the nine first became eligible for parole in the spring of 2008, but were denied it. Parole hearings now occur yearly.[9][10]
1985 bombing[edit]In 1981, MOVE relocated to a row house at 6221 Osage Avenue in the Cobbs Creek area of West Philadelphia. After the move, neighbors complained for years that MOVE members were broadcasting political messages by bullhorn at all hours and also about the health hazards created from piles of compost. On May 13, 1985, after the complaints as well as indictments of numerous[quantify] MOVE members for crimes including parole violations, contempt of court, illegal possession of firearms, and making terrorist threats,[11] both mayor W. Wilson Goode and Philadelphia Police Department Commissioner Gregor Sambor had begun characterizing MOVE as a terrorist organization.[12] The police, along with city manager and retired United States ArmyGeneralLeo Brooks, arrived in force with arrest warrants and attempted to clear the building and arrest the indicted MOVE members.[12] This led to an armed standoff with police,[13] who lobbed tear gas canisters at the building. MOVE members fired at the police, who returned fire with automatic weapons.[14]Philadelphia Police Department Commissioner Sambor then ordered that the compound be bombed.[14] From a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter, Philadelphia Police Department Lt. Frank Powell proceeded to drop two one-pound bombs (which the police referred to as "entry devices"[12]) made of FBI-supplied water gel explosive, a dynamite substitute, targeting a fortified, bunker-like cubicle on the roof of the house.[15]
The resulting explosions ignited a fire that eventually destroyed approximately 65 nearby houses. The firefighters, who had earlier deluge-hosed the MOVE members in a failed attempt to evict them from the building, stood by as the fire caused by the bomb engulfed the first house and spread to others, having been given orders to let the fire burn. Officials feared that MOVE would shoot at the firefighters, as they had done before.[14][16][15][5] Eleven people (John Africa, five other adults and five children aged 7 to 13) died in the resulting fire and more than 250 people were left homeless.[17] Ramona Africa, one of the two survivors, stated that police fired at those trying to escape the burning house, while the police stated that MOVE members had been firing at police.[18]
Fallout[edit]Mayor Goode soon appointed an investigative commission called the PSIC (aka MOVE Commission), which issued its report on March 6, 1986. The report denounced the actions of the city government, stating that "Dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was unconscionable."[19] No one from the city government was charged criminally.
In 1996, a federal jury ordered the city to pay a $1.5 million civil suit judgement to survivor Ramona Africa and relatives of two people killed in the bombing. The jury had found that the city used excessive force and violated the members' constitutionalprotections against unreasonable search and seizure.[17] Philadelphia was given the sobriquet "The City that Bombed Itself."[20][21]
2002 murder of John Gilbride[edit]After the death of John Africa, his widow, Alberta, married John Gilbride, Jr., a white man 20 years her junior. Together they had a child, Zackary Africa, circa 1996. The couple divorced in 1999. After a custody battle, a court ruling granted Gilbride partial custody of Zackary, allowing him unsupervised visits. Gilbride moved to Maple Shade, NJ.
On September 10, 2002, Gilbride testified in court that MOVE had threatened to kill him.[22] On September 27, shortly after midnight and prior to Gilbride's first visitation date with Zackary, an unknown assailant shot and killed Gilbride with an automatic weapon as he sat in his car parked outside his home. The case remains unsolved. MOVE initially made statements that the U.S. government had assassinated Gilbride in order to frame MOVE. Alberta Africa denied that the murder had occurred, stating in 2009 that Gilbride "is out hiding somewhere". Tony Allen, an ex-MOVE member, maintains that MOVE murdered Gilbride.
In 2012, a newspaper reported that Gilbride had revealed to friends that he had recorded incriminating evidence in a notebook as security against a "hit" by MOVE. Gilbride had placed the notebook inside a locker for safekeeping, but the Burlington County Prosecutor's Office declined to allow the Philadelphia Police Department to examine the contents of the locker following his murder.[23]
Current activities[edit]Ramona Africa acts as a spokesperson for the group and has given numerous talks at leftist events throughout the US and in other countries. Mumia Abu-Jamal, convicted of the 1981 murder of police officer Daniel Faulkner, was closely involved with MOVE. MOVE continues to advocate for Abu-Jamal's release as well as that of imprisoned MOVE members, whom the group regard as political prisoners.
Birdie Africa, also known as Michael Moses Ward, the only child survivor of the 1985 MOVE bombing, accidentally drowned in 2013 in a hot tub on board the Carnival Dream while cruising in the Caribbean.[24]
In media[edit]Internet[edit]Despite its stated anti-technology stance, MOVE maintains a website encouraging visitors to support imprisoned MOVE members.[25] On the 25th anniversary of the 1985 bombing, the Philadelphia Inquirer created a detailed multimedia site containing retrospective articles, archived articles, videos, interviews, photos, and a timeline of the events.[26]
Music[edit]The folk-punk band Mischief Brew wrote a song about the bombing called "Save a City". The anarcho-punk band Left¶ver Crack wrote a song called "Operation: MOVE" describing the group's history and struggle against the police. Australian band Eurogliders were touring the US in 1985 and wrote a song about the events called "City Of Soul" which reached no. 19 on the Australian charts in 1985, they re-recorded the song recently and included it on their 2015 CD Don't Eat the Daisies.
Documentary[edit]Let the Fire Burn, a documentary composed largely of archival footage, was released in the Fall of 2013. MOVE has promoted the documentary on their website.[27]
See also[edit]References[edit]^"John Africa". books.google.com. Google. Retrieved 2015-04-17. ^"An inauspicious beginning". philly.com. philly.com. Retrieved 2015-02-21. ^John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the House: MOVE and the tragedy of Philadelphia, W.W. Norton & Co., 1987, ISBN 0-393-02460-1^Philadelphia, city officials ordered to pay $1.5 million in MOVE case; 1996-06-24; CNN^ ab25 Years Ago: Philadelphia Police Bombs MOVE Headquarters Killing 11, Destroying 65 Homes democracynow.org. Retrieved 14 May 2015.^"'Let The Fire Burn': A Philadelphia Community Forever Changed". npr.org. NPR. Retrieved 2015-02-21. ^"Survivor Remembers Bombing Of Philadelphia Headquarters". http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/. CBS Philly. Retrieved 2015-02-15. ^"Nose to Nose: Philadelphia confronts a cult". TIME magazine. August 14, 1978. Retrieved 2007-05-20. ^Emilie Lounsberry (February 28, 2008). "MOVE members due for parole hearing". The Philadelphia Inquirer. Archived from the original on 2008-04-11. Retrieved 2008-03-05. ^Lounsberry, Emilie (June 5, 2008). "MOVE members denied parole". The Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper. pp. B06. ^Trippett, Frank (1985-05-27). "It Looks Just Like a War Zone". TIME. Retrieved 2013-05-14. ^ abcShapiro, Michael J (June 17, 2010). The Time of the City: Politics, Philosophy and Genre. Routledge. p. 108. ISBN 9781136977879. ^Account of 1985 incident from USA Today.^ abcStevens, William K. (14 May 1985). "Police Drop Bomb on Radicals' Home in Philadelphia". New York Times. Retrieved 31 August 2012. ^ abFrank Trippett (May 27, 1985). "It Looks Just Like a War Zone". TIME magazine. Retrieved 2009-02-15. The Move property on Osage Avenue had become notorious for its abundant litter of garbage and human waste and for its scurrying rats and dozens of dogs. Bullhorns blared forth obscene tirades and harangues at all times of day and night. MOVE members customarily kept their children out of both clothes and school. They physically assaulted some neighbors and threatened others. ^Brian Jenkins (April 2, 1996). "MOVE siege returns to haunt city". CNN.com. Retrieved 2008-08-01. ^ abTerry, Don (1996-06-25). "Philadelphia Held Liable For Firebomb Fatal to 11". The New York Times. Retrieved May 13, 2010. ^"Philadelphia MOVE Bombing Still Haunts Survivors". NPR. Retrieved 2013-05-14. ^"Philadelphia Special Investigation (MOVE) Commission Manuscript Collection". Retrieved 2008-04-12. ^G. Shaffer, C. Tiger, D. L. Root (2008). Compass American Guides Pennsylvania. ^Larry Eichel (May 8, 2005). "The MOVE Disaster: May 13, 1985". Philadelphia Inquirer. ^October 23, 2003, Yanney, Monika Yant, "Talks of threats before slaying" http://www.religionnewsblog.com/4817/talks-of-threats-before-slaying^September 12, 20012, "A clue hidden in a lost locker?" http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inq-blinq/A-clue-hidden-in-a-lost-locker.html^Birdie Africa, child of MOVE, dies at 41 Davies, Dave Davies, www.newsworks.org, Sept. 25, 2013.^On A Move - Website of the MOVE organization Retrieved 14 May 2015.^"MOVE 25 years later". The Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved 2010-05-09. ; http://www.philly.com/philly/entertainment/20131020_A_haunting_look_at_when_Phila__burned.html^"Let the Fire Burn". onamove.com. MOVE. Retrieved 2015-03-26. Further reading[edit]John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the House: MOVE and the tragedy of Philadelphia, W.W. Norton & Co., 1987, ISBN 0-393-02460-1.Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE (1994) University of Chicago PressJohanna Saleh Dickson; Move: Sites of Trauma (Pamphlet Architecture 23) (2002) Princeton: Architectural PressToni Cade BambaraThe Bombing of Osage Avenue Philadelphia: WHYY. DVD OCLC 95315483Margot Harry, Attention Move! This is America (1987) Chicago: Banner Press, ISBN 0-916650-32-4Maurantonio, Nicole (2014). "Archiving the Visual:The promises and pitfalls of digital newspapers". Media History20 (1): 88''102. doi:10.1080/13688804.2013.870749. Michael Boyette & Randi Boyette, Let it Burn! (1989) Chicago: Contemporary Press, ISBN 0-8092-4543-4Ramona Africa (Contr. Author). "This Country Must Change: Essays on the Necessity of Revolution in the USA" (Arissa Media Group, 2009) ISBN 978-0-9742884-7-5External links[edit]News media[edit]Primary sources[edit]Coordinates: 39°57'²20'"N75°14'²49'"W>> / >>39.955683°N 75.246868°W>> / 39.955683; -75.246868
Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the MOVE family bombing in Philadelphia
Free the MOVE 9!Watch Collection of Videos of Rally, March and Cultural Event! http://www.ustream.tv/search?q=mumia-abu-jamalPhiladelphia Media Coverage:The Inquirer900am, WURDNational Public Radio (NPR)ABC News, PhiladelphiaThe Inquirer(written day before May 13th)
Please scroll down to read more ''They even killed newborn baby Life Africa by stomping her to death!
Free the MOVE 9 -- they are victims of a diabolical, racist frame-up.
EditStorylineOn May 13, 1985, Philadelphia police dropped two pounds of military explosives onto a city row house occupied by the radical group MOVE. The resulting fire was not fought for over an hour although firefighters were on the scene with water cannons in place. Five children and six adults were killed and sixty-one homes were destroyed by the six-alarm blaze, one of the largest in the city's history. This dramatic tragedy unfolds through an extraordinary visual record previously withheld from the public. It is a graphic illustration of how prejudice, intolerance and fear can lead to unthinkable acts of violence. Written by Anonymous
Plot Summary|Plot SynopsisEditDetailsRelease Date:2 October 2013 (USA) See more >>Also Known As:Deixe Queimar See more >>Box OfficeOpening Weekend:$5,226 (USA) (4 October 2013)
Gross:$59,033 (USA)(13 December 2013)
See more >>Company CreditsTechnical SpecsRuntime:88 min
This may all sound far-fetched, but the idea has been developed in some detail by a Norwegian academic, Trond Andresen*.
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In this futuristic world, all payments are made by contactless card, mobile phone apps or other electronic means, while notes and coins are abolished. Your current account will no longer be held with a bank, but with the government or the central bank. Banks still exist, and still lend money, but they get their funds from the central bank, not from depositors.
Having everyone's account at a single, central institution allows the authorities to either encourage or discourage people to spend. To boost spending, the bank imposes a negative interest rate on the money in everyone's account '' in effect, a tax on saving.
Faced with seeing their money slowly confiscated, people are more likely to spend it on goods and services. When this change in behaviour takes place across the country, the economy gets a significant fillip.
The recipient of cash responds in the same way, and also spends. Money circulates more quickly '' or, as economists say, the ''velocity of money'' increases.
What about the opposite situation '' when the economy is overheating? The central bank or government will certainly drop any negative interest on credit balances, but it could go further and impose a tax on transactions.
So whenever you use the money in your account to buy something, you pay a small penalty. That makes people less inclined to spend and more inclined to save, so reducing economic activity.
Such an approach would be a far more effective way to damp an overheated economy than today's blunt tool of a rise in the central bank's official interest rate.
' Interest rates predictions: 'July 2016 for first rise'
'Nikkei at 20,000: will it hit '63m' by 2025?
If this sounds rather fanciful, negative interest rates already exist in Denmark, where the central bank charges depositors 0.75pc a year, and in Switzerland.
At the moment it's easy for individuals to avoid seeing their money eroded this way '' they can simply hold banknotes, stored either in a safe or under the proverbial mattress.
But if notes and coins were abolished and the only way to hold money was through a government-controlled bank, there would be no escape.
Apart from the control over the economy, there would be many other advantages of a cashless society. Such a system is much cheaper to run than one based on banknotes and coins. Forgery is impossible, as are robberies.
Electronic money is an inclusive and convenient system, giving poor and rural sectors of an economy '' where cash machines and bank branches may be few and far between and not all people have accounts '' a tool for easy participation in the economy.
Finally, the ''black economy'' will be hugely diminished, and tax evasion made all but impossible.
Jim Leaviss is head of retail fixed interest at M&G Investments.
*Improved macroeconomic control with electronic money and modern monetary theory, by Trond Andresen of the Norwegian University of Science & Technology
No wallet, no worries: Denmark considering cash-free shops
Cash machines in Copenhagen. Danes haven't needed to carry cash or even bankcards since payment via smartphone was introduced two years ago. Photograph: Fabian Bimmer /Reuters
In Stockholm you can pay a street hawker with a credit card. In Copenhagen you can buy a single shot espresso with your smartphone. In Helsinki, you can go grocery shopping but leave your wallet at home.
Scandinavia has long been the most cashless place on the planet. Now Denmark is considering whether to go a step further and allow retailers to ban cash altogether.
The Danish Chamber of Commerce is recommending that shops and services be given the option of going completely cash-free. The proposal needs to be approved by parliament but if it gets the green light, retailers could begin rejecting cash from January 2016.
''We've recognised what merchants have been telling us for some time now,'' says Sofie Findling Andersen of the chamber of commerce. ''Using cash is expensive, because it takes time for salaried employees to handle, and it's also a security concern. Carrying cash opens you up to attack and even though we have relatively low levels of violent crime in Denmark, this is something business owners and employees tell us they worry about.''
There has been little resistance to the proposal from Danish media, consumers or businesses so far, with the country's largest supermarket group, Dansk Supermarked, working on a system for cash-free grocery shopping with the mobile money transfer system MobilePay in the near future.
''Customers will be able to swipe their smartphone; scan their food; tap 'accept' when they're done and then just leave,'' says Mark Wraa-Hansen from Danske Bank, which runs MobilePay.
''We're negotiating fixed costs for this for big businesses and then smaller merchants will pay a standard price of 1% of the transaction up to 5 DKK [about 50p]: roughly the same price as with a card. So it's not too much to pay '' we want a simple model and a good relationship with companies and so far it is working well.''
Small businesses seem equally keen on going cash-free when weighing up potential costs versus the convenience of the new move.
''So few customers pay with cash anyway now that it's a bit of a hassle when they do,'' says Mette Schmidt, who runs a hairdressing salon in Jutland. ''I have to go to the bank to drop off the takings at the end of the day, looking over my shoulder to check there's no one suspicious around, and then the bank charges me 30 DKK a time to drop off money. It's easier to be paid by card or MobilePay - as long as my customers are happy and ready to make the change.''
However, change won't happen overnight, say experts.
''If we look to Sweden, the country leading the way in terms of a cash-free society, we see that plenty of people are still paying with kroner,'' says Findling Andersen. ''It's up to customers and businesses to decide which works best for them '' if a shop switches to cash-free and they lose a couple of customers, they may decide it's worth it to make their jobs easier and safer.
''For customers, they can pay for things more quickly without waiting in line,'' she adds. ''Customers already tell us they prefer cards to cash, so we just want to make this easier.''
Related:Welcome to Sweden - the most cash-free society on the planet
There is plenty of evidence to suggest this is the case. On a drizzly morning in Vejle, southern Jutland, several shoppers queue to pay for gum or a bottle of water at a 7-Eleven with just their credit cards. Sheltering from the rain inside Lagkagehuset cafe, half a dozen customers pay for their coffee on plastic.
''It's just easier this way,'' says retired kindergarten teacher Susanne Nedergaard who has bought a latte on her debit card. ''I prefer cards and I also use MobilePay a lot. I wouldn't mind getting rid of cash.''
Barista Soren Jensen, 27, agrees: ''It's much better for us when people pay by card '' it's quicker, simpler and cleaner '' cash can be pretty dirty! I think most people would be OK with just cards and MobilePay in Denmark.'' Last year a US study found 3,000 types of bacteria on bank notes.
The move towards a brave new cash-free world is supported by the UN Capital Development Fund's Better Than Cash Alliance, which aims to accelerate the shift to electronic payments, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, MasterCard and Visa.
But opponents of the concept express concerns about loss of liberty. German central banker Carl-Ludwig Thiele recently criticised the Danish government's proposal, saying that ''abolishing cash would hurt consumer sovereignty - the free choice of citizens about their payment instruments'', and citing Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky's famous line: ''Money is coined liberty.''
While Swedish pensioner groups say elderly citizens may feel alienated or unable to cope with the demands of new technology, Danish pensioners are remarkably sanguine about reliance on smartphones.
''We have one of the highest rates of 60-plus citizens who already shop online and are tech literate, so this shouldn't be too much of a problem for them,'' says Findling Andersen.
Wraa-Hansen agrees: ''Our research shows that the elderly in Denmark prefer paying by cards and by smartphone '' our oldest MobilePay user is 104.''
Denmark Central Bank to Stop Printing Money: Shops Can Refuse to Accept Notes and Coins - CryptoCoinsNews
The Denmark Central Bank, National Banken, will be discontinuing the printing of new fiat in 2016. They will be outsourcing the printing of money to a private business or businesses, this part remains unclear.
Their reasoning for this is because more and more people are using digital payment systems. Such as cards, online payments, third party platforms, and to a minor extent (yes, we are still relatively very small), cryptocurrency. Shop owners can even refuse to accept notes and coins from 2016.
The definition of a virtual currency by the UK and Europe is one that can be inflated at command by the issuer of the currency which is also the central controller. A centralised currency. Exactly along the lines of World of Warcraft gold, or Diablo III gold.
I am not complaining, but I will feel sorry for those that suffer from a pure virtual currency. And this is not to say that there are mistakes and loss in the bitcoin sector, there has unfortunately been plenty of that to go around.
And let us not forget negative interest rates. For those forced into a pure virtual economy that suffers from inflation and your money would be drained through negative interest rates. You would be taking it from the front and the back.
It is clever, particularly evil, but cleverAnd do not even think about quantitative easing and where all those hundreds of billions are going. The trickle-down theory has apparently been serving the population so well. Meanwhile, the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer.
When both inflation and negative interest rates are eating away at people's life savings in a pure virtual world that is subject to absolute capital controls, then we will see mass exodus towards a digital answer.
The wealthiest will not notice at first as their savings will be offset by the various tax cuts and profit they make from their various ventures. The not so wealthy will notice the ever increasing monetary supply inflation from global quantitative easy, combined with negative interest rates.
But hey, don't worry, it will be alright because trickle down.
Let us not overreact though. Fiat is not completely disappearing. They are outsourcing printing of money; nothing can go wrong with that, right?
And some of the main reasons cited for this move to a pure virtual economy is the ability for banks to track your funds. For the purposes of tracing transactions that will be used to combat terrorism financing, money laundering and tax evasion. Let us not think about HSBC (2012, 2015) at this moment, bless their little cotton socks.
Also Read: Cash Bans Grow as Central Bankers Plan Centralized Future: Bitcoin to the Rescue?CCN
More Benefits For the Denmark Central BankAs most of you are probably aware of, the banks do not have the physical cash that should represent what they have on their systems. If people make a bank run they would all be up the creek without a paddle.
So why not get rid of physical cash? It removes the possibility of bank runs from ever happening. With the benefit of having even more funds available in case a bailout is needed again and with the coincidental bonus of negative interest rates, because banks are not making enough money, and higher bonuses are needed.
Updated: May 12, 2015 at 9:06 am CET.
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debt slavedenmark bank
Weiser economy Peter Bofinger for abolition of cash
Sollte das Bargeld abgeschafft werden? Ja, meint der Wirtschaftsweise Peter Bofinger. Denn das k¶nne nicht nur den Zahlungsverkehr erleichtern - sondern auch die M¤rkte f¼r Schwarzarbeit und Drogen austrocknen.
16.05.2015Der Wirtschaftsweise Peter Bofinger h¤lt eine Abschaffung des Bargelds f¼r sinnvoll. 'Bei den heutigen technischen M¶glichkeiten sind M¼nzen und Geldscheine tats¤chlich ein Anachronismus'', sagte der Wirtschaftswissenschaftler dem Hamburger Magazin 'Spiegel'' vom Samstag. Bargeld erschwere den Zahlungsverkehr 'ungemein''. Als Beispiel nannte Bofinger die verlorene Zeit, 'wenn Leute vor Ihnen an der Ladenkasse nach Kleingeld suchen und die Kassiererin nach Wechselgeld''.
Wichtiger sei aber noch, dass eine Abschaffung des Bargelds 'die M¤rkte f¼r Schwarzarbeit und Drogen'' austrocknen w¼rde, sagte Bofinger. Fast ein Drittel des Euro-Bargelds seien 500-Euro-Scheine - 'f¼rs Einkaufen braucht die niemand, damit wickeln lichtscheue Gestalten ihre Gesch¤fte ab''.
(C) dapd Der Wirtschaftsweise Peter Bofinger
Laut Bofinger w¤re es sinnvoll, wenn der Euroraum, die Vereinigten Staaten, Grobritannien und die Schweiz das Bargeld gleichzeitig abschafften. Die Zukunft von M¼nzen und Scheinen w¤re seiner Ansicht nach auch 'ein gutes Thema f¼r die Agenda des G-7-Gipfels'', der Anfang Juni im bayerischen Schloss Elmau stattfindet.
Mehr zum Thema
Vor kurzem hatte D¤nemark angek¼ndigt, den Annahmezwang f¼r Bargeld in vielen kleinen L¤den, Restaurants und an Tankstellen abzuschaffen. Dass eine Mehrheit im d¤nischen Parlament diesem Vorschlag ohne langes Z¶gern zustimmen wird, gilt in Kopenhagen als sicher. Insgesamt l¤sst sich die Abkehr vom Bargeld auch f¼r kleine Zahlungen in Nordeuropa am st¤rksten beobachten.
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Wirtschaftsweiser Peter Bofinger f¼r Abschaffung des Bargelds - Sparen und Geld anlegen - FAZ
Sollte das Bargeld abgeschafft werden? Ja, meint der Wirtschaftsweise Peter Bofinger. Denn das k¶nne nicht nur den Zahlungsverkehr erleichtern - sondern auch die M¤rkte f¼r Schwarzarbeit und Drogen austrocknen.
16.05.2015Der Wirtschaftsweise Peter Bofinger h¤lt eine Abschaffung des Bargelds f¼r sinnvoll. 'Bei den heutigen technischen M¶glichkeiten sind M¼nzen und Geldscheine tats¤chlich ein Anachronismus'', sagte der Wirtschaftswissenschaftler dem Hamburger Magazin 'Spiegel'' vom Samstag. Bargeld erschwere den Zahlungsverkehr 'ungemein''. Als Beispiel nannte Bofinger die verlorene Zeit, 'wenn Leute vor Ihnen an der Ladenkasse nach Kleingeld suchen und die Kassiererin nach Wechselgeld''.
Wichtiger sei aber noch, dass eine Abschaffung des Bargelds 'die M¤rkte f¼r Schwarzarbeit und Drogen'' austrocknen w¼rde, sagte Bofinger. Fast ein Drittel des Euro-Bargelds seien 500-Euro-Scheine - 'f¼rs Einkaufen braucht die niemand, damit wickeln lichtscheue Gestalten ihre Gesch¤fte ab''.
(C) dapd Der Wirtschaftsweise Peter Bofinger
Laut Bofinger w¤re es sinnvoll, wenn der Euroraum, die Vereinigten Staaten, Grobritannien und die Schweiz das Bargeld gleichzeitig abschafften. Die Zukunft von M¼nzen und Scheinen w¤re seiner Ansicht nach auch 'ein gutes Thema f¼r die Agenda des G-7-Gipfels'', der Anfang Juni im bayerischen Schloss Elmau stattfindet.
Mehr zum Thema
Vor kurzem hatte D¤nemark angek¼ndigt, den Annahmezwang f¼r Bargeld in vielen kleinen L¤den, Restaurants und an Tankstellen abzuschaffen. Dass eine Mehrheit im d¤nischen Parlament diesem Vorschlag ohne langes Z¶gern zustimmen wird, gilt in Kopenhagen als sicher. Insgesamt l¤sst sich die Abkehr vom Bargeld auch f¼r kleine Zahlungen in Nordeuropa am st¤rksten beobachten.
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As was written, the gates to the world would be taken away from Great Britain and the U.S..
DJIBOUTI '-- China is negotiating a military base in the strategic port of Djibouti, the president told AFP, raising the prospect of US and Chinese bases side-by-side in the tiny Horn of Africa nation.
''Discussions are ongoing,'' President Ismail Omar Guelleh told AFP in an interview in Djibouti, saying Beijing's presence would be ''welcome.''
Djibouti is already home to Camp Lemonnier, the US military headquarters on the continent, used for covert, anti-terror and other operations in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere across Africa.
'...
China is already financing several major infrastructure projects estimated to total more than $9 billion (8 billion euros), including improved ports, airports and railway lines to landlocked Ethiopia, for whom Djibouti is a lifeline port.
'...
Djibouti overseas the narrow Bab al-Mandeb straits, the channel separating Africa from Arabia and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, leading into the Red Sea and northwards to the Mediterranean.
Djibouti and Beijing signed a military agreement allowing the Chinese navy to use Djibouti port in February 2014, a move that angered Washington.
China aims to install a permanent military base in Obock, Djibouti's northern port city.
Full article:Djibouti President: China Negotiating Horn of Africa Military Base (DefenseNews)
China is negotiating a military base in a strategic port of Djibouti, the president said, according to the AFP news agency.
The move raises the prospect of US and Chinese bases side-by-side in the tiny Horn of Africa nation.
"Discussions are ongoing," President Ismail Omar Guelleh said in an interview in Djibouti, saying Beijing's presence would be "welcome".
The AFP did not say when the interview was conducted.
Djibouti is already home to Camp Lemonnier, the US military headquarters on the continent, used for covert, anti-terror and other operations in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere across Africa.
France and Japan also have bases in the port, a former French colony that guards the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and which has been used by European and other international navies as a base in the fight against piracy from neighbouring Somalia.
China is already financing several major infrastructure projects estimated to total more than $9bn, including improved ports, airports and railway lines to landlocked Ethiopia, for which Djibouti is a lifeline port.
"France's presence is old, and the Americans found that the position of Djibouti could help in the fight against terrorism in the region," Guelleh said.
"The Japanese want to protect themselves from piracy - and now the Chinese also want to protect their interests, and they are welcome," he said.
Djibouti overseas the narrow Bab al-Mandeb straits, the channel separating Africa from Arabia and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, leading into the Red Sea and northwards to the Mediterranean.
Djibouti and Beijing signed a military agreement allowing the Chinese navy to use Djibouti port in February 2014, a move that angered Washington.
China aims to install a permanent military base in Obock, Djibouti's northern port city.
In recent years, Guelleh has increasingly turned to China as a key economic partner. Last year he switched the port operating contract to a Chinese company, after the previous Dubai-based operator was accused of corruption.
To: His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United NationsHonorable Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health OrganizationU.N. Member States
International AppealScientists call for Protection from Non-ionizing Electromagnetic Field ExposureWe are scientists engaged in the study of biological and health effects of non-ionizing electromagnetic fields (EMF). Based upon peer-reviewed, published research, we have serious concerns regarding the ubiquitous and increasing exposure to EMF generated by electric and wireless devices. These include''but are not limited to''radiofrequency radiation (RFR) emitting devices, such as cellular and cordless phones and their base stations, Wi-Fi, broadcast antennas, smart meters, and baby monitors as well as electric devices and infra-structures used in the delivery of electricity that generate extremely-low frequency electromagnetic field (ELF EMF).
Scientific basis for our common concerns
Numerous recent scientific publications have shown that EMF affects living organisms at levels well below most international and national guidelines. Effects include increased cancer risk, cellular stress, increase in harmful free radicals, genetic damages, structural and functional changes of the reproductive system, learning and memory deficits, neurological disorders, and negative impacts on general well-being in humans. Damage goes well beyond the human race, as there is growing evidence of harmful effects to both plant and animal life.
These findings justify our appeal to the United Nations (UN) and, all member States in the world, to encourage the World Health Organization (WHO) to exert strong leadership in fostering the development of more protective EMF guidelines, encouraging precautionary measures, and educating the public about health risks, particularly risk to children and fetal development. By not taking action, the WHO is failing to fulfill its role as the preeminent international public health agency.
Inadequate non-ionizing EMF international guidelines
The various agencies setting safety standards have failed to impose sufficient guidelines to protect the general public, particularly children who are more vulnerable to the effects of EMF.
The International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) established in 1998 the ''Guidelines For Limiting Exposure To Time-Varying Electric, Magnetic, and Electromagnetic Fields (up to 300 GHz)''[1]. These guidelines are accepted by the WHO and numerous countries around the world. The WHO is calling for all nations to adopt the ICNIRP guidelines to encourage international harmonization of standards. In 2009, the ICNIRP released a statement saying that it was reaffirming its 1998 guidelines, as in their opinion, the scientific literature published since that time ''has provided no evidence of any adverse effects below the basic restrictions and does not necessitate an immediate revision of its guidance on limiting exposure to high frequency electromagnetic fields[2]. ICNIRP continues to the present day to make these assertions, in spite of growing scientific evidence to the contrary. It is our opinion that, because the ICNIRP guidelines do not cover long-term exposure and low-intensity effects, they are insufficient to protect public health.
The WHO adopted the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classification of extremely low frequency electromagnetic field (ELF EMF) in 2002[3] and radiofrequency radiation (RFR) in 2011[4]. This classification states that EMF is a possible human carcinogen (Group 2B). Despite both IARC findings, the WHO continues to maintain that there is insufficient evidence to justify lowering these quantitative exposure limits.
Since there is controversy about a rationale for setting standards to avoid adverse health effects, we recommend that the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) convene and fund an independent multidisciplinary committee to explore the pros and cons of alternatives to current practices that could substantially lower human exposures to RF and ELF fields. The deliberations of this group should be conducted in a transparent and impartial way. Although it is essential that industry be involved and cooperate in this process, industry should not be allowed to bias its processes or conclusions. This group should provide their analysis to the UN and the WHO to guide precautionary action.
Collectively we also request that:
children and pregnant women be protected;guidelines and regulatory standards be strengthened;manufacturers be encouraged to develop safer technology;utilities responsible for the generation, transmission, distribution, and monitoring of electricity maintain adequate power quality and ensure proper electrical wiring to minimize harmful ground current;the public be fully informed about the potential health risks from electromagnetic energy and taught harm reduction strategies;medical professionals be educated about the biological effects of electromagnetic energy and be provided training on treatment of patients with electromagnetic sensitivity;governments fund training and research on electromagnetic fields and health that is independent of industry and mandate industry cooperation with researchers;media disclose experts' financial relationships with industry when citing their opinions regarding health and safety aspects of EMF-emitting technologies; andwhite-zones (radiation-free areas) be established.
All inquiries, including those from qualified scientists who request that their name be added to the Appeal, may be made by contacting Elizabeth Kelley, M.A., Director, EMFscientist.org, at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..
Note: the signatories to this appeal have signed as individuals, giving their professional affiliations, but this does not necessarily mean that this represents the views of their employers or the professional organizations they are affiliated with.
Translations of the Appeal Arabic
Chinese
Farsi
French
German
Greek
Hebrew
Italian
Japanese
Korean
Norwegian
Portuguese
Spanish
Swedish
Turkish
Signatories
Armenia
Prof. Sinerik Ayrapetyan, Ph.D., Life Sciences International Postgraduate Educational Center, UNESCO Chair, Armenia
Australia
Dr. Priyanka Bandara, Ph.D., Independent Environmental Health Educator/Researcher, Australia; Advisor, Environmental Health Trust and Doctors for Safer Schools
Dr. Bruce Hocking, MD, MBBS, FAFOEM (RACP), FRACGP, FARPS, specialist in occupational medicine; Victoria, Australia
Dr. Gautam (Vini) Khurana, Ph.D., F.R.A.C.S., Director, C.N.S. Neurosurgery, Australia
Dr. Don Maisch, Ph.D., Australia
Dr. Elena Pirogova, Ph.D., Biomed Eng., B. Eng (Hon) Chem. Eng., Engineering & Health College; RMIT University, Australia
Dr.Mary Redmayne, Ph.D., Department of Epidemiology & Preventive Medicine, Monash University, Australia
Dr. Charles Teo, BM, BS, MBBS, Member of the Order of Australia,Director, Centre for Minimally Invasive Neurosurgery at Prince of Wales Hospital, NSW, Australia
Austria
Dr. Michael Kundi, MD, University of Vienna, Austria
Dr. Gerd Oberfeld, MD, Public Health Department, Salzburg Government, Austria
Dr.Bernhard Pollner, MD, Pollner Research, Austria
Prof. Dr. Hugo W. R¼diger, MD, Austria
Bahrain
Dr. Amer Kamal, MD, Physiology Department, College of Medicine, Arabian Gulf University, Bahrain
Belgium
Prof. Marie-Claire Cammaerts, Ph.D., Free University of Brussels, Faculty of Science, Brussels, Belgium
Brazil
Vnia Araºjo Condessa, MSc., Electrical Engineer, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Prof. Dr. Jo£o Eduardo de Araujo, MD, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
Dr.Francisco de Assis Ferreira Tejo, D. Sc., Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, Campina Grande, State of Paraba, Brazil
Prof. Alvaro deSalles, Ph.D., Federal University of Rio Grande Del Sol, Brazil
Prof. Adilza Dode, Ph.D., MSc. Engineering Sciences, Minas Methodist University, Brazil
Dr.Daiana Condessa Dode, MD, Federal University of Medicine, Brazil
Michael Condessa Dode, Systems Analyst, MRE Engenharia Ltda, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Canada
Dr. Magda Havas, Ph.D., Environmental and Resource Studies, Centre for Health Studies, Trent University, Canada
Dr. Paul H(C)roux, Ph.D., Director, Occupational Health Program, McGill University; InvitroPlus Labs, Royal Victoria Hospital, McGill University, Canada
Dr. Tom Hutchinson, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Environmental and Resource Studies, Trent University, Canada
Prof. Ying Li, Ph.D., InVitroPlus Labs, Dept. of Surgery, Royal Victoria Hospital, McGill University, Canada
James McKay M.Sc, Ecologist, City of London; Planning Services, Environmental and Parks Planning, London, Canada
Dr. Anthony B. Miller, MD, FRCP, Professor Emeritus, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Canada
Prof. Klaus-Peter Ossenkopp, Ph.D., Department of Psychology (Neuroscience), University of Western Ontario, Canada
Dr. Malcolm Paterson, Ph.D. Molecular Oncologist (ret.), British Columbia, Canada
Prof. Michael A. Persinger, Ph.D., Behavioural Neuroscience and Biomolecular Sciences, Laurentian University, Canada
China
Prof. Huai Chiang, Bioelectromagnetics Key Laboratory, Zhejiang University School of Medicine, China
Prof. Yuqing Duan, Ph.D., Food & Bioengineering, Jiangsu University, China
Dr.Kaijun Liu, Ph.D., Third Military Medical University, Chongqing, China
Prof. Xiaodong Liu, Director, Key Lab of Radiation Biology, Ministry of Health of China; Associate Dean, School of Public Health, Jilin University, China
Prof. Wenjun Sun, Ph.D., Bioelectromagnetics Key Lab, Zhejiang University School of Medicine, China
Prof. Minglian Wang, Ph.D., College of Life Science & Bioengineering, Beijing University of Technology, China
Prof. Qun Wang, Ph.D., College of Materials Science & Engineering, Beijing University of Technology, China
Prof. Haihiu Zhang, Ph.D., School of Food & BioEngineering, Jiangsu University, China
Prof. Jianbao Zhang, Associate Dean, Life Science and Technology School, Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
Prof. Hui-yan Zhao, Director of STSCRW, College of Plant Protection, Northwest A & F University, Yangling Shaanxi, China
Prof. J. Zhao, Department of Chest Surgery, Cancer Center of Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou, China
Croatia
Ivancica Trosic, Ph.D., Institute for Medical Research and Occupational Health, Croatia
Egypt
Prof. Dr. Abu Bakr Abdel Fatth El-Bediwi, Ph.D., Physics Dept., Faculty of Science, Mansoura University, Egypt
Prof. Dr. Emad Fawzy Eskander, Ph.D., Medical Division, Hormones Department, National Research Center, Egypt
Prof. Dr. Heba Salah El Din Aboul Ezz, Ph.D., Physiology, Zoology Department, Faculty of Science, Cairo University, Egypt
Prof. Dr. Nasr Radwan, Ph.D., Neurophysiology, Faculty of Science, Cairo University, Egypt
Estonia
Dr. Hiie Hinrikus, Ph.D., D.Sc, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Mr. Tarmo Koppel, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Finland
Dr. Mikko Ahonen, Ph.D, University of Tampere, Finland
Dr. Marjukka Hagstr¶m, LL.M., M.Soc.Sc, Principal Researcher, Radio and EMC Laboratory, Finland
Prof. Dr. Osmo H¤nninen, Ph.D., Dept. of Physiology, Faculty of Medicine, University of Eastern Finland, Finland; Editor-In-Chief, Pathophysiology
Dariusz Leszczynski, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of Biochemistry, University of Helsinki, Finland; Member of the IARC Working Group that classified cell phone radiation as possible carcinogen
France
Prof. Dr. Dominique Belpomme, MD, MPH, Professor in Oncology, Paris V Descartes University, ECERI Executive Director
Dr. Pierre Le Ruz, Ph.D., Criirem, Le Mans, France
Georgia
Prof. Besarion Partsvania, Ph.D., Head of Bio-cybernetics Department of Georgian Technical University, Georgia
Germany
Prof. Dr. Franz Adlkofer, MD, Chairman, Pandora Foundation, Germany
Prof. Dr. Hynek Burda, Ph.D., University of Duisburg-Essen,Germany
Dr. Horst Eger, MD, Electromagnetic Fields in Medicine, Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians, Bavaria, Germany
Dr. rer. nat. Lebrecht von Klitzing, Ph.D., Head, Institute of Environ. Physics; Ex-Head, Clinical Research, Fribourg Medical University, Germany
Dr. Ulrich Warnke, Ph.D., Bionik-Institut, University of Saarlandes, Germany
Greece
Dr.Adamantia F. Fragopoulou, M.Sc., Ph.D., Department of Cell Biology & Biophysics, Biology Faculty, University of Athens, Greece
Dr. Christos Georgiou, Ph.D., Biology Department, University of Patras, Greece
Prof. EmeritusLukas H. Margaritis, Ph.D., Depts. Cell Biology, Radiobiology & Biophysics, Biology Faculty, Univ. of Athens, Greece
Dr. Aikaterini Skouroliakou, M.Sc., Ph.D., Department of Energy Technology Engineering, Technological Educational Institute of Athens, Greece
Dr. Stelios A Zinelis, MD, Hellenic Cancer Society-Kefalonia, Greece
Iceland
Dr. Ceon Ramon, Ph.D., Affiliate Professor, University of Washington, USA; Professor, Reykjavik University, Iceland
India
Prof. Dr. B. D. Banerjee, Ph.D., Fmr. Head, Environmental Biochemistry & Molecular Biology Laboratory, Department of Biochemistry, University College of Medical Sciences, University of Delhi, India
Prof. Jitendra Behari, Ph.D., Ex-Dean, Jawaharlal Nehru University; presently, Emeritus Professor, Amity University, India
Prof. Dr. Madhukar Shivajirao Dama, Institute of Wildlife Veterinary Research, India
Associate Prof. Dr Amarjot Dhami, PhD., Lovely Professional University, Phagwara, Punjab, India
Dr. Kavindra K. Kesari, MBA, Ph.D., Resident Environmental Scientist, University of Eastern Finland, Finland; Assistant Professor, Jaipur National University, India
Prof. Girish Kumar, Ph.D., Electrical Engineering Department, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India
Prof. Rashmi Mathur, Ph.D., Head, Department of Physiology, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, India
Sivani Saravanamuttu, M.Sc., M.Phil., Dept. Advanced Zoology and Biotechnology, Loyola College, Chennai, India
Prof. N.N. Sareesh, Ph.D., Melaka Manipal Medical College, Manipal University, India
Dr. R.S. Sharma, MD, Sr. Deputy Director General, Scientist - G & Chief Coordinator - EMF Project, Indian Council of Medical Research, Dept. of Health Research, Ministry/Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Ansari Nagar, New Delhi, India
Prof. Dr. Dorairaj Sudarsanam, M.Sc., M.Ed., Ph.D., Fellow - National Academy of Biological Sciences, Prof. of Zoology, Biotechnology & Bioinformatics, Dept. Advanced Zoology & Biotechnology, Loyola College, Chennai, So India
Iran
Prof. Dr. Soheila Abdi, Ph.D., Physics, Islamic Azad University of Safadasht, Tehran, Iran
Prof. G.A. Jelodar, D.V.M., Ph.D., Physiology, School of Veterinary Medicine, Shiraz University, Iran
Prof. Hamid Mobasheri, Ph.D., Head, BRC; Head, Membrane Biophysics & Macromolecules Lab; Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of Tehran, Iran
Prof. S.M.J. Mortazavi, Ph.D., Head, Medical Physics & Engineering; Chair, NIER Protection Research Center, Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Iran
Prof. Amirnader Emami Razavi, Ph.D., Clinical Biochem., National Tumor Bank, Cancer Institute, Tehran Univ. Medical Sciences, Iran
Dr.Masood Sepehrimanesh, Ph.D., 'Gastroenterohepatology Research Center, Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Iran
Prof. Dr. Mohammad Shabani, Ph.D., Neurophysiology, Kerman Neuroscience Research Center, Iran
Israel
Dr. Yael Stein, MD, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Hadassah Medical Center, Israel
Dr. Danny Wolf, MD, Pediatrician and General Practitioner, Sherutey Briut Clalit, Shron Shomron district, Israel
Dr. Ronni Wolf, MD, Assoc. Clinical Professor, Head of Dermatology Unit, Kaplan Medical Center, Rehovot, Israel
Italy
Prof. Sergio Adamo, Ph.D., La Sapienza University, Rome, Italy
Prof. Fernanda Amicarelli,Ph.D., Applied Biology, Dept. of Health, Life and Environmental Sciences, University of L'Aquila, Italy
Dr. Pasquale Avino, Ph.D., INAIL Research Section, Rome, Italy
Dr. Fiorella Belpoggi, Ph.D., FIATP, Director, Cesare Maltoni Cancer Research Center, Ramazzini Institute, Italy
Prof. Emanuele Calabro, Department of Physics and Earth Sciences, University of Messina, Italy
Prof. Franco Cervellati, Ph.D., Department of Life Science and Biotechnology, Section of General Physiology, University of Ferrara, Italy
Prof. Stefano Falone, Ph.D., Researcher in Applied Biology, Dept. of Health, Life and Environmental Sciences, University of L'Aquila, Italy
Prof. Dr. Speridione Garbisa, ret. Senior Scholar, Dept. Biomedical Sciences, University of Padova, Italy
Dr. Settimio Grimaldi, Ph.D., Associate Scientist, National Research Council, Italy
Prof. Livio Giuliani, Ph.D., Director of Research, Italian Health National Service, Rome-Florence-Bozen; Spokesman, ICEMS - International Commission for Electromagnetic Safety, Italy
Prof. Dr. Angelo Levis, MD, Dept. Medical Sciences, Padua University, Italy
Prof. Salvatore Magaz¹, Ph.D., Department of Physics and Science, Messina University, Italy
Dr. Fiorenzo Marinelli, Ph.D., Researcher, Molecular Genetic Institute of the National Research Council, Italy
Claudio Poggi, Electronics Engineer, Research Director, Sistemi s.r.l., (TN), Genoa, Italy
Prof. Raoul Saggini, University G. D'Annunzio, Chieti, Italy
Dr.Morando Soffritti, MD, Honorary President, National Institute for the Study and Control of Cancer and Environmental Diseases B. Ramazzini, Bologna, Italy
Prof. Massimo Sperini, Ph.D., Center for Inter-University Research on Sustainable Development, Rome, Italy
Japan
Prof. Tsuyoshi Hondou, Ph.D., Graduate School of Science, Tohoku University, Japan
Prof. Hidetake Miyata, Ph.D., Department of Physics, Tohoku University, Japan
Jordan
Prof. Mohammed S. H. Al Salameh, Department of Electrical Engineering, American University of Madaba, Madaba,
Kazakhstan
Dr. Timur Saliev, MD, Ph.D., Life Sciences, Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan; Institute Medical Science/Technology, University of Dundee, UK
New Zealand
Dr. Bruce Rapley, BSc, MPhil, Ph.D., Principal Consulting Scientist, Atkinson & Rapley Consulting Ltd., New Zealand
Nigeria
Dr.Idowu Ayisat Obe, Department of Zoology, Faculty of Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria
Oman
Prof. Najam Siddiqi, MBBS, Ph.D., Human Structure, Oman Medical College, Oman
Poland
Dr. Pawel Bodera, Pharm. D., Department of Microwave Safety, Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Poland
Prof. Dr. Stanislaw Szmigielski, MD, Ph.D., Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Poland
Republic of China
Prof. Dr. Tsun-Jen Cheng, MD, Sc.D., National Taiwan University, Republic of China
Russian Federation
Dr. Oleg Grigoriev, DSc., Ph.D., Deputy Chairman, The Russian National Committee on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection, Russian Federation
Prof. Yury Grigoryev, MD, Chairman, Russian National Committee on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection, Russian Federation
Dr. Anton Merkulov, Ph.D., Russian National Committee on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection, Moscow, Russian Federation
Serbia
Dr. Snezana Raus Balind, Ph.D., Research Associate, Institute for Biological Research "Sinisa Stankovic", Belgrade, Serbia
Prof. Danica Dimitrijevic, Ph.D., Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Dr.Sladjana Spasic, Ph.D., Institute for Multidisciplinary Research, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Slovak Republic
Dr. Igor Belyaev, Ph.D., Dr.Sc., Cancer Research Institute, Slovak Academy of Science, Bratislava, Slovak Republic
South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Young Hwan Ahn, MD, Ph.D, Ajou University Medical School, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Kwon-Seok Chae, Ph.D., Molecular-ElectroMagnetic Biology Lab, Kyungpook National University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Dr. Myung Chan Gye, Ph.D., Hanyang University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Dr. Yoon-Myoung Gimm, Ph.D., School of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Dankook University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Dr. Mina Ha, MD, Dankook University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Seung-Cheol Hong, MD, Inje University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Dong Hyun Kim, Ph.D., Dept. of Otorhinolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, Incheon St. Mary's Hospital, Catholic University of Korea, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Ha-Rim Kim, Dept.of Pharmacology, College of Medicine, Dankook University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Myeung Ju Kim, MD, Ph.D., Department of Anatomy, Dankook University College of Medicine, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Yun-Sil Lee, Ph.D., Ewha Womans University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Dr. Yoon-Wong Kim, MD, Ph.D., Hallym University School of Medicine, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Jung Keog Park, Ph.D., Life Science & Biotech; Dir., Research Instit.of Biotechnology, Dongguk University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Sungman Park, Ph.D., Institute of Medical Sciences, School of Medicine, Hallym University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Prof. Kiwon Song,Ph.D., Dept. of Chemistry, Yonsei University, South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Spain
Prof. Dr. Miguel Alcaraz, MD, Ph.D., Radiology and Physical Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Murcia, Spain
Dr. Alfonso Balmori, Ph.D., Biologist, Consejera de Medio Ambiente, Junta de Castilla y Le"n, Spain
Prof. J.L. Bardasano, D.Sc, University of Alcal, Department of Medical Specialties, Madrid, Spain
Dr. Claudio G"mez-Perretta, MD, Ph.D., La Fe University Hospital, Valencia, Spain
Prof. Dr. Elena Lopez Martin, Ph.D., Human Anatomy, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Prof.Enrique A. Navarro, Ph.D., Department of Applied Physics and Electromagnetics, University of Valencia, Spain
Sweden
Dr. Michael Carlberg, MSc, rebro University Hospital, Sweden
Dr. Lennart Hardell, MD, Ph.D., University Hospital, rebro, Sweden
Prof. Olle Johansson, Ph.D., Experimental Dermatology Unit, Dept. of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Sweden
Dr. Bertil R. Persson, Ph.D., MD, Lund University, Sweden
Senior Prof. Dr. Leif Salford, MD. Department of Neurosurgery, Director, Rausing Laboratory, Lund University, Sweden
Dr. Fredrik S¶derqvist, Ph.D., Ctr. for Clinical Research, Uppsala University, V¤ster¥s, Sweden
Switzerland
Dr. nat. phil. Daniel Favre, Association Romande Alert, Switzerland
Turkey
Prof. Dr. Mehmet Z¼lk¼f AkdaÄ, Ph.D., Department of Biophysics, Medical School of Dicle University, Diyarbakir, Turkey
Prof. Dr. Halil Ibrahim Atasoy MD, Faculty of Medicine, Abant Izzet Baysal University, Turkey
Prof. Ayse G. Canseven (Kursun), Ph.D., Gazi University, Faculty of Medicine, Dept. of Biophysics, Turkey
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Salih Celik, Ph.D., Fmr. Head, Turkish Biophysical Society; Head, Biophysics Dept; Medical Faculty, Dicle Univ., Turkey
Prof. Dr. Suleyman Dasdag, Ph.D., Dept. of Biophysics, Medical School of Dicle University, Turkey
Prof. Omar Elmas, MD, Ph.D., Mugla Sitki Kocman University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Physiology, Turkey
Dr. Arzu Firlarer, M.Sc. Ph.D., Occupational Health & Safety Department, Baskent University, Turkey
Prof. Suleyman Kaplan, Ph.D., Deputy Chancellor; Dir. Health Services; Head, Dept. Histology & Embryology, Turkey
Dr. Mustafa NazıroÄlu, Ph.D., Biophysics Dept, Medical Faculty, S¼leyman Demirel University, Isparta, Turkey
Prof. Dr. Ersan Odacı, MD, Ph.D., Karadeniz Technical University, Medical Faculty, Trabzon, Turkey
Dr. Elcin Ozgur, Ph.D., Biophysics Department, Faculty of Medicine, Gazi University, Turkey
Dr. Cemil Sert, Ph.D., Department of Biophysics of Medicine Faculty, Harran University, Turkey
Prof. Dr. Nesrin Seyhan, B.Sc., Ph.D., Medical Faculty of Gazi University; Chair, Biophysics Dept; Director GNRK Ctr.; Panel Mbr, NATO STO HFM; Scientific Secretariat Member, ICEMS; Advisory Committee Member, WHO EMF, Turkey
Dr. Bahriye Sirav (Aral), ABD, Gazi University Faculty of Medicine, Dept of Biophysics, Turkey
United Kingdom
David Gee, Associate Fellow, Institute of Environment, Health and Societies, Brunel University, UK
Dr. Mae-Wan Ho, Ph.D., Institute of Science in Society, UK
Dr. Isaac Jamieson, Ph.D., Biosustainable Design, UK
Prof. Michael J. O'Carroll, Emeritus Professor, former Pro Vice-Chancellor, Sunderland University, UK.
Alasdair Phillips, Electrical Engineer, UK
Dr. Syed Ghulam Sarwar Shah, M.Sc., Ph.D., Public Health Consultant, Honorary Research Fellow, Brunel University London, UK
Dr.Sarah Starkey, Ph.D., UK
Ukraine
Dr. Oleg Banyra, MD, 2nd Municipal Polyclinic, St. Paraskeva Medical Centre, Ukraine
Prof. Igor Yakymenko, Ph.D., D.Sc., Institute of Experimental Pathology, Oncology & Radiobiology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
USA
Dr. Martin Blank, Ph.D., Columbia University, USA
Prof. Jim Burch, MS, Ph.D., Dept.of Epidemiology & Biostatistics, Arnold School of Public Health, University of South Carolina, USA
Prof. David O. Carpenter, MD, Director, Institute for Health and the Environment, University of New York at Albany, USA
Prof. Simona Carrubba, Ph.D., Biophysics, Daemen College, Women & Children's Hospital of Buffalo Neurology Dept., USA
Dr. Zoreh Davanipour, D.V.M., Ph.D., Friends Research Institute, USA
Dr. Devra Davis, Ph.D., MPH, President, Environmental Health Trust; Fellow, American College of Epidemiology, USA
Prof. Om P. Gandhi, Ph.D., Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Utah, USA
Prof. Beatrice Golomb, MD, Ph.D., University of California at San Diego School of Medicine, USA
Dr.Martha R. Herbert, MD, Ph.D., Harvard Medical School, Harvard University, USA
Dr. Donald Hillman, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Michigan State University, USA
Elizabeth Kelley, MA, Fmr. Managing Secretariat, ICEMS, Italy; Director, EMFscientist.org, USA
Dr. Henry Lai, Ph.D., University of Washington, USA
Blake Levitt, medical/science journalist, former New York Times contributor, EMF researcher and author, USA
Dr. Albert M. Manville, II, Ph.D. and C.W.B., Adj. Professor, Johns Hopkins University's Krieger Graduate School of Arts & Sciences; Migratory Bird Management, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, USA
Dr. Andrew Marino, J.D., Ph.D., Retired Professor, LSU Health Sciences Center, USA
Dr.Marko Markov, Ph.D., President, Research International, Buffalo, New York, USA
Jeffrey L. Marrongelle, DC, CCN, President/Managing Partner of BioEnergiMed LLC, USA
Dr. Samuel Milham, MD, MPH, USA
Lloyd Morgan, Environmental Health Trust, USA
Dr. Joel M. Moskowitz, Ph.D., School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Dr. Martin L. Pall,Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Biochemistry & Basic Medical Sciences, Washington State University, USA
Dr. Jerry L. Phillips, Ph.D. University of Colorado, USA
Dr. William J. Rea, M.D., Environmental Health Center, Dallas, Texas, USA
Camilla Rees, CEO, Electromagnetichealth.org; CEO, Wide Angle Health, LLC, USA
Prof. Narenda P. Singh, MD, University of Washington, USA
Prof. Eugene Sobel, Ph.D., Retired, School of Medicine, University of Southern California, USA
David Stetzer, Stetzer Electric, Inc., Blair, Wisconsin, USA
Dr. Lisa Tully, Ph.D., Energy Medicine Research Institute, Boulder, CO, USA
A federal appeals court won't force the US to disclose its clandestine plan to disable cell service during emergencies.
That was the decision from the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concerning Standard Operating Procedure 303. The court had taken the same position in February and agreed with the government's contention that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows the Department of Homeland Security to withhold documents if their exposure could "endanger" public safety.
After the decision, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), which brought the FOIA suit, had asked the court to revisit the issue in what is known as an en banc review. The appeals court declined (PDF) in a one-sentence order Wednesday.
The privacy group had demanded the document way back in 2011 following the shuttering of cell service in the San Francisco Bay Area subway system to quell a protest. The DHS refused to divulge the documents associated with SOP 303, which the appeals court described as a "unified voluntary process for the orderly shut-down and restoration of wireless services during critical emergencies such as the threat of radio-activated improvised explosive devices."
EPIC sued and won the case in the lower courts. The DHS appealed.
In its petition for a rehearing, EPIC argued that the appellate court's decision "created a catch-all provision that would allow federal agencies to routinely withhold records subject to disclosure where the agency merely asserts a speculative security risk."
SOP 303 allows for the shutting down of wireless networks "within a localized area, such as a tunnel or bridge, and within an entire metropolitan area."
Last week, Ginni Rometty, the chairman and CEO of IBM, stood on stage in front of a packed room and announced that she was going to make "a bold prediction."
"In the future, every decision that mankind makes is going to be informed by a cognitive system like Watson," she said, "and our lives will be better for it."
Listening in were the crowds of engineers, designers, doctors, bankers, researchers, and reporters that IBM had ferried over to a massive glass-and-steel structure on the banks of the East River in Brooklyn.
The occasion was a new event, World of Watson, designed to showcase the "ecosystem" of innovation happening around Watson, IBM's signature artificial-intelligence system.
Watson became famous in 2011 for beating Jeopardy! champion Ken Jennings at his own game. But now IBM has much larger plans for it, which Rometty was hinting at with her "bold prediction."
"Jeopardy! was all about answers," IBM Watson Group vice president Stephen Gold explained earlier in the day, describing how chefs were using Watson to develop new recipes. "This is all about discovery."
Chef Watson, however, is just a fun example of the kind of creative thinking Watson can be trained to do. Rometty made clear that the company's true aspirations are much larger and more consequential than what's for dinner.
IBM
The World of Watson event drove this home. It suggested that cognitive systems have a place in almost any type of decision a person or company may be faced with, whether that involves buying a house, making an investment, developing a pharmaceutical drug, or designing a new toy.
"As Watson gets smarter, his ability to reason is going to exponentially increase," Rometty said. What will be really game changing won't be Watson's knack for recalling facts faster than even the most trivia-savvy human, but its ability to assist people with the complex and nuanced tasks of decision-making and analysis.
"Watson deals in the gray area, where there's not a perfect right and wrong answer," she continued. "That's the hardest thing we do as humans."
If Rometty's big prediction pans out, this '-- the gray area that was once our exclusive and often most-challenging domain '-- may eventually become much easier.
Last year, Microsoft's new CEO, Satya Nadella, seemed to break with the company's longstanding ''complain instead of compete'' strategy to acknowledge that:
We're going to innovate with a challenger mindset'.... We're not coming at this as some incumbent.
Among the first items on his agenda? Treating competing platforms like opportunities for innovation and expansion rather than obstacles to be torn down by any means possible:
We are absolutely committed to making our applications run what most people describe as cross platform'.... There is no holding back of anything.
Earlier this week, at its Build Developer Conference, Microsoft announced its most significant initiative yet to bring about this reality: code built into its Windows 10 OS that will enable Android and iOS developers to port apps into the Windows ecosystem more easily.
To make this possible'... Windows phones ''will include an Android subsystem'' meant to play nice with the Java and C++ code developers have already crafted to run on a rival's operating system'.... iOS developers can compile their Objective C code right from Microsoft's Visual Studio, and turn it into a full-fledged Windows 10 app.
Microsoft also announced that its new browser, rebranded as ''Edge,'' will run Chrome and Firefox extensions, and that its Office suite would enable a range of third-party services to integrate with Office on Windows, iOS, Android and Mac.
Consumers, developers and Microsoft itself should all benefit from the increased competition that these moves are certain to facilitate.
Most obviously, more consumers may be willing to switch to phones and tablets with the Windows 10 operating system if they can continue to enjoy the apps and extensions they've come to rely on when using Google and Apple products. As one commenter said of the move:
I left Windows phone due to the lack of apps. I love the OS though, so if this means all my favorite apps will be on the platform I'll jump back onto the WP bandwagon in a heartbeat.
And developers should invest more in development when they can expect additional revenue from yet another platform running their apps and extensions, with minimal additional development required.
It's win-win-win. Except perhaps for Microsoft's lingering regulatory strategy to hobble Google.
That strategy is built primarily on antitrust claims, most recently rooted in arguments that consumers, developers and competitors alike are harmed by Google's conduct around Android which, it is alleged, makes it difficult for OS makers (like Cyanogen) and app developers (like Microsoft Bing) to compete.
But Microsoft's interoperability announcements (along with a host of other rapidly evolving market characteristics) actually serve to undermine the antitrust arguments that Microsoft, through groups like FairSearch and ICOMP, has largely been responsible for pushing in the EU against Google/Android.
The reality is that, with innovations like the one Microsoft announced this week, Microsoft, Google and Apple (and Samsung, Nokia, Tizen, Cyanogen'...) are competing more vigorously on several fronts. Such competition is evidence of a vibrant marketplace that is simply not in need of antitrust intervention.
The supreme irony in this is that such a move represents a (further) nail in the coffin of the supposed ''applications barrier to entry'' that was central to the US DOJ's antitrust suit against Microsoft and that factors into the contemporary Android antitrust arguments against Google.
Frankly, the argument was never very convincing. Absent unjustified and anticompetitive efforts to prop up such a barrier, the ''applications barrier to entry'' is just a synonym for ''big.'' Admittedly, the DC Court of Appeals in Microsoft was careful '-- far more careful than the district court '-- to locate specific, narrow conduct beyond the mere existence of the alleged barrier that it believed amounted to anticompetitive monopoly maintenance. But central to the imposition of liability was the finding that some of Microsoft's conduct deterred application developers from effectively accessing other platforms, without procompetitive justification.
With the implementation of initiatives like the one Microsoft has now undertaken in Windows 10, however, it appears that such concerns regarding Google and mobile app developers are unsupportable.
Of greatest significance to the current Android-related accusations against Google, the appeals court in Microsoft also reversed the district court's finding of liability based on tying, noting in particular that:
If OS vendors without market power also sell their software bundled with a browser, the natural inference is that sale of the items as a bundle serves consumer demand and that unbundled sale would not.
Of course this is exactly what Microsoft Windows Phone (which decidedly does not have market power) does, suggesting that the bundling of mobile OS's with proprietary apps is procompetitive.
Similarly, in reviewing the eventual consent decree in Microsoft, the appeals court upheld the conditions that allowed the integration of OS and browser code, and rejected the plaintiff's assertion that a prohibition on such technological commingling was required by law.
The appeals court praised the district court's recognition that an appropriate remedy ''must place paramount significance upon addressing the exclusionary effect of the commingling, rather than the mere conduct which gives rise to the effect,'' as well as the district court's acknowledgement that ''it is not a proper task for the Court to undertake to redesign products.'' Said the appeals court, ''addressing the applications barrier to entry in a manner likely to harm consumers is not self-evidently an appropriate way to remedy an antitrust violation.''
Today, claims that the integration of Google Mobile Services (GMS) into Google's version of the Android OS is anticompetitive are misplaced for the same reason:
But making Android competitive with its tightly controlled competitors [e.g., Apple iOS and Windows Phone] requires special efforts from Google to maintain a uniform and consistent experience for users. Google has tried to achieve this uniformity by increasingly disentangling its apps from the operating system (the opposite of tying) and giving OEMs the option (but not the requirement) of licensing GMS '-- a ''suite'' of technically integrated Google applications (integrated with each other, not the OS). Devices with these proprietary apps thus ensure that both consumers and developers know what they're getting.
In fact, some commenters have even suggested that, by effectively making the OS more ''open,'' Microsoft's new Windows 10 initiative might undermine the Windows experience in exactly this fashion:
As a Windows Phone developer, I think this could easily turn into a horrible idea'.... [I]t might break the whole Windows user experience Microsoft has been building in the past few years. Modern UI design is a different approach from both Android and iOS. We risk having a very unhomogenic [sic] store with lots of apps using different design patterns, and Modern UI is in my opinion, one of the strongest points of Windows Phone.
But just because Microsoft may be willing to take this risk doesn't mean that any sensible conception of competition law and economics should require Google (or anyone else) to do so, as well.
Most significantly, Microsoft's recent announcement is further evidence that both technological and contractual innovations can (potentially '-- the initiative is too new to know its effect) transform competition, undermine static market definitions and weaken theories of anticompetitive harm.
When apps and their functionality are routinely built into some OS's or set as defaults; when mobile apps are also available for the desktop and are seamlessly integrated to permit identical functions to be performed on multiple platforms; and when new form factors like Apple MacBook Air and Microsoft Surface blur the lines between mobile and desktop, traditional, static anticompetitive theories are out the window (no pun intended).
Of course, it's always been possible for new entrants to overcome network effects and scale impediments by a range of means. Microsoft itself has in the past offered to pay app developers to write for its mobile platform. Similarly, it offers inducements to attract users to its Bing search engine and it has devised severalcreativemechanisms to overcome its claimed scale inferiority in search.
A further irony (and market complication) is that now some of these apps '-- the ones with network effects of their own '-- threaten in turn to challenge the reigning mobile operating systems, exactly as Netscape was purported to threaten Microsoft's OS (and lead to its anticompetitive conduct) back in the day. Facebook, for example, now offers not only its core social media function, but also search, messaging, video calls, mobile payments, photo editing and sharing, and other functionality that compete with many of the core functions built into mobile OS's.
But the desire by apps like Facebook to expand their networks by being on multiple platforms, and the desire by these platforms to offer popular apps in order to attract users, ensure that Facebook is ubiquitous, even without any antitrust intervention. As Timothy Bresnahan, Joe Orsini and Pai-Ling Yin demonstrate:
(1) The distribution of app attractiveness to consumers is skewed, with a small minority of apps drawing the vast majority of consumer demand. (2) Apps which are highly demanded on one platform tend also to be highly demanded on the other platform. (3) These highly demanded apps have a strong tendency to multihome, writing for both platforms. As a result, the presence or absence of apps offers little reason for consumers to choose a platform. A consumer can choose either platform and have access to the most attractive apps.
Of course, even before Microsoft's announcement, cross-platform app development was common, and third-party platforms like Xamarin facilitated cross-platform development. As Daniel O'Connor noted last year:
Even if one ecosystem has a majority of the market share, software developers will release versions for different operating systems if it is cheap/easy enough to do so'.... As [Torsten] K¶rber documents [here], building mobile applications is much easier and cheaper than building PC software. Therefore, it is more common for programmers to write programs for multiple OSes'.... 73 percent of apps developers design apps for at least two different mobiles OSes, while 62 percent support 3 or more.
Whether Microsoft's interoperability efforts prove to be ''perfect'' or not (and some commenters are skeptical), they seem destined to at least further decrease the cost of cross-platform development, thus reducing any ''application barrier to entry'' that might impede Microsoft's ability to compete with its much larger rivals.
Moreover, one of the most interesting things about the announcement is that it will enable Android and iOS apps to run not only on Windows phones, but also on Windows computers. Some 1.3 billion PCs run Windows. Forget Windows' tiny share of mobile phone OS's; that massive potential PC market (of which Microsoft still has 91 percent) presents an enormous ready-made market for mobile app developers that won't be ignored.
It also points up the increasing absurdity of compartmentalizing these markets for antitrust purposes. As the relevant distinctions between mobile and desktop markets break down, the idea of Google (or any other company) ''leveraging its dominance'' in one market to monopolize a ''neighboring'' or ''related'' market is increasingly unsustainable. As I wrote earlier this week:
Mobile and social media have transformed search, too'.... This revolution has migrated to the computer, which has itself become ''app-ified.'' Now there are desktop apps and browser extensions that take users directly to Google competitors such as Kayak, eBay and Amazon, or that pull and present information from these sites.
In the end, intentionally or not, Microsoft is (again) undermining its own case. And it is doing so by innovating and competing '-- those Schumpeterian concepts that were always destined to undermine antitrust cases in the high-tech sector.
If we're lucky, Microsoft's new initiatives are the leading edge of a sea change for Microsoft '-- a different and welcome mindset built on competing in the marketplace rather than at regulators' doors.
A suspected terrorist is arrested every day in Britain. More than 700 British born extremists have traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State; half of them, according to Scotland Yard, are already back on British soil.The Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner for specialist crime and operations, Mark Rowley, said: "ISIL and other terrorist groups are trying to direct attacks in the UK, encouraging British citizens to travel to Syria to fight and train, and are seeking, through propaganda, to provoke individuals in the UK to carry out violent attacks here.
"They are not aid workers or visiting relatives, they are people of real concern that are getting involved in fighting or are supportive of it. They are potential terrorist suspects."
Britain's counter-terror chief says deradicalization programs need to be beefed up suggesting that the police are able to force potential terrorists onto a mandatory counter-radicalization program.
Met Police Turn Net Police
Meanwhile, a controversial proposal allowing British police the power to vet online conversations by suspected extremists is to be fast tracked into law by British Prime Minister David Cameron.
Home Secretary Theresa May told the National Security Council: "We will introduce legislation to combat groups and individuals who reject our values and promote messages of hate.
"We will empower institutions to stand up against the extremists and challenge bigotry and ignorance. And we will support those who are fighting back against extremism online."
But the new anti-terror laws en route through parliament have been criticized by the Islamic Human Rights Council, which suggests that the new anti-terror laws:
"Signal the Tory government's intent to accelerate Britain's rapid descent into a totalitarian state in which the Muslim minority will be singled out for prosecution for 'thoughtcrime'."
Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the 7/7 bombings in London, anti-terrorism laws in Britain have been brought into focus. Since 2000, there have been five major pieces of terrorism legislation, often introduced in response to attacks or as temporary, emergency and preventative measures relating to anticipated events '-- nevertheless, remaining part of UK law.The Terrorism Act was introduced in 2000 and included acts that "use or threaten violence against either people or property that are motivated by political, religious or ideological causes."
A new offence of inciting terrorism was created and police were given new powers such as Stop and Search. The Act outlawed groups such as Al Qaeda.
Two months after the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was formally introduced and came into force in December that year. Initially, it meant that suspected terrorists could be held indefinitely, without being charged or facing trial. The powers were then replaced with control orders, placing conditions on the movement of suspects and freezing their assets and bank accounts.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 implemented the control orders and gave the government powers to restrict the actions of suspected terrorists despite a lack of evidence to charge them.
Following the July 7 bombings in 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006 was introduced, prohibiting the 'glorification' of terrorism and increasing the number of days a terrorist suspect could be held without charge '-- from 14 to 28.
The Counter Terrorism Act 2008 allowed terrorist suspects to be questioned after being charged and amended the definition of terrorism by inserting a racial clause. It also gave the police the powers to take fingerprints and DNA samples from people subject to control orders.
The tensions between anti-terror laws and human rights groups has increased, with David Cameron's new anti-terror law already proving to be controversial.
Massoud Shadjareh, Chair of the Islamic Human Rights Council, said:
"The Counter Terrorism and Security Act moved us one step closer to a police state. The current set of proposals is the Orwellian nightmare with all the trappings, from vague concepts such as British values that the government manipulates to persecute its opponents, to using thoughtcrime to silence them.
"These proposals are not about keeping the UK safe, there are plenty of laws that already do that. The Conservative government is making their agenda clear: minorities that express any difference to their notions of Britishness will be silenced."
UK government quietly rewrites hacking laws to give GCHQ immunity | Ars Technica
The UK government has quietly passed new legislation that exempts GCHQ, police, and other intelligence officers from prosecution for hacking into computers and mobile phones.
While major or controversial legislative changes usually go through normal parliamentary process (i.e. democratic debate) before being passed into law, in this case an amendment to the Computer Misuse Act was snuck in under the radar as secondary legislation. According to Privacy International, "It appears no regulators, commissioners responsible for overseeing the intelligence agencies, the Information Commissioner's Office, industry, NGOs or the public were notified or consulted about the proposed legislative changes... There was no public debate."
Privacy International also suggests that the change to the law was in direct response to a complaint that it filed last year. In May 2014, Privacy International and seven communications providers filed a complaint with the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), asserting that GCHQ's hacking activities were unlawful under the Computer Misuse Act.
On June 6, just a few weeks after the complaint was filed, the UK government introduced the new legislation via the Serious Crime Bill that would allow GCHQ, intelligence officers, and the police to hack without criminal liability. The bill passed into law on March 3 this year, and it went into effect on May 3. Privacy International says there was no public debate before the law was enacted, with only a rather one-sided set of stakeholders being consulted (Ministry of Justice, Crown Prosecution Service, Scotland Office, Northern Ireland Office, GCHQ, police, and National Crime Agency).
Further ReadingDespite filing its complaint back way back in 2014, Privacy International wasn't told about the changes to the Computer Misuse Act until last week'--after the new legislation became effective. The UK government is allowed to do this, of course, but it's a little more underhanded and undemocratic than usual.
According to Privacy International's legal experts, the amended Computer Misuse Act "grants UK law enforcement new leeway to potentially conduct cyber attacks within the UK." Following Snowden's leaks throughout 2013 and 2014, a cynical person might see this new legislation as something of an insurance policy. Under the previous Computer Misuse Act, the courts might have found GCHQ's hacking activities within the UK to be illegal'--now they're on more solid ground.
Can a new surveillance law help stop terrorists the government is already tracking and simply choosing not to stop?France has announced that in the wake of the so-called "Charlie Hebdo Shooting," it will be passing a controversial new bill granting security agencies unprecedented powers to tap the communications of France's population without judicial overview.
Impossible to pass without having first provoked fear, hatred, division, and hysteria across the French population, and still facing stiff resistance from civil liberty activists, the bill's passage raises further suspicions regarding the fatal January 2015 shooting in regards to who organized the incident and who stood most to benefit.
The Guardian in its article, "France passes new surveillance law in wake of Charlie Hebdo attack," would report:
The French parliament has overwhelmingly approved sweeping new surveillance powers in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris in January that killed 17 people at the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher grocery in Paris. The new bill, which allows intelligence agencies to tap phones and emails without seeking permission from a judge, sparked protests from rights groups who claimed it would legalise highly intrusive surveillance methods without guarantees for individual freedom and privacy.
The Guardian would also claim that:The French prime minister, Manuel Valls, defended the bill as "necessary and proportionate", saying that to compare it to the mass surveillance Patriot Act introduced in the United States after the 9/11 attacks was a lie.
He said that the previous French law on wiretapping dated back to 1991, "when there were no mobile phones or internet," and the new bill was crucial in the face of extremist threats.
Not a Lack of SurveillanceAs seen in nearly every recent terror attack both in Europe and North America including the "Charlie Hebdo shooting" and the more recent Garland, Texas attack, the alleged suspects behind the attacks all have one thread in common - they were all already under the watch of security agencies for years, some even imprisoned one or more times for terror-related and/or other violent offenses, some even having traveled overseas to fight alongside Western-backed terrorists in Syria, Iraq, and beyond.
The Guardian itself admits that the French government alone has over 1,400 people under watch, including hundreds of terrorists who have recently returned from fighting alongside Western-backed terrorists including Al Qaeda and its regional franchise, the "Islamic State" (ISIS) in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Among these monitored potential risks were in fact the suspects behind the "Charlie Hebdo shooting."Slate Magazine would report in their article, "The Details of Paris Suspect Cherif Kouachi's 2008 Terrorism Conviction," that:
Kouachi was arrested in January 2005, accused of planning to join jihadists in Iraq. He was said to have fallen under the sway of Farid Benyettou, a young "self-taught preacher" who advocated violence, but had not actually yet traveled to Iraq or committed any acts of terror. Lawyers at the time said he had not received weapons training and "had begun having second thoughts," going so far as to express "relief" that he'd been apprehended.
Kourachi and his brother would be reported to have traveled to the Middle East to receive training from Al Qaeda, then to have fought in Syria in a war backed in part by France, before returning home and carrying out their grisly terror attack, all while being tracked by French intelligence.If Kouachi previously could be arrested for "association with wrongdoers with the intention of committing a terrorist act," why wasn't he arrested immediately upon his return to France for having received and employed military training by a terrorist organization?
CNN would report in an article titled, "France tells U.S. Paris suspect trained with al Qaeda in Yemen," that:
Western intelligence officials are scrambling to learn more about possible travel of the two Paris terror attack suspects, brothers Said and Cherif Kouachi, with new information suggesting one of the brothers recently spent time in Yemen associating with al Qaeda in that country, U.S. officials briefed on the matter told CNN. Additional information from a French source close to the French security services puts one of the brothers in Syria.
To explain how terrorists well-known to France's legal system and intelligence community could simply "disappear," the Wall Street Journal in an article titled, "Overburdened French Dropped Surveillance of Brothers," would attempt to claim:The terror attacks in Paris that have killed 17 people over three days this week represent one of the worst fears'--and failures'--of counterterrorist officials: a successful plot coordinated by people who had once been under surveillance but who were later dropped as a top priority.
The U.S. provided France with intelligence showing that the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo massacre received training in Yemen in 2011, prompting French authorities to begin monitoring the two brothers, according to U.S. officials. But that surveillance of Said and Ch(C)rif Kouachi came to an end last spring, U.S. officials said, after several years of monitoring turned up nothing suspicious.
It is a narrative that begs to be believed - considering the brothers had already tangled with the law, already traveled to Yemen to receive training from Al Qaeda, and with evidence suggesting they were indeed still being tracked since it is now known they have recently returned from Syria. The Wall Street Journal would also claim that France depends heavily on US intelligence, contradicting US intelligence officials who have said their information came from their French counterparts.France reportedly has over 1,000 citizens under surveillance who have recently traveled to Iraq and Syria, believed to have fought alongside terrorists France itself has been arming. In an NBC article titled, "French Intelligence Is Tracking 1,000 Who Have Been to Iraq, Syria: Expert," it is reported that:
"French intelligence is mostly focused today on more than 1,000 French citizens that traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012," said Jean-Charles Brisard, the author of "Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda."
He added that one-fifth of them were being tracked around the clock. "This is a problem of resources," he added. "We cannot follow everyone."
Brisard said the brothers had been "well known to French intelligence [for] several years now."
The problem that led up to the "Charlie Hebdo shooting" was clearly not a lack of intelligence or surveillance. French security agencies more than adequately identified the "Charlie Hebdo shooting" perpetrators as potential threats and tracked them for years beforehand. The problem was what appears to be a deliberate effort to keep these terrorists roaming freely among society. Free to join French-backed mercenary forces abroad, and free to commit heinous acts of terror at home, both serving the singular agenda of expanding Western hegemony abroad while preserving the primacy of select special interests at home.New Surveillance is For Crushing Freedom, Not TerrorAs already explained in painstaking detail, had the French government been interested in actually stopping terrorism, including the flight of its own citizens to the Middle East to participate in a war the French government itself is backing, it could have done so easily. Existing laws and France's current security agencies successfully identified the impending threat that led to the "Charlie Hebdo shooting," but willfully failed to stop it - with certain factions of French intelligence having even played a potential role in executing it.Therefore, clearly the solution to stopping terrorism is in fact evicting the criminal special interests occupying power throughout the French government, and more broadly, from across the Western World. However, such an eviction will now become exponentially more difficult to execute, thanks to France's new surveillance laws that give them virtually unhindered access to their citizenry's data, granting them an unparalleled strategic advantage.
Indeed, France's new surveillance laws will not stop terrorism at home nor quell the legions of terror they are backing, ravaging lands abroad - instead - they will ensure the uncontested expansion of terror used to coerce the French population at home while justifying and carrying out extraterritorial conquest abroad.Tony Cartalucci, Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine"New Eastern Outlook".
CHICAGO '-- The young law professor stood apart in too many ways to count. At a school where economic analysis was all the rage, he taught rights, race and gender. Other faculty members dreamed of tenured positions; he turned them down. While most colleagues published by the pound, he never completed a single work of legal scholarship.
At a formal institution, Barack Obama was a loose presence, joking with students about their romantic prospects, using first names, referring to case law one moment and ''The Godfather'' the next. He was also an enigmatic one, often leaving fellow faculty members guessing about his precise views.
Mr. Obama, now the junior senator from Illinois and the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, spent 12 years at the University of Chicago Law School. Most aspiring politicians do not dwell in the halls of academia, and few promising young legal thinkers toil in state legislatures. Mr. Obama planted a foot in each, splitting his weeks between an elite law school and the far less rarefied atmosphere of the Illinois Senate.
Before he outraised every other presidential primary candidate in American history, Mr. Obama marched students through the thickets of campaign finance law. Before he helped redraw his own State Senate district, making it whiter and wealthier, he taught districting as a racially fraught study in how power is secured. And before he posed what may be the ultimate test of racial equality '-- whether Americans will elect a black president '-- he led students through African-Americans' long fight for equal status.
Standing in his favorite classroom in the austere main building, sharp-witted students looming above him, Mr. Obama refined his public speaking style, his debating abilities, his beliefs.
''He tested his ideas in classrooms,'' said Dennis Hutchinson, a colleague. Every seminar hour brought a new round of, ''Is affirmative action justified? Under what circumstances?'' as Mr. Hutchinson put it.
But Mr. Obama's years at the law school are also another chapter '-- see United States Senate, c. 2006 '-- in which he seemed as intently focused on his own political rise as on the institution itself. Mr. Obama, who declined to be interviewed for this article, was well liked at the law school, yet he was always slightly apart from it, leaving some colleagues feeling a little cheated that he did not fully engage. The Chicago faculty is more rightward-leaning than that of other top law schools, but if teaching alongside some of the most formidable conservative minds in the country had any impact on Mr. Obama, no one can quite point to it.
''I don't think anything that went on in these chambers affected him,'' said Richard Epstein, a libertarian colleague who says he longed for Mr. Obama to venture beyond his ideological and topical comfort zones. ''His entire life, as best I can tell, is one in which he's always been a thoughtful listener and questioner, but he's never stepped up to the plate and taken full swings.''
Mr. Obama had other business on his mind, embarking on five political races during his 12 years at the school. Teaching gave him satisfaction, along with a perch and a paycheck, but he was impatient with academic debates over ''whether to drop a footnote or not drop a footnote,'' said Abner J. Mikva, a mentor whose own career has spanned Congress, the federal bench and the same law school.
Douglas Baird, another colleague, remembers once asking Mr. Obama to assess potential candidates for governor.
''First of all, I'm not running for governor, '' Mr. Obama told him. ''But if I did, I would expect you to support me.''
He was a third-year state senator at the time.
Popular and Enigmatic
Mr. Obama arrived at the law school in 1991 thanks to Michael W. McConnell, a conservative scholar who is now a federal appellate judge. As president of The Harvard Law Review, Mr. Obama had impressed Mr. McConnell with editing suggestions on an article; on little more than that, the law school gave him a fellowship, which amounted to an office and a computer, which he used to write his memoir, ''Dreams From My Father.''
The school had almost no black faculty members, a special embarrassment given its location on the South Side. Its sleek halls bordered a neighborhood crumbling with poverty and neglect. In his 2000 Congressional primary race, Representative Bobby L. Rush, a former Black Panther running for re-election, used Mr. Obama's ties to the school to label him an egghead and an elitist.
At the school, Mr. Obama taught three courses, ascending to senior lecturer, a title otherwise carried only by a few federal judges. His most traditional course was in the due process and equal protection areas of constitutional law. His voting rights class traced the evolution of election law, from the disenfranchisement of blacks to contemporary debates over districting and campaign finance. Mr. Obama was so interested in the subject that he helped Richard Pildes, a professor at New York University, develop a leading casebook in the field.
His most original course, a historical and political seminar as much as a legal one, was on racism and law. Mr. Obama improvised his own textbook, including classic cases like Brown v. Board of Education, and essays by Frederick Douglass, W. E. B. Dubois, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, as well as conservative thinkers like Robert H. Bork.
Mr. Obama was especially eager for his charges to understand the horrors of the past, students say. He assigned a 1919 catalog of lynching victims, including some who were first raped or stripped of their ears and fingers, others who were pregnant or lynched with their children, and some whose charred bodies were sold off, bone fragment by bone fragment, to gawkers.
''Are there legal remedies that alleviate not just existing racism, but racism from the past?'' Adam Gross, now a public interest lawyer in Chicago, wrote in his class notes in April 1994.
For all the weighty material, Mr. Obama had a disarming touch. He did not belittle students; instead he drew them out, restating and polishing halting answers, students recall. In one class on race, he imitated the way clueless white people talked. ''Why are your friends at the housing projects shooting each other?'' he asked in a mock-innocent voice.
A favorite theme, said Salil Mehra, now a law professor at Temple University, were the values and cultural touchstones that Americans share. Mr. Obama's case in point: his wife, Michelle, a black woman, loved ''The Brady Bunch'' so much that she could identify every episode by its opening shots.
As his reputation for frank, exciting discussion spread, enrollment in his classes swelled. Most scores on his teaching evaluations were positive to superlative. Some students started referring to themselves as his groupies. (Mr. Obama, in turn, could play the star. In what even some fans saw as self-absorption, Mr. Obama's hypothetical cases occasionally featured himself. ''Take Barack Obama, there's a good-looking guy,'' he would introduce a twisty legal case.)
Challenging Assumptions
Liberals flocked to his classes, seeking refuge. After all, the professor was a progressive politician who backed child care subsidies and laws against racial profiling, and in a 1996 interview with the school newspaper sounded skeptical of President Bill Clinton's efforts to reach across the aisle.
''On the national level, bipartisanship usually means Democrats ignore the needs of the poor and abandon the idea that government can play a role in issues of poverty, race discrimination, sex discrimination or environmental protection,'' Mr. Obama said.
But the liberal students did not necessarily find reassurance. ''For people who thought they were getting a doctrinal, rah-rah experience, it wasn't that kind of class,'' said D. Daniel Sokol, a former student who now teaches law at the University of Florida at Gainesville.
For one thing, Mr. Obama's courses chronicled the failure of liberal policies and court-led efforts at social change: the Reconstruction-era amendments that were rendered meaningless by a century of resistance, the way the triumph of Brown gave way to fights over busing, the voting rights laws that crowded blacks into as few districts as possible. He was wary of noble theories, students say; instead, they call Mr. Obama a contextualist, willing to look past legal niceties to get results.
For another, Mr. Obama liked to provoke. He wanted his charges to try arguing that life was better under segregation, that black people were better athletes than white ones.
''I remember thinking, 'You're offending my liberal instincts,' '' Mary Ellen Callahan, now a privacy lawyer in Washington, recalled.
In his voting rights course, Mr. Obama taught Lani Guinier's proposals for structuring elections differently to increase minority representation. Opponents attacked those suggestions when Ms. Guinier was nominated as assistant attorney general for civil rights in 1993, costing her the post.
''I think he thought they were good and worth trying,'' said David Franklin, who now teaches law at DePaul University in Chicago.
But whether out of professorial reserve or budding political caution, Mr. Obama would not say so directly. ''He surfaced all the competing points of view on Guinier's proposals with total neutrality and equanimity,'' Mr. Franklin said. ''He just let the class debate the merits of them back and forth.''
While students appreciated Mr. Obama's evenhandedness, colleagues sometimes wanted him to take a stand. When two fellow faculty members asked him to support a controversial antigang measure, allowing the Chicago police to disperse and eventually arrest loiterers who had no clear reason to gather, Mr. Obama discussed the issue with unusual thoughtfulness, they say, but gave little sign of who should prevail '-- the American Civil Liberties Union, which opposed the measure, or the community groups that supported it out of concern about crime.
''He just observed it with a kind of interest,'' said Daniel Kahan, now a professor at Yale.
Nor could his views be gleaned from scholarship; Mr. Obama has never published any. He was too busy, but also, Mr. Epstein believes, he was unwilling to put his name to anything that could haunt him politically, as Ms. Guinier's writings had hurt her. ''He figured out, you lay low,'' Mr. Epstein said.
The Chicago law faculty is full of intellectually fiery friendships that burn across ideological lines. Three times a week, professors do combat over lunch at a special round table in the university's faculty club, and they share and defend their research in workshop discussions. Mr. Obama rarely attended, even when he was in town.
''I'm not sure he was close to anyone,'' Mr. Hutchinson said, except for a few liberal constitutional law professors, like Cass Sunstein, now an occasional adviser to his campaign. Mr. Obama was working two other jobs, after all, in the State Senate and at a civil rights law firm.
Several colleagues say Mr. Obama was surely influenced by the ideas swirling around the law school campus: the prevailing market-friendliness, or economic analysis of the impact of laws. But none could say how. ''I'm not sure we changed him,'' Mr. Baird said.
Because he never fully engaged, Mr. Obama ''doesn't have the slightest sense of where folks like me are coming from,'' Mr. Epstein said. ''He was a successful teacher and an absentee tenant on the other issues.''
Leaving the Classroom
As Mr. Obama built his political career, his so-called groupies became an early core of supporters, handing out leaflets and hosting fund-raisers in their modest apartments.
''Maybe we charged an audacious $20?'' said Jesse Ruiz, now a corporate lawyer in Chicago. Mr. Obama was sheepish asking for even that, Mr. Ruiz recalls. With no staff, Mr. Obama would come by the day after a fund-raiser to stuff the proceeds into a backpack.
Mr. Obama never mentioned his humiliating, hopeless campaign against Mr. Rush in class (he lost by a two-to-one margin), though colleagues noticed that he seemed exhausted and was smoking more than usual.
Soon after, the faculty saw an opening and made him its best offer yet: Tenure upon hiring. A handsome salary, more than the $60,000 he was making in the State Senate or the $60,000 he earned teaching part time. A job for Michelle Obama directing the legal clinic.
Your political career is dead, Daniel Fischel, then the dean, said he told Mr. Obama, gently. Mr. Obama turned the offer down. Two years later, he decided to run for the Senate. He canceled his course load and has not taught since.
Now, watching the news, it is dawning on Mr. Obama's former students that he was mining material for his political future even as he taught them.
Byron Rodriguez, a real estate lawyer in San Francisco, recalls his professor's admiration for the soaring but plainspoken speeches of Frederick Douglass.
''No one speaks this way anymore,'' Mr. Obama told his class, wondering aloud what had happened to the art of political oratory. In particular, Mr. Obama admired Douglass's use of a collective voice that embraced black and white concerns, one that Mr. Obama has now adopted himself.
In class, Mr. Obama sounded many of the same themes he does on the campaign trail, Ms. Callahan said, ticking them off: ''self-determinism as opposed to paternalism, strength in numbers, his concept of community development.''
But as a professor, students say, Mr. Obama was in the business of complication, showing that even the best-reasoned rules have unintended consequences, that competing legal interests cannot always be resolved, that a rule that promotes justice in one case can be unfair in the next.
So even some former students who are thrilled at Mr. Obama's success wince when they hear him speaking like the politician he has so fully become.
''When you hear him talking about issues, it's at a level so much simpler than the one he's capable of,'' Mr. Rodriguez said. ''He was a lot more fun to listen to back then.''
Finally a former law student of Barack Obama's, surfaces and goes public (house of representatives, Congress) - Politics and Other Controversies -Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians, Conservatives, Liberals, Third Parties, Left-Wing, Right-Wing, Congress
I'm pretty astonished. Though Obama was widely advertised as a Professor (or at least a lecturer) on Constitutional Law at the University of Chicago, I never heard of a single person say "Yes, I knew Barry back then, he was my (friend/teacher/roommate/boss/employee/drinking buddy/date/rival/etc.)". The man went through an entire PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, which usually exposes everyone they have EVER known (isn't that right, Herman Cain?)... but no associate or acquaintance of Barack Obama from his college days was ever brought out.
Why is it that conservatives live in an alternate reality that so rarely turns out to be true... even regarding the simple stuff?STUDENTS
Craig Cunningham, UCLS '93
Craig Cunningham, '93, one of the President's first students and a supporter of his teacher's political ambitions, felt that Obama was brilliant, talented, and had the potential to be a great leader. But Cunningham was also concerned about Obama's political future.
''I did expect him to run for office, because I would hang around after class and we would talk about the state senate,'' Cunningham explains. ''But after he lost the congressional race to Bobby Rush I thought he was moving too fast, that he should slow down and not run for a different office for a while because he was trying to do too much at one time. And Chicago politics were not going to allow him to do that. I was worried. And I was really surprised when he told me he was going to run for U.S. Senate.''
''We African American students were very aware of him because at the time there really weren't a lot of minority professors at the Law School,'' Cunningham explains, ''and we really wanted him to be a strong representation for the African American students. We wanted him to live up to the pressures and reach out to other ethnic minorities. And we were also very excited about possibly having an African American tenure-track professor at the Law School.''
Elysia Solomon, UCLS '99
''In Con Law III we study equal process and due process. He was incredibly charismatic, funny, really willing to listen to student viewpoints'--which I thought was very special at Chicago,'' says Elysia Solomon, '99. ''There were so many diverse views in the class and people didn't feel insecure about voicing their opinions. I thought that he did a really good job of balancing viewpoints.''
''I knew he was ambitious, but at that point in time at the Law School there were so many people on the faculty that you knew weren't going to be professors for the rest of their lives,'' Solomon explains. ''We had [Judge] Abner Mikva and Elena Kagan and Judge Wood and Judge Posner. There is a very active intellectual life at the Law School and this melding of the spheres of academics and the real world is very cool. It's what attracts teachers and students to the school.''
Jesse Ruiz, UCLS '95
''When I walked into class the first day I remember that we'--meaning the students I knew'--thought we were going to get a very left-leaning perspective on the law,'' explains Jesse Ruiz, '95.
''We assumed that because he was a minority professor in a class he designed. But he was very middle-of-the-road. In his class we were very cognizant that we were dealing with a difficult topic, but what we really got out of that class was that he taught us to think like lawyers about those hard topics even when we had issues about those topics.''
Unsurprisingly, though, he was of greater interest to the minority students on campus. ''I don't think most people know his history,'' Ruiz says, ''but when he became the first African American president of the Harvard Law Review it was a national story. I remembering reading the story and thinking I gotta go to law school!''
In 1996, Obama ran for, and won, the Thirteenth District of Illinois state senate seat, which then spanned Chicago South Side neighborhoods from Hyde Park''Kenwood to South Shore and west to Chicago Lawn. Then in 2000 he ran for, and lost, the Democratic nomination for Bobby Rush's seat in the U.S. House of Representatives.
''He was very demoralized at that point and would not have recommended a career in public service to anyone,'' Ruiz says.
''He had suffered a setback, he was facing a lot of struggles in Springfield, and it was a hard lifestyle traveling back and forth to Springfield. We sat at lunch and he talked about how if he had joined a big firm when he graduated he could have been a partner. We did a lot of what if. But then he decided to run for U.S. Senate. And the rest is history.''
Dan Johnson-Weinberger, UCLS '00
Over time, Obama developed a reputation for teaching from a nonbiased point of view. He was also noted for widening the legal views of his students.
''I liked that he included both jurisprudence and real politics in the class discussions,'' says Dan Johnson-Weinberger, '00.
''Lots of classes in law school tend to be judge-centric and he had as much a focus on the legislative branch as the judicial branch. That was refreshing.''
''I was into state politics while I was at the Law School, so I am one of the few alums who knew the President as both a legislator and as a teacher,'' notes Johnson-Weinberger. ''I thought he would continue as a successful politician. But I never would have guessed that he would be our President.''
Joe Khan, UCLS '00
''Most students were not that focused on Barack during the years I was there,'' says Joe Khan, '00. ''For example, every year the professors would donate their time or belongings to the law school charity auction. Professor Obama's donation was to let two students spend the day with him in Springfield, where he'd show them around the state senate and introduce them to the other senators. People now raise thousands of dollars to be in a room with the man, but my friend and I won the bid for a few hundred bucks.''
David Franklin, UCLS
In his voting rights course, Obama taught Lani Guinier's proposals for structuring elections differently to increase minority representation. Opponents attacked those suggestions when Guinier was nominated as assistant attorney general for civil rights in 1993, costing her the post."I think he thought they were good and worth trying," said David Franklin, who now teaches law at DePaul University in Chicago. But whether out of professorial reserve or budding political caution, Obama would not say so directly. "He surfaced all the competing points of view on Guinier's proposals with total neutrality and equanimity," Franklin said. "He just let the class debate the merits of them back and forth."
Kenworthey Bilz, UCLS
"Anybody who's thinking they want to go into academia, conservative or liberal, kind of knows they have to take equal protection," says Kenworthey Bilz, who took equal protection from Obama in 1997 and is now a professor at Northwestern Law School. "I can very confidently say he didn't strike me as liberal or conservative."
"He was not an ivory tower academic," said former student Kenworthey Bilz, who had him for the low-ranked 1997 Constitutional Law class. "The class was not his first love. He was basically in the trenches. These were real problems to him. That kind of on-the-street realism was really refreshing."
Patrick Jasperse, UCLS
''He was very engaging, approachable and human,'' recalls Patrick Jasperse, now a Justice Department trial attorney based in Washington.
Andrew Janis, UCLS
While a state senator, Obama held classes early on Monday and late on Friday during legislative sessions, running right through the school's popular Friday evening wine-and-cheese hour. Obama was so popular, students signed up for his class anyway.
"We'd be in class and get messages that he would come in 45 minutes late and everyone would wait for him," said former student Andrew Janis, now a New York lawyer.
"Some professors are just kind of going through the motions with you," Janis said. "He actually seemed to take everyone's point of view seriously."
Adam Bonin, UCLS
It was 1996, and there I was, in a seminar room with maybe fifteen students, not knowing that I was learning from the man who might be the next President of the United States.
Spring quarter of my second year, I took Voting Rights and Election Law as a seminar with Professor Obama. Now, let's be clear: in a school with a lot of Somebodies '' Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, Cass Sunstein and David Currie '' he was a relative nobody, and even compared with other younger faculty, it was Larry Lessig and Elena Kagan who had more of the hype. But Obama was teaching a course in a subject I wanted to study '' at a point when I realized that law school was too short to be spent in classes that felt obligatory '' and that made it an easy decision.
And he was ... different. For one thing, better dressed. Sleek sweaters and blazers as opposed to ill-fitting, coffee-stained suits with mismatched ties. But he was also less formal, more relaxed '' he never taught the class as though he knew the answers to all the questions he was posing and was just hiding the ball from us until we could find them. Confident, sure, but never cocky.
What's more, he taught Voting Rights in a different way than others do. He didn't use a textbook, for starters, but rather had us each purchase an eight-inch high multilith of cases, law review articles and statutes that he had personally compiled. And they weren't all the "big" cases either '' no, our class started by reviewing some early-19th century cases about the denial of the franchise, so that as the course moved forward we saw "voting rights" not as some static thing to be analyzed, but a constantly- and still-evolving process to be affected. Over the course of a few months, we studied changes in the franchise, changes in the rights of political parties, campaign finance law and redistricting, among other topics. We learned the law, but we also learned it on the level of real-world impact: based on a whites-only party primary, how many people would be denied a voice? What kind of policies would result from such a legislature?
Much in the Chicago tradition, he wanted all voices to be heard in the classroom, and when there a viewpoint that wasn't being expressed or students were too complacent in their liberal views, he'd push the contrary view himself. These classes were conversations.
And the conversations extended outside the classroom. I spent plenty of time in Prof. Obama's office, talking to him about the paper I was working on. Just the two of us, one on one, with him always provoking me to think deeper, work harder ...
Salil Mehra, UCLS
A favorite theme, said Salil Mehra, now a law professor at Temple University, were the values and cultural touchstones that Americans share. Mr. Obama's case in point: his wife, Michelle, a black woman, loved ''The Brady Bunch'' so much that she could identify every episode by its opening shots.
Adam Gross, UCLS
''Are there legal remedies that alleviate not just existing racism, but racism from the past?'' Adam Gross, now a public interest lawyer in Chicago, wrote in his class notes in April 1994.
D. Daniel Sokol, UCLS
But the liberal students did not necessarily find reassurance. ''For people who thought they were getting a doctrinal, rah-rah experience, it wasn't that kind of class,'' said D. Daniel Sokol, a former student who now teaches law at the University of Florida at Gainesville.
Mary Ellen Callahan, UCLS
He wanted his charges to try arguing that life was better under segregation, that black people were better athletes than white ones. ''I remember thinking, 'You're offending my liberal instincts,' '' Mary Ellen Callahan, now a privacy lawyer in Washington, recalled.
In class, Mr. Obama sounded many of the same themes he does on the campaign trail, Ms. Callahan said, ticking them off: ''self-determinism as opposed to paternalism, strength in numbers, his concept of community development.''
David Franklin, UCLS
In his voting rights course, Mr. Obama taught Lani Guinier's proposals for structuring elections differently to increase minority representation.''I think he thought they were good and worth trying,'' said David Franklin, who now teaches law at DePaul University in Chicago.
But whether out of professorial reserve or budding political caution, Mr. Obama would not say so directly. ''He surfaced all the competing points of view on Guinier's proposals with total neutrality and equanimity,'' Mr. Franklin said. ''He just let the class debate the merits of them back and forth.''
Byron Rodriguez, UCLS
Now, watching the news, it is dawning on Mr. Obama's former students that he was mining material for his political future even as he taught them. Byron Rodriguez, a real estate lawyer in San Francisco, recalls his professor's admiration for the soaring but plainspoken speeches of Frederick Douglass.
''No one speaks this way anymore,'' Mr. Obama told his class, wondering aloud what had happened to the art of political oratory. In particular, Mr. Obama admired Douglass's use of a collective voice that embraced black and white concerns, one that Mr. Obama has now adopted himself.
''When you hear him talking about issues, it's at a level so much simpler than the one he's capable of,'' Mr. Rodriguez said. ''He was a lot more fun to listen to back then.''
COLLEAGUES
David Strauss, Colleague
''Many of us thought he would be a terrific addition to the faculty, but we understood that he had other plans,'' explains David Strauss, Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor. ''Although I don't think any of us imagined that things would work out the way they did.''
During his tenure in the state senate, Obama continued to teach at the Law School, some nights traveling straight up from evening sessions at the State House to his classroom.
''But the students never thought of him as a part-timer,'' Strauss adds. ''They just thought of him as a really good teacher.''
Professor David Strauss, the only teacher with higher ratings than Obama in his last year at the school, said, "The students thought he was great. He thought about things in unconventional ways."
Douglas Baird, Colleague
Douglas Baird, the Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law and former Dean, shared Cunningham's concern that winning the seat was a long shot for Obama. ''I remember having a cup of coffee with him when he said he was thinking of running for the U.S. Senate, and I looked at him straight in the eye and said, 'Don't do it, you're not going to win.'''
[Baird] remembers once asking Obama to assess potential candidates for governor. "First of all, I'm not running for governor," Obama told him. "But if I did, I would expect you to support me."
Dennis Hutchinson, Colleague
Standing in his favorite classroom in the austere main building, sharp-witted students looming above him, Obama refined his public speaking style, his debating abilities, his beliefs. "He tested his ideas in classrooms," said Dennis Hutchinson, a colleague. Every seminar hour brought a new round of "Is affirmative action justified? Under what circumstances?" as Hutchinson put it.
Richard Epstein, Colleague
"I don't think anything that went on in these chambers affected him," said Richard Epstein, a libertarian colleague who says he longed for Obama to venture beyond his ideological and topical comfort zones. "His entire life, as best I can tell, is one in which he's always been a thoughtful listener and questioner, but he's never stepped up to the plate and taken full swings."
Nor could his views be gleaned from scholarship; Obama has never published any. He was too busy, but also, Epstein believes, he was unwilling to put his name to anything that could haunt him politically, as Guinier's writings had hurt her. "He figured out, you lay low," Epstein said.
Epstein, who once almost sold his Hyde Park home to Obama and would buttonhole him to talk about things like state mandates for health insurance, offers one reason why: "He was always a terrific listener. He'd sit there and **** his head, take it all in."
Of course, as Epstein points out, Obama's willingness to listen didn't necessarily mean he was willing to be convinced. "What you don't get, alas and alack, out of all this is a change in point of view," Epstein says. "If you ask me whether I had any influence on his intellectual or moral development, I'd say no, not even a little."
Abner Mikva, Colleague
Obama had other business on his mind, embarking on five political races during his 12 years at the school. Teaching gave him satisfaction, along with a perch and a paycheck, but he was impatient with academic debates over "whether to drop a footnote or not drop a footnote," said Abner Mikva, a mentor whose own career has spanned Congress, the federal court system and the same law school.
Cass Sunstein, Colleague
"Those are tremendous ratings, especially for someone who had a day job," Professor Cass Sunstein said. "We wanted him to join the faculty full-time at various different junctures. That's not a trivial fact. . . . If we want to hire someone, the faculty has to think they're tremendous. But he liked political life."
Daniel Fischel, Former Dean, UCLS
In the spring of 2000, not long after Barack Obama was trounced in the Democratic primary for a South Side Chicago congressional seat, Daniel Fischel staged an intervention. Meeting with Obama in the main lounge at the University of Chicago Law School, where Fischel was then dean and Obama was a part-time senior lecturer, Fischel offered Obama some unsolicited advice. "I told him that it was obvious his political career was going nowhere," Fischel recalls, "and that he really ought to think about doing something else."
The particular "something else" Fischel had in mind was a full-time tenured professorship; to sweeten the offer, Fischel said the law school would even hire Obama's wife, Michelle, to run its legal clinic. Although the move would require Obama to give up his state Senate seat, Fischel tried to convince his junior colleague that Chicago professor might be a more natural role than Chicago politician for a cerebral guy like him. "I mentioned people who'd been faculty members like [Antonin] Scalia and [Richard] Posner and [Frank] Easterbrook and many others who had gone on to very distinguished careers outside of academia or in combination with academia," Fischel says. "I told him he could be a faculty member as well as a public intellectual."
Obama declined Fischel's overture, saying that he wanted to give elected politics another shot.
"What I know from my dealings with him at the law school is that he does really attempt to understand the points of view of other people who look at the world or a particular issue differently than he does," says Fischel. "He's much more intellectual, much more thoughtful, much more interested in discussion, debate, and dialogue than the typical politician. And that gives me some confidence about him, even though from my perspective he's much too liberal. I've never voted for a Democrat in my entire life. He's the first one I might vote for."
Saul Levmore, Current Dean, UCLS
Saul Levmore, the school's current dean, whose politics are hard to characterize but generally right-leaning, says, "We were intensely interested in him. We were looking for him to say, 'I'm giving up politics, I want to be an academic.' We were always in recruiting mode with him."
My Professor, My Judge, and the Doctrine of Judicial Review | Truth on the Market
Imagine if you picked up your morning paper to read that one of your astronomy professors had publicly questioned whether the earth, in fact, revolves around the sun. Or suppose that one of your economics professors was quoted as saying that consumers would purchase more gasoline if the price would simply rise. Or maybe your high school math teacher was publicly insisting that 2 + 2 = 5. You'd be a little embarrassed, right? You'd worry that your colleagues and friends might begin to question your astronomical, economic, or mathematical literacy.
Now you know how I felt this morning when I read in the Wall Street Journal that my own constitutional law professor had stated that it would be ''an unprecedented, extraordinary step'' for the Supreme Court to ''overturn[] a law [i.e., the Affordable Care Act] that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress.'' Putting aside the ''strong majority'' nonsense (the deeply unpopular Affordable Care Act got through the Senate with the minimum number of votes needed to survive a filibuster and passed 219-212 in the House), saying that it would be ''unprecedented'' and ''extraordinary'' for the Supreme Court to strike down a law that violates the Constitution is like saying that Kansas City is the capital of Kansas. Thus, a Wall Street Journal editorial queried this about the President who ''famously taught constitutional law at the University of Chicago'': ''[D]id he somehow not teach the historic case of Marbury v. Madison?''
I actually know the answer to that question. It's no (well, technically yes'...he didn't). President Obama taught ''Con Law III'' at Chicago. Judicial review, federalism, the separation of powers '-- the old ''structural Constitution'' stuff '-- is covered in ''Con Law I'' (or at least it was when I was a student). Con Law III covers the Fourteenth Amendment. (Oddly enough, Prof. Obama didn't seem too concerned about ''an unelected group of people'' overturning a ''duly constituted and passed law'' when we were discussing all those famous Fourteenth Amendment cases '-- Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut, Romer v. Evans, etc.) Of course, even a Con Law professor focusing on the Bill of Rights should know that the principle of judicial review has been alive and well since 1803, so I still feel like my educational credentials have been tarnished a bit by the President's ''unprecedented, extraordinary'' remarks.
Fortunately, another bit of my educational background somewhat mitigates the reputational damage inflicted by the President's unfortunate comments. This morning, the judge for whom I clerked, Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, called the President's bluff.
Here's a bit of transcript from this morning's oral argument in Physicians Hospital of America v. Sebelius, a case involving a challenge to the Affordable Care Act:
Judge Jerry E. Smith: Does the Department of Justice recognize that federal courts have the authority in appropriate circumstances to strike federal statutes because of one or more constitutional infirmities?
Dana Lydia Kaersvang (DOJ Attorney): Yes, your honor. Of course, there would need to be a severability analysis, but yes.
Smith: I'm referring to statements by the President in the past few days to the effect'...that it is somehow inappropriate for what he termed ''unelected'' judges to strike acts of Congress that have enjoyed '-- he was referring, of course, to Obamacare '-- what he termed broad consensus in majorities in both houses of Congress.
That has troubled a number of people who have read it as somehow a challenge to the federal courts or to their authority or to the appropriateness of the concept of judicial review. And that's not a small matter. So I want to be sure that you're telling us that the attorney general and the Department of Justice do recognize the authority of the federal courts through unelected judges to strike acts of Congress or portions thereof in appropriate cases.
Kaersvang: Marbury v. Madison is the law, your honor, but it would not make sense in this circumstance to strike down this statute, because there's no ''
Smith: I would like to have from you by noon on Thursday'...a letter stating what is the position of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, in regard to the recent statements by the President, stating specifically and in detail in reference to those statements what the authority is of the federal courts in this regard in terms of judicial review. That letter needs to be at least three pages single spaced, no less, and it needs to be specific. It needs to make specific reference to the President's statements and again to the position of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
I must say, I'm pretty dang proud of Judge Smith right now. And I'm really looking forward to reading that three-page, single-spaced letter.
My Con Law Prof Flubs the Constitution'...Again. | Truth on the Market
Once again, my constitutional law professor has embarrassed me with his gross misunderstanding of the U.S. Constitution. First, he insisted that it would be ''unprecedented'' for the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn a statute enacted by a ''democratically elected Congress.'' Seventh-grade Civics students know that's not right, but Mr. Obama's misstatement did have its intended effect: It sent a clear signal that the President and his lackeys would call into question the legitimacy of the Supreme Court should it invalidate the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Duly warned, Chief Justice Roberts changed his vote in NFIB v. Sebelius to save the Court from whatever institutional damage Mr. Obama would have inflicted.
Now President Obama '' who chastised his predecessor for offending the constitutional order and insisted that he, a former constitutional law professor, would never stoop so low '' has both violated his oath of office and flouted a key constitutional feature, the separation of powers. I'm speaking of the President's ''administrative fix'' to the ACA. That ''fix'' consists of a presidential order not to enforce the Act's minimum coverage provisions, a move that President Obama says will allow insurance companies to continue offering ACA non-compliant policies to those previously enrolled in them if the companies wish to do so and are able to obtain permission at the state level.
This is, of course, nothing more than a transparent attempt to shift blame for the millions of recently canceled policies. Having priced their more generous ACA-compliant policies on the assumption that there would be an influx of healthy customers now covered by high-deductible, non-compliant policies, insurance companies would shoot themselves in the foot by accepting Mr. Obama's generous ''offer.'' Moreover, state insurance commissioners, aware of the adverse selection likely to result from this last-minute rule change, are unlikely to give their blessing. (Indeed, several have balked '' including the D.C. insurance commissioner, who was promptly fired.)
But putting aside the fact that the administrative fix won't work, the main problem with it is that it is blatantly unconstitutional. The Constitution divides power between the three branches of government. Article I grants to the Congress ''all legislative Powers,'' including ''Power to lay and collect Taxes.'' Article II then directs the President to ''take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' With his administrative fix, President Obama has essentially said, ''I promise not to execute the law Congress passed.''
Moreover, the President went further to say, ''I promise not to collect a tax the Congress imposed.'' Remember that the penalty for failure to carry ACA-compliant insurance is, for constitutional purposes, a tax. That was the central holding of last summer's Obamacare decision, NFIB v. Sebelius. When the President assured victims of insurance cancellations that he would turn a blind eye to the law and allow their insurers to continue to offer canceled policies, he also implied that he would order his administration not to collect the taxes owed by those in ACA-noncompliant policies. Indeed, this matter was clarified in the letter the Department of Health and Human Services sent to state insurance commissioners notifying them of the Obama Administration's decision not to enforce the law as written. That letter stated that the Department of the Treasury, which is charged (through the IRS) with collecting the ACA's penalties/taxes, ''concur[red] with the transitional relief afforded in this document.'' That means the IRS, pursuant to the President's order, is promising not to collect a tax the Congress has imposed.
This, my friends, is a major disruption of the constitutional order. If the President of the United States may simply decide not to collect taxes imposed by the branch of government that has been given exclusive ''Power to lay and collect Taxes,'' the whole Constitution is thrown off-kilter. Any time a president wanted to favor some individuals, firms, or industries, he wouldn't need to go to Congress for approval. No, he could just order his IRS not to collect taxes from those folks. Can't get Congress to approve subsidies for green technologies? No worries. Just order your IRS not to collect taxes from firms in that sector. Or maybe even order a refundable tax credit. You think Congress has enacted job-killing regulations on an industry? Just invoke your enforcement discretion and ignore those rules. Whew! This sure makes things easier.
President Obama twice promised, under oath, to ''take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' Unfortunately, he also rammed through a terrible law. Our Constitution now gives him the option to enforce the enacted law and pay the political price, or seek Congress's assistance to change the law. On the particular matter at issue here, Congress is willing to help the President out. On Friday, the House of Representatives voted to amend the law to allow insurance companies to continue to offer ACA non-compliant policies. Mr. Obama doesn't like some details of the legislative fix he's been offered. Unfortunately for him, though, he's not a king. He has to work within the constitutional order.
At least, that's what I thought I learned in constitutional law.
Marbury v. Madison - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Marbury v. MadisonArgued February 11, 1803Decided February 24, 1803Full case nameWilliam Marbury v. James Madison, Secretary of State of the United StatesCitations5 U.S.137 (more)1 Cranch 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352
Prior historyOriginal action filed in U.S. Supreme Court; order to show cause why writ of mandamus should not issue, December 1801Subsequent historyNoneHoldingSection 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is unconstitutional to the extent it purports to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that permitted by the Constitution. Congress cannot pass laws that are contrary to the Constitution, and it is the role of the Judicial system to interpret what the Constitution permits.Court membershipCase opinionsMajorityMarshall, joined by Paterson, Chase, WashingtonCushing and Moore took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Laws appliedU.S. Const. arts. I, III; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.137 (1803), was a landmarkUnited States Supreme Court case in which the Court formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States under Article III of the Constitution. The landmark decision helped define the boundary between the constitutionally separate executive and judicial branches of the American form of government.
The case resulted from a petition to the Supreme Court by William Marbury, who had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia by President John Adams but whose commission was not subsequently delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to force the new Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the documents. The Court, with John Marshall as Chief Justice, found firstly that Madison's refusal to deliver the commission was both illegal and correctible. Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of ordering Madison (by writ of mandamus) to hand over Marbury's commission, instead holding that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court's original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III established. The petition was therefore denied.
Background of the caseIn the presidential election of 1800, Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson defeated Federalist John Adams, becoming the third President of the United States. Although the election was decided on February 17, 1801, Jefferson did not take office until March 4, 1801. Until that time, outgoing president Adams and the Federalist-controlled 6th Congress were still in power. During this lame-duck session, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801. This Act modified the Judiciary Act of 1789 in establishing ten new district courts, expanding the number of circuit courts from three to six, and adding additional judges to each circuit, giving the President the authority to appoint Federal judges and justices of the peace. The act also reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from six to five, effective upon the next vacancy in the Court.[1][2]
On March 3, just before his term was to end, Adams, in an attempt to stymie the incoming Democratic-Republican Congress and administration, appointed 16 Federalist circuit judges and 42 Federalist justices of the peace to offices created by the Judiciary Act of 1801. These appointees, the infamous "Midnight Judges", included William Marbury, a prosperous financier in Maryland. An ardent Federalist, Marbury was active in Maryland politics and a vigorous supporter of the Adams presidency.[3] He had been appointed to the position of justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The term for a justice of the peace was five years, and they were "authorized to hold courts and cognizance of personal demands of the value of 20 dollars."[4]
On the following day, the appointments were approved en masse by the Senate; however, to go into effect, the commissions had to be delivered to those appointed. This task fell to John Marshall, who, even though recently appointed Chief Justice of the United States, continued as the acting Secretary of State at President Adams's personal request.[5]
While a majority of the commissions were delivered, it proved impossible for all of them to be delivered before Adams's term as president expired. As these appointments were routine in nature, Marshall assumed the new Secretary of State James Madison would see they were delivered, since "they had been properly submitted and approved, and were, therefore, legally valid appointments."[6] On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson was sworn in as President. As soon as he was able, President Jefferson ordered Levi Lincoln, who was the new administration's Attorney General and acting Secretary of State until the arrival of James Madison, not to deliver the remaining appointments. Without the commissions, the appointees were unable to assume the offices and duties to which they had been appointed. In Jefferson's opinion, the undelivered commissions, not having been delivered on time, were void.[5]
The newly sworn-in Democratic-Republican7th Congress immediately set about voiding the Judiciary Act of 1801 with their own Judiciary Act of 1802 which reversed the act of 1801 so that the Judicial branch once again operated under the dictates of the original Judiciary Act of 1789. In addition, it replaced the Court's two annual sessions with one session to begin on the first Monday in February, and "canceled the Supreme Court term scheduled for June of that year [1802] ... seeking to delay a ruling on the constitutionality of the repeal act until months after the new judicial system was in operation."[7][8]
Status of the judicial power before MarburyAlthough the power of judicial review is sometimes said to have originated with Marbury, the concept of judicial review has ancient roots. The idea that courts could nullify statutes originated in England with Chief Justice Edward Coke's 1610 opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a. That decision arose under a statute of Parliament enabling the London College of Physicians to levy fines against anyone who violated their rules. The College accused a doctor of practicing without a license and fined him accordingly. Coke found that their statutory powers violated "common right or reason" because "no person should be a judge in his own case."[9]
The U.S. Supreme Court stated Bonham's Case did not set a precedent in the United States to make common law supreme over statutory law:
[N]otwithstanding what was attributed to Lord COKE in Bonham's Case, 8 Reporter, 115, 118a, the omnipotence of parliament over the common law was absolute, even against common right and reason. The actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the commons.[10]
The idea that courts could declare statutes void was defeated in England with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when King James II was removed and the elected Parliament declared itself supreme. However, it continued to be known in the American colonies and at the bars of young states, where Coke's books were very influential. The doctrine was specifically enshrined in some state constitutions, and by 1803 it had been employed in both State and Federal courts in actions dealing with state statutes, but only insofar as the statutes conflicted with the language of state constitutions.[11][12]
A number of legal scholars argue that the power of judicial review in the United States predated Marbury, and that Marbury was merely the first Supreme Court case to exercise a power that already existed and was acknowledged. These scholars point to statements about judicial review made in the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions, statements about judicial review in publications debating ratification, and court cases before Marbury that involved judicial review.[13]
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, there were a number of references to judicial review. Fifteen delegates made statements about the power of the federal courts to review the constitutionality of laws, with all but two of them supporting the idea.[14]
Likewise, at the state ratifying conventions, over two dozen delegates in at least seven states indicated that under the Constitution, the federal courts would have the power to declare statutes unconstitutional.[15] Professors Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo point out, with respect to the ratification of the Constitution, that "no scholar to date has identified even one participant in the ratification fight who argued that the Constitution did not authorize judicial review of Federal statutes. This silence in the face of the numerous comments on the other side is revealing."[16]
The concept of judicial review was discussed in The Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton asserted in Federalist No. 78 that under the Constitution, the federal courts would have not just the power, but the duty, to examine the constitutionality of statutes:
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It, therefore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.[17]
The opponents to ratification, known as Anti-federalists, agreed that the federal courts would have the power to declare statutes unconstitutional, but were concerned that this would give the federal courts too much power. Robert Yates argued: "The supreme court then have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away. If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution, they will declare it void."[18]
A number of courts engaged in judicial review before Marbury was decided. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, there had been cases in the state courts of at least seven states involving judicial review of state statutes.[19] Between the ratification of the Constitution in 1788 and the Supreme Court's decision in Marbury in 1803, judicial review was used a number of times in both state and federal courts. One scholar counted thirty-one cases during this period in which courts found statutes unconstitutional, concluding: "The sheer number of these decisions not only belies the notion that the institution of judicial review was created by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury, it also reflects widespread acceptance and application of the doctrine."[20]
Scholars have pointed out the Supreme Court itself already had engaged in judicial review before Marbury, although it had not struck down the statute in question because it concluded that the statute was constitutional. In Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), the Court upheld a federal tax on carriages against a claim that the tax violated the "direct tax" provision of the Constitution.[21] Therefore, the concept of judicial review was familiar before Marbury.
However, it is important to note that nothing in the text of the Constitution explicitly authorized the power of judicial review, despite persistent fears voiced by Anti-federalists over the power of the new Federal court system:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
'--U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2, Clause 1
Relevant lawIn all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned [within the judicial power of the United States], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
'--U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2, Clause 2
The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts [...] and writs of mandamus [...] to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
'--Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13
The issueThere are three ways a case can be heard in the Supreme Court: (1) filing directly in the Supreme Court; (2) filing in a lower federal court, such as a district court, and appealing all the way up to the Supreme Court; (3) filing in a state court, appealing all the way up through the state's highest courts, and then appealing to the Supreme Court on an issue of federal law. The first is an exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction; the second and third are exercises of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Because Marbury filed his petition for the writ of mandamus directly in the Supreme Court, the Court needed to be able to exercise original jurisdiction over the case in order to have the power to hear it.
Marbury's argument is that in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandamus. This raises several issues that the Supreme Court had to address:
Does Article III of the Constitution create a floor for original jurisdiction, which Congress can add to, or does it create an exhaustive list that Congress can't modify at all?If Article III's original jurisdiction is an exhaustive list, but Congress tries to modify it anyway, who wins that conflict, Congress or the Constitution?And, more importantly, who is supposed to decide who wins?In its answer to this last question, the Supreme Court formalizes the notion of judicial review. In short, the constitutional issue on which Marbury v. Madison was decided was whether Congress could expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[22]
The decisionOn February 24, 1803, the Court rendered a unanimous (4''0) decision,[23] that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the court. Marshall presented the case as raising three distinct questions:
Did Marbury have a right to the commission?Do the laws of the country give Marbury a legal remedy?Is asking the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus the correct legal remedy?[24]Marshall quickly answered the first two questions affirmatively. He found that the failure to deliver the commission was "violative of a vested legal right."
In deciding whether Marbury had a remedy, Marshall stated: "The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." One of the key legal principles on which Marbury relies is the notion that for every violation of a vested legal right, there must be a legal remedy. Marshall next described two distinct types of Executive actions: political actions, where the official can exercise discretion, and purely ministerial functions, where the official is legally required to do something. Marshall found that delivering the appointment to Marbury was a purely ministerial function required by law, and therefore the law provided him a remedy.
A federal court has a "special obligation to 'satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.'"[25] If a court does not have the power to hear a case, it will not issue dicta. Consequently, with exceptions not applicable here, a federal court must decide whether it has jurisdiction before discussing the merits of the case.[26] Chief Justice Marshall, however, did not address jurisdictional issues until addressing the first two questions presented above. Because of the canon of constitutional avoidance (i.e., where a statute can fairly be interpreted so as to avoid a constitutional issue, it should be so interpreted), courts generally deal with the constitutional issues only if necessary. In this case, the jurisdictional issue was a constitutional one.[27]
In analyzing the third question, Marshall divided the question further, asking if a writ of mandamus was the correct means by which to restore Marbury to his right, and if so, whether the writ Marbury sought could issue from the Supreme Court. Concluding quickly that since a writ of mandamus, by definition, was the correct judicial means to order an official of the United States (in this case, the Secretary of State) to do something required of him (in this case, deliver a commission), Marshall devotes the remainder of his inquiry at the second part of the question: "Whether it [the writ] can issue from this court."
Marshall first examined the Judiciary Act of 1789 and determined that the Act purported to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over writs of mandamus. Marshall then looked to Article III of the Constitution, which defines the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdictions (see Relevant Law above). Marbury had argued that the Constitution was only intended to set a floor for original jurisdiction that Congress could add to. Marshall disagreed and held that Congress does not have the power to modify the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Consequently, Marshall found that the Constitution and the Judiciary Act conflict.
This conflict raised the important question of what happens when an Act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution. Marshall answered that Acts of Congress that conflict with the Constitution are not law and the Courts are bound instead to follow the Constitution, affirming the principle of judicial review. In support of this position Marshall looked to the nature of the written Constitution'--there would be no point of having a written Constitution if the courts could just ignore it. "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"[28] Marshall also argued that the very nature of the judicial function requires courts to make this determination. Since it is a court's duty to decide cases, courts have to be able to decide what law applies to each case. Therefore, if two laws conflict with each other, a court must decide which law applies.[29] Finally, Marshall pointed to the judge's oath requiring them to uphold the Constitution, and to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which lists the "Constitution" before the "laws of the United States." Part of the core of this reasoning is found in the following statements from the decision:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department [the judicial branch] to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.
So, if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law [e.g., the statute or treaty].
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.[30]
"In denying his request, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act passed by Congress in 1789, which authorized the Court to issue such a writ, was unconstitutional and thus invalid."[31] Marbury never became a Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia.[32]
CriticismJefferson disagreed with Marshall's reasoning in this case:
You seem to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps.... Their power [is] the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves.[33][34][35]
Some legal scholars have questioned the legal reasoning of Marshall's opinion. They argue that Marshall selectively quoted the Judiciary Act of 1789, interpreting it to grant the Supreme Court the power to hear writs of mandamus on original jurisdiction.[36] These scholars argue that there is little connection between the notion of original jurisdiction and the Supreme Court, and note that the Act seems to affirm the Court's power to exercise only appellate jurisdiction.[37] Furthermore, it has been argued that the Supreme Court should have been able to issue the writ on original jurisdiction based on the fact that Article III of the Constitution granted it the right to review on original jurisdiction "all cases affecting ... public ministers and consuls," and that James Madison, Secretary of State at the time and defendant of the suit, should have fallen into that category of a "public minister [or] consul."[38]
Questions have also frequently been raised about the logic of Marshall's argument for judicial review, for example by Alexander Bickel in his book The Least Dangerous Branch.[39] Bickel argues that Marshall's argument implies an unrealistically mechanical view of jurisprudence, one which suggests that the Court has an absolute duty to strike down every law it finds violative of the Constitution.[citation needed] Under Marshall's conception of the judicial process in Marbury, judges themselves have no independent agency and can never take into account the consequences of their actions when deciding cases.[citation needed]
Marbury can also be criticized[by whom?] on grounds that it was improper for the Court to consider any issues beyond jurisdiction. After concluding that the Court lacked jurisdiction in the case, the further review regarding the substantive issues presented was arguably improper.[40] Also, it has been argued that Justice Marshall should have recused himself on the grounds that he was still acting Secretary of State at the time the commissions were to be delivered and it was his brother, James Marshall, who was charged with delivering a number of the commissions.[41]
Because the Constitution lacks a clear statement authorizing the Federal courts to nullify the acts of coequal branches, critics contend that the argument for judicial review must rely on a significant gloss on the Constitution's terms. Despite such criticisms of Marbury v. Madison, judicial review has been accepted in the American legal community.
On the other hand, the Constitution, unlike the Articles of Confederation, created an independent judiciary, and gave it power to resolve matters arising under the Constitution, controversies between two states, and disputes between the federal government and a state, suggesting that the Framers of the Constitution intended the court to act as, in effect, an arbitrator, to which the parties appearing before it would be bound.
See alsoNotes and references^Federal Judicial History, The Judiciary Act of 1801'-- Historical Note 2 Stat.89^Judiciary Act of 1801^Mark Carlton Miller (2009). The View of the Courts from the Hill: Interactions Between Congress and the Federal Judiciary. University of Virginia Press. p. 44. ^Ch.4, Sec. 4, Judiciary Act of 1801^ abSmith, Jean Edward (1996). John Marshall: Definer of a Nation. New York: Henry Holt & Company; New York. p. 524. ISBN 978-0-8050-1389-4. ^Sec. 3d, Marbury v. Madison,AMDOCS: www.vlib.us.^Federal Judicial History, The Judiciary Act of 1802'-- Historical Note2 Stat. 156^The Supreme Court in United States history, Volume 1. By Charles Warren. Little, Brown, 1922. p 222^Coke's decision in the Bonham case, retrieved 2/12/07.^Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.516 (1884)^(See, e.g., Bayard v. Singleton, 1 NC (Martin) 5 (1787); Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236 (Md.Gen. 1802) (Samuel Chase, J.); State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 (N.J. 1802); Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799); Williams Lindsay v. East Bay Street Com'rs, 2 Bay (S.C.L.) 38 S.C.Const.App. 1796)(Thomas Waties, J.).; Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 199 (1796); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 386 (1798); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dallas (4 U.S.) 14 (1800); Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 304; 1 L. Ed. 391; C. Pa. 1795).)^Fletcher, George P.; Sheppard, Steve (2004). American Law in Global Perspective: The Basics. Oxford University Press. pp. 132''134. ISBN 0-19-516723-6. ^For a more detailed discussion of the status of judicial review before Marbury, see Judicial review in the United States.^Prakash, Saikrishna, and Yoo, John, "The Origins of Judicial Review," 70 U. Chicago Law Review 887, 952 (2003).^Ibid., p. 965.^Ibid., p. 974.^Full text of Federalist No. 78 from thomas.loc.gov^Anti-Federalist No. 78^Prakash and Yoo, "The Origins of Judicial Review," 70 U. Chicago Law Review at 933''39.^See Treanor, William, "Judicial Review Before Marbury," 58 Stanford Law Review 455, 457''58 (2005).^Professor Jack Rakove wrote: "Hylton v. United States was manifestly a case of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation." See Rakove, Jack, "The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts," 49 Stanford Law Review 1031, 1030''41 (1997).^David P. Currie (1997). The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801. University of Chicago Press. p. 53. ^Due to illness, Justices William Cushing and Alfred Moore did not sit for oral argument or participate in the Court's decision.^[1] '' Lecture: starting at time 16:16, these three questions are described by the teacher almost verbatim to this article, and this school video is in regards to judicial review.^Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)); accordSteel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)^See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) (en banc), admonishing that the federal courts "have an affirmative obligation to examine jurisdictional concerns on their own initiative" even if the parties have neglected them; Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1997), noting "that a court should first confirm the existence of rudiments such as jurisdiction . . . before tackling the merits of a controverted case").^Supreme Court History: The Court and Democracy, Marbury v. Madison, pbs.org, retrieved 2/12/07^5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.^5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.^5 U.S. at 177''78.^Marbury v. Madison. In Encyclopaedia Britannica.^Henretta, James A.; David Brody; Lynn Dumenil (2007). America's History: Volume 1: To 1877 (6th ed.). Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. pp. 218''219. ISBN 978-0-312-45285-8. ^Jefferson, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Jarvis (September 28, 1820).^James Taranto, Leonard Leo (2004). Presidential Leadership. Wall Street Journal Books. ISBN 978-0-7432-7226-1. Retrieved 2008-10-20. ^Thomas Jefferson (1830). Memoir, correspondence, and miscellanies, from the papers of Thomas Jefferson. Gray and Bowen. pp. 372''375. ^Reinstein, Robert J. (2004-04-01). "Marbury's Myths: John Marshall, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law". bepress Legal Series. Working Paper 230.^Full text of the Judiciary Act of 1789^Stone, Geoffrey R. (2005). Constitutional Law (5 ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers. pp. 29''51. ISBN 0-7355-5014-X. ^Bickel, Alexander (1962). The Least Dangerous Branch. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. ISBN 978-0-300-03299-4. Retrieved May 26, 2011. ^Chemerinsky, Erwin (2006). Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (3rd ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers. p. 41. ISBN 0-7355-5787-X. ^Sullivan, Kathleen M.; Gunther, Gerald (2007). Constitutional Law. New York: Foundation Press. ISBN 978-1-59941-246-7. Further readingSmith, Jean Edward (1996). John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation. Owl Books. ISBN 0-8050-5510-X. Smith, Jean Edward (1989). The Constitution And American Foreign Policy. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company. ISBN 0-314-42317-6. Nelson, William E. (2000). Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1062-6. (One introduction to the case)Clinton, Robert Lowry (1991). Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0517-7. (Claims that it is a mistake to read the case as claiming a judicial power to tell the President or Congress what they can or cannot do under the Constitution.)Irons, Peter (1999). A People's History of the Supreme Court. Penguin Books. pp. 104''107. ISBN 0-14-029201-2. Newmyer, R. Kent (2001). John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 0-8071-3249-7. James M. O'Fallon, The Case of Benjamin More: A Lost Episode in the Struggle over Repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, 11 Law & Hist. Rev. 43 (1993).Tushnet, Mark (2008). I dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 1''16. ISBN 978-0-8070-0036-6. Sloan, Cliff; McKean, David (2009). The Great Decision: Jefferson, Adams, Marshall and the Battle for the Supreme Court. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. ISBN 1-58648-426-5. External linksText of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) is available from: Findlaw Justia LII
HILLARY PATH-James Madison - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
James Madison4thPresident of the United StatesIn officeMarch 4, 1809 '' March 4, 1817Vice PresidentGeorge Clinton(1809''12)None(1812''13)Elbridge Gerry(1813''14)None(1814''17)Preceded byThomas JeffersonSucceeded byJames Monroe5thUnited States Secretary of StateIn officeMay 2, 1801 '' March 3, 1809PresidentThomas JeffersonPreceded byJohn MarshallSucceeded byRobert SmithMember of theU.S. House of Representativesfrom Virginia's 15th districtIn officeMarch 4, 1793 '' March 4, 1797Preceded byDistrict createdSucceeded byJohn DawsonMember of theU.S. House of Representativesfrom Virginia's 5th districtIn officeMarch 4, 1789 '' March 4, 1793Preceded byDistrict createdSucceeded byGeorge HancockDelegate to theCongress of the Confederationfrom VirginiaIn officeMarch 1, 1781 '' November 1, 1783Preceded byPosition establishedSucceeded byThomas JeffersonPersonal detailsBorn(1751-03-16)March 16, 1751Port Conway, Virginia Colony, British AmericaDiedJune 28, 1836(1836-06-28) (aged 85)Orange, Virginia, U.S.Resting placeMontpelier (Orange, Virginia)Political partyDemocratic-RepublicanSpouse(s)Dolley Todd(1794''1836; his death)ChildrenJohn(stepson)ResidenceMontpelierAlma materPrinceton UniversityProfessionPlanter, college administratorReligionDeist[1]EpiscopalianSignatureJames Madison, Jr. (March 16, 1751 '' June 28, 1836) was an American statesman, political theorist, and the fourthPresident of the United States (1809''17). He is hailed as the "Father of the Constitution" for being instrumental in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and as the key champion and author of the Bill of Rights.[2] He served as a politician much of his adult life.
After the constitution had been drafted, Madison became one of the leaders in the movement to ratify it. His collaboration with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay produced The Federalist Papers (1788). Circulated only in New York at the time, they would later be considered among the most important treatises in support of the Constitution. He was also a delegate to the Virginia constitutional ratifying convention, and was instrumental to the successful ratification effort in Virginia. Like most of his contemporaries, Madison changed his political views during his life. During the drafting and ratification of the constitution, he favored a strong national government, though later he grew to favor stronger state governments, before settling between the two extremes late in his life.
In 1789, Madison became a leader in the new House of Representatives, drafting many basic laws. He is notable for drafting the first ten amendments to the Constitution, and thus is known as the "Father of the Bill of Rights".[3] Madison worked closely with President George Washington to organize the new federal government. Breaking with Hamilton and what became the Federalist Party in 1791, Madison and Thomas Jefferson organized what they called the Republican Party (later called by historians the Democratic-Republican Party).
As Jefferson's Secretary of State (1801''09), Madison supervised the Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the nation's size. After his election to the presidency, he presided over renewed prosperity for several years. As president (1809''17), after the failure of diplomatic protests and a trade embargo against Great Britain, he led the nation into the War of 1812. He was responding to British encroachments on American honor and rights; in addition, he wanted to end the influence of the British among their Indian allies, whose resistance blocked United States settlement in the Midwest around the Great Lakes. Madison found the war to be an administrative nightmare, as the United States had neither a strong army nor financial system; as a result, he afterward supported a stronger national government and a strong military, as well as the national bank, which he had long opposed. Like other Virginia statesmen in the slave society,[4] he was a slaveholder who inherited his plantation known as Montpelier, and owned hundreds of slaves during his lifetime to cultivate tobacco and other crops. Madison supported the Three-Fifths Compromise that allowed three-fifths of the enumerated population of slaves to be counted for representation.[5]
Early life and educationJames Madison, Jr. was born at Belle Grove Plantation near Port Conway, Virginia on March 16, 1751, (March 5, 1751, Old Style, Julian calendar), where his mother had returned to her parents' home to give birth. He grew up as the oldest of twelve children.[6] Nelly and James Sr. had seven more boys and four girls. Three of James Jr.'s brothers died as infants, including one who was stillborn. In the summer of 1775, his sister Elizabeth (age 7) and his brother Reuben (age 3) died in a dysentery epidemic that swept through Orange County because of contaminated water.[6][7]
His father, James Madison, Sr. (1723''1801), was a tobacco planter who grew up on a plantation, then called Mount Pleasant, in Orange County, Virginia, which he had inherited upon reaching adulthood. He later acquired more property and slaves; with 5,000 acres (2,000 ha), he became the largest landowner and a leading citizen of Orange County, in the Piedmont. James Jr.'s mother, Nelly Conway Madison (1731''1829), was born at Port Conway, the daughter of a prominent planter and tobacco merchant and his wife. Madison's parents were married on September 15, 1749.[6][7] In these years the southern colonies were becoming a slave society, in which slave labor powered the economy and slaveholders formed the political (C)lite.[8]
From ages 11 to 16, the young "Jemmy" Madison was sent to study under Donald Robertson, an instructor at the Innes plantation in King and Queen County, Virginia in the Tidewater region. Robertson was a Scottish teacher who tutored numerous prominent plantation families in the South. From Robertson, Madison learned mathematics, geography, and modern and ancient languages. He became especially proficient in Latin. Madison said that he owed his bent for learning "largely to that man (Robertson)."[9][10]
At age 16, he returned to Montpelier, where he began a two-year course of study under the Reverend Thomas Martin in preparation for college. Unlike most college-bound Virginians of his day, Madison did not choose the College of William and Mary, because the lowland climate of Williamsburg, where mosquitoes transmitted fevers and other infectious diseases during the summer, might have strained his delicate health. Instead, in 1769, he enrolled at the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University, where he became roommates and close friends with Philip Freneau, later dubbed "the poet of the Revolution." Indeed, Madison and Freneau would have become brothers-in-law had Freneau's favorite sister, Mary, accepted Madison's repeated proposals of marriage.[11] But although Mary greatly admired and respected Madison, she had determined to stay single[citation needed]'--one way a woman of her intelligence and accomplishments could hope to pursue her interests and remain independent in that era.
Through diligence and long hours of study that may have damaged his health,[12] Madison graduated in 1771. His studies included Latin, Greek, science, geography, mathematics, rhetoric, and philosophy. Great emphasis also was placed on speech and debate; Madison helped found the American Whig Society, in direct competition to fellow student Aaron Burr's Cliosophic Society. After graduation, Madison remained at Princeton to study Hebrew and political philosophy under the university president, John Witherspoon, before returning to Montpelier in the spring of 1772. He became quite fluent in Hebrew. Madison studied law from his interest in public policy, not with the intent of practicing law as a profession.[13]
At a height of only five feet, four inches (163 cm), and never weighing more than 100 pounds, he was the smallest president.[14]
ReligionAlthough educated by Presbyterian clergymen, young Madison was an avid reader of English deist tracts.[15] Madison as an adult paid little attention to religious matters. Hutson says that historians searching through Madison's voluminous writings discover that after he left college, "there is no trace, no clue as to his personal religious convictions."[16] However, some scholars say he leaned toward deism.[17][18] Madison accepted Christian tenets generally and formed his outlook on life within a Christian world view.[19]
Military service in the Revolutionary WarAfter graduation from Princeton, young Madison took an increasing interest in the relationship between the American colonies and Britain, which deteriorated over the issue of British taxation. In 1774, Madison took a seat on the local Committee of Safety, a patriot pro-revolution group that oversaw the local militia. This was the first step in a life of public service that his family's wealth allowed him to pursue.[20] In October 1775 he was commissioned as the colonel of the Orange County militia. He would not serve in combat as he was of very slight stature (5-4) and weighed only about 100 pounds.
Early political careerAs a young man during the American Revolutionary War, Madison served in the Virginia state legislature (1776''1779), where he became known as a prot(C)g(C) of the delegate Thomas Jefferson. He had earlier witnessed the persecution of Baptist preachers in Virginia, who were arrested for preaching without a license from the established Anglican Church. He worked with the Baptist preacher Elijah Craig on constitutional guarantees for religious liberty in Virginia.[21] Working on such cases helped form his ideas about religious freedom, which he applied to the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Madison attained prominence in Virginia politics, working with Jefferson to draft the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which was finally passed in 1786. It disestablished the Church of England and disclaimed any power of state compulsion in religious matters. He excluded Patrick Henry's plan to compel citizens to pay taxes that would go to a congregation of their choice. In 1777 Madison's cousin, the Right Reverend James Madison (1749''1812), became president of The College of William & Mary. Working closely with Madison and Jefferson, Bishop Madison helped lead the College through the changes involving separation from both Great Britain and the Church of England. He also led college and state actions that resulted in the formation of the new Episcopal Diocese of Virginia after the Revolution.
As the youngest delegate to the Continental Congress (1780''1783), Madison was considered a legislative workhorse and a master of parliamentary coalition building.[22][23] He persuaded Virginia to give up its claims to northwestern territories'--consisting of most of modern-day Ohio and points west'--to the Continental Congress. It created the Northwest Territory in 1783, as a federally supervised territory from which new states would be developed and admitted to the union. Virginia's land claims had partially overlapped with those of Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Maryland; they too ceded their westernmost lands to national authority, with the understanding that new states could be formed from the land. The Northwest Ordinance prohibited slavery in the new territory north of the Ohio River, but did not end it for those slaves held by settlers already in the territory.
Madison was elected a second time to the Virginia House of Delegates, serving from 1784 to 1786 in the new years of independence. During these final years in the House of Delegates, Madison grew increasingly frustrated with what he saw as excessive democracy. He criticized the tendency for delegates to cater to the particular interests of their constituents, even if such interests were destructive to the state at large. In particular, he was troubled by a law that denied diplomatic immunity to ambassadors from other countries, and a law that legalized paper money.[24] He thought legislators should be "disinterested" and act in the interests of their state at large, even if this contradicted the wishes of constituents. This "excessive democracy," Madison grew to believe, was the cause of a larger social decay which he and others (such as Washington) believed had resumed after the revolution and was nearing a tipping point. They were alarmed by Shays' Rebellion.[25]
Father of the ConstitutionThe Articles of Confederation established the United States as a confederation of sovereign states with a weak central government. This arrangement did not work particularly well, and was even less successful after the war was over. Congress had no power to tax, and as a result was unable to pay debts left over from the Revolution. Madison and other nationalists, such as Washington and Alexander Hamilton, were very concerned about this. They feared a break-up of the union and national bankruptcy.[26] The historian Gordon S. Wood has noted that many leaders such as Madison and Washington, feared more that the revolution had not fixed the social problems that had triggered it, and the excesses ascribed to the King were being seen in the state legislatures. Shays' Rebellion is often cited as the event that forced the issue; Wood argues that many at the time saw it as only the most extreme example of democratic excess. They believed the constitution would need to do more than fix the Articles of Confederation. Like the revolution, it would need to rewrite the social compact and redefine the relationship among the states, the national government, and the people.[25]
As Madison wrote, "a crisis had arrived which was to decide whether the American experiment was to be a blessing to the world, or to blast for ever the hopes which the republican cause had inspired."[27] Partly at Madison's instigation, a national convention was called in 1787. Madison was crucial in persuading George Washington to attend the convention, since he knew how important the popular general would be to the adoption of a constitution. As one of the first delegates to arrive, while waiting for the convention to begin, Madison wrote what became known as the Virginia Plan. The Virginia Plan was submitted at the opening of the convention, and the work of the convention quickly became to amend the Virginia Plan and to fill in the gaps.[28][29] Though the Virginia Plan was an outline rather than a draft of a possible constitution, and though it was extensively changed during the debate (especially by John Rutledge and James Wilson in the Committee of Detail), its use at the convention led many to call Madison the "Father of the Constitution".[30] He was only 36 years old.
During the course of the Convention, Madison spoke over two hundred times, and his fellow delegates rated him highly. For example, William Pierce wrote that "... every Person seems to acknowledge his greatness. In the management of every great question he evidently took the lead in the Convention ... he always comes forward as the best informed Man of any point in debate." Madison recorded the unofficial minutes of the convention, and these have become the only comprehensive record of what occurred. The historian Clinton Rossiter regarded Madison's performance as "a combination of learning, experience, purpose, and imagination that not even Adams or Jefferson could have equaled."[31] Years earlier he had pored over crates of books that Jefferson sent him from France on various forms of government. The historian Douglas Adair called Madison's work "probably the most fruitful piece of scholarly research ever carried out by an American."[32] Many have argued that this study helped prepare him for the convention.
Gordon Wood, however, argues that Madison's frustrating experience in the Virginia legislature years earlier most shaped his constitutional views. Wood notes that the governmental structure in both the Virginia Plan and the final constitution were not innovative, since they were copied from the British government, had been used in the states since 1776, and numerous authors had already argued for their adoption at the national level.[33] Most of what was controversial in the Virginia Plan was removed, and most of the rest had been commonly accepted as necessary for a functional government (state or national) for decades; thus, Madison's contribution was more qualitative.[33] Wood argues that, like most national politicians of the late 1780s, Madison believed that the problem was less with the Articles of Confederation than with the nature of the state legislatures. He believed the solution was to restrain the excesses of the states. This required more than an alternation in the Articles of Confederation; it required a change in the character of the national compact. The ultimate question before the convention, Wood notes, was not how to design a government but whether the states should remain sovereign, whether sovereignty should be transferred to the national government, or whether the constitution should settle somewhere in between.[33]
Those, like Madison, who thought democracy in the state legislatures was excessive and insufficiently "disinterested", wanted sovereignty transferred to the national government, while those (like Patrick Henry) who did not think this a problem, wanted to fix the Articles of Confederation. Madison was one of the only delegates who wanted to deprive the states of sovereignty completely, which he considered the only solution to the problem. Though sharing the same goal as Madison, most other delegates reacted strongly against such an extreme change to the status quo. Though Madison lost most of his battles over how to amend the Virginia Plan (most importantly over the exclusion of the Council of Revision), in the process he increasingly shifted the debate away from a position of pure state sovereignty. Since most disagreements over what to include in the constitution were ultimately disputes over the balance of sovereignty between the states and national government, Madison's influence was critical. Wood notes that Madison's ultimate contribution was not in designing any particular constitutional framework, but in shifting the debate toward a compromise of "shared sovereignty" between the national and state governments.[33][34]
The Federalist Papers and ratification debatesThe Constitution developed by the convention in Philadelphia had to be ratified. This would be done by special conventions called in each state to decide that sole question of ratification.[35] Madison was a leader in the ratification effort. He, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay wrote The Federalist Papers, a series of 85 newspaper articles published in New York to explain how the proposed Constitution would work, mainly by responding to criticisms from anti-federalists. They were also published in book form and became a virtual debater's handbook for the supporters of the Constitution in the ratifying conventions.[36] The historian Clinton Rossiter called The Federalist Papers "the most important work in political science that ever has been written, or is likely ever to be written, in the United States."[37] They were not scholarly arguments or impartial justifications for the constitution, but political polemics intended to assist the federalists in New York, which was the only state to have a coordinated anti-federalist movement. One reason Madison was involved in the project was because he was a delegate to the lame duck Confederation Congress, which was meeting in New York.
If Virginia, the most populous state at the time, did not ratify the Constitution, the new national government would likely not succeed. When the Virginia convention began, the constitution had not yet been ratified by the required nine states. New York, the second largest state and a bastion of anti-federalism, would likely not ratify it if Virginia rejected the constitution, and Virginia's exclusion from the new government would disqualify George Washington from being the first president.[38] Virginia delegates believed that Washington's election as the first president was an implicit condition for their acceptance of the new constitution and the new government. Without Virginia, a new convention might have been held and a new constitution written in a much more polarized atmosphere, since the constitution did not specify what would happen if it was only partially ratified. The states might have joined in regional confederacies or allied with Spain, France or Britain, which still had North American colonies.[39] Arguably the most prominent anti-federalist, the powerful orator Patrick Henry was a delegate and had a following second only to Washington (who was not a delegate). Most delegates believed that most Virginians opposed the constitution.[38] Initially Madison did not want to stand for election to the Virginia ratifying convention, but was persuaded to do so because the situation looked so bad. His role at the convention was likely critical to Virginia's ratification, and thus to the success of the constitution generally.[38]
As the states were leery of creating a powerful central government, the drive to achieve ratification was difficult. Patrick Henry feared that the constitution would trample on the independence of the states and the rights of citizens. In the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison, who was a poor public speaker, had to go up against Henry, who was the most esteemed orator in the country.[40] Although Henry was by far the more powerful and dramatic speaker, Madison successfully matched him. While Henry's arguments were emotional appeals to possible unintended consequences, Madison responded with rational answers to these claims; he eventually argued that Henry's claims were becoming absurd. Madison pointed out that a limited government would be created, and that the powers delegated "to the federal government are few and defined."[41] Madison persuaded prominent figures such as George Mason and Edmund Randolph, who had refused to endorse the constitution at the convention, to change their position and support it at the ratifying convention. Mason and Randolph's switch likely changed the votes of several more anti-federalists.[42] When the vote was nearing, and the constitution still looked likely to be defeated, Madison pleaded with a small group of anti-federalists, and promised them he would push for a bill of rights later if they changed their votes. When the vote was held, the convention barely had sufficient votes to ratify, and these likely did not appear until the last minute.[42]
In terms of slavery and the Constitution, Madison viewed African American slaves as an "unfortunate race" and believed their true nature was both human and property.[43] On February 12, 1788, Madison, in the Federalist Letter No. 54, stated that the Constitutional three-fifths compromise clause was the best alternative for the slaves' current condition and for determining representation of citizens in Congress.[44] Madison believed that slaves, as property, would be protected by both their masters and the government.[5]
Madison was called the "Father of the Constitution" by his peers in his own lifetime. However, he was modest, and he protested the title as being "a credit to which I have no claim. ... The Constitution was not, like the fabled Goddess of Wisdom, the offspring of a single brain. It ought to be regarded as the work of many heads and many hands".[45] He wrote Hamilton at the New York ratifying convention, stating his opinion that "ratification was in toto and 'for ever'".
Member of CongressMadison had been a delegate to the Confederation Congress, and wanted to be elected senator in the new government. A vengeful Patrick Henry wanted to deny Madison a seat in the new congress, so he ensured that Madison remained in the lame duck Confederation Congress to prevent him as long as possible from campaigning. Henry used his power to keep the Virginia legislature from appointing Madison as one of the state's senators. When Madison decided to run for election to the house instead, Henry gerrymandered Madison's home district, filling it with anti-federalists in an attempt to prevent Madison's election. Madison could have run in another district, so to prevent this, Henry forced through a law requiring congressmen to live in the district they represent. Later this was recognized as unconstitutional but, at the time, the law made it increasingly unlikely that Madison would be elected to congress. He ran against James Monroe, a future president, and traveled with Monroe while campaigning. Later as president, Madison was told by some of his former constituents that, had it not been for unusually bad weather on election day, Monroe likely would have won. Madison defeated Monroe and became an important leader in Congress.[46]
Father of the Bill of RightsThough the idea for a bill of rights had been suggested at the end of the constitutional convention, the delegates wanted to go home and thought the suggestion unnecessary. The omission of a bill of rights became the main argument of the anti-federalists against the constitution. Though no state conditioned ratification of the constitution on a bill of rights, several states came close, and the issue almost prevented the constitution from being ratified. Some anti-federalists continued to fight the issue after the constitution had been ratified, and threatened the entire nation with another constitutional convention. This would likely be far more partisan than the first had been. Madison objected to a specific bill of rights[47] for several reasons: he thought it was unnecessary, since it purported to protect against powers that the federal government had not been granted; that it was dangerous, since enumeration of some rights might be taken to imply the absence of other rights; and that at the state level, bills of rights had proven to be useless paper barriers against government powers.[3]
Though few in the new congress wanted to debate a possible Bill of Rights (for the next century, most thought that the Declaration of Independence, not the first ten constitutional amendments, constituted the true Bill of Rights), Madison pressed the issue.[48] Congress was extremely busy with setting up the new government, most wanted to wait for the system to show its defects before amending the constitution, and the anti-federalist movements (which had demanded a new convention) had died out quickly once the constitution was ratified. Despite this, Madison still feared that the states would compel congress to call for a new constitutional convention, which they had the right to do. He also believed that the constitution did not sufficiently protect the national government from excessive democracy and parochialism (the defects he saw in the state governments), so he saw his amendments as a way to mitigate these problems. On June 8, 1789, Madison introduced his bill proposing amendments consisting of Nine Articles comprising up to 20 Amendments depending on how one counted. Madison initially proposed that the amendments would be incorporated into the body of the Constitution. The House passed most of his slate of amendments, but rejected the idea of placing the amendments in the body of the Constitution. Instead, it adopted 17 amendments to be attached separately and sent this bill to the Senate.[49][50]
The Senate condensed this slate to eleven amendments and removed the language that Madison had included to integrate them into the body of the constitution.[51] The Senate also added what became the Ninth Amendment, which was not included in his original slate.[52] To Madison's deep disappointment, it excluded a proposed amendment guaranteeing national sovereignty over the states. Some have argued that if this amendment had been included the American Civil War could have been avoided.[53] By 1791, the last ten of the proposed amendments were ratified and became the Bill of Rights.
The Second Amendment originally proposed by Madison (but not then ratified) was later ratified in 1992 as the Twenty-seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The remaining proposal was intended to accommodate future increase in the members of the House of Representatives.
Debates on foreign policyWhen Britain and France went to war in 1793, the U.S. was caught in the middle. The 1778 treaty of alliance with France was still in effect, yet most of the new country's trade was with Britain. War with Britain seemed imminent in 1794, as the British seized hundreds of American ships that were trading with French colonies. Madison believed that Britain was weak and the United States was strong, and that a trade war with Britain, although risking a real war by the British government, probably would succeed, and would allow Americans to assert their independence fully. Great Britain, he charged, "has bound us in commercial manacles, and very nearly defeated the object of our independence." As Varg explains, Madison discounted the much more powerful British army and navy for "her interests can be wounded almost mortally, while ours are invulnerable." The British West Indies, Madison maintained, could not live without American foodstuffs, but Americans could easily do without British manufactures. This faith led him to the conclusion "that it is in our power, in a very short time, to supply all the tonnage necessary for our own commerce".[54] However, George Washington avoided a trade war and instead secured friendly trade relations with Britain through the Jay Treaty of 1794. Madison threw his energies into fighting the Treaty'--his mobilization of grassroots support helped form the First Party System. He failed in both the Senate and House, and the Jay Treaty led to ten years of prosperous trade with Britain (and anger on the part of France leading to the Quasi-War). All across the United States, voters divided for and against the Treaty and other key issues, and thus became either Federalists or Jeffersonian Republicans.
Electoral History1789
Madison was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives with 57.37% of the vote, defeating James Monroe.
1790
Madison was re-elected with 97.79% of the vote, defeating Monroe.
Founding the Democratic-Republican partySupporters for ratification of the Constitution had become known as the Federalist Party. Those opposing the proposed constitution were labeled Anti-Federalists, but neither group was a political party in the modern sense. Following ratification of the Constitution and formation of the first government in 1789, two new political factions formed along similar lines as the old division. The supporters of Alexander Hamilton's attempts to strengthen the national government called themselves Federalists, while those who opposed Hamilton called themselves "Republicans" (later historians would refer to them as the Democratic-Republican party). Madison and other Democratic Party organizers, who favored states' rights and local control, were struggling to find an institutional solution to the seeming Constitution's inability to prevent concentration of power in an administrative republic. As first Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton created many new federal institutions, including the Bank of the United States. Madison led the unsuccessful attempt in Congress to block Hamilton's proposal, arguing that the new Constitution did not explicitly allow the federal government to form a bank. As early as May 26, 1792, Hamilton complained, "Mr. Madison cooperating with Mr. Jefferson is at the head of a faction decidedly hostile to me and my administration."[56] On May 5, 1792, Madison told Washington, "with respect to the spirit of party that was taking place ...I was sensible of its existence".[57] He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1794.[58]
In 1798 under President John Adams, the U.S. and France unofficially went to war'--the Quasi War, that involved naval warships and commercial vessels battling in the Caribbean. The Federalists created a standing army and passed laws against French refugees engaged in American politics and against Republican editors. Congressman Madison and Vice President Jefferson were outraged. Madison and Jefferson secretly drafted the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts to be unconstitutional and noted that "states, in contesting obnoxious laws, should 'interpose for arresting the progress of the evil.'"[59] These turned out to be unpopular, even among republicans, since they called for state governments to invalidate federal laws. Jefferson went further, urging states to secede if necessary, though Madison convinced Jefferson to back down from this extreme view.[60]
According to Chernow, Madison's position "was a breathtaking evolution for a man who had pleaded at the Constitutional Convention that the federal government should possess a veto over state laws."[61] Chernow feels that Madison's politics remained closely aligned with Jefferson's until his experience as president with a weak national government during the War of 1812 caused Madison to appreciate the need for a strong central government to aid national defense. At the time, he began to support a national bank, a stronger navy, and a standing army.
The historian Gordon S. Wood says that Lance Banning, as in his Sacred Fire of Liberty (1995), is the "only present-day scholar to maintain that Madison did not change his views in the 1790s."[62] To reach that conclusion, Banning downplays Madison's nationalism in the 1780s.[62] Wood notes that many historians struggle to understand Madison, but he looks at him within his own times'--as a nationalist but one with a different conception of what that meant than the Federalists. He wanted to avoid a European-style government and always thought that the embargo would ultimately have been successful.[62] thus, Wood assesses Madison from a different point of view.[62] Gary Rosen and Banning use other approaches to suggest Madison's consistency.[63][64][65]
Marriage and familyMadison was 43 when he married for the first time, which was considered late in that era. On September 15, 1794, James Madison married Dolley Payne Todd, a 26 year old widow, at Harewood, in what is now Jefferson County, West Virginia.[6] Madison had no children but did adopt Todd's one surviving son, John Payne Todd (known as Payne), after the marriage.
Dolley Payne was born May 20, 1768, at the New Garden Quaker settlement in North Carolina, where her parents, John Payne and Mary Coles Payne, lived briefly. Dolley's sister, Lucy Payne, had recently married George Steptoe Washington, a nephew of President Washington. As a member of Congress, Madison had doubtless met the widow Todd at social functions in Philadelphia, then the nation's capital. She had been living there with her late husband. In May 1794, Madison asked their mutual friend Aaron Burr to arrange a meeting. By August, she had accepted his proposal of marriage. For marrying Madison, a non-Quaker, she was expelled from the Society of Friends.
They were known to have a happy marriage. Dolley Madison put her social gifts to use when the couple lived in Washington, beginning when he was Secretary of State. With the White House still under construction, she advised as to its furnishings and sometimes served as First Lady for ceremonial functions for President Thomas Jefferson, a widower and their friend. When her husband was president, she created the role of First Lady, using her social talents to advance his program. She is credited with adding to his popularity in office.
Madison's father died in 1801 and at age 50, Madison inherited the large plantation of Montpelier and other holdings, and his father's 108 slaves. He had begun to act as a steward of his father's properties by 1780, but this completed his takeover.[66]
United States Secretary of State 1801''1809When Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated as president in 1801, he named Madison to be his secretary of state. At the start of his term, Madison was a party to the United States Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison (1803), in which the doctrine of judicial review was asserted by the high Court, much to the annoyance of the Jeffersonians who did not want a powerful federalist judiciary. The main challenge to the Jefferson Administration was maintaining neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars. Throughout Jefferson's presidency, much of Europe was at war, at first between France and Austria. After the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805, where France decisively defeated the Austrian Habsburgs, the conflict transformed into a grinding war between France and Britain.
Shortly before Jefferson's election, Napoleon had seized power from the hapless French Directory, which had recently mismanaged France's finances in unsuccessful wars and had lost control of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) after a slave rebellion. Beginning in 1802, Napoleon sent more than 20,000 troops to try to restore slavery on the island, as its colonial sugar cane plantations had been the chief revenue producer for France in the New World. The warfare went badly and the troops were further decimated by yellow fever. Napoleon gave up on thoughts of restoring the empire and sold the Louisiana territory to Madison and Jefferson in 1803. Later that year, the 7,000 surviving French troops were withdrawn from the island, and in 1804 Haiti declared its independence as the second republic in the western hemisphere.
Many contemporaries and later historians, such as Ron Chernow, noted that Madison and President Jefferson ignored their "strict construction" view of the Constitution to take advantage of the purchase opportunity. Jefferson would have preferred to have a constitutional amendment authorizing the purchase, but did not have time nor was he required to do so. The Senate quickly ratified the treaty that completed the purchase. The House, with equal alacrity, passed enabling legislation.[67] With the wars raging in Europe, Madison tried to maintain American neutrality, and insisted on the legal rights of the U.S. as a neutral under international law.
Neither London nor Paris showed much respect, however, and the situation deteriorated during Jefferson's second term. After Napoleon achieved victory at Austerlitz over his enemies in continental Europe, he became more aggressive and tried to starve Britain into submission with an embargo that was economically ruinous to both sides. Madison and Jefferson had also decided on an embargo to punish Britain and France, which forbade American trade with any foreign nation. The embargo failed in the United States just as it did in France, and caused massive hardships up and down the seaboard, which depended on foreign trade. The Federalists made a comeback in the Northeast by attacking the embargo, which was allowed to expire just as Jefferson was leaving office.[68][page needed]
Election of 1808With Jefferson's second term winding down, and his decision to retire widely known, Madison was the party choice for president in 1808. He was opposed by Rep. John Randolph, who had broken earlier with Jefferson and Madison. The Republican Party Congressional caucus chose the candidate and easily selected Madison over James Monroe.[69] As the Federalist party by this time had largely collapsed outside New England, Madison easily defeated Federalist Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.[70]
Presidency 1809''1817Upon his Inauguration in 1809, Madison immediately had difficulty in his appointment selection of Sec. Albert Gallatin as Secretary of State.[71] Under opposition from Sen. William B. Giles, Madison chose not to fight Congress for the nomination but kept Sec. Gallatin, a carry over from the Jefferson Administration, in the Treasury.[71] The talented Swiss born Gallatin was Madison's primary advisor, confidant, and policy planner.[71] Madison appointed Robert Smith for Secretary of State, Jefferson's former Secretary of Navy. For his Secretary of Navy, Madison appointed Paul Hamilton.[71] Madison's Cabinet, that included men of mediocre talent, was chosen in terms of national interest and political harmony.[71] When Madison assumed office in 1809, the federal government had a surplus of $9,500,000 and by 1810 the national debt continued to be reduced and taxes had been cut.[72]
Bank of United StatesMadison sought to continue Jefferson's agenda, in particular the dismantling of the system left behind by the federalists under Washington and Adams. One of the most pressing issues Madison confronted was the first Bank of the United States. Its twenty-year charter was scheduled to expire in 1811, and while Madison's treasury secretary said the bank was a necessity, Congress failed to re-authorize it. As the absence of a national bank made war with Britain very difficult to finance, in 1814 Congress passed a bill chartering a second national bank. Madison vetoed it.[73] In 1816, Congress passed another bill to charter a second national bank; Madison signed the act, having learned the bank was needed from the war with Britain.[74][75]
Prelude to warBy 1809 the Federalist party was no longer competitive outside a few strongholds. Some former members (such as John Quincy Adams, Madison's ambassador to Russia) had joined Madison's Republican party.[76] Though one party appeared to dominate, it had begun to split into rival factions, which would later form the basis of the modern party system. In particular, with hostilities against Britain appearing increasingly likely, factions in favor of and against war with Britain formed in Congress.[77] The predominant faction, the "War Hawks," were led by House SpeakerHenry Clay. When war finally did break out, the war effort was led by the War Hawks in Congress under Clay at least as much as it was by Madison; this accorded with the president's preference for checks and balances.
Napoleon had won a decisive victory at the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805, and as a consequence Europe remained mostly at peace for the next few years. Congress repealed Jefferson's embargo shortly before Madison became president.[78] America's new "nonintercourse" policy was to trade with all countries including France and Britain if restrictions on shipping were removed.[79] Madison's diplomatic efforts in April 1809, although initially promising, to get the British to withdraw the Orders in Council were rejected by British Foreign Secretary George Canning.[80] By August 1809, diplomatic relations with Britain deteriorated as minister David Erskine was withdrawn and replaced by "hatchet man" Francis James Jackson; Madison however, resisted calls for war.[81] In his Political Observations from April 20, 1795 Madison had stated:
Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people. The same malignant aspect in republicanism may be traced in the inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and in the degeneracy of manners and of morals engendered by both. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.[82]After Jackson accused Madison of duplicity with Erskine, Madison had Jackson barred from the State Department and sent packing to Boston.[83] During his first State of the Union Address in November 1809, Madison asked Congress for advice and alternatives concerning the British-American trade crisis, and warned of the possibility of war. By spring 1810, Madison was specifically asking Congress for more appropriations to increase the Army and Navy in preparation for war with Britain.[84] Together with the effects of European peace, the United States economy began to recover early in Madison's presidency. By the time Madison was standing for reelection, the Peninsular War in Spain had spread, while at the same time Napoleon invaded Russia, and the entire European continent was once again embroiled in war.
War of 1812Main article: War of 1812The United States entered the War of 1812, which in many respects was a theater of the broader Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon began his Continental System, intended to force other European countries to join his embargo on Britain. Although he was initially successful in starving out Britain, Portugal refused to capitulate, leading to the Peninsular War throughout Spain. This loosened Spain's grip on its South American colonies. Soon Great Britain was the only major power in the Atlantic.
As Great Britain increased naval pressure against Napoleon, it inadvertently did the same against American ships. Some British tactics quickly caused widespread American anger. Britain had used its navy to prevent American ships from trading with France; the United States, which was a neutral nation, saw this act as a violation of international law. The Royal Navy boarded American ships on the high seas and impressed its seamen, as it needed more sailors than it could recruit. The United States considered this no less an affront to American sovereignty than an invasion of American soil.[85][86] Britain also armed Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory and encouraged them to attack settlers, even though Britain had ceded this territory to the United States by treaties in 1783 and 1794.
Americans called for a "second war of independence" to restore honor and stature to the new nation.[87] An angry public elected a "war hawk" Congress, led by Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun. Madison asked Congress for a declaration of war, which was passed along sectional and party lines, with intense opposition from the Federalists and the Northeast (where the economy had suffered during Jefferson's trade embargo).[86][88]
Madison hurriedly called on Congress to put the country "into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis," specifically recommending enlarging the army, preparing the militia, finishing the military academy, stockpiling munitions, and expanding the navy.[89] Madison faced formidable obstacles'--a divided cabinet, a factious party, a recalcitrant Congress, obstructionist governors, and incompetent generals, together with militia who refused to fight outside their states. Most serious was lack of unified popular support. There were serious threats of disunion from New England, which engaged in extensive smuggling with Canada and refused to provide financial support or soldiers.[90] The problems were worse due to Jefferson's and Madison's dismantling of the system built by Hamilton and the Federalists. They had reduced the military, closed the Bank of the U.S., and narrowed the tax system. They distrusted standing armies and banks, and the dismantling of the federalist taxation system meant they could not finance the quick hiring of mercenaries. By the time the war began, Madison's military force consisted mostly of poorly trained militia members.
The senior command at the War Department and in the field proved incompetent or cowardly'--the general at Detroit surrendered to a smaller British force without firing a shot. Gallatin at the Treasury discovered the war was almost impossible to fund, since the national bank had been closed and major financiers in the Northeast refused to help. Madison believed the U.S. could easily seize Canada and thus cut off food supplies to the West Indies, making for a good bargaining chip at the peace talks. But the US invasion efforts all failed. Madison had believed the state militias would rally to the flag and invade Canada, but the governors in the Northeast failed to cooperate. Their militias either sat out the war or refused to leave their respective states for action.[91] The British armed American Indians in the Northwest, most notably several tribes allied with the Shawnee chief, Tecumseh. But, after losing control of Lake Erie at the naval Battle of Lake Erie in 1813, the British were forced to retreat. General William Henry Harrison caught up with them at the Battle of the Thames, where he destroyed the British and Indian armies, killed Tecumseh, and permanently destroyed Indian power in the Great Lakes region. The British raided Washington in 1814, as Madison headed a dispirited militia. Dolley Madison rescued White House valuables and documents shortly before the British burned the White House, the Capitol and other public buildings.[92][93]
By 1814, Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison had destroyed the main Indian threats in the South and West, respectively. As part of the war effort, an American naval shipyard was built up at Sackets Harbor, New York, where thousands of men produced twelve warships and had another nearly ready by the end of the war. American frigates and other vessels, such as the USS Constitution, USS United States, USS Chesapeake, USS Hornet, USS Wasp,[disambiguation needed] and USS Essex, won some significant naval battles on the Great Lakes. In a famous three-hour battle with the HMS Java, the USS Constitution earned her nickname, "Old Ironsides."[94] The U.S. fleet on Lake Erie went up against a superior British force there and destroyed or captured the entire British Fleet on the lake. Commander Oliver Hazard Perry reported his victory with the simple statement, "We have met the enemy, and they are ours."[95] America had built up one of the largest merchant fleets in the world, though it had been partially dismantled under Jefferson and Madison. Madison authorized many of these ships to become privateers in the war. Armed, they captured 1,800 British ships.[96]
The courageous, successful defense of Ft. McHenry, which guarded the seaway to Baltimore, against one of the most intense naval bombardments in history (over 24 hours), led Francis Scott Key to write the poem that was set to music as the U.S. national anthem, "The Star Spangled Banner."[97] In New Orleans, Gen. Andrew Jackson put together a force including regular Army troops, militia, frontiersmen, Creoles, Native American allies and Jean Lafitte's pirates. The Battle of New Orleans took place two weeks after peace treaty was drafted (but before it was ratified, so the war was not over). The American defenders repulsed the British invasion army in the most decisive victory of the war.[98] The Treaty of Ghent ended the war in February 1815, with no territorial gains on either side. The Americans felt that their national honor had been restored in what has been called "the Second War of American Independence."[99] On March 3, 1815, the U.S. Congress authorized deployment of naval power against Algiers, and two squadrons were assembled and readied for war; the Second Barbary War would mark the beginning of the end for piracy in that region.
To most Americans, the quick succession of events at the end of the war (the burning of the capital, the Battle of New Orleans, and the Treaty of Ghent) appeared as though American valor at New Orleans had forced the British to surrender after almost winning. This view, while inaccurate, strongly contributed to the post-war euphoria that persisted for a decade. It also helps explain the significance of the war, even if it was strategically inconclusive. Napoleon was defeated for the last time at the Battle of Waterloo near the end of Madison's presidency, and as the Napoleonic Wars ended, so did the War of 1812. Madison's final years began an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity, which was called the Era of Good Feelings. Madison's reputation as President improved and Americans finally believed the United States had established itself as a world power.[100]
Postwar economy and internal improvementsWith peace finally established, Americans believed they had secured a solid independence from Britain. The Federalist Party, which had called for secession over the war at the Hartford Convention, dissolved and disappeared from politics. With Europe finally at peace, the Era of Good Feelings described the prosperity and relatively equable political environment. Some political contention continued, for instance, in 1816, two-thirds of the incumbents in Congress were defeated for re-election after having voted to increase their salary. Madison approved a Hamiltonian national bank, an effective taxation system based on tariffs, a standing professional military, and the internal improvements championed by Henry Clay under his American System. In 1816, pensions were extended to orphans and widows of the War of 1812 for a period of 5 years at the rate of half pay.[101] However, in his last act before leaving office, he vetoed the Bonus Bill of 1817, which would have financed more internal improvements, including roads, bridges, and canals:[102]
Having considered the bill ... I am constrained by the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling this bill with the Constitution of the United States.... The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified ... in the ... Constitution, and it does not appear that the power proposed to be exercised by the bill is among the enumerated powers.
Madison rejected the view of Congress that the General Welfare provision of the Taxing and Spending Clause justified the bill, stating:
Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of legislation instead of the defined and limited one hitherto understood to belong to them, the terms "common defense and general welfare" embracing every object and act within the purview of a legislative trust.
Madison urged a variety of measures that he felt were "best executed under the national authority," including federal support for roads and canals that would "bind more closely together the various parts of our extended confederacy."[103]
Wilkinson affairJames Wilkinson was a controversial U.S. military commander and appointed governor of the Louisiana Territory by Thomas Jefferson in 1805.[104] Wilkinson had earlier been implicated in Aaron Burr's conspiracy to form a new nation in the West and taking Spanish gold, however, he was exonerated in 1808.[104] Jefferson chose to retain Wilkinson, a Republican, for political expedience.[105]
After Madison assumed the Presidency in 1809, he placed Wilkinson in charge of Terre aux Boeufs on the Louisiana coast to protect the U.S. from invasion.[105] Wilkinson proved to be an incompetent general; many soldiers complained that he was ineffectual: their tents were defective, and they became sick by malaria, dysentery, and scurvy; dozens died daily.[105] Wilkinson made excuses and refused to move inland from the mosquito-infested coastline.[105] A two-year congressional investigation into the Wilkinson matter proved to be inconclusive, and Madison had to decide whether to keep or sack him.[105] Like Jefferson, Madison chose to retain Wilkinson for political reasons, as Wilkinson had influence as a Pennsylvania Republican.[105][106] By retaining Wilkinson, both Jefferson and Madison supported military leaders in both the Army and Navy for political reasons rather than competence.[105][106] Historian Robert Allen Rutland stated the Wilkinson affair left "scars on the War Department" and "left Madison surrounded by senior military incompetents ..." at the beginning of the War of 1812.[105] After Wilkinson's two battle defeats by the British, Madison relieved the officer from active military service.[106]
Indian policyUpon assuming office on March 4, 1809 James Madison, in his first Inaugural Address to the nation, stated that the federal government's duty was to convert the American Indians by the "participation of the improvements of which the human mind and manners are susceptible in a civilized state".[107] Like Jefferson, Madison had a paternalistic attitude toward American Indians, encouraging the men to give up hunting and become farmers.[108] Although there are scant details, Madison often met with Southeastern and Western Indians who included the Creek and Osage.[108] As pioneers and settlers moved West into large tracts of Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, and Chickasaw territory, Madison ordered the US Army to protect Native lands from intrusion by settlers, to the chagrin of his military commander Andrew Jackson. Jackson wanted the President to ignore Indian pleas to stop the invasion of their lands[109] and resisted carrying out the president's order.[109] In the Northwest Territory after the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, Indians were pushed off their tribal lands and replaced entirely by white settlers.[109] By 1815, with a population of 400,000 European-American settlers in Ohio, Indian rights to their lands had effectively become null and void.[109]
Administration and cabinetBEP engraved portrait of Madison as President.Madison is the only president to have had two vice-presidents die while in office.Judicial appointmentsSupreme CourtMadison appointed the following Justices to the Supreme Court of the United States:
Other courtsMadison appointed eleven other federal judges, two to the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, and nine to the various United States district courts. One of those judges was appointed twice, to different seats on the same court.
States admitted to the UnionLater lifeWhen Madison left office in 1817, he retired to Montpelier, his tobacco plantation in Orange County, Virginia, not far from Jefferson's Monticello. He was 65 years old. Dolley, who thought they would finally have a chance to travel to Paris, was 49. As with both Washington and Jefferson, Madison left the presidency a poorer man than when he entered, due to the steady financial collapse of his plantation, aided by the continued low price of tobacco and his stepson's mismanagement.
Insight into Madison is provided by the first "White House memoir," A Colored Man's Reminiscences of James Madison (1865), told by his former slave Paul Jennings, who served the president from the age of 10 as a footman, and later as a valet for the rest of Madison's life. After Madison's death, Jennings was purchased in 1845 from Dolley Madison by arrangement with the senator Daniel Webster, who enabled him to work off the cost and gain his freedom. Jennings published his short account in 1865.[110] He had the highest respect for Madison and said he never struck a slave, nor permitted an overseer to do so. Jennings said that if a slave misbehaved, Madison would meet with the person privately to try to talk about the behavior.[110]
Some historians speculate that Madison's mounting debt was one of the chief reasons why he refused to allow his notes on the Constitutional Convention, or its official records which he possessed, to be published in his lifetime. "He knew the value of his notes, and wanted them to bring money to his estate for Dolley's use as his plantation failed'--he was hoping for one hundred thousand dollars from the sale of his papers, of which the notes were the gem."[111] Madison's financial troubles weighed on him, and deteriorating mental and physical health would haunt him.
In his later years, Madison became extremely concerned about his historic legacy. He took to modifying letters and other documents in his possession: changing days and dates, adding and deleting words and sentences, and shifting characters. By the time he had reached his late seventies, this "straightening out" had become almost an obsession. As an example, he edited a letter written to Jefferson criticizing Lafayette: Madison not only inked out original passages, but imitated Jefferson's handwriting as well in making changes.[112]
Portrait of Madison, age 82,c.1833
"During the final six years of his life, amid a sea of personal [financial] troubles that were threatening to engulf him...At times mental agitation issued in physical collapse. For the better part of a year in 1831 and 1832 he was bedridden, if not silenced... Literally sick with anxiety, he began to despair of his ability to make himself understood by his fellow citizens."[113]
In 1826, after the death of Jefferson, Madison was appointed as the second Rector ("President") of the University of Virginia. He retained the position as college chancellor for ten years until his death in 1836.
In 1829, at the age of 78, Madison was chosen as a representative to the constitutional convention in Richmond for the revising of the Virginia state constitution. It was his last appearance as a legislator and constitutional drafter. The issue of greatest importance at this convention was apportionment. The western districts of Virginia complained that they were underrepresented because the state constitution apportioned voting districts by county, not population. The growing population in the Piedmont and western parts of the state were not reflected in their representation in the legislature. Western reformers also wanted to extend suffrage to all white men, in place of the historic property requirement. Madison tried to effect a compromise, but to no avail. Eventually, suffrage rights were extended to renters as well as landowners, but the eastern planters refused to adopt population apportionment. Madison was disappointed at the failure of Virginians to resolve the issue more equitably.
Madison was very concerned about the continuing issue of slavery in Virginia and the South. He believed that transportation of free American blacks to Africa offered a solution, as promoted by the American Colonization Society (ACS).[114] He told Lafayette at the time of the convention that colonization would create a "rapid erasure of the blot on our Republican character."[115] The British sociologist Harriet Martineau visited with Madison during her tour of the United States in 1834. She characterized his faith in colonization as the solution to slavery as "bizarre and incongruous."[115] Madison may have sold or donated his gristmill in support of the ACS.[114] The historian Drew R. McCoy believes that "The Convention of 1829, we might say, pushed Madison steadily to the brink of self-delusion, if not despair. The dilemma of slavery undid him."[116][117] Like most African Americans of the time, Madison's slaves wanted to remain in the U.S. where they had been born and believed their work earned them citizenship; they resisted "repatriation".[114]
Through failing health, Madison wrote several memoranda on political subjects, including an essay against the appointment of chaplains for Congress and the armed forces. He felt it would produce religious exclusion but not political harmony.[118]
Between 1834 and 1835, Madison sold 25% of his slaves to make up for financial losses on his plantation.[114] Madison lived until 1836, increasingly ignored by the new leaders of the American polity. He died at Montpelier on June 28, as the last of the Founding Fathers.[119] He was buried in the Madison Family Cemetery at Montpelier.[7]
In 1842, Dolley Madison sold the Montpelier mansion, and in 1844 sold the extensive plantation lands to Henry W. Moncure.[114] She leased half of the remaining slaves to Moncure. The other half were inherited by her, her son John Payne Todd, and James Madison, Jr., a nephew.[120] Between 1845 and 1849 Todd sold numerous slaves; by 1851 he retained only 15 at his residence.[114] By 1850, the Montpelier plantation was a "ghost of its former self".[114] In 1851, Montpelier was owned by Thomas Thorton, an Englishman; he held 40 slaves.[114]
LegacyThe historian Garry Wills wrote:
Madison's claim on our admiration does not rest on a perfect consistency, any more than it rests on his presidency. He has other virtues. ... As a framer and defender of the Constitution he had no peer. ... The finest part of Madison's performance as president was his concern for the preserving of the Constitution. ... No man could do everything for the country'--not even Washington. Madison did more than most, and did some things better than any. That was quite enough.[121]
George F. Will once wrote that if we truly believed that the pen is mightier than the sword, our nation's capital would have been called "Madison, D.C.", instead of Washington, D.C.[122]
Madison's writings are studied for the debate over human rights among different classes of citizens in the 21st century. Madison appears to have anticipated the danger of a strong majority imposing its will on a weaker minority by popular vote.[123] Madison, in The Federalist Papers, in Federalist No. 51, wrote:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part... In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger.
In 1986, Congress created the James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation as part of the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution. The Foundation offers $24,000 graduate level fellowships to secondary teachers to undertake a master's degree which emphasizes the study of the Constitution. Montpelier, his family's plantation and his home in Orange, Virginia, has been designated a National Historic Landmark.
Many counties, several towns, cities, educational institutions, a mountain range and a river are named after Madison:
Madison's portrait on the 1928-34 US $5000 bill
See alsoNotes^The religion of James Madison retrieved 9 April 2013^Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, (1971) pp. 229, 289''92,^ abWood, 2006b.^Peter Kolchin, American Slavery, 1619''77, New York: Hill and Wang, 1993, p. 28^ abWills (1982), The Federalist Letters Papers By Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, pp. 276, 278^ abcdChapman, C. Thomas (May 22, 2006). "Descendants of Ambrose Madison, the Grandfather of President James Madison, Jr"(PDF).The National Society of Madison Family Descendants. pp. 1''20. Retrieved October 25, 2011. ^ abc"The Madison Cemetery". James Madison's Montpelier. 2011. Retrieved October 25, 2011. ^Peter Kolchin, American Slavery, 1619''1877, p. 28^Boyd-Rush, Dorothy. "Molding a founding father". James Madison University. Retrieved 25 March 2013. ^"James Madison's Biography". The Montpelier Foundation. Retrieved 25 March 2013. ^Mount Pleasant Hall - Where James Madison wooed in vain the sister of Philip Freneau, the Poet of the Revolution^Brennan, Daniel. "Did James Madison suffer a nervous collapse due to the intensity of his studies?" Mudd Manuscript Library Blog, January 2008, Princeton University Archives and Public Policy Papers Collection, Princeton University.^Ketcham, Ralph, James Madison: A Biography, p. 56, Newtown, Connecticut: American Political Biography Press, 1971.^Noah McCullough (2006). The Essential Book of Presidential Trivia. Random House Digital, Inc. p. 21. ISBN 9781400064823. ^Peter Charles Hoffer (2006). The Brave New World: A History of Early America. Johns Hopkins U.P. p. 363. ISBN 9780801884832. ^James H. Hutson (2003). Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic. Lexington Books. p. 156. ISBN 9780739105702. ^Bruce Miroff et al. (2011). Debating Democracy: A Reader in American Politics. Cengage Learning. p. 149. ISBN 9780495913474. ^Michael Corbett (2013). Politics and Religion in the United States. Routledge. p. 78. ISBN 9781135579753. ^Ralph Louis Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (University of Virginia Press, 1990) p. 47^http://millercenter.org/president/madison/essays/biography/2 American President, A Referenced Resource, Miller Center, University of Virginia WEB Site^Ralph Louis Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1971; paperback, 1990, p. 57, accessed February 6, 2009^"James Madison", James Madison Museum^"James Madison Biography", American-Presidents.com, Retrieved July 29, 2009.^Wood, Gordon. The Idea of America. p. 104^ abWood, Gordon. "The Idea of America". p. 104.^Richard B. Bernstein, Are We to be a Nation? (1987) pp. 11''12, 81''109^Robert Allen Rutland (1997). James Madison: The Founding Father. University of Missouri Press. p. 14. ISBN 9780826211415. ^Rutland, James Madison: The Founding Father, pp. 14''21,^Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention, (1968) pp. 41''57^David Stewart, "The Summer of 1787". p. 181^Rutland, James Madison: The Founding Father, p. 18^Wills, Garry, James Madison, pp. 26''27, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002.^ abcdWood, Gordon. "The Idea of America". p. 183.^Stewart, David. "The Summer of 1787". p. 182^Bernstein, Richard B., Are We to be a Nation? p. 199, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.^Rossiter, Clinton, ed., The Federalist Papers, p. xiii, Penguin Putnam, Inc., New York, NY, 1961.^Rossiter, Clinton, ed., The Federalist Papers, p. ix, Penguin Putnam, Inc., New York, NY, 1961.^ abcLabunski, Richard, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, p. 82.^Labunski, Richard, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, p. 3.^Rutland, Robert Allen, James Madison: The Founding Father, pp. 36''39, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, MO, 1987.^Samples, John, James Madison and the Future of Limited Government, pp. 25''42, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., 2002.^ abLabunski, Richard, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, pp. 135.^Wills (1982), The Federalist Letters Papers By Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, pp. 276, 277^Wills (1982), The Federalist Letters Papers By Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, pp. 277, 278^Lance Banning, "James Madison: Federalist," note 1, [1].^Labunski, Richard, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, pp. 148''50, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2006.^Matthews, 1995, p. 130.^Labunski, Richard. "James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights". p. 180^Labunski, Richard, James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, pp. 195''97, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2006.^"A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774''1875, Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Congress, 1st Session". The Library of Congress. Retrieved August 7, 2012. ^Labunski, Richard. "James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights". p. 232^Amar, Akhil. "The Bill of Rights, Creation and Reconstruction". p. 193^Labunski, Richard. "James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights". p. 202^Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (Michigan State Univ. Press, 1963), p. 74.^Hamilton, Writings (Library of America, 2001), p. 738.^Madison Letters 1 (1865), p. 554.^"Book of Members, 1780''2010: Chapter M"(PDF). American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved July 28, 2014. ^Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton, New York: Penguin, 2004, p. 573^Chernow. Alexander Hamilton p. 571.^Chernow. Alexander Hamilton pp. 573''74.^ abcdGordon S. Wood, "Is There a "James Madison Problem"?, in David Womersely, Introduction and editor, Liberty and American Experience in the Eighteenth Century, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006, accessed 2 May 2012^Rosen, Gary, American Compact: James Madison and the Problem of the Founding, pp. 2''4, 6''9, 140''75, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1999.^Banning, Lance, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic, pp. 7''9, 161, 165, 167, 228''31, 296''98, 326''27, 330''33, 345''46, 359''61, 371, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1995.^Banning, Lance, Jefferson and Madison: Three Conversations from the Founding, pp. 78''79, Madison House, Madison, WI, 1995.^Taylor, Elizabeth Dowling. (Jan. 2012), A Slave in the White House: Paul Jennings and the Madisons, Foreword by Annette Gordon-Reed, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 1^Ketcham (1971), James Madison, pp. 419''21^Burton Spivak, Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo and the Republican Revolution (1988)^David A. Carson, "Quiddism and the Reluctant Candidacy of James Monroe in the Election of 1808," Mid-America 1988 70(2): 79''89^Rutland (1999), p. 5^ abcdeRutland (1990), pp. 32''33.^Rutland (1990), pp. 51, 55^Rosen, Gary, American Compact: James Madison and the Problem of Founding, p. 171, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999.^Rosen, Gary, American Compact: James Madison and the Problem of Founding, pp. 171-3, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1999.^Peterson, Merrill D., ed., James Madison: A Biography in His Own Words, Vol. 2, pp. 356''59, New York: Newsweek, 1974.^Rutland (1990), p. 55.^Rutland (2012), p. 57^Rutland (1990), p. 13^Rutland (1990), p. 39^Bradford Perkins, Prologue to war: England and the United States, 1805''1812 (1961) full text online^Rutland (1990), pp. 40''44.^Madison, James (1865). Letters and other Writings of James Madison. Volume IV. 1829''1836. Philadelphia: J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. pp. 491''92. ^Rutland (1990), pp. 44''45.^Rutland (1990), pp. 46''47^Ketcham (1871), James Madison, pp. 491''504,^ abRutland, James Madison: The Founding Father, pp. 217''24^Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's Honor," William And Mary Quarterly, 1961 18(2): 196''210. in JSTOR^Ketcham (1971), James Madison, pp. 508''09^Ketcham (1971), James Madison, pp. 509''15^Stagg, 1983.^Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Short History (U. of Illinois Press, 1995)^Ketcham (1971), James Madison, pp. 576''78,^"Dolley Madison," Montpelier Web site (http://montpelier.org/explore/dolley_madison/index.php), retrieved 6-5-11.^Toll, Ian W., Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, pp. 360''65, W. W. Norton, New York, NY, 2006.^Roosevelt, Theodore, The Naval War of 1812, pp. 147''52, The Modern Library, New York, NY.^Rowen, Bob, "American Privateers in the War of 1812," paper presented to the New York Military Affairs Symposium, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 2001, revised for Web publication, 2006-8 (http://nymas.org/warof1812paper/paperrevised2006.html), retrieved 6-6-11.^"The Star-Spangled Banner and the War of 1812," Encyclopedia Smithsonian (http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmah/starflag.htm), retrieved 3-10-08.^Reilly, Robin, The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812, 1974.^"Second War of American Independence," America's Library Web site (http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/madison/aa_madison_war_1.html) retrieved, 6-6-11.^Rutland (1988), p. 188^https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=5yVzAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA220&lpg=PA220&dq=thomas+jefferson+veteran+pensions&source=bl&ots=UILojrP8xo&sig=XHwxvh4iDj6C5huBPo7cFgV_7G4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DvtUVe31BYOe7gagxYAw&ved=0CD8Q6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=thomas%20jefferson%20veteran%20pensions&f=false^Text of Madison's Veto of the Bonus Bill, accessed December 20, 2010^"Madison's Seventh Annual Message December 5, 1815 '' Lance Banning, Liberty and Order: The First American Party Struggle [1787]", in Lance Banning, ed., '"Liberty and Order: The First American Party Struggle" (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004).^ abRutland (1990), pp. 57''58^ abcdefghRutland (1990), pp. 58''59^ abcBanner (1974), p. 45.^Rutland (1990), p. 20^ abRutland (1990), p. 37.^ abcdRutland (1990), pp. 199''200^ abJennings, Paul (1865). A Colored Man's Reminiscences of James Madison. Brooklyn, NY: George C. Beadle. ^Garry Wills, James Madison (2002), p. 163.^Wills, p. 162.^Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (1989), p. 151^ abcdefghChambers (2005), p. 138^ abMcCoy (1989), Last of the Fathers, p. 252^McCoy (1989), Last of the Fathers, p. 252.^Kevin R. C. Gutzman, Virginia's American Revolution: From Dominion to Republic, 1776''1840, ch. 6.)^He was tempted to admit chaplains for the navy, as sailors might otherwise have no opportunity for worship. The text of the memoranda^"The Founding Fathers: A Brief Overview". The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved February 12, 2008. ^Chambers (2005), pp. 138''39^Wills 2002, p. 164.^Quinn, Michael, "Preserving a Legacy: Montpelier Will be Showcase for Madison", Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 5, 2004.^Paul Schindler, "Christie's Tax Levy on the Gays", Gay City News, 1 February 2012^Allan H. Keith, Historical Stories: About Greenville and Bond County, IL. Consulted on August 15, 2007.^"Five Thousand Green Seal". The United States Treasury Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Retrieved September 17, 2008. [dead link]^Jackson, Kenneth T. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of New York City (1995) ISBN 0-300-05536-6BibliographyBiographiesBrant, Irving (1952). "James Madison and His Times". American Historical Review57 (4): 853''70. doi:10.2307/1844238. JSTOR 1844238. Brant, Irving (1941''1961). James Madison. 6 volumes. , the standard scholarly biographyBrant, Irving (1970). The Fourth President; a Life of James Madison. Single volume condensation of his 6-vol biographyBroadwater, Jeff. James Madison: A Son of Virginia and a Founder of a Nation. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.Brookhiser, Richard. James Madison (Basic Books; 2011) 287 pagesChadwick, Bruce. James and Dolley Madison: America's First Power Couple (Prometheus Books; 2014) 450 pages; detailed popular historyCheney, Lynne. James Madison: A Life Reconsidered (New York: Viking, 2014) 564 pp.Gay, Sydney Howard (1894). James Madison. Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston. p. 342. EbookGutzman, Kevin. James Madison and the Making of America (St. Martin's Press; 2012) 432 pagesKetcham, Ralph (1971). James Madison: A Biography. Macmillan. , recent scholarly biographyRakove, Jack (2002). James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic (2nd ed.). New York: Longman. ISBN 0-321-08797-6. Riemer, Neal (1968). James Madison. Washington Square Press. Rutland, Robert A. ed. James Madison and the American Nation, 1751''1836: An Encyclopedia (Simon & Schuster, 1994).Rutland, Robert A. James Madison: The Founding Father. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987. ISBN 978-0-02-927601-3.Wills, Garry (2002). James Madison. New York: Times Books. ISBN 0-8050-6905-4. Short bio.Zuchert, Michael (2008). "Madison, James (1751''1836)". In Hamowy, Ronald. The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE; Cato Institute. pp. 311''2. ISBN 978-1-4129-6580-4. LCCN 2008009151. OCLC 750831024. Analytic studiesAdams, Henry. History of the United States during the Administrations of James Madison (5 vol 1890''1891; 2 vol Library of America, 1986). ISBN 0-940450-35-6Table of contentsWills, Garry. Henry Adams and the Making of America (Houghton Mifflin, 2005). a close reading of AdamsBanning, Lance. Jefferson & Madison: Three Conversations from the Founding (Madison House, 1995).Banning, Lance. The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic (Cornell Univ. Press, 1995). online ACLS History e-Book.James M. Banner Jr. (1974). C. Vann Woodward, ed. Responses of the Presidents to Charges of Misconduct. ISBN 0-440-05923-2. Brant, Irving. James Madison and American Nationalism. (1968), short survey with primary sourcesDerthick, Martha (13 June 1999). Dilemmas of Scale in America's Federal Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-64039-8. Retrieved 5 March 2015. Elkins, Stanley M.; McKitrick, Eric. The Age of Federalism (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995); 925 pp. most detailed analysis of the politics of the 1790s. online editionGabrielson, Teena, "James Madison's Psychology of Public Opinion," Political Research Quarterly, 62 (Sept. 2009), 431''44.Kasper, Eric T. To Secure the Liberty of the People: James Madison's Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court's Interpretation (Northern Illinois University Press, 2010) online reviewKernell, Samuel, ed. James Madison: the Theory and Practice of Republican Government (Stanford U. Press, 2003).Kester, Scott J. The Haunted Philosophe: James Madison, Republicanism, and Slavery (Lexington Books, 2008) 132 pp. ISBN 978-0-7391-2174-0Labunski, Richard. James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights (Oxford U. P., 2006).Matthews, Richard K. If Men Were Angels : James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason (U. Press of Kansas, 1995).McCoy, Drew R. The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (W.W. Norton, 1980). mostly economic issues.McCoy, Drew R. The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989). JM after 1816.Mu±oz, Vincent Phillip. "James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty," American Political Science Review 97,1(2003), 17''32. SSRN 512922in JSTORRead, James H. Power versus Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson and Jefferson (University Press of Virginia, 2000).Riemer, Neal. "The Republicanism of James Madison," Political Science Quarterly, 69,1(1954), 45''64 in JSTORRiemer, Neal. James Madison: Creating the American Constitution (Congressional Quarterly, 1986).Rosen, Gary. American Compact: James Madison and the Problem of Founding (University Press of Kansas, 1999).Rutland, Robert A. The Presidency of James Madison (Univ. Press of Kansas, 1990). ISBN 978-0700604654. scholarly overview of his two terms.Scarberry, Mark S. "John Leland and James Madison: Religious Influence on the Ratification of the Constitution and on the Proposal of the Bill of Rights," Penn State Law Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (April 2009), 733''800. SSRN 1262520Sheehan, Colleen A. "The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's 'Notes on Government'," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. v49 No. 3 (1992), 609''27. in JSTORSheehan, Colleen. "Madison and the French Enlightenment," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. v59#4 (Oct. 2002), 925''56. in JSTOR.Sheehan, Colleen. "Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle Over Republicanism and the Role of Public Opinion," American Political Science Review 98,3(2004), 405''24. in JSTORSheehan, Colleen."Madison Avenues," Claremont Review of Books (Spring 2004), online.Sheehan, Colleen."Public Opinion and the Formation of Civic Character in Madison's Republican Theory," Review of Politics 67,1(Winter 2005), 37''48. in JSTORSorenson, Leonard R. Madison on the "General Welfare" of America: His Consistent Constitutional Vision (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995).Stagg, John C. A. "James Madison and the 'Malcontents': The Political Origins of the War of 1812," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. 33,4(Oct. 1976), 557''585. in JSTORStagg, John C. A. "James Madison and the Coercion of Great Britain: Canada, the West Indies, and the War of 1812," in William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. 38,1(Jan. 1981), 3''34. in JSTORStagg, John C. A. Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American republic, 1783''1830 (Princeton, 1983).Stagg, John C. A. Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776''1821 (2009)Vile, John R. William D. Pederson, Frank J. Williams, eds. James Madison: Philosopher, Founder, and Statesman (Ohio University Press, 2008) 302 pp. ISBN 978-0-8214-1832-1online reviewWeiner, Greg. Madison's Metronome: The Constitution, Majority Rule, and the Tempo of American Politics. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012.Wood, Gordon S. "Is There a 'James Madison Problem'?" in Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different (Penguin Press, 2006a), 141''72.Wood, Gordon S. "Without Him, No Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights by Richard Labunski", The New York Review of Books (November 30, 2006b). onlinePrimary sourcesMadison, James (1865). Letters & Other Writings Of James Madison Fourth President Of The United States (called the Congress edition ed.). J.B. Lippincott & Co. Madison, James (1900''1910). Gaillard Hunt, ed., ed. The Writings of James Madison. G. P. Putnam's Sons. Madison, James (1962). William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., ed. The Papers of James Madison (30 volumes published and more planned ed.). Univ. of Chicago Press. Madison, James (1982). Jacob E. Cooke, ed., ed. The Federalist. Wesleyan Univ. Press. ISBN 0-8195-6077-4. Madison, James (1987). Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. W.W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-30405-1. Madison, James (1995). Marvin Myers, ed., ed. Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison. Univ. Press of New England. ISBN 0-87451-201-8. Madison, James (1995). James M. Smith, ed., ed. The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776''1826. W.W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-03691-X. Madison, James (1999). Jack N. Rakove ed., ed. James Madison, Writings. Library of America. ISBN 1-883011-66-3. External linksListen to this article (2 parts) · (info)This audio file was created from a revision of the "James Madison" article dated 2008-08-17, and does not reflect subsequent edits to the article. (Audio help)James Madison: A Resource Guide at the Library of CongressThe Papers of James Madison, subset of Founders Online from the National ArchivesJames Madison at the Biographical Directory of the United States CongressJames Madison at Find a GraveJames Madison at the White HouseAmerican President: James Madison (1751''1836) at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of VirginiaJames Madison at the Online Library of Liberty, Liberty FundMemorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785) at the Religious Movements Homepage Project, University of VirginiaThe Papers of James Madison at the Avalon ProjectJames Madison Museum, Orange, VirginiaMontpelier, home of James MadisonJames Madison at C-SPAN's American Presidents: Life PortraitsJefferson and Madison at C-SPAN's American Writers: A Journey Through HistoryWill, George F. (January 23, 2008). "Alumni who changed America, and the world: #1 '' James Madison 1771". Princeton Alumni Weekly. Booknotes interview with William Lee Miller on The Business of May Next: James Madison and the Founding, June 14, 1992.Booknotes interview with Lance Banning on The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic, February 11, 1996.Works by James Madison at Project GutenbergWorks by or about James Madison at Internet ArchiveWorks by James Madison at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks) Offices and distinctions
Historians have long debated the relative weight of the multiple reasons underlying the United States declaration of war.
Honor and the second war of independenceAs Risjord (1961) notes, a powerful motivation for the Americans was the desire to uphold "national honor" in the face of what they considered to be British insults such as the Chesapeake affair. Brands says, "The other war hawks spoke of the struggle with Britain as a second war of independence; [Andrew] Jackson, who still bore scars from the first war of independence held that view with special conviction. The approaching conflict was about violations of American rights, but was it also about vindication of American identity".[10] People at the time and historians since often called it America's "Second War of Independence."[11]
Trade with FranceIn 1807, Britain introduced a series of trade restrictions via a series of Orders in Council to impede American trade with France, with which Britain was at war. The United States contested these restrictions as illegal under international law.[12] Also, historian Reginald Horsman states, "a large section of influential British opinion, both in the government and in the country, thought that America presented a threat to British maritime supremacy".
The American merchant marine had come close to doubling between 1802 and 1810, making it by far the largest neutral fleet. Britain was the largest trading partner, receiving 80% of U.S. cotton and 50% of other U.S. exports. The British public and press were resentful of the growing mercantile and commercial competition. The United States' view was that Britain's restrictions violated its right to trade with others.
ImpressmentDuring the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy expanded to 175 ships of the line and 600 ships overall, requiring 140,000 sailors to man. While the Royal Navy could man its ships with volunteers in peacetime, it competed in wartime with merchant shipping and privateers for a small pool of experienced sailors and turned to impressment when it could not operate ships with volunteers alone. Britain did not recognize the right of a British subject to relinquish his status as a British subject, emigrate and transfer his national allegiance as a naturalized citizen to any other country. Thus while the United States recognized British-born sailors on American ships as Americans, Britain did not. It was estimated that there were 11,000 naturalized sailors on United States ships in 1805. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin stated that 9,000 were born in Britain.[16] The Royal Navy went after them by intercepting and searching U.S. merchant ships for deserters. Impressment actions such as the Leander Affair and the Chesapeake''Leopard Affair outraged Americans, because they infringed on national sovereignty and denied America's ability to naturalize foreigners. Moreover, a great number of British sailors serving as naturalized Americans on U.S. ships were Irish. An investigation by Captain Isaac Chauncey in 1808 found that 58% of the sailors based in New York City were either naturalized citizens or recent immigrants, the majority of foreign sailors (134 of 150) being from Britain. Moreover, eighty of the 134 British sailors were Irish. The US Navy also forcibly recruited British sailors but the British government saw impressment as commonly accepted practice and preferred to rescue British sailors from American impressment on a case-by-case basis.[19]
The United States believed that British deserters had a right to become United States citizens. Britain did not recognize naturalized United States citizenship, so in addition to recovering deserters, it considered United States citizens born British liable for impressment. Aggravating the situation was the widespread use of forged identity or protection papers by sailors. This made it difficult for the Royal Navy to distinguish Americans from non-Americans and led it to impress some Americans who had never been British. (Some gained freedom on appeal.) American anger at impressment grew when British frigates were stationed just outside U.S. harbors in view of U.S. shores and searched ships for contraband and impressed men while in U.S. territorial waters. "Free trade and sailors' rights" was a rallying cry for the United States throughout the conflict.
British support for American Indian raidsThe Northwest Territory, comprising the modern states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, was the battleground for conflict between the Indian Nations and the United States. The British Empire had ceded the area to the United States in the Treaty of Paris in 1783, both sides ignoring the fact that the land was already inhabited by various Indian nations. These included the Miami, Winnebago, Shawnee, Fox, Sauk, Kickapoo, Delaware and Wyandot. Some warriors, who had left their nations of origin, followed Tenskwatawa, the Shawnee Prophet and the brother of Tecumseh. Tenskwatawa had a vision of purifying his society by expelling the "children of the Evil Spirit": the American settlers. Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh formed a confederation of numerous tribes to block American expansion. The British saw the Indian nations as valuable allies and a buffer to its Canadian colonies and provided arms. Attacks on American settlers in the Northwest further aggravated tensions between Britain and the United States. The confederation's raids and existence hindered American expansion into rich farmlands in the Northwest Territory. Pratt writes:
There is ample proof that the British authorities did all in their power to hold or win the allegiance of the Indians of the Northwest with the expectation of using them as allies in the event of war. Indian allegiance could be held only by gifts, and to an Indian no gift was as acceptable as a lethal weapon. Guns and ammunition, tomahawks and scalping knives were dealt out with some liberality by British agents.
Raiding grew more common in 1810 and 1811; Westerners in Congress found the raids intolerable and wanted them permanently ended.
However, according to the U.S Army Center of Military History, the "land-hungry frontiersmen", with "no doubt that their troubles with the Indians were the result of British intrigue", exacerbated the problem by "[circulating stories] after every Indian raid of British Army muskets and equipment being found on the field". Thus, "the westerners were convinced that their problems could best be solved by forcing the British out of Canada".[28]
The British had the long-standing goal of creating a large "neutral" Indian state that would cover much of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. They made the demand as late as the fall of 1814 at the peace conference, but lost control of western Ontario in 1813 at key battles on and around Lake Erie. These battles destroyed the Indian confederacy which had been the main ally of the British in the region, and which would make up the proposed neutral state. Although the area remained under British or British-allied Indians' control until the end of the war, it became a less practicable idea. At American insistence, and with higher priorities, the British dropped the demands.
American expansionismAmerican expansion into the Northwest Territory was being obstructed by indigenous leaders like Tecumseh, who were supplied and encouraged by the British. Americans on the western frontier demanded that interference be stopped. There is dispute, however, over whether or not the American desire to annex Canada brought on the war. Several historians believe that the capture of Canada was intended only as a means to secure a bargaining chip, which would then be used to force Britain to back down on the maritime issues. It would also cut off food supplies for Britain's West Indian colonies, and temporarily prevent the British from continuing to arm the Indians.[32] However, a significant minority of historians believes that a desire to annex Canada was a cause of the war. This view was more prevalent before 1940, but continues to be held by a number of historians.[39][40] The U.S. Army Center for Military History compares War Hawks' desire to annex the Canadas to the enthusiasm for the annexation of Spanish Florida by inhabitants of the American South.[28] Congressman Richard Mentor Johnson told Congress that the constant Indian atrocities along the Wabash River in Indiana were enabled by supplies from Canada and were proof that, "the war has already commenced. ... I shall never die contended until I see England's expulsion from North America and her territories incorporated into the United States."[46]
Upper Canada (modern southern Ontario) had mostly been settled by Revolution-era exiles from the United States (United Empire Loyalists) or postwar American immigrants. The Loyalists were hostile to union with the United States, while the immigrant settlers were generally uninterested in politics and remained neutral or supported the British during the war. The Canadian colonies were thinly populated and only lightly defended by the British Army. Americans then believed that many men in Upper Canada would rise up and greet an American invading army as liberators. That did not happen. One reason American forces retreated after one successful battle inside Canada was that they could not obtain supplies from the locals. But the Americans thought that the possibility of local support suggested an easy conquest, as former President Thomas Jefferson believed: "The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us the experience for the attack on Halifax, the next and final expulsion of England from the American continent".
Annexation was supported by American businessmen who wanted to gain control of Great Lakes trade.[49]
Stagg has examined at the fate of the expansionist cause proposed by Hacker and Pratt in the 1920s:
this 'expansionist' interpretation of the war can still be found in textbooks currently in use in the nation's high schools. It has also compounded popular confusion about the war by perpetuating an arid dispute over what should be deemed to be its 'real' or most important causes. Were these causes international or domestic in origin? That debate became both interminable and insoluble. Consequently, a new generation of historians by the 1960s ... repudiated the views of Hacker and Pratt.
Maass argued in 2015 that the expansionist theme is a myth that goes against the "relative consensus among experts that the primary U.S. objective was the repeal of British maritime restrictions". He argues that consensus among scholars is that the United States went to war "because six years of economic sanctions had failed to bring Britain to the negotiating table, and threatening the Royal Navy's Canadian supply base was their last hope." Maass agrees that theoretically expansionism might have tempted Americans, but finds that "leaders feared the domestic political consequences of doing so. Notably, what limited expansionism there was focused on sparsely populated western lands rather than the more populous eastern settlements [of Canada]."[50]
David and Jeanne Heidler argue that "acquiring Canada would [have] satisfied America's expansionist desires", also describing it as a key goal of western expansionists, who, they argue, believed that "eliminating the British presence in Canada would best accomplish" their goal of halting British support for Indian raids. They argue that the "enduring debate" is over the relative importance of expansionism as a factor, and whether "expansionism played a greater role in causing the War of 1812 than American concern about protecting neutral maritime rights." [51]
U.S. political conflictWhile the British government was largely oblivious to the deteriorating North-American situation because of its involvement in a continent-wide European War, the U.S. was in a period of significant political conflict between the Federalist Party (based mainly in the Northeast), which favored a strong central government and closer ties to Britain, and the Republicans (with its greatest power base in the South and West), which favored a weak central government, preservation of slavery, expansion into Indian land, and a stronger break with Britain. By 1812, the Federalist Party had weakened considerably, and the Republicans, with James Madison completing his first term of office and control of Congress, were in a strong position to pursue their more aggressive agenda against Britain.[52] Throughout the war, support for the U.S. cause was weak (or sometimes non-existent) in Federalist areas of the Northeast. Few men volunteered to serve; the banks avoided financing the war. The negatavism of the Federalists, especially as exemplified by the Hartford Convention of 1814''15 ruined its reputation and the Party survived only in scattered areas. By 1815 there was broad support for the war from all parts of the country. This allowed the triumphant Republicans to adopt some Federalist policies, such as a national bank, which Madison reestablished in 1816.[53][54]
The war was conducted in three theatres:
At sea, principally the Atlantic Ocean and the east coast of North AmericaThe Great Lakes and the Canadian frontierThe Southern states and southwestern territoriesAtlantic theatreOpening strategiesIn 1812, Britain's Royal Navy was the world's largest, with over 600 cruisers in commission and some smaller vessels. Although most of these were involved in blockading the French navy and protecting British trade against (usually French) privateers, the Royal Navy still had 85 vessels in American waters, counting all British Navy vessels in North American and the Caribbean waters.[83] But, the Royal Navy's North American squadron based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, which bore the brunt of the war, numbered one small ship of the line, seven frigates, nine smaller sloops and brigs along with five schooners. By contrast, the United States Navy comprised 8 frigates, 14 smaller sloops and brigs, and no ships of the line. The U.S. had embarked on a major shipbuilding program before the war at Sackets Harbor, New York and continued to produce new ships. Three of the existing American frigates were exceptionally large and powerful for their class, larger than any British frigate in North America. Whereas the standard British frigate of the time was rated as a 38 gun ship, usually carrying up to 50 guns, with its main battery consisting of 18-pounder guns; the USS Constitution, President, and United States, in comparison, were rated as 44-gun ships, carrying 56''60 guns with a main battery of 24-pounders.
The British strategy was to protect their own merchant shipping to and from Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the West Indies, and to enforce a blockade of major American ports to restrict American trade. Because of their numerical inferiority, the American strategy was to cause disruption through hit-and-run tactics, such as the capture of prizes and engaging Royal Navy vessels only under favorable circumstances. Days after the formal declaration of war, however, it put out two small squadrons, including the frigate President and the sloop Hornet under Commodore John Rodgers, and the frigates United States and Congress, with the brig Argus under Captain Stephen Decatur. These were initially concentrated as one unit under Rodgers, who intended to force the Royal Navy to concentrate its own ships to prevent isolated units being captured by his powerful force.
Large numbers of American merchant ships were returning to the United States with the outbreak of war, and if the Royal Navy was concentrated, it could not watch all the ports on the American seaboard. Rodgers' strategy worked, in that the Royal Navy concentrated most of its frigates off New York Harbor under Captain Philip Broke, allowing many American ships to reach home. But, Rodgers' own cruise captured only five small merchant ships, and the Americans never subsequently concentrated more than two or three ships together as a unit.[citation needed]
Single-ship actionsMeanwhile, the Constitution, commanded by Captain Isaac Hull, sailed from Chesapeake Bay on July 12. On July 17, Broke's British squadron gave chase off New York, but the Constitution evaded her pursuers after two days. After briefly calling at Boston to replenish water, on August 19, the Constitutionengaged the British frigateHMS Guerriere. After a 35-minute battle, Guerriere had been dis-masted and captured and was later burned. The Constitution earned the nickname "Old Ironsides" following this battle as many of the British cannonballs were seen to bounce off her hull. Hull returned to Boston with news of this significant victory. On October 25, the United States, commanded by Captain Decatur, captured the British frigate HMS Macedonian, which he then carried back to port. At the close of the month, the Constitution sailed south, now under the command of Captain William Bainbridge. On December 29, off Bahia, Brazil, she met the British frigate HMS Java. After a battle lasting three hours, Javastruck her colors and was burned after being judged unsalvageable. The Constitution, however, was relatively undamaged in the battle.[citation needed]
The successes gained by the three big American frigates forced Britain to construct five 40-gun, 24-pounder heavy frigates and two "spar-decked" frigates (the 60-gun HMS Leander and HMS Newcastle) and to razee three old 74-gun ships of the line to convert them to heavy frigates. The Royal Navy acknowledged that there were factors other than greater size and heavier guns. The United States Navy's sloops and brigs had also won several victories over Royal Navy vessels of approximately equal strength. While the American ships had experienced and well-drilled volunteer crews, the enormous size of the overstretched Royal Navy meant that many ships were shorthanded and the average quality of crews suffered. The constant sea duties of those serving in North America interfered with their training and exercises.
The capture of the three British frigates stimulated the British to greater exertions. More vessels were deployed on the American seaboard and the blockade tightened. On June 1, 1813, off Boston Harbor, the frigate Chesapeake, commanded by Captain James Lawrence, was captured by the British frigate HMS Shannon under Captain Philip Broke. Lawrence was mortally wounded and famously cried out, "Don't give up the ship! Hold on, men!" The two frigates were of near-identical size. Chesapeake ''''s crew was larger but most had not served or trained together. British citizens reacted with celebration and relief that the run of American victories had ended. Notably, this action was by ratio one of the bloodiest contests recorded during this age of sail, with more dead and wounded than HMS Victory suffered in four hours of combat at Trafalgar. Captain Lawrence was killed and Captain Broke was so badly wounded that he never again held a sea command.
In January 1813, the American frigate Essex, under the command of Captain David Porter, sailed into the Pacific to harass British shipping. Many British whaling ships carried letters of marque allowing them to prey on American whalers, and they nearly destroyed the industry. The Essex challenged this practice. She inflicted considerable damage on British interests before she and her tender, Essex Junior (armed with twenty guns) were captured off Valparaiso, Chile by the British frigate HMS Phoebe and the sloop HMS Cherub on March 28, 1814.
The British 6th-rate Cruizer-class brig-sloops did not fare well against the American ship-rigged sloops of war. The Hornet and Wasp constructed before the war were notably powerful vessels, and the Frolic class built during the war even more so (although Frolic was trapped and captured by a British frigate and a schooner). The British brig-rigged sloops tended to suffer fire to their rigging more frequently than the American ship-rigged sloops. In addition, the ship-rigged sloops could back their sails in action, giving them another advantage in manoeuvring.
Following their earlier losses, the British Admiralty instituted a new policy that the three American heavy frigates should not be engaged except by a ship of the line or smaller vessels in squadron strength. An example of this was the capture of the President by a squadron of four British frigates in January 1815. But, a month later, the Constitution engaged and captured two smaller British warships, HMS Cyane and HMS Levant, sailing in company.
Success in single ship battles raised American morale after the repeated failed invasion attempts in Upper and Lower Canada. However these single ship victories had no military effect on the war at sea as they did not alter the balance of naval power, impede British supplies and reinforcements, or even raise insurance rates for British trade.
PrivateeringThe operations of American privateers proved a more significant threat to British trade than the U.S. Navy. They operated throughout the Atlantic and continued until the close of the war, most notably from ports such as Baltimore. American privateers reported taking 1300 British merchant vessels, compared to 254 taken by the U.S. Navy.[97][98][99] although the insurer Lloyd's of London reported that only 1,175 British ships were taken, 373 of which were recaptured, for a total loss of 802.[100] However the British were able to limit privateering losses by the strict enforcement of convoy by the Royal Navy and by capturing 278 American privateers. Due to the massive size of the British merchant fleet, American captures only affected 7.5% of the British merchant fleet, resulting no supply shortages or lack of reinforcements for British forces in North America.
Due to the large size of their navy, the British did not rely as much on privateering. The majority of the 1,407 captured American merchant ships were taken by the Royal Navy. The war was the last time the British allowed privateering, since the practice was coming to be seen as politically inexpedient and of diminishing value in maintaining its naval supremacy. However privateering remained popular in British colonies. It was the last hurrah for privateers Bermuda who vigorously returned to the practice after experience in previous wars.[102] The nimble Bermuda sloops captured 298 American ships. Privateer schooners based in British North America, especially from Nova Scotia took 250 American ships and proved especially effective in crippling American coastal trade and capturing American ships closer to shore than the Royal Navy cruisers.
BlockadeThe small British North American squadron had difficulty at the beginning of the war in blockading the entire U.S. coast, faced by the need to convoy vessels against American privateers. However as additional ships were sent to North America in 1813, the Royal Navy was able to tighten the blockade and extend it, first to the coast south of Narragansett by November 1813 and to the entire American coast on May 31, 1814.
The British government, having need of American foodstuffs for its army in Spain, benefited from the willingness of the New Englanders to trade with them, so no blockade of New England was at first attempted. The Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay were declared in a state of blockade on December 26, 1812. Illicit trade was carried on by collusive captures arranged between American traders and British officers. American ships were fraudulently transferred to neutral flags. Eventually, the U.S. government was driven to issue orders to stop illicit trading; this put only a further strain on the commerce of the country. The overpowering strength of the British fleet enabled it to occupy the Chesapeake and to attack and destroy numerous docks and harbors.
The blockade of American ports later tightened to the extent that most American merchant ships and naval vessels were confined to port. The American frigates United States and HMS Macedonian ended the war blockaded and hulked in New London, Connecticut. Some merchant ships were based in Europe or Asia and continued operations. Others, mainly from New England, were issued licences to trade by Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, commander in chief on the American station in 1813. This allowed Wellington's army in Spain to receive American goods and to maintain the New Englanders' opposition to the war. The blockade nevertheless resulted in American exports decreasing from $130 million in 1807 to $7 million in 1814. Most of these were food exports that ironically went to supply their enemies in Britain or British colonies.
As the Royal Navy base that supervised the blockade, Halifax profited greatly during the war. From that base British privateers seized many French and American ships and sold their prizes in Halifax.
Freeing and recruiting slavesThe British Royal Navy's blockades and raids allowed about 4,000 African Americans to escape slavery by fleeing American plantations to find freedom aboard British ships, a migration known as the Black Refugees. The blockading British fleet in Chesapeake Bay received increasing numbers of enslaved black Americans during 1813. They were welcomed by British government order, and were treated as free persons when reaching British hands.[105] A proclamation of April 2, 1814, offered freedom to slaves reaching British lines or ships. About 2,400 of the escaped slaves and their families who served in the Royal Navy following their escape settled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick during and after the war. From May 1814, younger men among the volunteers were recruited into a new Corps of Colonial Marines. They fought for Britain throughout the Atlantic campaign, including the Battle of Bladensburg and the attacks on Washington, D.C. and Battle of Baltimore, later settling in Trinidad. The slaves who escaped to the British navy represented the largest emancipation of African Americans before the American Civil War.[106]
Occupation of MaineMaine, then part of Massachusetts, was a base for smuggling and illegal trade between the U.S. and the British. Until 1813 the region was generally quiet except for privateer actions near the coast. In September 1813, there was a notable naval action when the U.S. Navy's brig Enterprisefought and captured the Royal Navy brig Boxer off Pemaquid Point. The first British assault came in July 1814, when Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy took Moose Island (Eastport, Maine) without a shot, with the entire American garrison of Fort Sullivan'--which became the British Fort Sherbrooke'--surrendering. Next, from his base in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in September 1814, Sir John Coape Sherbrooke led 3,000 British troops in the "Penobscot Expedition". In 26 days, he raided and looted Hampden, Bangor, and Machias, destroying or capturing 17 American ships. He won the Battle of Hampden (losing two killed while the Americans lost one killed). Retreating American forces were forced to destroy the frigate Adams. The British occupied the town of Castine and most of eastern Maine for the rest of the war, re-establishing the colony of New Ireland. The Treaty of Ghent returned this territory to the United States, though Machias Seal Island has remained in dispute. The British left in April 1815, at which time they took '¤10,750 obtained from tariff duties at Castine. This money, called the "Castine Fund", was used to establish Dalhousie University, in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Chesapeake campaign and "The Star-Spangled Banner"The strategic location of the Chesapeake Bay near America's new national capital, Washington, D.C. on the major tributary of the Potomac River, made it a prime target for the British and their Royal Navy and the King's Army. Starting in March 1813, a squadron under Rear Admiral George Cockburn started a blockade of the mouth of the Bay at Hampton Roads harbor and raided towns along the Bay from Norfolk, Virginia to Havre de Grace, Maryland.
On July 4, 1813, CommodoreJoshua Barney, a Revolutionary War naval hero, convinced the U.S. Navy Department to build the Chesapeake Bay Flotilla, a squadron of twenty barges powered by small sails or oars (sweeps) to defend the Chesapeake Bay. Launched in April 1814, the squadron was quickly cornered in the Patuxent River, and while successful in harassing the Royal Navy, they were powerless to stop the British campaign that ultimately led to the "Burning of Washington". This expedition, led by Cockburn and General Robert Ross, was carried out between August 19 and 29, 1814, as the result of the hardened British policy of 1814 (although British and American commissioners had convened peace negotiations at Ghent in June of that year). As part of this, Admiral Warren had been replaced as commander in chief by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, with reinforcements and orders to coerce the Americans into a favorable peace.
Governor-in-chief of British North America in Upper and Lower Canada, Sir George Pr(C)vost had written to the Admirals on the North American Station in Bermuda, calling for retaliation for the American sacking and burning of York (now largest city of Toronto on north shore of Lake Erie).[citation needed] A force of 2,500 soldiers under General Ross had just arrived in Bermuda aboard ""H.M.S. Royal Oak", three frigates, three sloops and ten other vessels. Released from the Peninsular War in Spain and Portugal by British victory, the British intended to use them for diversionary raids along the coasts of Maryland and Virginia. In response to Pr(C)vost's request, they decided to employ this force, together with the naval and military units already on the station, to strike at the "Federal City" of Washington, D.C.
On August 24, U.S. Secretary of War, John Armstrong insisted that the British would attack Baltimore rather than Washington, even when units of the British Army, accompanied by major ships of the Royal Navy, was obviously on their way to the capital. The inexperienced American militia, which had congregated at Bladensburg, Maryland, to protect the capital, were defeated in the Battle of Bladensburg, opening the route to Washington. While First Lady Dolley Madison saved valuables from the then named "President's House" (or "President's Palace" [executive mansion] - now "White House"), Fourth President James Madison and the government with members of the Presidential Cabinet, fled to Virginia.[110] Seeing that the Battle of Bladensburg, northeast of the town in rural Prince George's County was not going well, the Secretary of the Navy commanded Captain Thomas Tingey, commandant of the Washington Naval Yard on the Eastern Branch of the Potomac River (now the Anacostia River), to set the facility ablaze to prevent the capture of American naval ships, buildings, shops and supplies.[110] Tingey had overseen the Naval Yard's planning and development since the national capital had been moved from Philadelphia to Washington in 1800, and waited until the very last possible minute, nearly four hours after the order was given to execute it. The destruction included most of the facility as well as the nearly-completed frigate "Columbia" and the sloop "Argus".[111]
The British commanders ate the supper that had been prepared for the President and his departmental secretaries after returning from hopeful glorious U.S. victory, before they burned the Executive Mansion; American morale was reduced to an all-time low. The British viewed their actions as retaliation for the destructive American invasions and raids into Canada, most notably the Americans' burning of York (now Toronto) earlier in 1813. Later that same evening, a furious storm (some later weather experts called it a thunderstorm, almost a hurricane) swept into Washington, D.C., sending one or more tornadoes into the rough, unfinished town that caused more damage but finally extinguished the fires with torrential rains, leaving fire-blackened walls and partial ruins of the President's House, The Capitol, Treasury Department that were set the first night.[112] The British left Washington, D.C. the following day after the storm subsided. Also unfortunately, an explosion of the combustibles they used to finish off the Navy Yard destruction that the Americans had started, exploded, killing or maimed a large number of "Red-Coats"
Having destroyed Washington's public buildings, including the President's Mansion and the Treasury, the British army and navy next moved several weeks later to capture Baltimore, forty miles northeast, a busy port and a key base for American privateers. However by not immediately going overland to the port city they sneeringly called a "nest of pirates", but returned to their ships anchored in the Patuxent River and proceeding later up to the Upper Bay, gave the Baltimoreans plenty of time to reinforce their fortifications and gather regular U.S. Army and state militia troops from surrounding counties and states. The subsequent "Battle for Baltimore" began with the British landing on Sunday, September 12th, 1814, at North Point, where the Baltimore harbor's Patapsco River met the Chesapeake Bay, where they were met by American militia further up the "Patapsco Neck" peninsula. An exchange of fire began, with casualties on both sides. Major Gen. Robert Ross was killed by American snipers as he attempted to rally his troops in the first skirmish. The snipers were killed moments later, and the British paused, then continued to march northwestward to the stationed Maryland and Baltimore City militia units deployed further up Long Log Lane on the peninsula at "Godly Wood" where the later Battle of North Point was fought for several afternoon hours in a musketry and artillery duel under command of British Col. Arthur Brooke and American commander for the Maryland state militia and its Third Brigade (or "Baltimore City Brigade"), Brig. Gen. John Stricker. The British also planned to simultaneously attack Baltimore by water on the following day, September 13th, to support their military now arrayed facing the massed, heavily dug-in and fortified American units of approximately 15,000 with about a hundred cannon gathered along the eastern heights of the city named "Loudenschlager's Hill" (later "Hampstead Hill" - now part of Patterson Park). These overall Baltimore defenses had been planned in advance and foreseen by the state militia commander, Maj. Gen. Samuel Smith, who had been set in charge of the Baltimore defenses instead of the discredited U.S. Army commander for the Mid-Atlantic's 10th Military District (following the debacle the previous month at Bladensburg), William H. Winder). Smith had been earlier a Revolutionary War officer and commander, then wealthy city merchant and U.S. Representative, Senator and later Mayor of Baltimore. The "Red Coats" were unable to immediately reduce Fort McHenry, at the entrance to Baltimore Harbor to allow their ships to provide heavier naval gunfire to support their troops to the northeast.
At the bombardment of Fort McHenry, the British naval guns, mortars and revolutionary new "Congreve rockets" had a longer range than the American cannon onshore, and the ships mostly stood off out of the Americans' range, bombarding the fort, which returned very little fire and was not too heavily damaged during the onslaught except for a burst over a rear brickwall knocking out some fieldpieces and resulting in a few casualties. Despite however the heavy bombardment, casualties in the fort were slight and the British ships eventually realized that they could not force the passage to attack Baltimore in coordination with the land force. After a last ditch night feint and barge attack during the heavy rain storm at the time led by Capt. Charles Napier around the fort up the Middle Branch of the river to the west which was split and misdirected partly in the storm, then turned back with heavy casualties by alert gunners at supporting western batteries Fort Covington and Battery Babcock, so the British called off the attack and sailed downriver to pick up their army which had retreated from the eastside of Baltimore. All the lights were extinguished in Baltimore the night of the attack, and the fort was bombarded for 25 hours. The only light was given off by the exploding shells over Fort McHenry, illuminating the flag that was still flying over the fort. The defence of the fort inspired the American lawyer Francis Scott Key to write "Defence of Fort M'Henry", a poem that was set to music as "The Star-Spangled Banner".
Great Lakes and Western TerritoriesInvasions of Upper and Lower Canada, 1812American leaders assumed that Canada could be easily overrun. Former President Jefferson optimistically referred to the conquest of Canada as "a matter of marching".[113] Many Loyalist Americans had migrated to Upper Canada after the Revolutionary War. There was also significant non-Loyalist American immigration to the area due to the offer of land grants to immigrants, and the U.S. assumed the latter would favor the American cause, but they did not. In prewar Upper Canada, General Pr(C)vost was in the unusual position of having to purchase many provisions for his troops from the American side. This peculiar trade persisted throughout the war in spite of an abortive attempt by the U.S. government to curtail it. In Lower Canada, which was much more populous, support for Britain came from the English elite with strong loyalty to the Empire, and from the Canadien elite, who feared American conquest would destroy the old order by introducing Protestantism, Anglicization, republican democracy, and commercial capitalism; and weakening the Catholic Church. The Canadien inhabitants feared the loss of a shrinking area of good lands to potential American immigrants.
In 1812''13, British military experience prevailed over inexperienced American commanders. Geography dictated that operations would take place in the west: principally around Lake Erie, near the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, and near the Saint Lawrence River area and Lake Champlain. This was the focus of the three-pronged attacks by the Americans in 1812. Although cutting the St. Lawrence River through the capture of Montreal and Quebec would have made Britain's hold in North America unsustainable, the United States began operations first in the western frontier because of the general popularity there of a war with the British, who had sold arms to the Native Americans opposing the settlers.
The British scored an important early success when their detachment at St. Joseph Island, on Lake Huron, learned of the declaration of war before the nearby American garrison at the important trading post at Mackinac Island in Michigan. A scratch force landed on the island on July 17, 1812 and mounted a gun overlooking Fort Mackinac. After the British fired one shot from their gun, the Americans, taken by surprise, surrendered. This early victory encouraged the natives, and large numbers moved to help the British at Amherstburg. The island totally controlled access to the Old Northwest, giving the British nominal control of this area, and, more vitally, a monopoly on the fur trade.
An American army under the command of William Hull invaded Canada on July 12, with his forces chiefly composed of untrained and ill-disciplined militiamen. Once on Canadian soil, Hull issued a proclamation ordering all British subjects to surrender, or "the horrors, and calamities of war will stalk before you".[this quote needs a citation] He also threatened to kill any British prisoner caught fighting alongside a native. The proclamation helped stiffen resistance to the American attacks. Hull's army was too weak in artillery and badly supplied to achieve its objectives, and had to fight just to maintain its own lines of communication.[citation needed]
The senior British officer in Upper Canada, Major General Isaac Brock, felt that he should take bold measures to calm the settler population in Canada, and to convince the aboriginals who were needed to defend the region that Britain was strong. He moved rapidly to Amherstburg near the western end of Lake Erie with reinforcements and immediately decided to attack Detroit. Hull, fearing that the British possessed superior numbers and that the Indians attached to Brock's force would commit massacres if fighting began, surrendered Detroit without a fight on August 16. Knowing of British-instigated indigenous attacks on other locations, Hull ordered the evacuation of the inhabitants of Fort Dearborn (Chicago) to Fort Wayne. After initially being granted safe passage, the inhabitants (soldiers and civilians) were attacked by Potowatomis on August 15 after travelling only 2 miles (3.2 km) in what is known as the Battle of Fort Dearborn. The fort was subsequently burned.
Brock promptly transferred himself to the eastern end of Lake Erie, where American General Stephen Van Rensselaer was attempting a second invasion. An armistice (arranged by Pr(C)vost in the hope the British renunciation of the Orders in Council to which the United States objected might lead to peace) prevented Brock from invading American territory. When the armistice ended, the Americans attempted an attack across the Niagara River on October 13, but suffered a crushing defeat at Queenston Heights. Brock was killed during the battle. While the professionalism of the American forces would improve by the war's end, British leadership suffered after Brock's death. A final attempt in 1812 by American General Henry Dearborn to advance north from Lake Champlain failed when his militia refused to advance beyond American territory.
In contrast to the American militia, the Canadian militia performed well. French Canadians, who found the anti-Catholic stance of most of the United States troublesome, and United Empire Loyalists, who had fought for the Crown during the American Revolutionary War, strongly opposed the American invasion. However, many in Upper Canada were recent settlers from the United States who had no obvious loyalties to the Crown. Nevertheless, while there were some who sympathized with the invaders, the American forces found strong opposition from men loyal to the Empire.[117]
American Northwest, 1813After Hull's surrender of Detroit, General William Henry Harrison was given command of the U.S. Army of the Northwest. He set out to retake the city, which was now defended by Colonel Henry Procter in conjunction with Tecumseh. A detachment of Harrison's army was defeated at Frenchtown along the River Raisin on January 22, 1813. Procter left the prisoners with an inadequate guard, who could not prevent some of his North American aboriginal allies from attacking and killing perhaps as many as sixty Americans, many of whom were Kentucky militiamen.[118] The incident became known as the River Raisin Massacre. The defeat ended Harrison's campaign against Detroit, and the phrase "Remember the River Raisin!" became a rallying cry for the Americans.
In May 1813, Procter and Tecumseh set siege to Fort Meigs in northwestern Ohio. American reinforcements arriving during the siege were defeated by the natives, but the fort held out. The Indians eventually began to disperse, forcing Procter and Tecumseh to return north to Canada. A second offensive against Fort Meigs also failed in July. In an attempt to improve Indian morale, Procter and Tecumseh attempted to storm Fort Stephenson, a small American post on the Sandusky River, only to be repulsed with serious losses, marking the end of the Ohio campaign.
On Lake Erie, American commander Captain Oliver Hazard Perry fought the Battle of Lake Erie on September 10, 1813. His decisive victory at "Put-In-Bay" ensured American military control of the lake, improved American morale after a series of defeats, and compelled the British to fall back from Detroit. This paved the way for General Harrison to launch another invasion of Upper Canada, which culminated in the U.S. victory at the Battle of the Thames on October 5, 1813, in which Tecumseh was killed. Tecumseh's death effectively ended the North American indigenous alliance with the British in the Fort Detroit region. American control of Lake Erie meant the British could no longer provide essential military supplies to their aboriginal allies, who therefore dropped out of the war. The Americans controlled the area during the conflict.
Niagara frontier, 1813Because of the difficulties of land communications, control of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River corridor was crucial. When the war began, the British already had a small squadron of warships on Lake Ontario and had the initial advantage. To redress the situation, the Americans established a Navy yard at Sackett's Harbor in northwestern New York. Commodore Isaac Chauncey took charge of the large number of sailors and shipwrights sent there from New York; they completed the second warship built there in a mere 45 days. Ultimately, almost 3,000 men worked at the naval shipyard, building eleven warships and many smaller boats and transports. Having regained the advantage by their rapid building program, Chauncey and Dearborn attacked York, (future Toronto), on the northern shore of the lake, the capital of Upper Canada, on April 27, 1813. The Battle of York was a "pyrrhic" American victory, marred by looting and the burning of the small Provincial Parliament buildings and a library (resulting in a spirit of revenge by the British/Canadians led by Gov. George Pr(C)vost, who later demanded satisfaction encouraging the British Admiralty to issue orders to their officers later operating in the Chesapeake Bay region to exact similar devastation on the American Federal capital village of Washington the following year). However, Kingston was strategically much more valuable to British supply and communications routes along the St. Lawrence corridor. Without control of Kingston, the U.S. Navy could not effectively control Lake Ontario or sever the British supply line from Lower Canada.
On May 27, 1813, an American amphibious force from Lake Ontario assaulted Fort George on the northern end of the Niagara River and captured it without serious losses. The retreating British forces were not pursued, however, until they had largely escaped and organized a counteroffensive against the advancing Americans at the Battle of Stoney Creek on June 5. On June 24, with the help of advance warning by Laura Secord, another American force was forced to surrender by a much smaller British and native force at the Battle of Beaver Dams, marking the end of the American offensive into Upper Canada. Meanwhile, Commodore James Lucas Yeo had taken charge of the British ships on the lake and mounted a counterattack, which was nevertheless repulsed at the Battle of Sackett's Harbor. Thereafter, Chauncey and Yeo's squadrons fought two indecisive actions, neither commander seeking a fight to the finish.
Late in 1813, the Americans abandoned the Canadian territory they occupied around Fort George. They set fire to the village of Newark (now Niagara-on-the-Lake) on December 15, 1813, incensing the Canadians and politicians in control. Many of the inhabitants were left without shelter, freezing to death in the snow. This led to British retaliation following the Capture of Fort Niagara on December 18, 1813. Early the next morning on December 19, the British and their native allies stormed the neighboring town of Lewiston, New York, torching homes and buildings and killing about a dozen civilians. As the British were chasing the surviving residents out of town, a small force of Tuscarora natives intervened and stopped the pursuit, buying enough time for the locals to escape to safer ground. It is notable in that the Tuscaroras defended the Americans against their own Iroquois brothers, the Mohawks, who sided with the British.[119][120] Later, the British attacked and burned Buffalo on December 30, 1813.
In 1814, the contest for Lake Ontario turned into a building race. Naval superiority shifted between the opposing fleets as each built new, bigger ships. However, neither was able to bring the other to battle when in a position of superiority. The Engagements on Lake Ontario were a draw.
St. Lawrence and Lower Canada, 1813The British were potentially most vulnerable over the stretch of the St. Lawrence where it formed the frontier between Upper Canada and the United States. During the early days of the war, there was illicit commerce across the river. Over the winter of 1812 and 1813, the Americans launched a series of raids from Ogdensburg on the American side of the river, which hampered British supply traffic up the river. On February 21, Sir George Pr(C)vost passed through Prescott on the opposite bank of the river with reinforcements for Upper Canada. When he left the next day, the reinforcements and local militia attacked. At the Battle of Ogdensburg, the Americans were forced to retire.
For the rest of the year, Ogdensburg had no American garrison, and many residents of Ogdensburg resumed visits and trade with Prescott. This British victory removed the last American regular troops from the Upper St. Lawrence frontier and helped secure British communications with Montreal. Late in 1813, after much argument, the Americans made two thrusts against Montreal. The plan eventually agreed upon was for Major General Wade Hampton to march north from Lake Champlain and join a force under General James Wilkinson that would embark in boats and sail from Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario and descend the St. Lawrence. Hampton was delayed by bad roads and supply problems and also had an intense dislike of Wilkinson, which limited his desire to support his plan. On October 25, his 4,000-strong force was defeated at the Chateauguay River by Charles de Salaberry's smaller force of Canadian Voltigeurs and Mohawks. Wilkinson's force of 8,000 set out on October 17, but was also delayed by bad weather. After learning that Hampton had been checked, Wilkinson heard that a British force under Captain William Mulcaster and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wanton Morrison was pursuing him, and by November 10, he was forced to land near Morrisburg, about 150 kilometres (90 mi.) from Montreal. On November 11, Wilkinson's rear guard, numbering 2,500, attacked Morrison's force of 800 at Crysler's Farm and was repulsed with heavy losses. After learning that Hampton could not renew his advance, Wilkinson retreated to the U.S. and settled into winter quarters. He resigned his command after a failed attack on a British outpost at Lacolle Mills.
Niagara and Plattsburgh Campaigns, 1814By the middle of 1814, American generals, including Major Generals Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott, had drastically improved the fighting abilities and discipline of the army. Their renewed attack on the Niagara peninsula quickly captured Fort Erie. Winfield Scott then gained a victory over an inferior British force at the Battle of Chippawa on July 5. An attempt to advance further ended with a hard-fought but inconclusive battle at Lundy's Lane on July 25.
The outnumbered Americans withdrew but withstood a prolonged Siege of Fort Erie. The British suffered heavy casualties in a failed assault and were weakened by exposure and shortage of supplies in their siege lines. Eventually the British raised the siege, but American Major General George Izard took over command on the Niagara front and followed up only halfheartedly. The Americans lacked provisions, and eventually destroyed the fort and retreated across the Niagara.
Meanwhile, following the abdication of Napoleon, 15,000 British troops were sent to North America under four of Wellington's ablest brigade commanders. Fewer than half were veterans of the Peninsula and the rest came from garrisons. Pr(C)vost was ordered to neutralize American power on the lakes by burning Sackets Harbor, gain naval control of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the Upper Lakes, and defend Lower Canada from attack. He did defend Lower Canada but otherwise failed to achieve his objectives. Given the late season he decided to invade New York State. His army outnumbered the American defenders of Plattsburgh, but he was worried about his flanks so he decided he needed naval control of Lake Champlain. On the lake, the British squadron under Captain George Downie and the Americans under Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough were more evenly matched.
On reaching Plattsburgh, Pr(C)vost delayed the assault until the arrival of Downie in the hastily completed 36-gun frigate HMS Confiance. Pr(C)vost forced Downie into a premature attack, but then unaccountably failed to provide the promised military backing. Downie was killed and his naval force defeated at the naval Battle of Plattsburgh in Plattsburgh Bay on September 11, 1814. The Americans now had control of Lake Champlain; Theodore Roosevelt later termed it "the greatest naval battle of the war".[this quote needs a citation] The successful land defence was led by Alexander Macomb. To the astonishment of his senior officers, Pr(C)vost then turned back, saying it would be too hazardous to remain on enemy territory after the loss of naval supremacy. Pr(C)vost was recalled and in London, a naval court-martial decided that defeat had been caused principally by Pr(C)vost's urging the squadron into premature action and then failing to afford the promised support from the land forces. Pr(C)vost died suddenly, just before his own court-martial was to convene. Pr(C)vost's reputation sank to a new low, as Canadians claimed that their militia under Brock did the job and he failed. Recently, however, historians have been more kindly, measuring him not against Wellington but against his American foes. They judge Pr(C)vost's preparations for defending the Canadas with limited means to be energetic, well-conceived, and comprehensive; and against the odds, he had achieved the primary objective of preventing an American conquest.
To the east, the northern part of Massachusetts, soon to be Maine, was invaded. Fort Sullivan at Eastport was taken by Sir Thomas Hardy on July 11. Castine, Hampden, Bangor, and Machias were taken, and Castine became the main British base till April 15, 1815, when the British left, taking £10,750 in tariff duties, the "Castine Fund" which was used to found Dalhousie University.[122] Eastport was not returned to the United States till 1818.
American West, 1813''14The Mississippi River valley was the western frontier of the United States in 1812. The territory acquired in the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 contained almost no U.S. settlements west of the Mississippi except around Saint Louis and a few forts and trading posts. Fort Bellefontaine, an old trading post converted to a U.S. Army post in 1804, served as regional headquarters. Fort Osage, built in 1808 along the Missouri was the western-most U.S. outpost, it was abandoned at the start of the war.Fort Madison, built along the Mississippi in what is now Iowa, was also built in 1808, and had been repeatedly attacked by British-allied Sauk since its construction. In September 1813 Fort Madison was abandoned after it was attacked and besieged by natives, who had support from the British. This was one of the few battles fought west of the Mississippi. Black Hawk played a leadership role.[124]
Little of note took place on Lake Huron in 1813, but the American victory on Lake Erie and the recapture of Detroit isolated the British there. During the ensuing winter, a Canadian party under Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall established a new supply line from York to Nottawasaga Bay on Georgian Bay. When he arrived at Fort Mackinac with supplies and reinforcements, he sent an expedition to recapture the trading post of Prairie du Chien in the far west. The Siege of Prairie du Chien ended in a British victory on July 20, 1814.
Earlier in July, the Americans sent a force of five vessels from Detroit to recapture Mackinac. A mixed force of regulars and volunteers from the militia landed on the island on August 4. They did not attempt to achieve surprise, and at the brief Battle of Mackinac Island, they were ambushed by natives and forced to re-embark. The Americans discovered the new base at Nottawasaga Bay, and on August 13, they destroyed its fortifications and a schooner that they found there. They then returned to Detroit, leaving two gunboats to blockade Mackinac. On September 4, these gunboats were taken unawares and captured by British boarding parties from canoes and small boats. This Engagement on Lake Huron left Mackinac under British control.
The British garrison at Prairie du Chien also fought off another attack by Major Zachary Taylor. In this distant theatre, the British retained the upper hand until the end of the war, through the allegiance of several indigenous tribes that received British gifts and arms, enabling them to take control of parts of what is now Michigan and Illinois, as well as the whole of modern Wisconsin.[125] In 1814 U.S. troops retreating from the Battle of Credit Island on the upper Mississippi attempted to make a stand at Fort Johnson, but the fort was soon abandoned, along with most of the upper Mississippi valley.
After the U.S. was pushed out of the Upper Mississippi region, they held on to eastern Missouri and the St. Louis area. Two notable battles fought against the Sauk were the Battle of Cote Sans Dessein, in April 1815, at the mouth of the Osage River in the Missouri Territory, and the Battle of the Sink Hole, in May 1815, near Fort Cap au Gris.[127]
At the conclusion of peace, Mackinac and other captured territory was returned to the United States. At the end of the war, some British officers and Canadians objected to handing back Prairie du Chien and especially Mackinac under the terms of the Treaty of Ghent. However, the Americans retained the captured post at Fort Malden, near Amherstburg, until the British complied with the treaty.
Fighting between Americans, the Sauk, and other indigenous tribes continued through 1817, well after the war ended in the east.[129]
Southern theatreCreek WarThe Battle of Burnt Corn between Red Stick Creeks and U.S. troops, occurred in the southern parts of Alabama on July 27, 1813 prompted the state of Georgia as well as the Mississippi territory militia to immediately take major action against Creek offensives. The Red Sticks chiefs gained power in the east along the Alabama, Coosa, and Tallapoosa Rivers '' Upper Creek territory. The Lower Creek lived along the Chattahoochee River. Many Creeks tried to remain friendly to the United States, and some were organized by federal Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins to aid the 6th Military District under General Thomas Pinckney and the state militias. The United States combined forces were large. At its peak the Red Stick faction had 4,000 warriors, only a quarter of whom had muskets.[130]
Before 1813, the Creek War had been largely an internal affair sparked by the ideas of Tecumseh farther north in the Mississippi Valley, but the United States was drawn into a war with the Creek Nation by the War of 1812. The Creek Nation was a trading partner of the United States actively involved with Spanish and British trade as well. The Red Sticks, as well as many southern Muscogeean people like the Seminole, had a long history of alliance with the Spanish and British Empires.[131] This alliance helped the North American and European powers protect each other's claims to territory in the south.[132] On August 18, 1813, Red Stick chiefs planned an attack on Fort Mimms, north of Mobile, the only American-held port in the territory of West Florida. The attack on Fort Mimms resulted in the death of 400 settlers and became an ideological rallying point for the Americans.[133]
The Indian frontier of western Georgia was the most vulnerable but was partially fortified already. From November 1813 to January 1814, Georgia's militia and auxiliary Federal troops - from the Creek and Cherokee Indian nations and the states of North Carolina and South Carolina '' organized the fortification of defenses along the Chattahoochee River and expeditions into Upper Creek territory in present-day Alabama. The army, led by General John Floyd, went to the heart of the "Creek Holy Grounds" and won a major offensive against one of the largest Creek towns at Battle of Autosee, killing an estimated two hundred people. In November, the militia of Mississippi with a combined 1200 troops attacked the "Econachca" encampment ("Battle of Holy Ground") on the Alabama River.[134] Tennessee raised a militia of 5,000 under Colonel Andrew Jackson and Major General Coke and won the battles of Tallushatchee and Talladega in November 1813.[135]
The Georgia militia withdrew to the Chattahoochee, and Jackson's force in Tennessee mostly disbanded for the winter. In January Floyd's force of 1,300 state militia and 400 Creek Indians moved to join the U.S forces in Tennessee, but were attacked in camp on the Calibee Creek by Tuckaubatchee Indians on the 27th.
Despite enlistment problems in the winter, the U.S. Army forces and a second draft of Tennessee state militia and Cherokee and Creek allies swelled his army to around 5,000. In March 1814 they moved south to attack the Creek.[136] On March 26, Jackson and General John Coffee decisively defeated the Creek Indian force at Horseshoe Bend, killing 800 of 1,000 Creeks at a cost of 49 killed and 154 wounded out of approximately 2,000 American and Cherokee forces.[137] The American army moved to a fort on the Alabama River. On August 9, 1814, the Upper Creek chiefs and Major General Andrew Jackson's army signed the "Treaty of Fort Jackson". The most of western Georgia and part of Alabama was taken from the Creeks to pay for expenses borne by the United States. The Treaty also "demanded" that the "Red Stick" insurgents cease communicating with the Spanish or British, and only trade with U.S.-approved agents.[138]
British aid to the Red Sticks arrived after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in April 1814 and after Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane assumed command from Admiral Warren in March. The Creek promised to join any body of 'troops that should aid them in regaining their lands, and suggesting an attack on the tower off Mobile.' In April 1814 the British established an outpost on the Apalachicola River at Prospect Bluff (Fort Gadsden). Cochrane sent a company of Royal Marines, the vessels HMS Hermes and HMS Carron, commanded by Edward Nicolls, with further supplies to meet the Indians.[139] In addition to training the Indians, Nicolls was tasked to raise a force from escaped slaves, as part of the Corps of Colonial Marines.[140]
In July 1814, General Andrew Jackson complained to the Governor of Pensacola, Mateo Gonzalez Manrique, that combatants from the Creek War were being harbored in Spanish territory, and made reference to the British presence on Spanish soil. Although he gave an angry reply to Jackson, Manrique was alarmed at the weak position he found himself in. He appealed to the British for help, with Woodbine arriving on 28 July, and Nicolls arriving at Pensacola on 24 August.[141][142]
The first engagement of the British and their Creek allies against the Americans on the Gulf Coast was the attack on Fort Bowyer September 14, 1814. Captain William Percy tried to take the U.S. fort, hoping that would enable the British to move on Mobile and block US trade and encroachment on the Mississippi. After the Americans repulsed Percy's forces, the British established a military presence of up to 200 Marines at Pensacola. In November, Jackson's force of 4,000 men took the town in November. This underlined the superiority of numbers of Jackson's force in the region.[144] The U.S force moved to New Orleans in late 1814. Jackson's army of 1,000 regulars and 3,000 to 4,000 militia, pirates and other fighters, as well as civilians and slaves built fortifications south of the city.[145]
Gulf CoastAmerican forces under General James Wilkinson, who was himself getting $4,000 per year as a Spanish secret agent, took the Mobile area'--formerly part of West Florida'--from the Spanish in March 1813; this would be the only territory permanently gained by the U.S. during the war.[146] The Americans built Fort Bowyer, a log and earthenwork fort with 14 guns, on Mobile Point.[147]
At the end of 1814, the British launched a double offensive in the South weeks before the Treaty of Ghent was signed. On the Atlantic coast, Admiral George Cockburn was to close the Intracoastal Waterway trade and land Royal Marine battalions to advance through Georgia to the western territories. On the Gulf coast, Admiral Alexander Cochrane would move on the new state of Louisiana and the Mississippi Territory. Admiral Cochrane's ships reached the Louisiana coast December 9, and Cockburn arrived in Georgia December 14.[148]
On January 8, 1815, a British force of 8,000 under General Edward Pakenham attacked Jackson's defenses in New Orleans. The Battle of New Orleans was an American victory, as the British failed to take the fortifications on the East Bank. The British suffered high casualties: 291 dead, 1262 wounded, and 484 captured or missing whereas American casualties were 13 dead, 39 wounded, and 19 missing. It was hailed as a great victory across the U.S., making Jackson a national hero and eventually propelling him to the presidency.[151] The American garrison at Fort St. Philip endured ten days of bombardment from Royal Navy guns, which was a final attempt to invade Louisiana; British ships sailed away from the Mississippi River on January 18. However, it was not until January 27, 1815, that the army had completely rejoined the fleet, allowing for their departure.[152]
After New Orleans, the British tried to take Mobile a second time; General John Lambert laid siege for five days and took the fort, winning the Second Battle of Fort Bowyer on February 12, 1815. HMS Brazen brought news of the Treaty of Ghent the next day, and the British abandoned the Gulf coast.[153]
In January 1815, Admiral Cockburn succeeded in blockading the southeastern coast by occupying Camden County, Georgia. The British quickly took Cumberland Island, Fort Point Peter, and Fort St. Tammany in a decisive victory. Under the orders of his commanding officers, Cockburn's forces relocated many refugee slaves, capturing St. Simons Island as well, to do so. During the invasion of the Georgia coast, an estimated 1,485 people chose to relocate in British territories or join the military. In mid-March, several days after being informed of the Treaty of Ghent, British ships finally left the area.[154]
Postwar fightingAfter peace was declared, Nicolls and his men returned to Prospect Bluff. The British post at Prospect Bluff was handed over to the Seminoles.[155] In April 1815 the locally recruited companies of the Corps of Colonial Marines were disbanded.[156] The greater part of the Royal Marine garrison at Apalachicola were embarked aboard HMS Cydnus on 22 April 1815,[157][158] and Edward Nicolls embarked the brig HMS Forward at Amelia Island on 29 June 'for passage to England'.[159] The legacy of the Negro Fort would subsequently lead to the first of the Seminole Wars.
In May 1815, a band of British-allied Sauk, unaware that the war had ended months before, attacked a small band of U.S. soldiers northwest of St. Louis. Intermittent fighting, primarily with the Sauk, continued in the Missouri Territory well into 1817, although it is unknown if the Sauk were acting on their own or on behalf of British agents.[129] Several uncontacted isolated warships continued fighting well into 1815 and were the last American forces to take offensive action against the British.
Shadow Puppet Theatre
Former Pentagon Acting IG Cashes In with No Accountability
Former Pentagon Acting IG Cashes In with No AccountabilityMay 14, 2015
Last month, the Project On Government Oversight reported that Lynne Halbrooks'--a former acting Inspector General (IG) at the Department of Defense (DoD)'--would soon be exiting government. We wrote that her pending departure would leave many questions unanswered about her alleged efforts to suppress details of the collaboration between the government and Hollywood on Zero Dark Thirty:
Among the unanswered questions: Did Halbrooks shield [former CIA Director Leon] Panetta because she was angling for a permanent appointment to the IG position at the time? And did Panetta directly influence her decision to keep him and others out of the report when he met with her the same day the document was scrubbed?
At least one question has now been resolved: despite lingering doubts about her record as a Pentagon watchdog, Halbrooks has managed to spin through the revolving door and secure a job with a major law firm that represents one of the top contractors overseen by her former agency. She is now a partner at the law firm of Holland & Knight, which has a ''history of hiring outstanding attorneys such as Lynne who have served with great distinction in government,'' according to the firm's announcement.
Halbrooks' movement through the revolving door means she is unlikely to be held accountable for her role in the Zero Dark Thirty affair. But that's not all. As a recent government official, she may be able to provide an advantage to defense contractors represented by her new firm.
In an email to POGO, Halbrooks said her practice ''will include advising clients on inspector general and other federal investigations, enforcement defense, and compliance matters.'' She said she will be working with the firm's ''white collar defense and investigations practice and the government contracts team.'' Halbrooks added that she isn't the only former government official on the team. ''John Brownlee, who is the leader for these areas, spent nearly 11 years at DOJ and represents dozens of companies, including many government contractors,'' she wrote.
When asked why Holland & Knight hired her for this position, Halbrooks said the firm ''believes that my 24 years of government experience, including serving as a federal prosecutor, general counsel at three agencies and as acting IG for DOD, will help us offer important advice to our clients on a variety of legal matters and represent them in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings.''
Halbrooks also told POGO she is ''subject to post-government employment restrictions, including the representational restrictions in 18 U.S.C. 207.'' This ethics law restricts former federal employees from personally contacting the government on issues they handled closely during their public service, and imposes a blanket one-year cooling-off period on former ''senior'' officials. But someone in Halbrooks' position can typically go to work right away advising her law firm clients and colleagues on how to influence her former agency, as long as she isn't the one doing the lobbying. Holland & Knight ''has many lawyers who successfully transitioned from government service and is committed to strict adherence to these important rules,'' Halbrooks added.
Holland & Knight received nearly $20 million in lobbying income last year, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. The firm's lobbying clients include Raytheon, a top defense contractor that was cited for quality control issues last year in a DoD OIG report on missile defense systems. Holland & Knight attorneys have played leadership roles with trade groups such as the National Defense Industrial Association, and the firm advises clients ''in responding to Department of Justice, congressional, Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG) subpoenas and investigations,'' according to the website for Halbrooks' new colleagues in the firm's government contracts practice.
We hope that Halbrooks will use her new position to help clients do a better job of complying with contracting laws and regulations. But we worry that her move will only exacerbate the public's distrust in government and demoralize other government employees who do not view public service as a stepping stone to a job representing the industry they used to oversee.
In an email to POGO, DoD OIG spokesperson Bridget Serchak said that Halbrooks ''was not involved in any [OIG] matter that would affect her prospective employers, including specifically, the law firm of Holland & Knight. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, Ms. Halbrooks elected to disqualify herself from any potential matters that may have involved all prospective employers. Furthermore, Ms. Halbrooks also established written screening arrangements where her staff would screen all matters to ensure they did not involve prospective employers.'' Halbrooks never needed a waiver exempting her from this disqualification, Serchak said.
Serchak also stated that Halbrooks' post-government activities are subject to the standard ethics restrictions for former federal employees, but that those restrictions do not ''prohibit any former Government employee, regardless of Government rank or position, from accepting employment with any particular private employer.'' She said that Halbrooks ''actively engaged the OIG Designated Agency Ethics Official and agency ethics counselors throughout her transitional process from government service,'' and ''was provided a post government employment restrictions briefing by a DoD OIG ethics counselor.'' In addition, Serchak said, Halbrooks requested and received a ''Post-Government Employment Opinion regarding the applicability of the Procurement Integrity Act '1-year compensation ban' to her employment with Holland & Knight.''
Serchak added that DoD IG Jon Rymer ''has expressed and continues to express full confidence in Ms. Halbrooks' integrity, judgment and professionalism.''
We've requested a copy of Halbrooks' ethics records and will update this post with any information we receive. POGO has called for former government employees to cool off for a longer period of time before going to work as an attorney, consultant, or lobbyist for a company they used to oversee. We've also recommended more online disclosure of ethics records for officials such as Halbrooks, including ethics opinions, waivers, recusals, and exit plans.
Michael Smallberg is an investigator for the Project On Government Oversight. Michael's investigations center on oversight of the financial sector.
Topics:Government Accountability
Related Content:Ethics, Improper Influence, Lobbying, Watching the Watchdogs, Inspector General Oversight, Revolving Door
Authors:Michael Smallberg
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Latest PodcastPodcast; Social Media, Internet Provides Opportunities, Challenges for LawmakersThe Congressional Management Foundation offers the Gold Mouse Awards annually to members of Congress who make the most of the opportunity the digital world offers them. POGO spoke with members of Rep. Mike Honda's communications team about their award.
Big Pharma
California Senate Advances Tyrannical Bill to Forcibly Vaccinate Kids
By Melissa DykesHey California parents '... Have you considered homeschool yet?
You might want to right about now.
The California Senate just advanced a bill yesterday that would end a parent's right to choose what is shot into his or her child for philosophical reasons, once again effectively telling the entire state their supposed political representatives do not represent the will of the people but the will of corporations.
The only option left for parents to refuse vaccinations for their public school children will be to receive a medical waiver signed off by a licensed physician. Considering the majority of pediatricians make most of their money off Orwellian-named ''well-child'' (read: vaccination) visits, those will likely be hard to come by.
Via LA Times:
The legislation ''is about increasing immunization rates so no one will have to suffer from vaccine-preventable diseases,'' said Sen. Benjamin Allen (D-Santa Monica), who co-authored it with Sen. Richard Pan (D-Sacramento)'...
Pan said more parents are refusing to immunize their children, putting others with low immune systems at risk.
''Vaccines are needed to protect us, but that protection has been eroding,'' said Pan, a pediatrician.
The good senators admit right there they are not preserving an individual's rights or the will of the people. If more people are collectively refusing to vaccinate their kids, maybe there's a reason for it that should be respected. The arguments against vaccines are many and the corruption of its politics significant; parents who opt out are surely doing so for a strong reason, no matter what that reason is. Simple emotion arguments are used over and over to beat people into obedience, and impose upon individual rights again and again to transfer their power to the State.And that's a problem for everyone.
It should also be noted that pediatrician Senator Pan is officially on the Big Pharma payroll, so he has a vested interest in seeing this bill pass (read more about that in ''CA Bill Banning Childhood Vaccine Exemptions Sponsored by Big Pharma Bought-off Senator Moves Ahead'').
Once upon a time we may have lived in a country where people had the right to choose what went into their bodies. Now we are being told we aren't even allowed to know whether or not the food we eat is genetically modified. The government has put us on a need-to-know basis and determined we do not need to know. Now we won't have any rights when it comes to our children.
Tyranny, corruption, and corporatism are rampant. Founding father Benjamin Rush warned us long ago that medical freedom should have been added to the Constitution:
Unless we put medical freedom into the Constitution, the time will come when medicine will organize into an undercover dictatorship to restrict the art of healing to one class of Men and deny equal privileges to others; the Constitution of the Republic should make a Special privilege for medical freedoms as well as religious freedom.
(Not the religious freedom is really being upheld in this country these days either, but that's another story.)That medical tyranny is here being blatantly shoved in our faces, and we can't even say we weren't warned. A Florida Congresswoman recently introduced The Vaccinate All Children Act of 2015 which will go a step beyond just eliminating personal belief waivers; the bill attempts to blackmail all states into vaccine compliance by withholding grant funding. Considering our schools today are all about the funding'...
California's bill still has to pass the assembly, but considering the state of hysteria people were brought to over measles, a chickenpox-like disease that used to be little more than a sitcom punchline back in the days before vaccines, it likely will.
When it does, California will be the 33rd state to take away a parent's right to decide whether or not his child gets shot up with a cocktail of heavy metals, antibiotics, preservatives like formaldehyde, and human and calf fetal tissue in a nation with an autism epidemic and which is tied with Serbia and Bosnia for 42nd in child mortality rates under the age of five despite having the most aggressive vaccination schedule in the world.
Melissa Dykes is a writer, researcher, and analyst for The Daily Sheeple, where this article first appeared, and a co-creator of Truthstream Media with Aaron Dykes, a site that offers teleprompter-free, unscripted analysis of The Matrix we find ourselves living in. Melissa also co-founded Nutritional Anarchy with Daisy Luther of The Organic Prepper, a site focused on resistance through food self-sufficiency. Wake the flock up!
This article may be re-posted in full with attribution.
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EuroLand
Song Contest from Bill
Adam,
Last year about this time, I emailed you and told you the show needed to get behind this Conchita Wurst, because "The Community" would as well, and he would win. Well, I was right! Not bad for an American male, who obviously should not be getting into this, especially since his Dutch wife doesn't care.
Well, this year it looks like we will have a winner without any political baggage. And it's a pretty good field this year. Even Belgium and Latvia have songs that may not win, but should put them in the finals at least. At this time, Sweden is the frontrunner, while 6 or 7 others actually have a shot. And, if you wish to get political, at least 4 songs fit that bill, although none of them at this time seems to have the backing to win.
Along with Sweden, Italy, Estonia, Norway, Russia (no Ukraine this year), even Azerbaijan, Slovinia and Iceland have songs that can compete. Australia is competing, and could win with the song they have, but I don't think they stand a chance due to the politics and block voting that goes on every year.
The four with a cause, or that are political start with Finland. To me, the only thing these guys have going for them is they won't torture the crowd very long, as the song is less than a minute and a half. While I understand the situation, and I applaud the effort, I can't see enough people who could vote for them with a song so terrible.
Next is Serbia. The artist is Bojana Stamenov, and she is a rather large woman. She could get the entire outcast vote with the message of her song (Beauty Never Lies), but even then it's still not enough momentum to win.
Boggie is from Hungary, and her song is Wars for Nothing. Are there really enough hippies in Europe to propel a lackluster song to the top? I think not.
That leaves Armenia. The situation here is intriguing. Armenia just remembered the 100 year anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. And the makeup of the group fits that. There are 6 members, 5 from other countries (US, France, Ethiopia, Australia, Japan) who are Armenian, and one member from Armenia. They don't have a great song, however. The only was I see them winning is if the Kardashians get onboard. Even then, you can' only shine a turd so much.
I'll wait to give my final prediction until after the first round, but I lean toward Sweden. Måns has a great stage presence, and his song is one of the few that have a shot that isn't a love song, so it should set him apart.
In the morning! (barely)
Bill from Indy
Obama Nation
JustOneMinute: The Obama Presidential Library Is Headed For The Windy City
From the New York Times, we learn that the Barack Obama Foundation has decided that Chicago is worthy of being the home of Obama's Presidential Library:
In an announcement posted early in the morning, the Barack Obama Foundation said the presidential library would be built in a park here, and not in New York or Hawaii, which were also considered. But the cheery message did not say which of two sprawling Chicago parks would be home to the library, nor did it mention a possible legal challenge to the project.
''All the strands of my life came together, and I really became a man, when I moved to Chicago,'' Mr. Obama said in a videotaped announcement posted on YouTube. ''That's where I was able to apply that early idealism to try to work in communities in public service.''
Honestly, no one really believed the library was going anywhere but Chicago. It's not like this was Obama vying for the Olympics or something.
The location of the library will be in one of two parks in the city, perhaps due to concerns of remaining asbestos in Altgeld Gardens:
Being selected to host the library was a point of pride for many in Chicago, the city that nurtured Mr. Obama's ascent from young community activist to state legislator and then United States senator. Mayor Rahm Emanuel, Mr. Obama's first White House chief of staff, made the project a priority, and the City Council voted unanimously to allow it to be built in Washington Park or Jackson Park.
However, there may be some legal challenges ahead, as building in city parks is frowned upon by some:
Building on parkland is a legally murky issue in Chicago, but state legislators passed a law this year intended to ease legal concerns. Friends of the Parks, a Chicago group that opposes private development on parkland, has filed a lawsuit seeking to block a narrative arts museum from being built along the lakefront. Though the group had publicly urged Mr. Obama to select a Chicago site that is not a park, officials there were not available to comment on Monday on whether they would ask the courts to block construction.
They passed a law? How quaint. This is Obama. Surely Rahm could have just issued an executive order.
But do give the Times credit for this: at least they don't use the word "professor" in describing Obama's stint at the University of Chicago:
The library will be built in a partnership with the University of Chicago, where Mr. Obama once taught law. Both parks are near the university's campus.
And finally for the also-rans, there is this bit of consolation:
The Obama Foundation said it would collaborate with the other finalists, and mentioned plans ''to maintain a presence at Columbia'' and work with the state of Hawaii ''to establish a lasting presence in Honolulu.''
Unfortunately, we will all be living with some form of "a lasting presence" from Obama after he leaves office. Worse still, we will all be living with the lasting repercussions from the disaster of his two terms in office for generations to come.
MEMORY LANE: Back in 2008, Obama was that fresh-faced Senator who had never done much of anything other than run campaigns. At the time, I imagined what his Presidential Library would look like.
Link to Last Page of Thread.
Cultural Marxism
Fox affiliate censors breasts of $179m Picasso painting on air | Art and design | The Guardian
A Fox News affiliate in New York censored Picasso's Women of Algiers (Version O) when reporting on the painting's recent sale at auction. Photograph: Jerry Saltz/Twitter
A local Fox news station has censored the breasts on a cubist painting by Pablo Picasso, prompting bemusement and ridicule from art critics and audiences.
Reporting on the record-setting, $179m auction of Picasso's Women of Algiers (Version O), Fox 5, the New York affiliate of Fox, blurred the breasts of three women in the painting, despite the stylized and distinctly unrealistic portrayal of those women mostly through blocky shapes.
The network did not censor a pair of buttocks.
The New York channel falls under the Fox umbrella network, owned by the media mogul Rupert Murdoch. Observers, sometimes conflating the affiliate with the Fox News cable channel, derided the censorship of art.
New York magazine art critic Jerry Saltz tweeted: ''how sexually sick are conservatives [and] Fox News?'' Culture critic Aruna D'Souza sarcastically quipped: ''Glad [Fox] is protecting its audience from Picasso's smutty mind. Wouldn't want to scare the children.'' Art history blog Alberti's Window tweeted: ''Glad I didn't pay $179 million for a Picasso painting that was 'retouched' by a Fox News employee.''
On Tuesday, Christie's auction house sold the painting for $179m, a record for a painting that the auctioneer said could last a decade. The painting, featuring several nude women and was inspired by the work of 19th century artist Eug¨ne Delacroix and one of 15 in a series.
This article was updated on Friday 15 May to clarify that MyFoxNY is not a Fox News affiliate. It is owned by 21st Century Fox.
Drone Nation
The FAA's proposed drone rules fail under both economic and First Amendment scrutiny | Truth on the Market
Last week the International Center for Law & Economics, joined by TechFreedom, filed comments with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in its Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (''UAS'' '-- i.e, drones) proceeding to establish rules for the operation of small drones in the National Airspace System.
We believe that the FAA has failed to appropriately weigh the costs and benefits, as well as the First Amendment implications, of its proposed rules.
The FAA's proposed drones rules fail to meet (or even undertake) adequate cost/benefit analysisFAA regulations are subject to Executive Order 12866, which, among other things, requires that agencies:
''consider incentives for innovation,''''propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs'';''base [their] decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information''; and''tailor [their} regulations to impose the least burden on society,''The FAA's proposed drone rules fail to meet these requirements.
An important, and fundamental, problem is that the proposed rules often seem to import ''scientific, technical, economic, and other information'' regarding traditional manned aircraft, rather than such knowledge specifically applicable to drones and their uses '-- what FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen has dubbed ''The Procrustean Problem with Prescriptive Regulation.''
As such, not only do the rules often not make sense as a practical matter, they also seek to simply adapt existing standards, rules and understandings promulgated for manned aircraft to regulate drones '-- insufficiently tailoring the rules to ''impose the least burden on society.''
In some cases the rules would effectively ban obviously valuable uses outright, disregarding the rules' effect on innovation (to say nothing of their effect on current uses of drones) without adequately defending such prohibitions as necessary to protect public safety.
Importantly, the proposed rules would effectively prohibit the use of commercial drones for long-distance services (like package delivery and scouting large agricultural plots) and for uses in populated areas '-- undermining what may well be drones' most economically valuable uses.
As our comments note:
By prohibiting UAS operation over people who are not directly involved in the drone's operation, the rules dramatically limit the geographic scope in which UAS may operate, essentially limiting commercial drone operations to unpopulated or extremely sparsely populated areas. While that may be sufficient for important agricultural and forestry uses, for example, it effectively precludes all possible uses in more urban areas, including journalism, broadcasting, surveying, package delivery and the like. Even in nonurban areas, such a restriction imposes potentially insurmountable costs.
Mandating that operators not fly over other individuals not involved in the UAS operation is, in fact, the nail in the coffin of drone deliveries, an industry that is likely to offer a significant fraction of this technology's potential economic benefit. Imposing such a blanket ban thus improperly ignores the important ''incentives for innovation'' suggested by Executive Order 12866 without apparent corresponding benefit.
The FAA's proposed drone rules fail under First Amendment scrutinyThe FAA's failure to tailor the rules according to an appropriate analysis of their costs and benefits also causes them to violate the First Amendment. Without proper tailoring based on the unique technological characteristics of drones and a careful assessment of their likely uses, the rules are considerably more broad than the Supreme Court's ''time, place and manner'' standard would allow.
Several of the rules constitute a de facto ban on most '-- indeed, nearly all '-- of the potential uses of drones that most clearly involve the collection of information and/or the expression of speech protected by the First Amendment. As we note in our comments:
While the FAA's proposed rules appear to be content-neutral, and will thus avoid the most-exacting Constitutional scrutiny, the FAA will nevertheless have a difficult time demonstrating that some of them are narrowly drawn and adequately tailored time, place, and manner restrictions.
Indeed, many of the rules likely amount to a prior restraint on protected commercial and non-commercial activity, both for obvious existing applications like news gathering and for currently unanticipated future uses.
Our friends Eli Dourado, Adam Thierer and Ryan Hagemann at Mercatus also filed comments in the proceeding, raising similar and analogous concerns:
As far as possible, we advocate an environment of ''permissionless innovation'' to reap the greatest benefit from our airspace. The FAA's rules do not foster this environment. In addition, we believe the FAA has fallen short of its obligations under Executive Order 12866 to provide thorough benefit-cost analysis.
The full Mercatus comments, available here, are also recommended reading.
1 Billing Code 4910-13-P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Parts 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183 [Docket No.: FAA-2015-0150; Notice No. 15-01] RIN 2120''AJ60 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). SUMMARY: The FAA is proposing to amend its regulations to adopt specific rules to allow the operation of small unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace System. These changes would address the operation of unmanned aircraft systems, certification of their operators, registration, and display of registration markings. The proposed rule would also find that airworthiness certification is not required for small unmanned aircraft system operations that would be subject to this proposed rule. Lastly, the proposed rule would prohibit model aircraft from endangering the safety of the National Airspace System. DATES: Send comments on or before [INSERT DATE 60 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2015-0150 using any of the following methods: · Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
2 · Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001. · Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. · Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251. Privacy: In accordance with 5 USC 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these comments, without edit, including any personal information the commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at www.dot.gov/privacy. Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this action, contact Lance Nuckolls, Office of Aviation Safety, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office, AFS-80, Federal Aviation Administration, 490 L'Enfant Plaza East,
3 SW., Suite 3200, Washington, DC 20024; telephone (202) 267-8447; e-mail UAS-rule@faa.gov. For legal questions concerning this action, contact Alex Zektser, Office of Chief Counsel, International Law, Legislation, and Regulations Division, AGC-220, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3073; e-mail Alex.Zektser@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Authority for this Rulemaking This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-95). Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 directs the Secretary of Transportation1 to determine whether ''certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace system.'' If the Secretary determines, pursuant to section 333, that certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace system, then the Secretary must ''establish requirements for the safe operation of such aircraft systems in the national airspace system.''2 This rulemaking is also promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (2), which charge the FAA with issuing regulations: (1) to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, 1 The primary authority for this rulemaking is based on section 333 of Public Law 112-95 (Feb. 14, 2012). In addition, this rulemaking also relies on FAA statutory authorities. Thus, for the purposes of this rulemaking, the terms ''FAA,'' ''the agency,'' ''DOT,'' and ''the Secretary,'' are used synonymously throughout this document. 2 Pub. L. 112-95, §333(c). In addition, Public Law 112-95, § 332(b)(1) requires the Secretary to issue ''a final rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that will allow for civil operation of such systems in the national airspace system, to the extent the systems do not meet the requirements for expedited operational authorization under sections 333 of [Public Law 112-95].''
4 protecting and identifying aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), charges the FAA with prescribing regulations that the FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security. Finally, the model-aircraft component of this rulemaking incorporates the statutory mandate in section 336(b) that preserves the FAA's authority, under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b) and 44701(a)(5), to pursue enforcement ''against persons operating model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.'' List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used In This Document AC '' Advisory Circular AGL '' Above Ground Level ACR '' Airman Certification Representative ARC '' Aviation Rulemaking Committee ATC '' Air Traffic Control CAFTA-DR '' Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement CAR '' Civil Air Regulation CFI '' Certified Flight Instructor CFR '' Code of Federal Regulations COA '' Certificate of Waiver or Authorization DPE '' Designated Pilot Examiner FR '' Federal Register FSDO '' Flight Standards District Office ICAO '' International Civil Aviation Organization
5 NAFTA '' North American Free Trade Agreement NAS '' National Airspace System NOTAM '' Notice to Airmen NPRM '' Notice of Proposed Rulemaking NTSB '' National Transportation Safety Board PIC '' Pilot in Command Pub. L. '' Public Law PMA '' Parts Manufacturer Approval TFR '' Temporary Flight Restriction TSA '' Transportation Security Administration TSO '' Technical Standard Order UAS '' Unmanned Aircraft System U.S.C. '' United States Code Table of Contents I. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action C. Costs and Benefits II. Background A. Analysis of Public Risk Posed by Small UAS Operations B. Current Statutory and Regulatory Structure Governing Small UAS C. Integrating Small UAS Operations into the NAS III. Discussion of the Proposal A. Incremental Approach and Privacy B. Applicability 1. Air Carrier Operations 2. External Load and Towing Operations 3. International Operations 4. Foreign-Owned Aircraft That Are Ineligible for U.S. Registration 5. Public Aircraft Operations
6 6. Model Aircraft 7. Moored Balloons, Kites, Amateur Rockets, and Unmanned Free Balloons C. Definitions 1. Control Station 2. Corrective Lenses 3. Operator and Visual Observer 4. Small Unmanned Aircraft 5. Small Unmanned Aircraft System (small UAS) 6. Unmanned Aircraft D. Operating Rules 1. Micro UAS Classification 2. Operator and Visual Observer i. Operator ii. Visual Observer 3. See-and-Avoid and Visibility Requirements i. See-and-Avoid ii. Additional Visibility Requirements iii. Yielding right of way 4. Containment and Loss of Positive Control i. Confined Area of Operation Boundaries ii. Mitigating Loss-of-Positive-Control Risk 5. Limitations on Operations in Certain Airspace i. Controlled Airspace ii. Prohibited or Restricted Areas iii. Areas Designated by Notice to Airmen 6. Airworthiness, Inspection, Maintenance, and Airworthiness Directives i. Inspections and Maintenance ii. Airworthiness Directives 7. Miscellaneous Operating Provisions i. Careless or Reckless Operation ii. Drug and Alcohol Prohibition iii. Medical Conditions iv. Sufficient Power for the small UAS v. Registration and Marking E. Operator Certificate 1. Applicability 2. Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate '' Eligibility & Issuance i. Minimum Age ii. English Language Proficiency iii. Pilot Qualification a. Flight Proficiency and Aeronautical Experience b. Initial Aeronautical Knowledge Test c. Areas of Knowledge Tested on the Initial Knowledge Test d. Administration of the Initial Knowledge Test e. Recurrent Aeronautical Knowledge Test i. General Requirement and Administration of the Recurrent Knowledge Test ii. Recurrent Test Areas of Knowledge iv. Issuance of an Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate with Small UAS Rating v. Not Requiring an Airman Medical Certificate
7 4. Military Equivalency 5. Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate: Denial, Revocation, Suspension, Amendment, and Surrender i. Transportation Security Administration Vetting and Positive Identification ii. Drugs and Alcohol Violations iii. Change of Name iv. Change of Address v. Voluntary Surrender of Certificate F. Registration G. Marking 1. Display of Registration Number 2. Marking of Products and Articles H. Fraud and False Statements I. Oversight 1. Inspection, Testing, and Demonstration of Compliance 2. Accident Reporting J. Section 333 Statutory Findings 1. Hazard to Users of the NAS or the Public 2. National Security 3. Airworthiness Certification IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses A. Regulatory Evaluation 1. Total Benefits and Costs of this Rule 2. Who is Potentially Affected by this Rule? 4. Benefit Summary 5. Cost Summary B. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination (IRFA) 1. Description of reasons the agency is considering the action 2. Statement of the legal basis and objectives for the proposed rule 3. Description of the record keeping and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule. 4. All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule 5. Description and an estimated number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply 6. Alternatives considered C. International Trade Impact Assessment D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment E. Paperwork Reduction Act 1. Obtaining an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating 2. Registering a small unmanned aircraft 3. Accident Reporting F. International Compatibility and Cooperation G. Environmental Analysis H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska V. Executive Order Determinations A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use VI. Additional Information
8 A. Comments Invited B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents I. Executive Summary A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action This rulemaking proposes operating requirements to allow small unmanned aircraft systems (small UAS) to operate for non-hobby or non-recreational purposes. A small UAS consists of a small unmanned aircraft (which, as defined by statute, is an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds3) and equipment necessary for the safe and efficient operation of that aircraft. The FAA has accommodated non-recreational small UAS use through various mechanisms, such as special airworthiness certificates, exemptions, and certificates of waiver or authorization (COA). This proposed rule would be the next phase of integrating small UAS into the NAS. The following are examples of possible small UAS operations that could be conducted under this proposed framework: · Crop monitoring/inspection; · Research and development; · Educational/academic uses; · Power-line/pipeline inspection in hilly or mountainous terrain; · Antenna inspections; · Aiding certain rescue operations such as locating snow avalanche victims; 3 Pub. L. No. 112-95, sec. 331(6).
9 · Bridge inspections; · Aerial photography; and · Wildlife nesting area evaluations. Because of the potential societally beneficial applications of small UAS, the FAA has been seeking to incorporate the operation of these systems into the national airspace system (NAS) since 2008. In April 2008, the FAA chartered the small UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). In April 2009, the ARC provided the FAA with recommendations on how small UAS could be safely integrated into the NAS. Since that time, the FAA has been working on a rulemaking to incorporate small UAS operations into the NAS. In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-95). Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 directed the Secretary to determine whether UAS operations posing the least amount of public risk and no threat to national security could safely be operated in the NAS and if so, to establish requirements for the safe operation of these systems in the NAS, prior to completion of the UAS comprehensive plan and rulemakings required by section 332 of Public Law 112-95. As part of its ongoing efforts to integrate UAS operations in the NAS in accordance with section 332, and as authorized by section 333 of Public Law 112-95, the FAA is proposing to amend its regulations to adopt specific rules for the operation of small UAS in the NAS. Based on our experience with the certification, exemption, and COA process, the FAA has developed the framework proposed in this rule to enable certain small UAS operations to commence upon adoption of the final rule and accommodate technologies as
10 they evolve and mature. This proposed framework would allow small UAS operations for many different non-recreational purposes, such as the ones discussed previously, without requiring airworthiness certification, exemption, or a COA. B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action Specifically, the FAA is proposing to add a new part 107 to Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to allow for routine civil operation of small UAS in the NAS and to provide safety rules for those operations. Consistent with the statutory definition, the proposed rule defines small UAS as those UAS weighing less than 55 pounds. To mitigate risk, the proposed rule would limit small UAS to daylight-only operations, confined areas of operation, and visual-line-of-sight operations. This proposed rule also addresses aircraft registration and marking, NAS operations, operator certification, visual observer requirements, and operational limits in order to maintain the safety of the NAS and ensure that they do not pose a threat to national security. Below is a summary of the major provisions of the proposed rule. Summary of Major Provisions of Proposed Part 107 Operational Limitations · Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg). · Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the operator or visual observer. · At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough to the operator for the operator to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. · Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons not directly involved in the operation. · Daylight-only operations (official sunrise to official
11 sunset, local time). · Must yield right-of-way to other aircraft, manned or unmanned. · May use visual observer (VO) but not required. · First-person view camera cannot satisfy ''see-and-avoid'' requirement but can be used as long as requirement is satisfied in other ways. · Maximum airspeed of 100 mph (87 knots). · Maximum altitude of 500 feet above ground level. · Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station. · No operations are allowed in Class A (18,000 feet & above) airspace. · Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with the required ATC permission. · Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC permission · No person may act as an operator or VO for more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one time. · No operations from a moving vehicle or aircraft, except from a watercraft on the water. · No careless or reckless operations. · Requires preflight inspection by the operator. · A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or has reason to know of any physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. · Proposes a microUAS category that would allow operations in Class G airspace, over people not involved in the operation, and would require airman to self-certify that they are familiar with the aeronautical knowledge testing areas. Operator Certification and Responsibilities · Pilots of a small UAS would be considered ''operators''. · Operators would be required to: o Pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-approved knowledge testing center. o Be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration. o Obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating (like existing pilot airman certificates, never expires).
12 o Pass a recurrent aeronautical knowledge test every 24 months. o Be at least 17 years old. o Make available to the FAA, upon request, the small UAS for inspection or testing, and any associated documents/records required to be kept under the proposed rule. o Report an accident to the FAA within 10 days of any operation that results in injury or property damage. o Conduct a preflight inspection, to include specific aircraft and control station systems checks, to ensure the small UAS is safe for operation. Aircraft Requirements · FAA airworthiness certification not required. However, operator must maintain a small UAS in condition for safe operation and prior to flight must inspect the UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation. Aircraft Registration required (same requirements that apply to all other aircraft). · Aircraft markings required (same requirements that apply to all other aircraft). If aircraft is too small to display markings in standard size, then the aircraft simply needs to display markings in the largest practicable manner. Model Aircraft · Proposed rule would not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the criteria specified in section 336 of Public Law 112-95. · The proposed rule would codify the FAA's enforcement authority in part 101 by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the safety of the NAS. Operator Certification: Under the proposed rule, the person who manipulates the flight controls of a small UAS would be defined as an ''operator.'' A small UAS operator would be required to pass an aeronautical knowledge test and obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating from the FAA before operating a small UAS. In order to maintain his or her operator certification, the operator would be required to pass
13 recurrent knowledge tests every 24 months subsequent to the initial knowledge test. These tests would be created by the FAA and administered by FAA-approved knowledge testing centers. Although a specific distant vision acuity standard is not being proposed, this proposed rule would require the operator to keep the small unmanned aircraft close enough to the control station to be capable of seeing that aircraft through his or her unaided (except for glasses or contact lenses) visual line of sight. The operator would also be required to actually maintain visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft if a visual observer is not used. Visual Observer: Under the proposed rule, an operator would not be required to work with a visual observer, but a visual observer could be used to assist the operator with the proposed visual-line-of-sight and see-and-avoid requirements by maintaining constant visual contact with the small unmanned aircraft in place of the operator. While an operator would always be required to have the capability for visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft, this proposed rule would not require the operator to exercise this capability if he or she is augmented by at least one visual observer. No certification requirements are being proposed for visual observers. A small UAS operation would not be limited in the number of visual observers involved in the operation, but the operator and visual observer(s) must remain situated such that the operator and any visual observer(s) are all able to view the aircraft at any given time. The operator and visual observer(s) would be permitted to communicate by radio or other communication-assisting device, so they would not need to remain in close enough physical proximity to allow for unassisted oral communication.
14 Since the operator and any visual observers would be required to be in a position to maintain or achieve visual line of sight with the aircraft at all times, the proposed rule would effectively prohibit a relay or ''daisy-chain'' formation of multiple visual observers by requiring that the operator must always be capable of seeing the small unmanned aircraft. Such arrangements would potentially expand the area of a small UAS operation and pose an increased public risk if there is a loss of aircraft control. Operational Scope: A small UAS operator would be required to see and avoid all other users of the NAS in the area in which the small UAS is operating. The proposed rule contains operating restrictions designed to help ensure that the operator is able to yield right-of-way to other aircraft at all times. The proposed rule would limit the exposure of small unmanned aircraft to other users of the NAS by restricting small UAS operations in controlled airspace. Specifically, small UAS would be prohibited from operating in Class A airspace, and would require prior permission from Air Traffic Control to operate in Class B, C, or D airspace, or within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport. The risk of collision with other aircraft would be further reduced by limiting small UAS operations to a maximum airspeed of 87 knots (100 mph) and a maximum altitude of 500 feet above ground. Further, in order to enable maximum visibility for small UAS operation, the proposed rule would restrict small UAS to daylight-only operations (sunrise to sunset), and impose a minimum weather-visibility of 3 statute miles (5 kilometers) from the small UAS control station.
15 Aircraft Maintenance: Under the proposed rule, the operator of a small UAS would be required to conduct a preflight inspection before each flight operation, and determine that the small UAS (aircraft, control station, launch and recovery equipment, etc.) is safe for operation. Airworthiness: Pursuant to section 333(b)(2) of Public Law 112-95, the Secretary has determined that small UAS subject to this proposed rule would not require airworthiness certification because the safety concerns associated with small UAS operation would be mitigated by the other provisions of this proposed rule. Rather, this proposed rule would require the operator to ensure that the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation by conducting an inspection prior to each flight. Registration and Marking: This proposed rule would apply to small unmanned aircraft the current registration requirements that apply to all aircraft. Once a small unmanned aircraft is registered, this proposed rule would require that aircraft to display its registration marking in a manner similar to what is currently required of all aircraft.. C. Costs and Benefits This proposed rule reflects the fact that technological advances in small UAS have led to a developing commercial market for their uses by providing a safe operating environment for them and for other aircraft in the NAS. In time, the FAA anticipates that the proposed rule would provide an opportunity to substitute small UAS operations for some higher risk manned flights, such as inspecting towers, bridges, or other structures. The use of small unmanned aircraft would avert potential fatalities and injuries to those in the aircraft and on the ground. It would also lead to more efficient methods of performing
16 certain commercial tasks that are currently performed by other methods. The FAA has not quantified the benefits for this proposed rulemaking because we lack sufficient data. The FAA invites commenters to provide data that could be used to quantify the benefits of this proposed rule. For any commercial operation occurring because this rule is enacted, the operator/owner of that small UAS will have determined the expected revenue stream of the flights exceeds the cost of the flights operation. In each such case this rule helps enable new markets to develop. The costs are shown in the table below.
17 TOTAL AND PRESENT VALUE COST SUMMARY BY PROVISION (Thousands of Current Year Dollars) Total Costs 7 % P.V. Type of Cost (000) (000) Applicant/small UAS operator Travel Expense $151.7 $125.9 Knowledge Test Fees $2,548.6 $2,114.2 Positive Identification of the Applicant Fee $434.3 $383.7 Owner Small UAS Registration Fee $85.7 $70.0 Time Resource Opportunity Costs Applicants Travel Time $296.1 $245.3 Knowledge Test Application $108.9 $90.2 Physical Capability Certification $20.0 $17.7 Knowledge Test Time $1,307.1 $1,082.9 Small UAS Registration Form $220.5 $179.7 Change of Name or Address Form $14.9 $12.3 Knowledge Test Report $154.9 $128.5 Pre-flight Inspection Not quantified Accident Reporting Minimal cost Government Costs TSA Security Vetting $1,026.5 $906.9 FAA - sUAS Operating Certificate $39.6 $35.0 FAA '' Registration $394.3 $321.8 Total Costs $6,803.1 $5,714.0 * Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding.
18 II. Background This NPRM addresses the operation, airman certification, and registration of civil small UAS. A small UAS consists of a small unmanned aircraft and associated elements that are necessary for the safe and efficient operation of that aircraft in the NAS. Associated elements that are necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the aircraft include the interface that is used to control the small unmanned aircraft (known as a control station) and communication links between the control station and the small unmanned aircraft. A small unmanned aircraft is defined by statute as ''an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds.''4 Due to the size of a small unmanned aircraft, the FAA envisions considerable potential business and non-business applications, particularly in areas that are hard to reach for a manned aircraft. The following are examples of possible small UAS operations that could be conducted under this proposed framework: · Crop monitoring/inspection; · Research and development; · Educational/academic uses; · Power-line/pipeline inspection in hilly or mountainous terrain; · Antenna inspections; · Aiding certain rescue operations such as locating snow avalanche victims; 4 Sec. 331(6) of Pub. L. 112-95.
19 · Bridge inspections; · Aerial photography; and · Wildlife nesting area evaluations. The following sections discuss: (1) the public risk associated with small UAS operations; (2) the current legal framework governing small UAS operations; and (3) the FAA's ongoing efforts to incorporate small UAS operations into the NAS. A. Analysis of Public Risk Posed by Small UAS Operations Small UAS operations pose risk considerations that are different from the risk considerations associated with manned-aircraft operations. On one hand, certain operations of a small unmanned aircraft, discussed more fully in section III.D of this preamble, have the potential to pose significantly less risk to persons and property than comparable operations of a manned aircraft. The typical total takeoff weight of a general aviation aircraft is between 1,300 and 6,000 pounds. By contrast, the total takeoff weight of a small unmanned aircraft is less than 55 pounds. Consequently, because a small unmanned aircraft is significantly lighter than a manned aircraft, in the event of a mishap, the small unmanned aircraft would pose significantly less risk to persons and property on the ground. As such, a small UAS operation whose parameters are well defined so it does not pose a significant risk to other aircraft would also pose a smaller overall public risk or threat to national security than the operation of a manned aircraft. However, even though small UAS operations have the potential to pose a lower level of public risk in certain types of operations, the unmanned nature of the small UAS
20 operations raises two unique safety concerns that are not present in manned-aircraft operations. The first safety concern is whether the person operating the small unmanned aircraft, who would be physically separated from that aircraft during flight, would have the ability to see manned aircraft in the air in time to prevent a mid-air collision between the small unmanned aircraft and another aircraft. As discussed in more detail below, the FAA's regulations currently require each person operating an aircraft to maintain vigilance ''so as to see and avoid other aircraft.''5 This is one of the fundamental principles for collision avoidance in the NAS. For manned-aircraft operations, ''see and avoid'' is the responsibility of persons on board an aircraft. By contrast, small unmanned aircraft operations have no human beings physically on the unmanned aircraft with the same visual perspective and the ability to see other aircraft in the manner of a manned-aircraft pilot. Thus, the challenge for small unmanned aircraft operations is to ensure that the person operating the small unmanned aircraft is able to see and avoid other aircraft. In considering this issue, the FAA examined to what extent existing technology could provide a solution to this problem. The FAA notes that advances in technologies that use ground-based radar and aircraft sensors to detect the reply signals from aircraft ATC transponders have provided significant improvement in the ability to detect other aircraft in close proximity to each other. The Traffic Collision Avoidance System also has the ability to provide guidance to flight crews to maneuver appropriately to avoid a mid-air collision. Both of these technologies have done an excellent job in reducing the mid-air collision rate 5 14 CFR 91.113(b).
21 between manned aircraft. Unfortunately, the equipment required to utilize these widely available technologies is currently too large and heavy to be used in small UAS operations. Until this equipment is miniaturized to the extent necessary to make it viable for use in small UAS operations, existing technology does not appear to provide a way to resolve the ''see and avoid'' problem with small UAS operations without maintaining human visual contact with the small unmanned aircraft during flight. The second safety concern with small UAS operations is the possibility that, during flight, the person operating the small UAS may become unable to use the control interface to operate the small unmanned aircraft due to a failure of the control link between the aircraft and the operator's control station. This is known as a loss of positive control. This situation may result from a system failure or because the aircraft has been flown beyond the signal range or in an area where control link communication between the aircraft and the control station is interrupted. A small unmanned aircraft whose flight is unable to be directly controlled could pose a significant risk to persons, property, or other aircraft. B. Current Statutory and Regulatory Structure Governing Small UAS Due to the lack of an onboard pilot, small unmanned aircraft are unable to see and avoid other aircraft in the NAS. Therefore, small UAS operations conflict with the FAA's current operating regulations codified in 14 CFR part 91 that apply to general aviation. Specifically, at the heart of the part 91 operating regulations is § 91.113(b), which requires each person operating an aircraft to maintain vigilance ''so as to see and avoid other aircraft.''
22 The FAA created this requirement in a 1968 rulemaking that combined two previous aviation regulatory provisions, Civil Air Regulations (CAR) §§ 60.13(c) and 60.30.6 Both of the provisions that were combined to create the ''see and avoid'' requirement of § 91.113(b) were intended to address aircraft collision-awareness problems by requiring that a pilot on board the aircraft look out of the aircraft during flight to observe whether other aircraft are on a collision path with his or her aircraft. Those provisions did not contemplate the use of technology to substitute for the human vision of a pilot on board the aircraft. Similarly, there is no evidence that those provisions contemplated a pilot fulfilling his or her ''see and avoid'' responsibilities from outside the aircraft. To the contrary, CAR § 60.13(c) stated that one of the problems it intended to address was ''preoccupation by the pilot with cockpit duties,'' which indicates that the regulation contemplated the presence of a pilot on board the aircraft. Because the regulations that resulted in the see-and-avoid requirement of § 91.113(b) did not contemplate that this requirement could be complied with by a pilot who is outside the aircraft, § 91.113(b) currently requires an aircraft pilot to have the perspective of being inside the aircraft as that aircraft is moving in order to see and avoid other aircraft. Since the operator of a small UAS does not have this perspective, operation of a small UAS could not meet the see and avoid requirement of § 91.113(b) at this time. In addition to currently being prohibited by § 91.113(b), there are also statutory considerations that apply to small UAS operations. Specifically, even though a small UAS is different from a manned aircraft, the operation of a small UAS still involves the 6 Pilot Vigilance, 33 FR 10505 (July 24, 1968).
23 operation of an aircraft. This is because the FAA's statute defines an ''aircraft'' as ''any contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate or fly in the air.'' 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(6). Since a small unmanned aircraft is a contrivance that is invented, used, and designed to fly in the air, a small unmanned aircraft is an aircraft for purposes of the FAA's statutes.7 Because a small UAS involves the operation of an ''aircraft,'' this triggers the FAA's registration and certification statutory requirements. Specifically, subject to certain exceptions, a person may not operate a civil aircraft that is not registered. 49 U.S.C. 44101(a). In addition, a person may not operate a civil aircraft in air commerce without an airworthiness certificate. 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(1). Finally, a person may not serve in any capacity as an airman on a civil aircraft being operated in air commerce without an airman certificate. 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A).8 The term ''air commerce,'' as used in the FAA's statutes, is defined broadly to include ''the operation of aircraft within the limits of a Federal airway, or the operation of aircraft that directly affects, or may endanger safety in foreign or interstate air commerce.'' 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(3). Because of this broad definition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has held that ''any use of an aircraft, for purpose of flight, constitutes air commerce.''9 Courts that have considered this issue have reached similar conclusions that 7 Public Law 112-95 reaffirmed that an unmanned aircraft is indeed an aircraft by defining an unmanned aircraft as ''an aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.'' Sec. 331(8), Pub. L. 112-95 (emphasis added). 8 The statutes also impose other requirements that are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. For example, 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(4) prohibits a person from operating as an air carrier without an air-carrier operating certificate. 9 Administrator v. Barrows, 7 N.T.S.B. 5, 8-9 (1990).
24 ''air commerce,'' as defined in the FAA's statute, encompasses a broad range of commercial and non-commercial aircraft operations.10 Accordingly, because ''air commerce'' encompasses such a broad range of aircraft operations, a civil small unmanned aircraft cannot currently be operated, for purposes of flight, if: (1) it is not registered (49 U.S.C. 44101(a)); (2) it does not possess an airworthiness certificate (49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(1)); and (3) the airman operating the aircraft does not possess an airman certificate (49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A)). However, the FAA's current processes for issuing airworthiness and airman certificates were designed to be used for manned aircraft and do not take into account the considerations associated with civil small UAS. Specifically, obtaining a type certificate and a standard airworthiness certificate, which permits the widest range of aircraft operation, currently takes about 3 to 5 years. Because the pertinent existing regulations do not differentiate between manned and unmanned aircraft, a small UAS is currently subject to the same airworthiness certification process as a manned aircraft. However, it is not practically feasible for many small UAS manufacturers to go through the certification process required of manned aircraft. This is because small UAS technology is rapidly evolving at this time, and consequently, if a small UAS manufacturer goes through a 3-to-5-year process to obtain a type certificate, which enables the issuance of a standard airworthiness certificate, the small UAS would be technologically outdated by the time it completed the certification process. For example, 10 See, e.g., United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1964) (holding that ''air commerce'' is not limited to commercial airplanes); Hill v. NTSB, 886 F.2d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1989) (''[t]he statutory definition of ''air commerce'' is therefore clearly not restricted to interstate flights occurring in controlled or navigable airspace''); United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151, 155 (D. Nev. 1944) (''any operation of any aircraft in the air space either directly affects or may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce'').
25 advances in lightweight battery technology may allow new lightweight transponders and power sources within the next 3 to 5 years that are currently unavailable for small UAS operations. The FAA notes that there are several other certification options available to small UAS manufacturers and operators who do not wish to go through the process of obtaining a type certificate and standard airworthiness certificate. However, because each of these options has significant limitations, these options do not provide flexibility for most routine small UAS operations. These certification options are as follows: · A special airworthiness certificate in the experimental category may be issued to UAS pursuant to 14 CFR 21.191-21.195. This certificate is time-limited, and cannot be used for any activities other than research and development, market surveys, and crew training. · A special flight permit may be issued pursuant to 14 CFR 21.197. At this time, however, a special flight permit for a UAS is limited to production flight testing of new production aircraft.11 · A special airworthiness certificate in the restricted category is issued pursuant to 14 CFR 21.25(a). There are two options for obtaining this certificate. First, pursuant to § 21.25(a)(2), a certificate may be issued for aircraft accepted by an Armed Force of the United States and later modified for a special purpose. 11 A special flight permit for production flight testing is not limited to small UAS and can be obtained for unmanned aircraft weighing more than 55 pounds. We emphasize, however, that a special flight permit is limited at this time to production flight testing and will include operational requirements and limitations.
26 Second, pursuant to § 21.25(a)(1), a certificate may be issued for aircraft used in special purpose operations, which consist of: (1) agricultural operations; (2) forest and wildlife conservation; (3) aerial surveying; (4) patrolling (pipelines, power lines, and canals); (5) weather control; (6) aerial advertising; and (7) any other operation specified by the FAA. As can be seen from the above list, the current certification options are limited to very specific purposes. Accordingly, they do not provide sufficient flexibility for most routine civil small UAS operations within the NAS. In addition to obtaining an airworthiness certificate, any person serving as an airman in the operation of a small UAS must obtain an airman certificate. 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A). The statute defines an ''airman'' to include an individual who is ''in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew, who navigates aircraft when under way.'' 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(8)(A). Because the person operating the small UAS is in command and is a member of the crew who navigates the aircraft, that person is an airman and must obtain an airman certificate. Under current pilot certification regulations, depending on the type of operation, the operator of the small UAS currently must obtain either a private pilot certificate or a
27 commercial pilot certificate. A private pilot certificate cannot be used to operate a small UAS for compensation or hire unless the flight is only incidental to the operator's business or employment.12 Typically, to obtain a private pilot certificate, the small UAS operator currently has to: (1) receive training in specific aeronautical knowledge areas; (2) receive training from an authorized instructor on specific areas of aircraft operation; (3) obtain a minimum of 40 hours of flight experience; and (4) obtain a third-class airman medical certificate.13 Conversely, holding at least a commercial pilot certificate allows the small UAS to generally be used for compensation or hire, but is more difficult to obtain. In addition to the requirements necessary to obtain a private pilot certificate, applicants for a commercial pilot certificate currently need to also obtain 250 hours of flight time, satisfy extensive testing requirements, and obtain a second-class airman medical certificate.14 While these airman certification requirements are necessary for manned aircraft operations, they impose an unnecessary burden for many small UAS operations. This is because a person typically obtains a private or commercial pilot certificate by learning how to operate a manned aircraft. Much of that knowledge would not be applicable to small UAS operations because a small UAS is operated differently than a manned aircraft. In addition, the knowledge currently necessary to obtain a private or commercial pilot certificate would not equip the certificate holder with the tools necessary to safely operate a small UAS. Specifically, applicants for a private or commercial pilot certificate currently are not trained in how to deal with the ''see-and-avoid'' and loss-of-positive-control safety issues that are unique to small unmanned aircraft. Thus, requiring persons wishing to 12 See 14 CFR 61.113. 13 See 14 CFR part 61, Subpart E and § 61.23(a)(3)(i). 14 See 14 CFR part 61, Subpart F and § 61.23(a)(2).
28 operate a small UAS to obtain a private or commercial pilot certificate imposes the cost of certification on those persons, but does not result in a significant safety benefit because the process of obtaining the certificate does not equip those persons with the tools necessary to mitigate the public risk posed by small UAS operations. Recognizing the problem of applying the operating rules of part 91 to small UAS operations and the cost imposed on small UAS operations by existing certification processes, the FAA fashioned a temporary solution. Specifically, the FAA issued an advisory circular (AC) 91-57 and a policy statement elaborating on AC 91-57, which provide guidance for the safe operation of ''model aircraft.'' The policy statement defines a ''model aircraft'' as a UAS that is used for hobby or recreational purposes.15 The policy statement explains that AC 91-57: [E]ncourages good judgment on the part of operators so that persons on the ground or other aircraft in flight will not be endangered. The AC contains among other things, guidance for site selection. Users are advised to avoid noise sensitive areas such as parks, schools, hospitals, and churches. Hobbyists are advised not to fly in the vicinity of spectators until they are confident that the model aircraft has been flight tested and proven airworthy. Model aircraft should be flown below 400 feet above the surface to avoid other aircraft in flight. The FAA expects that hobbyists will operate these recreational model aircraft within visual line-of-sight.16 Neither AC 91-57 nor the associated policy statement contains any registration or certification requirements.17 15 See Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 FR 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (explaining how AC 91-57 functions). 16 Id. 17 The policy statement did, however, explain the COA process that is currently used to allow public aircraft operations with UAS. This process is discussed in detail in section III.C of this preamble. As discussed in that section, this proposed rule would allow public aircraft operations with UAS to voluntarily comply with proposed part 107, but would otherwise leave the existing public aircraft operations COA process unchanged.
29 To date, the FAA has used its discretion18 to not bring enforcement action against model-aircraft operations that comply with AC 91-57. However, the use of discretion to permit continuing violation of FAA statutes and regulations is not a viable long-term solution for incorporating UAS operations into the NAS. Additionally, because AC 91-57 and the associated policy statement are limited to model aircraft, they do not apply to non-recreational UAS operations. Thus, even with the use of enforcement discretion, because of the difficulty of obtaining the requisite certification for a small UAS and because operation of a small UAS would violate the see-and-avoid requirement of § 91.113(b), non-recreational civil small UAS operations are effectively prohibited at this time. C. Integrating Small UAS Operations into the NAS To address the issues discussed above, the FAA chartered the small UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) on April 10, 2008. On April 1, 2009, the ARC provided the FAA with recommendations on how small UAS could be safely integrated into the NAS.19 In 2013, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a comprehensive plan and subsequently the FAA issued a roadmap of its efforts to achieve safe integration of UAS operations into the NAS.20 In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-95). In section 332(b) of Public Law 112-95, Congress directed the Secretary to issue a final rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that will allow for civil operations of 18 As used in this context, ''discretion'' refers to the FAA's power to decide whether to commence an enforcement action. 19 A copy of the small UAS ARC Report and Recommendations can be found in the docket for this rulemaking. 20 http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf
30 such systems in the NAS.21 In section 333 of Public Law 112-95, Congress also directed the Secretary to determine whether ''certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace system.'' To make a determination under section 333, we must assess ''which types of unmanned aircraft systems, if any, as a result of their size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity to airports and populated areas, and operation within visual line of sight do not create a hazard to users of the national airspace system or the public or pose a threat to national security.'' Public Law 112-95, Sec. 333(b)(1). The Secretary must also determine whether a certificate of waiver or authorization, or airworthiness certification is necessary to mitigate the public risk posed by the unmanned aircraft systems that are under consideration. Public Law 112-95, Sec. 333(b)(2). If the Secretary determines that certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the NAS, then the Secretary must ''establish requirements for the safe operation of such aircraft systems in the national airspace system.'' Public Law 112-95, Sec. 333(c). The flexibility provided for in section 333 did not extend to airman certification and security vetting, aircraft marking, or registration requirements. As noted above, section 333(b)(2) provided the Secretary of Transportation with discretionary power as to whether airworthiness certification should be required for certain small UAS.22 As discussed previously, the FAA's statute normally requires an aircraft being flown outdoors to possess an airworthiness certificate.23 However, subsection 333(b)(2) allows for the determination that airworthiness certification is not necessary for 21 As discussed in more detail further in the preamble, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 also contained a provision prohibiting the FAA from issuing rules and regulations for model aircraft meeting certain criteria specified in section 336 of the Act. 22 Pub. L. 112-95, sec. 333(b)(2). 23 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(1).
31 certain small UAS. The key determinations that must be made in order for UAS to operate under the authority of section 333 are: (1) the operation must not create a hazard to users of the national airspace system or the public; and (2) the operation must not pose a threat to national security.24 In making these determinations, we must consider the following factors: size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity to airports and populated areas, and operation within visual line of sight. Of these factors, operation within visual line of sight is a primary factor for evaluation. At this point in time, we have determined that technology has not matured to the extent that would allow small UAS to be used safely in lieu of visual line of sight without creating a hazard to other users of the NAS or the public, or posing a threat to national security. This construction of section 333 is a reasonable interpretation that is consistent with the statutory text and reflects Congressional intent in adopting the provision. We invite comments on whether there are well-defined circumstances and conditions under which operation beyond the line of sight would pose little or no additional risk to other users of the NAS, the public, or national security. Finally, we invite comments on the technologies and operational capabilities or procedures needed to allow UAS flights beyond visual line of sight, and how such technologies, capabilities and procedures could be accommodated under this rule or in a future rulemaking. As a result of its ongoing integration efforts, the FAA seeks to change its regulations to take the first step in the process of integrating small UAS operations into the NAS. This proposal would utilize the airworthiness-certification flexibility provided by 24 Pub. L. 112-95, sec. 333(b)(1).
32 Congress in section 333 of Public Law 112-95, and allow some small UAS operations to commence in the NAS.25 In addition, to further facilitate the integration of UAS into the NAS, the FAA has selected six test sites to test UAS technology and operations. As of August 2014, all of the UAS test sites, which were selected based on geographic and climatic diversity, are operational and will remain in place for the next 5 years to help us gather operational data to foster further integration, as well as evaluate new technologies. In addition, the FAA is in the process of selecting a new UAS Center of Excellence which will also serve as another resource for these activities. The FAA invites comments on how it can improve or further leverage its test site program to encourage innovation, safe development and UAS integration into the NAS. III. Discussion of the Proposal As discussed in the previous section, in order to determine whether certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS pursuant to section 333, the Secretary must find that the operation of the UAS would not: (1) create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public; or (2) pose a threat to national security. The Secretary must also determine whether small UAS operations subject to this proposed rule pose a safety risk sufficient to require airworthiness certification. The following preamble sections discuss the specific components of this proposed rule, and in section III.J below, we explain how these 25 As discussed in section III.B.6 below, 14 CFR part 107 that would be created by this proposed rule would not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the statutory criteria specified in section 336 of Public Law 112-95. The FAA has recently published an interpretive rule for public comment explaining the statutory criteria of § 336. See Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 FR 36172, 36175 (June 25, 2014).
33 components work together and allow the Secretary to make the statutory findings required by section 333. A. Incremental Approach and Privacy The FAA began its small UAS rulemaking in 2005. In its initial approach to this rulemaking, which the FAA utilized from 2005 until November 2013, the FAA attempted to implement the ARC's recommendations and craft a rule that encompassed the widest possible range of small UAS operations. This approach utilized a regulatory structure similar to the one that the FAA uses for manned aircraft. Specifically, small UAS operations that pose a low risk to people, property, and other aircraft would have been subject to less stringent regulation while small UAS operations posing a greater risk would have been subject to more stringent regulation in order to mitigate the greater risk. In exploring this approach, the FAA found that, as discussed previously, there are two unique safety issues associated with UAS: (1) extending ''see and avoid'' anti-collision principles to a pilot that is not physically present on the aircraft; and (2) loss of positive control of the unmanned aircraft. In addition, at the time that it was considering this approach, the FAA did not have the discretion necessary to exempt these aircraft from the statutory requirement for airworthiness certification, as the section 333 authority did not come into effect until February 14, 2012. As a result of these issues, the FAA's original broadly-scoped approach to the rulemaking effort took significantly longer than anticipated. Consequently, the FAA decided to proceed with multiple incremental UAS rules rather than a single omnibus rulemaking in order to utilize the flexibility with regard to airworthiness certification that Congress provided in section 333.
34 Accordingly, at this time, the FAA is proposing a rule that, pursuant to section 333 of Public Law 112-95, will integrate small UAS operations posing the least amount of risk. Because these operations pose the least amount of risk, this proposed rule would treat the entire spectrum of operations that would be subject to this rule in a similar manner by imposing less stringent regulatory burdens that would ensure that the safety and security of the NAS would not be reduced by operation of these UAS. In the meantime, the FAA will continue working on integrating UAS operations that pose greater amounts of risk, and will issue notices of proposed rulemaking for those operations once the pertinent issues have been addressed, consistent with the approach set forth in the UAS Comprehensive Plan for Integration and FAA roadmap for integration.26 Once the entire integration process is complete, the FAA envisions the NAS populated with UAS that operate well beyond the operational limits proposed in this rule. Those UAS will be regulated differently than the UAS that would be integrated through this rule, and will be addressed in subsequent rulemakings. The FAA has selected this approach because it would allow lower-risk small UAS operations to be incorporated into the NAS immediately instead of waiting until the issues associated with higher-risk UAS operations are resolved. The approach of this proposal is meant to address low risk operations; to the greatest extent possible, it takes a data-driven, risk-based approach to defining specific regulatory requirements for small UAS operations. It is well understood that regulations that are articulated in terms of the desired outcomes (i.e., ''performance standards'') are 26 Section 332(a) of Public Law 112-95 requires the Secretary of Transportation to develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil UAS into the NAS. This plan must be developed in consultation with representatives of the aviation industry, federal agencies that employ UAS technology in the NAS, and the UAS industry. Section 332(a) also requires the Secretary of Transportation to develop a 5-year roadmap for the introduction of civil UAS into the NAS. Both the comprehensive plan and the roadmap were published in November 2013.
35 generally preferable to those that specify the means to achieve the desired outcomes (i.e., ''design'' standards). According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4 (''Regulatory Analysis''), performance standards ''give the regulated parties the flexibility to achieve the regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way.''27 Design standards have a tendency to lock in certain approaches that limit the incentives to innovate and may effectively prohibit new technologies altogether. The distinction between design and performance standards is particularly important where technology is evolving rapidly, as is the case with small UAS. In this proposal, the regulatory objectives are to enable integration of small UAS into the NAS in a manner that does not impose unacceptable risk to other aircraft, people, or property. The FAA seeks comment on whether there are additional requirements that could be specified in ways that are more performance-oriented in order to minimize any disincentives to develop new technologies that achieve the regulatory objectives at lower cost. Recently, the FAA, with the approval of the Secretary, has been issuing exemptions in accordance with 14 CFR part 11 and section 333 of Public Law 112-95 to accommodate an increasing number of small UAS operations that are not for hobby or recreational purposes. If adopted, this rule will eliminate the need for the vast majority of these exemptions. The exemption process will continue to be available for UAS operations that fall outside the parameters of this rule. Such operations may involve the use of more advanced technologies that are not yet mature at the time of this rulemaking. 27 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf
36 The FAA also notes that, because UAS-associated technologies are rapidly evolving at this time, new technologies could come into existence after this rule is issued or existing technologies may evolve to the extent that they establish a level of reliability sufficient to allow those technologies to be relied on for risk mitigation. These technologies may alleviate some of the risk concerns that underlie the provisions of this rulemaking like the line of sight rule. Accordingly, the FAA invites comments as to whether the final rule should relax operating restrictions on small UAS equipped with technology that addresses the concerns underlying the operating limitations of this proposed rule, for instance through some type of deviation authority (such as a letter of authorization or a waiver). The FAA also notes that privacy concerns have been raised about unmanned aircraft operations. Although these issues are beyond the scope of this rulemaking, recognizing the potential implications for privacy and civil rights and civil liberties from the use of this technology, and consistent with the direction set forth in the Presidential Memorandum, Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (February 15, 2015), the Department and FAA will participate in the multi-stakeholder engagement process led by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to assist in this process regarding privacy, accountability, and transparency issues concerning commercial and private UAS use in the NAS. We also note that state law and other legal protections for individual privacy may provide recourse for a person whose privacy may be affected through another person's use of a UAS. The FAA conducted a privacy impact assessment (PIA) of this rule as required by section 522(a)(5) of division H of the FY 2005 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Public Law
37 108''447, 118 Stat. 3268 (Dec. 8, 2004) and section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347, 116 Stat. 2889 (Dec. 17, 2002). The assessment considers any impacts of the proposed rule on the privacy of information in an identifiable form. The FAA has determined that this proposed rule would impact the FAA's handling of personally identifiable information (PII). As part of the PIA that the FAA conducted as part of this rulemaking, the FAA analyzed the effect this impact might have on collecting, storing, and disseminating PII and examined and evaluated protections and alternative information handling processes in developing the proposed rule in order to mitigate potential privacy risks. As proposed, the process for granting unmanned aircraft operator certificates with a small UAS rating would be brought in line with the process for granting traditional airman certificates. Thus, the privacy implications of this rule to the privacy of the information that would be collected, maintained, stored, and disseminated by the FAA in accordance with this rule are the same as the privacy implications of the FAA's current airman certification processes. These privacy impacts have been analyzed by the FAA in the following Privacy Impact Assessments for the following systems: Civil Aviation Registry Applications (AVS Registry); the Integrated Airman Certification and Ratings Application (IACRA); and Accident Incident Database. These Privacy Impact Assessments are available in the docket for this rulemaking and at http://www.dot.gov/individuals/privacy/privacy-impact-assessments#Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
38 B. Applicability To integrate small UAS operations into the NAS, this proposed rule would create a new part in title 14 of the CFR: part 107. Subject to the exceptions discussed below, proposed part 107 would prescribe the rules governing the registration, airman certification, and operation of civil small UAS within the United States. As mentioned previously, a small UAS is a UAS that uses an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds. This proposed rule would allow non-recreational small UAS to operate in the NAS. The operations enabled by this proposed rule would include business, academic, and research and development flights, which are hampered by the current regulatory framework. Under this proposal, the regulations of part 107, which are tailored to address the risks associated with small UAS operations, would apply to small UAS operations in place of certain existing FAA regulations that impede civil small UAS operations. Specifically, for small UAS operations, the requirements of proposed part 107 would generally replace the airworthiness provisions of part 21, the airman certification provisions of part 61, and the operating limitations of part 91. However, proposed part 107 would not apply to all small UAS operations. For the reasons discussed below, proposed part 107 would not apply to: (1) air carrier operations; (2) external load and towing operations; (3) international operations; (4) foreign-owned aircraft that are ineligible to be registered in the United States; (5) public aircraft; (6) certain model aircraft; and (7) moored balloons, kites, amateur rockets, and unmanned free balloons.
39 1. Air Carrier Operations When someone is transporting persons or property by air for compensation, that person is considered an air carrier by statute and is required to obtain an air carrier operating certificate.28 Because there is an expectation of safe transportation when payment is exchanged, air carriers are subject to more stringent regulations to mitigate the risks posed to persons or non-operator-owned property on the aircraft. The FAA notes that some industries may desire to transport property via UAS.29 Proposed part 107 would not prohibit this type of transportation so long as it is not done for compensation and the total weight of the aircraft, including the property, is less than 55 pounds. For example, research and development operations transporting property could be conducted under proposed part 107, as could operations by corporations transporting their own property within their business under the other provisions of this proposed rule. The FAA seeks comment on whether UAS should be permitted to transport property for payment within the other proposed constraints of the rule, e.g., the ban on flights over uninvolved persons, the requirements for line of sight, and the intent to limit operations to a constrained area. The FAA also seeks comment on whether a special class or classes of air carrier certification should be developed for UAS operations. 2. External Load and Towing Operations The FAA considered allowing small unmanned aircraft to conduct external-load operations and to tow other aircraft or objects. These operations involve a greater level of public risk due to the dynamic nature of external-load configurations and inherent risks 28 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(4). 29 Property that is transported as an external load is discussed in the next section of the preamble.
40 associated with the flight characteristics of a load that is carried, or extends, outside the aircraft fuselage and may be jettisonable. These types of operations may also involve evaluation of the aircraft frame for safety performance impacts, which may require airworthiness certification. Given the risks associated with external load and towing operations, the FAA cannot find that a certification is not required. However, the FAA invites comments, with supporting documentation, on whether external-load UAS operations and towing UAS operations should be permitted, whether they would require airworthiness certification, whether they would require higher levels of airman certification, whether they would require additional operational limitations, and on other relevant issues. 3. International Operations At this time, the FAA also proposes to limit this rulemaking to small UAS operations conducted entirely within the United States. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognizes that: The safe integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace will be a long-term activity with many stakeholders adding their expertise on such diverse topics as licensing and medical qualification of UAS crew, technologies for detect and avoid systems, frequency spectrum (including its protection from unintentional or unlawful interference), separation standards from other aircraft, and development of a robust regulatory framework.30 ICAO has further stated that ''[u]nmanned aircraft'...are, indeed aircraft; therefore existing [ICAO standards and recommended practices] SARPs apply to a very great extent. The complete integration of UAS at aerodromes and in the various airspace classes will, 30 ICAO Circular 328 (Unmanned Aircraft Systems(UAS))(2011).
41 however, necessitate the development of UAS-specific SARPs to supplement those already existing.''31 ICAO has begun to issue and amend SARPs to specifically address UAS operations. For example, the standard contained in paragraph 3.1.9 of Annex 2 (Rules of the Air) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation states that ''A remotely piloted aircraft shall be operated in such a manner as to minimize hazards to persons, property or other aircraft and in accordance with the conditions specified in Appendix 4.'' This appendix sets forth detailed conditions ICAO Member States must require of civil UAS operations for the ICAO Member State to comply with the Annex 2, paragraph 3.1.9 standard. ICAO standards in Annex 7 (Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks) to the Convention also require remotely piloted aircraft to ''carry an identification plate inscribed with at least its nationality or common mark and registration mark'' and be ''made of fireproof metal or other fireproof material of suitable physical properties.'' For remotely piloted aircraft, this identification plate must be ''secured in a prominent position near the main entrance or compartment or affixed conspicuously to the exterior of the aircraft if there is no main entrance or compartment.'' While we embrace the basic principle that UAS operations should minimize hazards to persons, property or other aircraft, we believe that it is possible to achieve this goal with respect to certain small UAS operations in a much less restrictive manner than current ICAO standards require. Accordingly, the FAA proposes, for the time being, to limit the applicability of proposed part 107 to small UAS operations that are conducted entirely within the United States. The FAA envisions that international operations would be dealt with in a future FAA rulemaking. The FAA believes that the experience that the FAA 31 Id.
42 will gain with UAS operations under this rule will assist with future rulemakings. The FAA also anticipates that ICAO will continue to revise and more fully develop its framework for UAS operations to better reflect the diversity of UAS operations and types of UAS and to distinguish the appropriate levels of regulation in light of those differences. The FAA notes that under Presidential Proclamation 5928, the territorial sea of the United States, and consequently its territorial airspace, extends to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with international law. Thus, UAS operating in the airspace above the U.S. territorial sea would be operating within the United States for the purposes of this proposed rule. The FAA also emphasizes that proposed part 107 would not prohibit small UAS operators from operating in international airspace or in other countries; however, the proposed rule also would not provide authorization for such operations. UAS operations that do not take place entirely within the United States would need to obtain all necessary authorizations from the FAA and the relevant foreign authorities outside of the part 107 framework, as that framework would not apply to operations that do not take place entirely within the United States. It is important to note that Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which the U.S. is a party, provides: No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.
43 Accordingly, UAS operations in foreign countries may not take place without the required authorizations and permission of that country. 4. Foreign-Owned Aircraft That Are Ineligible for U.S. Registration The FAA proposes to limit the scope of this rulemaking to U.S.-registered aircraft. Under 49 U.S.C. 44103 and 14 CFR 47.3, an aircraft can be registered in the United States only if it is not registered under the laws of a foreign country and meets one of the following ownership criteria: · The aircraft is owned by a citizen of the United States; · The aircraft is owned by a permanent resident of the United States; · The aircraft is owned by a corporation that is not a citizen of the United States, but that is organized and doing business under U.S. Federal or state law and the aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States; or · The aircraft is owned by the United States government or a state or local governmental entity. An aircraft that does not satisfy the above criteria is typically owned by a foreign person or entity and is subject to special operating rules.32 As previously noted, the ICAO framework for international UAS operations is at a relatively early stage in its development. Accordingly, proposed part 107 would only apply to small unmanned aircraft that meet the criteria specified in § 47.3, which must be satisfied in order for an aircraft to be eligible for U.S. registration. The FAA notes existing U.S. international trade 32 See, e.g., 14 CFR part 91, Subpart H (specifying operating rules for foreign civil aircraft).
44 obligations do permit certain kinds of operations, known as specialty air services. Specialty air services are generally defined as any specialized commercial operation using an aircraft whose primary purpose is not the transportation of goods or passengers, including but not limited to aerial mapping, aerial surveying, aerial photography, forest fire management, firefighting, aerial advertising, glider towing, parachute jumping, aerial construction, helilogging, aerial sightseeing, flight training, aerial inspection and surveillance, and aerial spraying services. The FAA will consult with the Secretary to determine the process through which it might permit foreign-owned small unmanned aircraft to operate in the United States. The FAA invites comments on the inclusion of foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft in this new framework. As provided by 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A), the FAA Administrator must carry out his responsibilities under Part A (Air Commerce and Safety) of title 49, United States Code, consistently with the obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements. The FAA invites comments regarding whether the proposed rule needs to be modified to ensure that it is consistent with any relevant obligations of the United States under international agreements. 5. Public Aircraft Operations This proposed rule would also not apply to public aircraft operations with small UAS that are not operated as civil aircraft. This is because public aircraft operations, such as those conducted by the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, are not required to comply with civil airworthiness or airman certification requirements to conduct
45 operations. However, these operations are subject to the airspace and air-traffic rules of part 91, which include the ''see and avoid'' requirement of § 91.113(b). Because unmanned aircraft operations currently are incapable of complying with § 91.113(b), the FAA has required public aircraft operations that use unmanned aircraft to obtain an FAA-issued Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) providing the public aircraft operation with a waiver/deviation from the ''see and avoid'' requirement of § 91.113(b). The existing COA system has been in place for over eight years, and has not caused any significant human injuries or other significant adverse safety impacts.33 Accordingly, this proposed rule would not abolish the COA system. However, this proposed rule would provide public aircraft operations with greater flexibility by giving them the option to declare an operation to be a civil operation and comply with the provisions of proposed part 107 instead of seeking a COA from the FAA. Because proposed part 107 would address the risks associated with small UAS operations, there would be no adverse safety effects from allowing public aircraft operations to be voluntarily conducted under proposed part 107.34 6. Model Aircraft Proposed part 107 would not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the criteria specified in section 336 of Public Law 112-95. Section 336 of Public Law 112-95 defines a model aircraft as an ''unmanned aircraft that is '' (1) capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (2) flown within visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and 33 The FAA has been issuing COAs to public aircraft operations using UAS for over 20 years; however, prior to 2005, those COAs were issued using different processes. 34 The FAA notes that section 334(b) of Public Law 112-95 requires the FAA to develop standards regarding the operation of public UAS by December 31, 2015.
46 (3) flown for hobby or recreational purposes.''35 Because section 336 of Public Law 112-95 defines a model aircraft as an ''unmanned aircraft,'' a model aircraft that weighs less than 55 pounds would fall into the definition of small UAS under this rule. However, Public Law 112-95 specifically prohibits the FAA from promulgating rules regarding model aircraft that meet all of the following statutory criteria:36 · The aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; · The aircraft is operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide community-based organization; · The aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified through a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety program administered by a community-based organization; · The aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft; and · When flown within 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the aircraft provides the airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic facility is located at the airport) with prior notice of the operation. Because of the statutory prohibition on FAA rulemaking regarding model aircraft that meet the above criteria, model aircraft meeting these criteria would not be subject to the provisions of proposed part 107. Likewise, operators of model aircraft excepted from 35 Sec. 336(c) of Pub. L. 112-95. 36 Sec. 336(a) of Pub. L. 112-95.
47 part 107 by the statute would not need to hold an unmanned aircraft operator's certificate with a small UAS rating. However, the FAA emphasizes that because the prohibition on rulemaking in section 336 of Public Law 112-95 is limited to model aircraft that meet all of the above statutory criteria, model aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds that fail to meet all of the statutory criteria would be subject to proposed part 107. In addition, although Public Law 112-95 excepted certain model aircraft from FAA rulemaking, it specifically states that the law's exception does not limit the Administrator's authority to pursue enforcement action against those model aircraft operators that ''endanger the safety of the national airspace system.''37 This proposed rule would codify the FAA's enforcement authority in part 101 by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the safety of the NAS. The FAA also notes that it recently issued an interpretive rule explaining the provisions of section 336 and concluding that ''Congress intended for the FAA to be able to rely on a range of our existing regulations to protect users of the airspace and people and property on the ground.'' 38 In this interpretive rule, the FAA gave examples of existing regulations the violation of which could subject model aircraft to enforcement action. Those regulations include: · Prohibitions on careless or reckless operation and dropping objects so as to create a hazard to persons or property (14 CFR 91.13 and 91.15); 37 Sec. 336(b) of Pub. L. 112-95. 38 Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 FR 36172, 36175 (June 25,2014). This document was issued as a notice of interpretation and has been in effect since its issuance on June 25, 2014. However, we note that the FAA has invited comment on this interpretation, and may modify the interpretation as a result of comments that were received.
48 · Right-of-way rules for converging aircraft (14 CFR 91.113); · Rules governing operations in designated airspace (14 CFR part 73 and §§ 91.126 through 91.135); and · Rules relating to operations in areas covered by temporary flight restrictions and notices to airmen (NOTAMs) (14 CFR 91.137 through 91.145).39 The FAA notes that the above list is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all existing regulations that apply to model aircraft meeting the statutory criteria of Public Law 112-95, section 336. Rather, as explained in the interpretive rule, ''[t]he FAA anticipates that the cited regulations are the ones that would most commonly apply to model aircraft operations.''40 7. Moored Balloons, Kites, Amateur Rockets, and Unmanned Free Balloons Lastly, proposed part 107 would not apply to moored balloons, kites, amateur rockets, and unmanned free balloons. These types of aircraft currently are regulated by the provisions of 14 CFR part 101. Because these aircraft are already incorporated into the NAS through part 101 and because the safety risks associated with these specific aircraft are already mitigated by the regulations of part 101, there is no need to make these aircraft subject to the provisions of proposed part 107. 39 Id. at 36175-76. 40 Id. at 36176.
49 C. Definitions Proposed part 107 would create a new set of definitions to address the unique aspects of a small UAS. Those proposed definitions are as follows. 1. Control Station Proposed part 107 would define a ''control station'' as an interface used by the operator to control the flight path of the small unmanned aircraft. In a manned aircraft, the interface used by the pilot to control the flight path of the aircraft is a part of the aircraft and is typically located inside the aircraft flight deck. Conversely, the interface used to control the flight path of a small unmanned aircraft is typically physically separated from the aircraft and remains on the ground during aircraft flight. Defining the concept of a control station would clarify the interface that is considered part of the small UAS under this regulation. 2. Corrective Lenses Proposed part 107 would also define ''corrective lenses'' as spectacles or contact lenses. As discussed in the Operating Rules section of this preamble, this proposed rule would require the operator and/or visual observer to have visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft with vision that is not enhanced by any device other than corrective lenses. This is because spectacles and contact lenses do not restrict a user's peripheral vision while other vision-enhancing devices may restrict that vision. Because peripheral vision is necessary in order for the operator and/or visual observer to be able to see and
50 avoid other air traffic in the NAS, this proposed rule would limit the circumstances in which vision-enhancing devices other than spectacles or contact lenses may be used. 3. Operator and Visual Observer Because of the unique nature of small UAS operations, this proposed rule would create two new crewmember positions: the operator and the visual observer. These positions are discussed further in section III.D.1 of this preamble. 4. Small Unmanned Aircraft Public Law 112-95 defines a ''small unmanned aircraft'' as ''an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds.''41 This statutory definition of small unmanned aircraft does not specify whether the 55-pound weight limit refers to the total weight of the aircraft at the time of takeoff (which would encompass the weight of the aircraft and any payload on board), or simply the weight of an empty aircraft. This proposed rule would define a small unmanned aircraft as an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds, including everything that is on board the aircraft. The FAA proposes to interpret the statutory definition of small unmanned aircraft as referring to total weight at the time of takeoff because heavier aircraft generally pose greater amounts of public risk in the event of an accident. In the event of a crash, a heavier aircraft can do more damage to people and property on the ground. The FAA also notes that this approach 41 Sec. 331(6) of Pub. L. 112-95.
51 would be similar to the approach that the FAA has taken with other aircraft, such as large aircraft, light-sport aircraft, and small aircraft.42 5. Small Unmanned Aircraft System (small UAS) This proposed rule would define a small UAS as a small unmanned aircraft and its associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the small unmanned aircraft) that are required for the safe and efficient operation of the small unmanned aircraft in the NAS. Except for one difference, this proposed definition would be similar to the definition of ''unmanned aircraft system'' provided in Public Law 112-95.43 The difference between the two definitions is that the proposed definition in this rule would not refer to a pilot-in-command because, as discussed further in this preamble, this proposed rule would create a new position of operator to replace the traditional manned-aviation positions of pilot and pilot-in-command for small UAS operations. 6. Unmanned Aircraft Lastly, this proposed rule would define an unmanned aircraft as an aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. This proposed definition would codify the definition of ''unmanned aircraft'' specified in Public Law 112-95.44 42 See 14 CFR 1.1 (referring to ''takeoff weight'' for large, light-sport, and small aircraft in the definitions for those aircraft). 43 Sec. 331(9) of Pub. L. 112-95. Public Law 112-95 defines an ''unmanned aircraft system'' as ''an unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for the pilot in command to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system.'' 44 Sec. 331(8) of Pub. L. 112-95.
52 D. Operating Rules As discussed earlier in this preamble (section III.A), instead of a single omnibus rulemaking that applies to all small UAS operations, the FAA has decided to proceed incrementally and issue a rule governing small UAS operations that pose the least amount of risk. Subpart B of this proposed rule would specify the operating constraints of these operations. The FAA emphasizes that it intends to conduct future rulemaking(s) to incorporate into the NAS small UAS operations that pose a greater level of risk than the operations that would be permitted by this proposed rule. However, those operations present additional safety issues that the FAA needs more time to address. In the meantime, under this proposed rule, operations that could be conducted within the proposed operational constraints would be incorporated into the NAS. The FAA also considered whether to further subdivide small UAS into different categories of unmanned aircraft that would be regulated differently based on their weight, operational characteristics, and operating environment. This subdivision would have been based on five category groups (Groups A through E). Each of these groups would have been regulated based on its specific weight and operating characteristics. This is the framework that the FAA used in its initial approach to this rulemaking. However, because this framework attempted to integrate a wide range of UAS operations posing different risk profiles whose integration raised policy questions on which data was either limited or unavailable, the FAA's initial approach would have been unduly burdensome on all UAS groups that would have been covered under that approach. For example, UAS in Group A, which posed the least safety risk under the FAA's initial
53 framework, would have been required to: (1) obtain a permit to operate (PTO) from the FAA, which would have to be renewed after one year; (2) file quarterly reports with the FAA providing their operational data; (3) establish a level of airworthiness that would be sufficient to obtain an airworthiness certification (the initial approach would have merged airworthiness certification into the PTO); (4) obtain a pilot certificate by passing a knowledge test, a practical test, and completing required ground training with an FAA-certificated instructor; (5) obtain a NOTAM from the FAA prior to conducting certain UAS operations (the operator would do this by filing notice with the FAA); and (6) maintain records documenting the complete maintenance history of the UAS. After extensive deliberation, the FAA ultimately determined that such a regulatory framework was too complex, costly, and burdensome for both the public and the FAA. The FAA then examined the entire small UAS category of aircraft (unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds) in light of the new authority provided for under section 333 of Public Law 112-95 and determined that appropriate operational risk mitigations could be developed to allow the entire category of small UAS to avoid airworthiness certification and be subject to the least burdensome level of regulation that is necessary to protect the safety and security of the NAS. Furthermore, the FAA decided to also substantially simplify the operational limitations and airman (operator) certification requirements in a manner that would equally accommodate all types of small UAS business users with the least amount of complexity and regulatory burden. The FAA believes that treating small UAS as a single category without airworthiness certification would accommodate a large majority of small UAS businesses
54 and other non-recreational users of UAS. The operational limits in this proposed rule would mitigate risk associated with small UAS operations in a way that would provide an equivalent level of safety to the NAS with the least amount of burden to business and other non-recreational users of even the smallest UAS. The FAA invites comments, with supporting documentation, on whether the regulation of small UAS should be further subdivided based on the size, weight, and operating environment of the small UAS. 1. Micro UAS Classification In addition to part 107 as proposed, the FAA is considering including a micro UAS classification. This classification would be based on the UAS ARC's recommendations, as well as approaches adopted in other countries that have a separate set of regulations for micro UAS. In developing this micro UAS classification, the FAA examined small UAS policies adopted in other countries. In considering other countries' aviation policies, the FAA noted that each country has its unique aviation statutory and rulemaking requirements, which may include that country's unique economic, geographic, and airspace density considerations. Canada is our only North American neighbor with a regulatory framework for small UAS. The chart below summarizes Transport Canada's operational limitations for micro UAS (4.4 pounds (2 kilograms) and under) and compares it with the regulatory framework in proposed part 107 as well as the micro UAS classification that the FAA is considering.
55 COMPARISON OF CANADIAN RULES GOVERNING MICRO UAS CLASS WITH PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED PART 107 AND MICRO UAS SUB-CLASSIFICATION PROVISION CANADA SMALL UAS NPRM MICRO UAS SUB-CLASSIFICATION Definition of Small UAS Up to 4.4 lbs (2 kg) Up to 55 lbs (24 kg) Up to 4.4 lbs (2 kg) Maximum Altitude Above Ground 300 feet 500 feet 400 feet Airspace Limitations Only within Class G airspace Allowed within Class E in areas not designated for an airport. Otherwise, need ATC permission. Allowed within Class B, C and D with ATC permission. Allowed in Class G with no ATC permission Only within Class G airspace Distance from people and structures 100 feet laterally from any building, structure, vehicle, vessel or animal not associated with the operation and 100 feet from any person. Simply prohibits UAS operations over any person not involved in the operations (unless under a covered structure) Flying over any person is permitted Ability to extend operational area No Yes, from a waterborne vehicle No Autonomous operations No Yes No Aeronautical knowledge required Yes; ground school Yes; applicant would take knowledge test Yes; applicant would self-certify First person view permitted No Yes, provided operator is visually capable of seeing the small UAS No Operator training required Yes, ground school No No Visual observer training required Yes No No Operator certificate required No Yes (must pass basic UAS aeronautical test) Yes (no knowledge test required) Preflight safety Yes Yes Yes
56 assessment Operate within 5 miles of an airport No Yes No Operate in a congested area No Yes Yes Liability insurance Yes, $100,000 CAN No No Daylight operations only Yes Yes Yes Aircraft must be made out of frangible materials No No Yes The FAA is considering the following provisions for the micro UAS classification: · The unmanned aircraft used in the operation would weigh no more than 4.4 pounds (2 kilograms). This provision would be based on the ARC's recommendations and on how other countries, such as Canada, subdivide their UAS into micro or lightweight UAS; · The unmanned aircraft would be made out of frangible materials that break, distort, or yield on impact so as to present a minimal hazard to any person or object that the unmanned aircraft collides with. Examples of such materials are breakable plastic, paper, wood, and foam. This provision would be based on the ARC's recommendations; · During the course of the operation, the unmanned aircraft would not exceed an airspeed of 30 knots. This provision would be based on the ARC's recommendation, which was concerned with damage that could be done by unmanned aircraft flying at higher speeds;
57 · During the course of the operation, the unmanned aircraft would not travel higher than 400 feet above ground level (AGL). This provision would be based on the ARC's recommendations; · The unmanned aircraft would be flown within visual line of sight; first-person view would not be used during the operation; and the aircraft would not travel farther than 1,500 feet away from the operator. These provisions would be based on ARC recommendations and Canada's requirements for micro UAS; · The operator would maintain manual control of the flight path of the unmanned aircraft at all times, and the operator would not use automation to control the flight path of the unmanned aircraft. This provision would be based on ARC recommendations and Canada's requirements for micro UAS; · The operation would be limited entirely to Class G airspace. This provision would be based on Canada's requirements for micro UAS; and · The unmanned aircraft would maintain a distance of at least 5 nautical miles from any airport. This provision would be based on Canada's requirements for micro UAS. The operational parameters discussed above may provide significant additional safety mitigations. Specifically, a very light (micro) UAS operating at lower altitudes and at lower speeds, that is made up of materials that break or yield easily upon impact, may pose a much lower risk to persons, property, and other NAS users than a UAS that does not operate within these parameters. Additionally, limiting the micro UAS operation entirely to Class G airspace, far away from an airport, and in close proximity to the operator (as well
58 as limiting the unmanned aircraft's flight path to the operator's constant manual control) would significantly reduce the risk of collision with another aircraft. Accordingly, because the specific parameters of a micro UAS operation described above would provide additional safety mitigation for those operations, the FAA's micro UAS approach would allow micro UAS to operate directly over people not involved in the operation. Under the FAA's micro UAS approach, the operator of a micro UAS also would be able to operate using a UAS airman certificate with a different rating (an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a micro UAS rating) than the airman certificate that would be created by proposed part 107. No knowledge test would be required in order to obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a micro UAS rating; instead, the applicant would simply submit a signed statement to the FAA stating that he or she has familiarized him or herself with all of the areas of knowledge that are tested on the initial aeronautical knowledge test that is proposed under part 107. The FAA is also considering whether to require, as part of the micro UAS approach, that the micro UAS be made out of frangible material. A UAS that is made out of frangible material presents a significantly lower risk to persons on the ground, as that UAS is more likely to shatter if it should impact a person rather than injuring that person. Without the risk mitigation provided by frangible-material construction, the FAA would be unable to allow micro UAS to operate directly over a person not involved in the operation. The FAA notes that, currently, a majority of fixed-wing small UAS are made out of frangible materials that would satisfy the proposed requirement. The FAA invites comments on whether it should eliminate frangibility from the micro UAS framework.
59 The FAA also invites commenters to submit data and any other supporting documentation on whether the micro UAS classification should be included in the final rule, and what provisions the FAA should adopt for such a classification. The FAA invites further comments, with supporting documentation, estimating the costs and benefits of implementing a micro UAS approach in the final rule. Finally, the FAA invites comments to assess the risk to other airspace users posed by the lesser restricted integration of micro UAS into the NAS. The FAA notes, however, that due to statutory constraints, the FAA would be unable to eliminate the requirement to hold an airman certificate and register the unmanned aircraft even if it were to adopt a micro UAS approach in the final rule. During the course of this rulemaking, the FAA also received a petition for rulemaking from UAS America Fund LLC. This petition presented the FAA with an alternative approach to regulating micro UAS, complete with a set of regulatory provisions that would be specific to micro UAS operations. Because the FAA was already in the process of rulemaking at the time this petition was filed, pursuant to 14 CFR 11.73(c), the FAA will not treat this petition as a separate action, but rather, will consider it as a comment on this rulemaking. Accordingly, the FAA has placed a copy of UAS America Fund's rulemaking petition in the docket for this rulemaking and invites comments on the suggestions presented in this petition. Any comments received in response to the proposals in the petition will be considered in this rulemaking. 2. Operator and Visual Observer As briefly mentioned earlier, this proposed rule would create two new crewmember positions: an operator and a visual observer. The FAA proposes these positions for small
60 UAS operations instead of the traditional manned-aircraft positions of pilot, flight engineer, and flight navigator. This is being proposed because, by their very nature, small UAS operations are different from manned aircraft operations, and this necessitates a different set of qualifications for crewmembers. i. Operator The FAA proposes to define an operator as a person who manipulates the flight controls of a small UAS. Flight controls include any system or component that affects the flight path of the aircraft. The position of operator would be somewhat analogous to the position of a pilot who controls the flight of a manned aircraft. However, the FAA proposes to create the position of an operator rather than expand the existing definition of pilot to emphasize that, even though the operator directly controls the flight of the unmanned aircraft, the operator is not actually present on the aircraft. The FAA notes that even though a small UAS operator is not a pilot, the operator would still be considered an airman and statutorily required to obtain an airman certificate. The statutory flexibility provided in section 333 of Public Law 112-95 is limited to airworthiness certification and does not extend to airman certification. Thus, as mentioned previously, the FAA's statute prohibits a person without an airman certificate from serving in any capacity as an airman with respect to a civil aircraft used or intended to be used in air commerce.45 The statute defines an ''airman,'' in part, as an individual who, as a member of the crew, navigates the aircraft when under way. 46 Because under this proposed rule the operator would be a member of the crew and would navigate the small unmanned 45 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A). 46 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(8)(A).
61 aircraft when that aircraft is under way, an operator would be an airman as defined in the FAA's statute. Accordingly, the operator would statutorily be required to obtain an airman certificate in order to fly the small unmanned aircraft. The FAA proposes to codify this statutory requirement in § 107.13(a), which would require a person who wishes to serve as an operator to obtain an unmanned aircraft airman certificate with a small UAS rating. An unmanned aircraft airman certificate would be a new type of airman certificate that would be created by this proposed rule specifically for UAS operators to satisfy the statutory requirement for an airman certificate. The certificate necessary to operate small UAS would have a small UAS rating. The FAA anticipates that certificates used to operate UAS not subject to this proposed rule would have different certification requirements. The specific details of this certificate are discussed further in section III.E of this preamble. The FAA also proposes to give each operator the power and responsibility typically associated with a pilot-in-command (PIC) under the existing regulations. Under the existing regulations, the PIC ''is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to the operation of [the] aircraft.''47 The PIC position provides additional accountability for the safety of an operation by: (1) ensuring that a single person on board the aircraft is accountable for that operation; and (2) providing that person with the authority to address issues affecting operational safety. An accountability system, such as the existing PIC concept, would provide similar benefits for small UAS operations. Accordingly, the FAA proposes, in § 107.19(a), to 47 14 CFR 91.3(a).
62 make each operator: (1) directly responsible for the small UAS operation, and (2) the final authority as to the small UAS operation. To provide further clarity as to the operator's authority over the small UAS operation, proposed § 107.49(b) would require that each person involved in the small UAS operation perform the duties assigned by the operator. The FAA also considered providing the operator with the emergency powers available to the PIC under 14 CFR 91.3(b). Under § 91.3(b), a PIC can deviate from FAA regulations to respond to an in-flight emergency. However, the FAA does not believe that this power is necessary for the operator because a small unmanned aircraft is highly maneuverable and much easier to land than a manned aircraft. Thus, in an emergency, an operator should be able to promptly land the small unmanned aircraft in compliance with FAA regulations. Accordingly, the FAA proposes not to provide an operator with the emergency powers available to the PIC under § 91.3(b). The FAA invites comments on this issue. The FAA also does not believe that it is necessary to create a separate ''operator-in-command'' position for small UAS operations. The existing regulations create a separate PIC position because many manned aircraft are operated by multiple pilots. Thus, it is necessary to designate one of those pilots as the accountable authority for the operation. By contrast, only one operator is needed for a small UAS flight operation even though additional non-operator persons could be involved in the operation. Thus, at this time, it is not necessary to create an operator-in-command position. The FAA invites comments on whether a separate operator-in-command position should be created for small UAS operations.
63 The FAA finally notes that the term ''operate'' is currently a defined term in 14 CFR 1.1 that is used in manned-aircraft operations. While, for purposes of proposed part 107, the proposed definition of ''operator'' would supersede any conflicting definitions in § 1.1, the FAA invites comments as to whether defining a new crewmember position as an ''operator'' would cause confusion with the existing terminology. If so, the FAA invites suggestions as to an alternative title for this crewmember position. ii. Visual Observer To assist the operator with the proposed see-and-avoid and visual-line-of-sight requirements discussed in the next section of this preamble, the FAA proposes to create the position of a visual observer. Under this proposed rule, a visual observer would be defined as a person who assists the small unmanned aircraft operator in seeing and avoiding other air traffic or objects aloft or on the ground. The visual observer would do this by augmenting the operator as the person who must satisfy the see-and-avoid and visual-line-of-sight requirements of this proposed rule. As discussed in more detail below, an operator must always be capable of seeing the small unmanned aircraft. However, if the operation is augmented by at least one visual observer, the operator is not required to exercise this capability, as long as the visual observer maintains a constant visual-line-of-sight of the small unmanned aircraft. The FAA emphasizes that, as proposed, a visual observer is not a required crewmember, as the operator could always satisfy the pertinent requirements him- or herself. Under this proposed rule, an operator could, at his or her discretion, use a visual observer to increase the flexibility of the operation. The FAA notes, however, that as
64 discussed in III.D.3.i of this preamble, even if a visual observer is used to augment the operation, a small unmanned aircraft would still be required by § 107.33(c) to always remain close enough to the control station for the operator to be capable of seeing that aircraft. To ensure that the visual observer can carry out his or her duties, the FAA proposes, in § 107.33(b), that the operator be required to ensure that the visual observer is positioned in a location where he or she is able to see the small unmanned aircraft in the manner required by the proposed visual-line-of-sight and see-and-avoid provisions of §§ 107.31 and 107.37. The operator can do this by specifying the location of the visual observer. The FAA also proposes to require, in § 107.33(d), that the operator and visual observer coordinate to: (1) scan the airspace where the small unmanned aircraft is operating for any potential collision hazard; and (2) maintain awareness of the position of the small unmanned aircraft through direct visual observation. This would be accomplished by the visual observer maintaining visual contact with the small unmanned aircraft and the surrounding airspace and then communicating to the operator the flight status of the small unmanned aircraft and any hazards which may enter the area of operation so that the operator can take appropriate action. To make this communication possible, this proposed rule would require, in § 107.33(a), that the operator and visual observer maintain effective communication with each other at all times. This means that the operator and visual observer must work out a method of communication prior to the operation that allows them to understand each other, and utilize that method in the operation. The FAA notes that this proposed communication
65 requirement would permit the use of communication-assisting devices, such as radios, to facilitate communication between the operator and visual observer from a distance. The FAA considered requiring the visual observer to be stationed next to the operator to allow for unassisted oral communication, but decided that this requirement would be unduly burdensome, as it is possible to have effective oral communication through a communication-assisting device. The FAA invites comments on whether the visual observer should be required to stand close enough to the operator to allow for unassisted verbal communication. Under this proposed rule, the visual observer would not be permitted to manipulate any controls of the small UAS, share in operational control, or exercise operation-related judgment independent of the operator. Because the visual observer's role in the small UAS operation would be limited to simply communicating what he or she is seeing to the operator, the visual observer would not be an ''airman'' as defined in the FAA's statute.48 Consequently, as proposed, the visual observer would not statutorily be required to obtain an airman certificate.49 While an airman certificate for a visual observer is not statutorily mandated, the FAA considered requiring that the visual observer obtain an airman certificate.50 However, 48 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(8). This statute defines an ''airman'' as an individual: ''(A) in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew, who navigates aircraft when under way; (B) except to the extent the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may provide otherwise for individuals employed outside the United States, who is directly in charge of inspecting, maintaining, overhauling, or repairing aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; or (C) who serves as an aircraft dispatcher or air traffic control-tower operator.'' The visual observer's limited role in the operation of a small UAS would not meet any of these criteria. 49 See 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting a person without an airman certificate from serving in any capacity as an airman with respect to a civil aircraft used or intended to be used in air commerce). 50 This requirement would be imposed pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which gives FAA the power to prescribe regulations that it finds necessary for safety in air commerce.
66 due to the fact that this proposed rule would not permit the visual observer to manipulate the small UAS controls or exercise any independent judgment or operational control, the FAA believes that certification of visual observers would not result in significant safety benefits. Accordingly, the FAA is not proposing to require airman certification for visual observers. The FAA invites comments on whether an airman certificate should be required to serve as a visual observer. If so, what requirements should an applicant meet in order to obtain a visual observer airman certificate? The FAA also invites comments regarding the costs and benefits of requiring airman certification for visual observers. 3. See-and-Avoid and Visibility Requirements Turning to the see-and-avoid and visibility requirements mentioned in the previous section, one of the issues with small UAS operations is that the small UAS operator cannot see and avoid other aircraft in the same manner as a pilot who is inside a manned aircraft. Because at this time there is no technology that can provide an acceptable see-and-avoid replacement for human vision for small UAS operations, this proposed rule would limit small UAS operations to within the visual line of sight of the operator and a visual observer. This proposed rule would also impose requirements to ensure maximum visibility for the operation of the small UAS and ensure that small unmanned aircraft always yield the right-of-way to other users of the NAS. i. See-and-Avoid Currently, 14 CFR 91.113(b) imposes a requirement on all aircraft operations that, during flight, ''vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.'' This see-and-avoid requirement is at the heart of the FAA's
67 regulatory structure mitigating the risk of aircraft colliding in midair. As such, in crafting this proposed rule, the FAA sought a standard under which the small UAS operator would have the ability to see and avoid other aircraft similar to that of a manned-aircraft pilot. The FAA considered proposing that a UAS operator be permitted to exercise his or her see-and-avoid responsibilities through technological means, such as onboard cameras. We recognize that technology is developing that could provide an acceptable substitute for direct human vision in UAS operations. FAA does not, however, believe this technology has matured to the extent that would allow it to be used safely in small UAS operations in lieu of visual line of sight. The FAA has not identified an acceptable technological substitute for the safety protections provided by direct human vision in small UAS operations at this time. For these reasons and consistent with the statutory direction provided for in section 333, the FAA proposes to require, in §§ 107.31 and 107.37(a)(1), that the operator (and visual observer, if used) must be capable of maintaining a visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft throughout that aircraft's entire flight with human vision that is unaided by any device other than spectacles or contact lenses. If a visual observer is not used, the operator must exercise this capability and maintain watch over the small unmanned aircraft during flight. However, if an operation is augmented by at least one visual observer, then the visual observer can be used to satisfy the visual-line-of-sight requirements, as long as the operator always remains situated such that he or she can exercise visual-line-of-sight capability. The FAA notes that this proposed requirement does not require the person maintaining visual line of sight to constantly watch the unmanned aircraft for every single
68 second of that aircraft's flight. The FAA understands and accepts that this person may lose sight of the unmanned aircraft for brief moments of the operation. This may be necessary either because the small UAS momentarily travels behind an obstruction or to allow the person maintaining visual line of sight to perform actions such as scanning the airspace or briefly looking down at the small UAS control station. The visual-line-of-sight requirement of this proposed rule would allow the person maintaining visual line of sight brief moments in which he or she cannot directly see the small unmanned aircraft provided that the person is able to see the surrounding operational area sufficiently well to carry out his or her visual-line-of-sight-related responsibilities. Anything more than brief moments during which the person maintaining visual line of sight is unable to see the small unmanned aircraft would be prohibited under this proposed rule. To ensure that the operator's vision (and that of a visual observer, if used) of the small unmanned aircraft is sufficient to see and avoid other aircraft in the NAS, the proposed rule would require that the operator's or visual observer's vision of the small unmanned aircraft must be sufficient to allow him or her to: (1) know the small unmanned aircraft's location; (2) determine the small unmanned aircraft's attitude, altitude, and direction; (3) observe the airspace for other air traffic or hazards; and (4) determine that the small unmanned aircraft does not endanger the life or property of another. Because maintaining this type of awareness in real-time is a concentration-intensive activity,
69 proposed § 107.35 would limit an operator or visual observer to operating no more than one small UAS at the same time.51 Binoculars, onboard cameras, and other vision-enhancing devices (aside from spectacles or contact lenses) cannot be used to satisfy this proposed requirement because those devices restrict the user's peripheral field of vision. Since a pilot often uses peripheral vision to identify other aircraft in the NAS,52 a device that restricts peripheral vision hinders the user's ability to see other aircraft. However, the FAA recognizes that there are advantages to using vision-enhancing devices, such as those used when utilizing camera video transmitted to a screen at the operator's station (also known as first person view) when conducting inspections of bridges or towers. This proposed rule is not intended to prohibit the use of those devices. Rather, the proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement requires simply that at least one person involved in the operation, either the operator or a visual observer, must maintain an unenhanced visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft. Anyone else involved in the operation may use a vision-enhancing device (including first-person view) so long as that device is not used to meet the proposed requirements of §§ 107.31 and 107.37. The FAA invites comments on this proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement. The FAA also invites suggestions, with supporting documentation, for other ways in which a first-person-view device could be used by the operator without compromising the risk mitigation provided by the proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement. The FAA also invites comments on whether it should permit operations 51 The use of a visual observer would not be sufficient to allow an operator to operate more than one small UAS because the operator would still need to maintain sufficient concentration to react to the information provided to him or her by the visual observer. 52 Pilot Safety brochure: ''Pilot Vision.'' http://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/pilot_vision.pdf. A copy of this document is also available in the docket for this rulemaking.
70 beyond visual line of sight in its final rule, for example through deviation authority, once the pertinent technology matures to the extent that it can be used to safely operate beyond visual line of sight. If so, what level of validation should the technology be subject to in order to demonstrate reliability? For example, should the FAA use its existing certification or validation methodologies to evaluate UAS technology? ii. Additional Visibility Requirements To further ensure that a small UAS operator/visual observer can see and avoid other aircraft, the FAA proposes (1) to limit the operation of small UAS to daylight-only operations, and (2) to impose weather-minimum visibility requirements First, the FAA proposes, in § 107.29, to prohibit the operation of a small UAS outside the hours of official sunrise and sunset. The Federal Air Almanac provides tables which are used to determine sunrise and sunset at various latitudes. The FAA considered proposing to allow small UAS operations outside the hours of official sunrise and sunset, recognizing that this would integrate a greater quantity of small UAS operations into the NAS. However, the FAA has decided to propose limiting small UAS use to daylight-only operations due to the relatively small size of the small unmanned aircraft and the difficulty in being able to see it in darker environments to avoid other airspace users. The FAA also notes that most small unmanned aircraft flights under this proposed rule would take place at low altitudes, and flying at night would limit the small UAS operator's ability to see people on the ground and take precautions to ensure that the small unmanned aircraft does not pose a hazard to those people. Moreover, allowing small UAS operations outside of daylight hours would require equipage specifications (such as a lighting system emitting a
71 certain minimum amount of light) and airworthiness certification requirements that are contrary to the FAA's goal of a minimally burdensome rule for small unmanned aircraft. The FAA also notes that, for manned aircraft operations, the regulations provide for very specific lighting systems necessary to safely operate in the NAS. Those regulations require, among other things: (1) lighting system angles; (2) lighting system intensity; (3) lighting system color and position; (4) lighting system installation; and (5) lighting system configuration.53 This level of regulation and airworthiness certification would be beyond the level of a minimally burdensome rule encompassing low-risk operation that is contemplated by section 333 of Public Law 112-95. The FAA realizes the proposed daylight-only operations requirement may affect the ability to use small unmanned aircraft in more northern latitudes (specifically Alaska), and is willing to consider any reasonable mitigation which would ensure that an equivalent level of safety is maintained while operating in low-light areas. The FAA welcomes public comments with suggestions on how to effectively mitigate the risk of operations of small unmanned aircraft during low-light or nighttime operations. In addition, to ensure that small UAS operators and visual observers have the ability to see and avoid other aircraft, the FAA is proposing to require, in § 107.51(c), a minimum flight visibility of 3 statute miles (5 kilometers) from the control station for small UAS operations. A visibility of 3 statute miles currently is required for aircraft operations in controlled airspace.54 The FAA also requires a 3-mile visibility in the context of other 53 See 14 CFR sections 23.1381 through 23.1401. 54 See 14 CFR 91.115.
72 unmanned aircraft operations (moored balloons and kites).55 The reason for the increased visibility requirement is to provide the small UAS operator with additional time after seeing a manned aircraft to maneuver and avoid an accident or incident with the manned aircraft. In addition, the FAA is proposing to require, in § 107.51(d), that the small unmanned aircraft must be no less than: (1) 500 feet (150 meters) below clouds; and (2) 2,000 feet (600 meters) horizontal from clouds. This is similar to the requirements imposed by 14 CFR 91.155 on aircraft operating in controlled airspace under visual flight rules. The FAA proposes to impose these cloud-clearance requirements on small UAS operations because, as mentioned previously, small UAS operators do not have the same see-and-avoid capability as manned-aircraft pilots. iii. Yielding right of way Now that we have discussed how a small UAS operator sees other users of the NAS, we turn to how that operator avoids those users. In aviation, this is accomplished through right-of-way rules, which pilots are required to follow when encountering other aircraft. These rules specify how pilots should respond to other NAS users based on the types of aircraft or the operational scenario. The operation of small UAS presents challenges to the application of the traditional right-of-way rules. The smaller visual profile of the small unmanned aircraft makes it difficult for manned pilots to see and, therefore, avoid the unmanned aircraft. This risk is further compounded by the difference in speed between manned aircraft and the often 55 14 CFR 101.13(a)(3).
73 slower small unmanned aircraft. Because of these challenges, the FAA proposes to require, in § 107.37(a)(2), that the small UAS operator must always be the one to initiate an avoidance maneuver to avoid collision with any other user of the NAS. Optimally, the small UAS operator should give right-of-way to all manned aircraft in such a manner that the manned aircraft is never presented with a see-and-avoid decision or the impression that it must maneuver to avoid the small UAS. When a small UAS operator encounters another unmanned aircraft, each operator must exercise his or her discretion to avoid a collision between the aircraft. In extreme situations where collision is imminent, the small UAS operator must always consider the safety of people, first and foremost, over the value of any equipment, even if it means the loss of the unmanned aircraft. To further mitigate the risk of a mid-air collision, the FAA also proposes to codify, in § 107.37(b), the existing requirement in 14 CFR 91.111(a), which prohibits a person from operating an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. 4. Containment and Loss of Positive Control As discussed above, one of the issues unique to UAS operations is the possibility that during flight, the UAS operator may become unable to directly control the unmanned aircraft due to a failure of the control link between the aircraft and the operator's control station. This failure is known as a loss of positive control. Because the UAS operator's direct connection to the aircraft is funneled through the control link, a failure of the control link could have significant adverse results.
74 To address this issue, the FAA proposes a performance-based operator-responsibility standard built around the concept of a confined area of operation. Confining the flight of a small unmanned aircraft to a limited area would allow the operator to become familiar with the area of operation and to create contingency plans for using the environment in that area to mitigate the risk associated with possible loss of positive control. For example, the operator could mitigate loss-of-control risk to people on the ground by setting up a perimeter and excluding people not involved with the operation from the operational area. The operator could also mitigate risk to other aircraft by notifying the local air traffic control of the small UAS operation and the location of the confined area in which that operation will take place. As a result of risk-mitigation options that are available to the operator in a confined area of operation, the FAA proposes to mitigate the risk associated with loss of aircraft control by confining small unmanned aircraft to a limited area of operation. As an alternative method of addressing this issue, the FAA considered technological approaches such as requiring a flight termination system that would automatically terminate the flight of the small unmanned aircraft if the operator lost positive control of that aircraft. However, as previously discussed, due to the size and weight of a small UAS, operations subject to this proposed rule would not pose the same level of risk as other operations regulated by the FAA. Since small UAS operations subject to this rule pose a lower level of risk, there are operational alternatives available to mitigate their risk to an acceptable level without imposing an FAA requirement for technological equipage and airworthiness certification requirements. Therefore, this proposed rule would not mandate the use of a flight termination system nor would this proposed rule mandate
75 the equipage of any other navigational aid technology. Instead, the FAA invites comments on whether a flight termination system or other technological equipage should be required and how it would be integrated into the aircraft for small UAS that would be subject to this proposed rule. The FAA also invites comments, with supporting documentation, as to the costs and benefits of requiring a flight termination system or other technological equipage. i. Confined Area of Operation Boundaries The FAA notes that the proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement in § 107.31 would create a natural horizontal boundary on the area of operation. Due to the distance limitations of human vision, the operator or visual observer would be unable to maintain visual line of sight of the small unmanned aircraft sufficient to satisfy proposed § 107.31 if the aircraft travels too far away from them. Accordingly, the proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement in proposed § 107.31 would effectively confine the horizontal area of operation to a circle around the person maintaining visual contact with the aircraft with the radius of that circle being limited to the farthest distance at which the person can see the aircraft sufficiently to maintain compliance with proposed § 107.31. The FAA notes that there are two issues with defining the horizontal boundary of the area of operation in this manner. First, a small UAS operation could use multiple visual observers to expand the outer bounds of the horizontal circle created by the visual-line-of-sight requirement. To address this issue, the FAA proposes to require, in § 107.33(c), that if an operation uses a visual observer, the small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough to the operator at all times during flight for the operator to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. This approach would
76 prevent the use of visual observers to expand the horizontal outer bounds of the confined area of operation. This approach would also create a safety-beneficial redundancy in that, while the operator is not required to look at the small unmanned aircraft in an operation that uses a visual observer, should something go wrong, the operator would be able to look up and see for him- or herself what is happening with the aircraft. As an alternative method of addressing this issue, the FAA considered imposing a numerical limit on how far away a small unmanned aircraft can be from the operator. The FAA ultimately decided not to propose this approach, as it currently lacks sufficient data to designate a specific numerical limit. However, the FAA invites comments on whether the horizontal boundary of the contained area of operation should be defined through a numerical limit. If the boundary is defined through a numerical limit, what should that limit be? The second way that the horizontal boundary of the confined operational area could be expanded is by stationing the operator on a moving vehicle or aircraft. If the operator is stationed on a moving vehicle, then the horizontal area-of-operation boundary tied to the operator's line of sight would move with the operator, thus increasing the size of the small unmanned aircraft's area of operation. To prevent this scenario, the FAA proposes, in § 107.25, consistent with the ARC recommendations,56 to prohibit the operation of a small UAS from a moving aircraft or land-borne vehicle. However, proposed § 107.25 would make an exception for water-borne vehicles. This is because there are far less people and property located over water than on land. Consequently, a loss of positive control that 56 ARC report and recommendations, Sec. 6.11
77 occurs over water would have a significantly smaller chance of injuring a person or damaging property than a loss of positive control that occurs over land. Allowing use of a small UAS from a water-borne vehicle would also increase the societal benefits of this proposed rule without sacrificing safety by incorporating small UAS operations such as bridge inspections and wildlife nesting area evaluations into the NAS. The FAA is considering alternatives for regulation of the operation of small UAS from moving land vehicles, while protecting safety. It invites comments, with supporting documentation, on whether small UAS operations should be permitted from moving land-based vehicles, and invites comment on a regulatory framework for such operations. The FAA specifically invites comments as to whether distinctions could be drawn between different types of land-based vehicles or operating environments such that certain operations from moving land-based vehicles could be conducted safely. The FAA also invites comments on whether deviation authority should be included in the final rule to accommodate these types of operations. Next, we turn to the vertical boundary of the confined area of operation. With regard to the vertical boundary, the FAA proposes, in § 107.51(b), to set an altitude ceiling of 500 feet above ground level (AGL) for small UAS operations that would be subject to this proposed rule. The FAA chose to propose 500 feet as the vertical area-of-operation boundary because most manned aircraft operations take place above 500 feet. Specifically, most manned aircraft operations conducted over uncongested areas must be flown at an altitude above 500 feet AGL, while most manned aircraft operations conducted over
78 congested areas must be flown at an even higher altitude.57 Thus, a 500-foot altitude ceiling for small UAS operations would create a buffer between a small unmanned aircraft and most manned aircraft flying in the NAS. The FAA notes that while most manned aircraft operations fly above the 500-foot ceiling proposed in this rule, there are some manned-aircraft operations that could fly below this altitude. For example, aerial applicators, helicopter air ambulance services, and military operations conducted on military training routes often fly at an altitude below 500 feet. However, even though some manned aircraft operations take place at an altitude below 500 feet, there is significantly less air traffic at or below 500 feet than there is above 500 feet altitude. As a result of this difference in air-traffic density, the FAA has determined that small UAS operations would not pose a significant risk to manned aircraft operations taking place below 500 feet altitude if proper precautions are taken by the small UAS operator. The FAA also considered whether the vertical boundary should be set at a higher level. However, because most manned-aircraft operations transit the airspace above the 500-foot level, UAS operations at that altitude would likely require greater levels of operator training, aircraft equipage, and some type of aircraft certification in order to avoid endangering other users of the NAS. Since these provisions would be contrary to the goal of this rulemaking, which is to regulate the lowest-risk small UAS operations while imposing a minimal regulatory burden on those operations, this proposed rule would not allow small UAS to travel higher than 500 feet AGL. The FAA invites comments, with 57 See 14 CFR 91.119(b) and (c).
79 supporting documentation, on whether this proposed 500-foot ceiling should be raised or lowered. ii. Mitigating Loss-of-Positive-Control Risk Now that we have defined the confined area of operation, we turn to the question of how loss-of-positive-control risk can be mitigated within that area of operation. The FAA notes that there is significant diversity in both the types of small UAS that are available and the types of operations that those small UAS can be used in. Accordingly, small UAS operators need significant flexibility to mitigate hazards posed by their individual small UAS operation, as a mitigation method that works well for one type of small UAS used in one type of operation may not work as well in another operation that uses another type of small UAS. For example, in a loss-of-positive-control situation, a rotorcraft that loses operator inputs or power to its control systems would tend to descend straight down or at a slight angle while a fixed wing aircraft would glide for a greater distance before landing. Since the loss-of-positive-control risk posed by different types of small unmanned aircraft in various operations is different, the FAA proposes to create a performance-based standard under which, subject to certain broadly-applicable constraints, small UAS operators would have the flexibility to create operational and aircraft-specific loss-of-control mitigation measures. The broadly applicable constraints that the FAA proposes to impose on a small UAS operator's risk-mitigation decisions are as follows. First, the FAA proposes to require, in § 107.49(a)(3), that prior to flight, the operator must ensure that all links between the control station and the small unmanned aircraft are working properly. The
80 operator can do this by verifying control inputs from the control station to the servo actuators58 in the small unmanned aircraft. If the operator finds, during this preflight check, that a control link is not functioning properly, the operator would not commence flight until the problem with the control link is resolved. This proposed constraint would significantly mitigate the risk of a loss-of-positive-control scenario by reducing the possibility that small unmanned aircraft flight commences with a malfunctioning control link. Second, the FAA proposes to impose a speed limit of 87 knots (100 miles per hour) on small unmanned aircraft calibrated airspeed at full power in level flight. This is because, if there is a loss of positive control, an aircraft traveling at a high speed poses a higher risk to persons, property, and other aircraft than an aircraft traveling at a lower speed. A speed limit would also have safety benefits outside of a loss-of-positive-control scenario because a small unmanned aircraft traveling at a lower speed is generally easier to control than a higher-speed aircraft. In determining the specific speed limit, the FAA decided to propose 87 knots (100 mph) as the limit. This proposed speed limit is based on the ARC recommendation of a 100 mph speed limit for small UAS operations. The ARC determined that ''aircraft flying faster than 100 mph are considered a high performance aircraft'' that ''are perceived as having greater risks.''59 Accordingly, the FAA proposes to limit the speed of small unmanned aircraft to 87 knots (100 mph). The FAA invites comments on whether this speed limit should be raised or lowered or whether a speed limit is necessary. 58 A ''servo actuator'' is generally defined as a device used to provide a wide range of remote movement based on signals from the system on which it is used. 59 ARC Report, p. 20, section 6.12.
81 Third, the FAA proposes, in § 107.39, to prohibit the operation of a small unmanned aircraft over a person who is not directly participating in the operation of that small unmanned aircraft. One of the possible consequences of loss-of-positive-control is that the aircraft will immediately crash into the ground upon loss of control inputs from the operator. Because a loss of positive control can happen at any moment, the FAA's proposed prohibition on operating small unmanned aircraft over most persons will minimize the risk that a person is standing under a small unmanned aircraft if that aircraft terminates flight and returns to the surface. This prohibition would not apply to persons inside or underneath a covered structure that would protect the person from a falling small unmanned aircraft. The FAA's proposed prohibition on operating over people would provide an exception for persons directly participating in the operation of the small unmanned aircraft. The FAA considered prohibiting the operation of a small unmanned aircraft over any person, but rejected this approach as unduly burdensome because the operator or visual observer may, at some points of the operation, need to stand under the small unmanned aircraft in order to maintain visual line of sight and/or comply with other provisions of this proposed rule. As an alternative to prohibiting these persons from standing under the small unmanned aircraft, the FAA proposes, in § 107.49(a)(2), that prior to flight, the operator must ensure that all persons directly involved in the small unmanned aircraft operation receive a briefing that includes operating conditions, emergency procedures, contingency procedures, roles and responsibilities, and potential hazards. A person is directly involved in the operation when his or her involvement is necessary for the safe operation of the small unmanned aircraft. By receiving a pre-flight briefing on the details of the operation
82 and the hazards involved, the persons involved in the operation would be made aware of the small unmanned aircraft's location at all times and would be able to avoid the flight path of the small unmanned aircraft if the operator were to lose control or the aircraft were to experience a mechanical failure. Within these constraints, the FAA proposes the following performance-based standards for mitigating loss-of-positive-control risk. First, the FAA proposes, in § 107.49(a)(1), that, prior to flight, the operator must become familiar with the confined area of operation by assessing the operating environment and assessing risks to persons and property in the immediate vicinity both on the surface and in the air. As part of this preflight assessment, the operator would need to consider conditions that could pose a hazard to the operation of the small UAS as well as conditions in which the operation of the small UAS could pose a hazard to other aircraft or persons or property on the ground. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to require that the preflight assessment include the consideration of: (1) local weather conditions; (2) local airspace and any flight restrictions; (3) the location of persons and property on the ground; and (4) any other ground hazards. Second, the FAA proposes that, after becoming familiar with the confined area of operation and conducting a preflight assessment, the operator be required, by § 107.19(b), to ensure that the small unmanned aircraft will pose no undue hazard to other aircraft, people, or property in the event of a loss of control of the aircraft for any reason. This proposed requirement would provide the operator with significant flexibility to choose how to mitigate the hazards associated with loss of aircraft control. For example, in addition to the examples mentioned previously, if the operation takes place in a residential area, the
83 operator could ask everyone in the area of operation to remain inside their homes while the operation is conducted.60 If the operation takes place in an area where other air traffic could pose a hazard, the operator would advise local air traffic control as to the location of his or her area of operation and add extra visual observers to the operation so that they can notify the operator if other aircraft are approaching the area of operation. The above are just some examples of mitigation strategies that could be employed by the operator to ensure that the small unmanned aircraft will pose no hazard to other aircraft, people or property in the event of lost positive control. These examples are not intended to provide an exhaustive list, as there are different ways to mitigate loss of positive control. The proposed requirement in § 107.19(b) would provide the operator with the flexibility to choose which mitigation method is appropriate for his/her specific operation to ensure any hazards posed by loss of positive aircraft control are sufficiently mitigated. The FAA also anticipates creating guidance that provides additional examples of how operators can mitigate loss of positive control in small UAS operations. However, the FAA emphasizes that no matter what mitigation option(s) the operator employs under this proposed rule, the operator must strive to always maintain positive control of the small unmanned aircraft. The operator would be in violation of proposed § 107.19(b) if he or she intentionally operates the small unmanned aircraft in a location where he or she will not have positive control over that aircraft. 60 The FAA notes that this proposed requirement would not require people not involved with the operation to comply with the operator's warnings. The operator would simply be unable to commence the operation until the pertinent area has been made safe for operation.
84 5. Limitations on Operations in Certain Airspace This proposed rule would place limitations small UAS operations in three areas related to airspace: (1) controlled airspace (airspace other than Class G); (2) prohibited or restricted airspace; and (3) airspace where aviation activity is limited by a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). The FAA is proposing these requirements to reduce the threat to other users of the NAS in busy airspace or where most or all aviation activities would otherwise be limited. i. Controlled Airspace The FAA is seeking to limit the exposure of the small unmanned aircraft to other users of the NAS to minimize the risk of collision, which can occur both during controlled flight of the UAS or if the operator loses positive control of the small unmanned aircraft. This proposed rule would prohibit small unmanned aircraft operations in Class A airspace. Class A airspace starts at 18,000 feet mean sea level and extends up to 60,000 feet (Flight Level 600). As discussed above, this rule would prohibit small UAS operations above 500 feet AGL and outside of visual line of sight. Operations in Class A airspace would be inconsistent with that requirement, and therefore this proposed rule would prohibit operations in Class A airspace. Small UAS operations would also be prohibited in Class B, Class C, Class D, and within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport without prior authorization from the ATC facility having jurisdiction over the airspace. The FAA factors information such as traffic density, the nature of operations, and
85 the level of safety required when determining whether to designate controlled airspace.61 Pilots must have an ATC clearance to enter certain controlled airspace. In other words, the FAA requires ATC to have knowledge of aviation operations in the airspace due to the greater amount of activity in that area compared to uncontrolled airspace. The FAA believes that restricting use of controlled airspace to approved operations would reduce the risk of interference with other aircraft activities. Interference could occur for many reasons, including the location of the proposed small UAS operation in the airspace, or how the small unmanned aircraft would behave if there is a loss of positive control. These limitations would also be consistent with the general requirement for aircraft operating in controlled airspace to have ATC approval prior to entering the airspace. Therefore, the FAA proposes that small UAS receive approval from the ATC facility with jurisdiction over the airspace in which the operator would like to conduct operations. That ATC facility would have the best understanding of local airspace, its usage, and traffic patterns and would be in the best position to ascertain whether the proposed small UAS operation would pose a hazard to other users or the efficiency of the airspace, and procedures to implement to mitigate hazards. This proposed rule would not establish equipment requirements for small UAS operating in controlled airspace as the FAA does for other users of controlled airspace. Rather, the FAA believes that local ATC approval would provide a safer and more efficient operating environment at less cost to the operator. The FAA notes that normal aircraft operations inside controlled airspace in the vicinity of an airport require prior authorization from ATC. Per part 91, ATC currently 61 See FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, Para. 3-1-1.
86 requires two-way radio communication for departures, through flights, arrivals, and operations inside the airspace. The FAA understands that not all small UAS will be able to comply with the provisions of part 91, and that is why this proposed rule would not require strict compliance with part 91. However, because the air-traffic provisions of part 91 are intended to ensure safe operation in the NAS, a small UAS operator that intends to operate in controlled airspace must ensure that the proposed operations are planned and conducted in the safest manner possible. The small UAS operator can do this by working closely with the ATC facility that controls the airspace. The ATC facility has the authority to approve or deny aircraft operations based on traffic density, controller workload, communication issues, or any other type of operations that could potentially impact the safe and expeditious flow of air traffic in that airspace. The more that a small UAS is able to show that it would satisfy the provisions of part 91 and comply with the local operating procedures, the easier the access to the airspace would be. These items should be outlined in a prior agreement with the ATC facility to identify shortfalls and establish operating procedures for small UAS to integrate into the existing air traffic operation. This agreement would ensure all parties involved are aware of limitations and special interest items and would enable the safe flow of aircraft operations in that airspace. The FAA seeks comments related to part 91 compliance issues small UAS operators may encounter. ii. Prohibited or Restricted Areas The proposed rule would prohibit small UAS operations in prohibited and restricted areas without permission from the using or controlling agency as applicable. Prohibited and
87 restricted areas are designated in 14 CFR part 73. Prohibited areas are established when necessary to prohibit flight over an area on the surface in the interest of national security or welfare. No person may operate an aircraft without permission of the using agency in a prohibited area.62 Restricted areas are areas established when determined necessary to confine or segregate activities considered hazardous to non-participating aircraft. Although aircraft flight is not wholly prohibited in these areas, it is subject to restriction.63 The proposed provision concerning prohibited and restricted areas would be similar to the part 91 restriction on operations in these areas.64 iii. Areas Designated by Notice to Airmen This proposed rule would also prohibit operation of small UAS in airspace restricted by NOTAMs unless authorized by ATC or a certificate of waiver or authorization. This would include NOTAMs issued to designate a temporary flight restriction (TFR). NOTAMs contain time-critical aeronautical information that is either temporary in nature, or not sufficiently known in advance to permit publication on aeronautical charts or other publications.65 For example, NOTAMs may be used to limit or restrict aircraft operations during emergency situations or presidential or VIP movements. They may also be used to limit aircraft operations in the vicinity of aerial demonstrations or sporting events. NOTAMs are available to the public on the FAA's website.66 62 See 14 CFR 1.1. 63 See id. 64 See 14 CFR 91.133. 65 See FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, para. 5-1-3. 66 See, e.g., https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/ and http://www.faa.gov/pilots/flt_plan/notams/
88 Like other users of the airspace, small UAS operators would be required to review and comply with NOTAMs. As with other airspace restrictions in this rule, an operator could seek authorization from ATC or through a certificate of waiver or authorization to conduct operations in otherwise restricted airspace. The FAA believes that this process would permit an assessment of the operation in relation to the airspace restriction to determine whether the operation can be safely conducted. 6. Airworthiness, Inspection, Maintenance, and Airworthiness Directives i. Inspections and Maintenance As discussed in section III.J.3 of this preamble, pursuant to section 333(b)(2) of Public Law 112-95, we have determined that a small UAS should not be required to obtain airworthiness certification if satisfying the provisions of this proposal. However, without an airworthiness certification process, the FAA still needs to ensure that a small UAS is in a condition for safe operation. In considering how to address this issue, the FAA notes that the current regulations applicable to manned civil aircraft generally require an annual aircraft inspection every 12 months.67 The inspection and any maintenance that might be necessary as a result of the inspection currently are governed by the provisions of 14 CFR part 43. Part 43 requires that the inspection examine every component of the aircraft in detail to determine whether any hazardous characteristics are present that would render the 67 See 14 CFR 91.609. Different components of the aircraft are also currently subject to additional component-specific inspection schedules. For example, in addition to the above general inspection requirements, altimeter instruments on airplanes and helicopters operating in controlled airspace under instrument flight rules must be inspected every 24 months. See 14 CFR 91.411(a)(1).
89 aircraft unairworthy.68 If the inspection reveals any hazardous characteristics that would render the aircraft unairworthy, then maintenance, conducted pursuant to the regulations of part 43, must be performed in order to return the aircraft to an airworthy condition. In addressing the issue of airworthiness for small UAS, the FAA considered several approaches, including requiring small UAS operators to comply with the existing inspection and maintenance requirements of this chapter. The FAA also considered requiring a separate permit to operate (PTO) in addition to aircraft registration and airman certification. A PTO would have included airworthiness certification requirements that would have required an applicant to: · Describe the entire small UAS, including airframe, control station, and communications link; · Comply with a set of unvalidated consensus standards; · Test the design features required by the unvalidated consensus standards and determine that the UAS satisfies those standards; · Inspect the aircraft for compliance with the manufacturer's requirements; · Determine whether the aircraft has been manufactured in compliance with unvalidated production acceptance and quality assurance consensus standards acceptable to the FAA; · Complete ground and flight testing of required UAS components and determine whether they demonstrated acceptable performance and safe operation. · Create a process for addressing unsafe conditions in the aircraft; and 68 See 14 CFR part 43, Appendix D (listing aircraft components that must be inspected and the hazardous characteristics that the inspection should look for).
90 · Create a monitoring program to identify and correct safety-of-flight issues. After further consideration, the FAA decided that neither of these approaches is proportionate to the risk posed by small UAS. FAA noted that, as mentioned previously, due to their light weight, small unmanned aircraft generally pose a significantly lower risk to people and property on the ground than manned aircraft. This relatively low risk is mitigated even further by the see-and-avoid and loss-of-positive-control provisions of this proposed rule, which are discussed above. Accordingly, based on existing information, the FAA believes that requiring small UAS operators to conduct inspection and maintenance of the small UAS pursuant to the existing regulations of part 43, or to obtain a PTO, would not result in significant safety benefits. As a result, this proposed rule would not require small UAS compliance with part 43 or the application for, or issuance of, a PTO. Instead, this proposed rule would require, in § 107.21(b), that prior to each flight, the operator must inspect the small UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation. The operator could do this by, for example, performing a manufacturer-recommended preflight inspection or performing an on-the-ground test of the small UAS to determine whether safety-critical systems and components are working properly. If, as a result of the inspection, the operator determines that the small UAS is no longer in a condition for safe operation, then proposed §§ 107.21(a) and 107.15(a) would prohibit the operation of the small UAS until the necessary maintenance has been made and the small UAS is once again in a condition for safe operation. First, proposed § 107.21(a) would require that the operator must maintain the small UAS in a condition for safe operation. An example of how the operator could satisfy this proposed requirement would
91 be performing the manufacturer's recommended maintenance at manufacturer-recommended regular intervals. Second, § 107.15(a) would prohibit a person from operating a small UAS unless that UAS is in a condition for safe operation. Thus, if an operator notices during inspection, maintenance, or preflight action, that the small UAS is not in a condition for safe operation, then the operator would be in violation of § 107.15(a) if he or she flies the small unmanned aircraft while the UAS is not in a condition safe for operation. The FAA also notes that a small UAS that appears to be in a condition for safe operation prior to flight may become unsafe for operation during flight. For example, the small unmanned aircraft could sustain damage during flight rendering that aircraft unsafe for continuing the flight. As such, this proposed rule would require, in § 107.15(b), that the operator must discontinue the flight of the small unmanned aircraft when he or she knows or has reason to know that continuing the flight would pose a hazard to other aircraft, people, or property. This proposed requirement is similar to a requirement that currently exists in § 91.7(b), which requires the PIC to ''discontinue the flight [of an aircraft] when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur.'' The FAA invites comments on the issues discussed in this section. The FAA also invites comments as to the costs and benefits of requiring small UAS operators to perform maintenance and inspections pursuant to existing regulations. ii. Airworthiness Directives The FAA typically issues airworthiness directives to correct an existing unsafe condition in a product when the condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of
92 the same type design. Airworthiness directives currently are issued for engines, propellers, and other products that are either: (1) approved under a type certificate or a supplemental type certificate; or (2) that are manufactured under a production certificate, a parts manufacturer approval (PMA), or technical standard order (TSO) authorization. As discussed in section III.J of this preamble, the FAA does not propose to require a type certificate, a production certificate, a PMA or TSO authorization for small UAS or any part installed on the small UAS. However, to provide manufacturers with flexibility, manufacturers would not be prohibited from installing parts that are FAA-certificated, have received PMA, or are TSO-authorized for manned-aircraft use on the small UAS, provided the small unmanned aircraft remains under 55 pounds after the installation of the part. The FAA anticipates that some manufacturers may choose to use these parts on the small UAS in order to obtain a higher level of reliability associated with a certificate, approval, or authorization. However, because parts that are FAA-certificated, have received PMA, or are TSO-authorized may have airworthiness directives that are applicable to those parts, the FAA proposes to require, in § 107.13(d), that the owner or operator of the small UAS must comply with all applicable airworthiness directives. The FAA notes that it used a similar approach in its 2004 light-sport aircraft rulemaking. In that rulemaking, the FAA did not require a type or production certificate for light-sport aircraft but allowed the installation on the aircraft of parts that are FAA-certificated, have received PMA, or are TSO-
93 authorized as long as the owner or operator complied with all applicable airworthiness directives.69 7. Miscellaneous Operating Provisions i. Careless or Reckless Operation The existing FAA regulations prohibit a person from operating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.70 These regulations also prohibit the PIC from allowing any object to be dropped from an aircraft in flight if doing so would create a hazard to persons or property.71 The FAA proposes to apply similar regulations to small UAS operations, in § 107.23 to ensure that a small UAS is not operated in a hazardous manner. ii. Drug and Alcohol Prohibition Proposed § 107.27 would require small UAS operators and visual observers to comply with the alcohol and drug use prohibitions that are currently in place in part 91 of the FAA's regulations. Small UAS operators and visual observers would also be subject to the existing regulations of § 91.19, which prohibit knowingly carrying narcotic drugs, marijuana, and depressant or stimulant drugs or substances. The purpose of these regulations is to ensure that the safety of small UAS operations are not impeded by alcohol or drug use and to prohibit the use of aircraft for drug trafficking. Section 91.17 specifically prohibits use of alcohol or drugs during or for a 69 Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft Final Rule, 69 FR 44772, 44855 (July 27, 2004). 70 14 CFR 91.13(a). 71 14 CFR 91.15.
94 time period prior to an operation. Moreover, operators and visual observers would need to submit to testing to determine alcohol concentration in the blood due to a suspected violation of law or § 91.17. Operators or visual observers would be required to submit these tests to the FAA if the FAA has a reasonable basis to believe that the person has violated § 91.17. This section would also subject persons operating small UAS who knowingly carry illegal substances to FAA enforcement action, which could include certificate revocation. An exception exists for substances authorized by or under any Federal or State statute or by any Federal or State Agency. iii. Medical Conditions As discussed in section III.E of this preamble, this proposed rule would not require a small UAS operator or visual observer to hold an airman medical certificate. However, the FAA recognizes the possibility that a person acting as an operator or visual observer may have a medical condition that could interfere with the safe operation of the small UAS. Accordingly, the FAA proposes, in § 107.17, to prohibit a person from acting as an operator or visual observer if he or she knows or has reason to know of any physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. This proposed provision is similar to the regulatory provision of 14 CFR 61.53(b), which currently applies to operations that do not require a medical certificate.
95 iv. Sufficient Power for the small UAS Proposed § 107.49(a)(4) would require a small UAS operator to ensure that, if powered, the small UAS has enough power to operate for its intended operational time and an additional five minutes. The 5-minute buffer would ensure that the small UAS has sufficient power to return to the operator, or another location, and be able to make a controlled landing. Additionally, control inputs to a small UAS may degrade as batteries lose charge because power to the flight control system(s) may be lost. Accordingly this proposed rule would help to ensure that the small UAS remains controllable throughout its intended operational time. The FAA notes that a small UAS travelling at 10 miles per hour would be able to cover nearly one mile in 5 minutes. v. Registration and Marking As mentioned earlier, the FAA's statute prohibits a person from operating a civil aircraft that is not registered.72 The FAA proposes to codify this statutory requirement in § 107.13(b). In addition, all aircraft currently are required to display their registration number on the aircraft.73 The FAA proposes to impose a similar requirement, in § 107.13(c), on small unmanned aircraft subject to this proposed rule. The specific manner in which the small unmanned aircraft would register and display its registration number is discussed in section III.G of this preamble. 72 49 U.S.C. 44101(a). 73 See 14 CFR part 45.
96 E. Operator Certificate As discussed earlier in this preamble, the FAA proposes to satisfy the statutory requirement for an airman to possess an airman certificate74 by requiring small UAS operators to obtain and hold an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating in order to operate a small UAS. An unmanned aircraft operator certificate would be a new type of airman certificate created by this proposed rule, and this section explains the FAA's proposal concerning this certificate. 1. Applicability The FAA is proposing to require that individuals obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating as a prerequisite to operating a small UAS. As with airman certificates that the FAA requires for operating other aircraft, an operator certificate would ensure that the operator is able to safely operate the small UAS. The FAA notes that airman certificates are currently issued to pilots who engage in commercial and non-commercial activities. The FAA is proposing to issue a new type of certificate for UAS operators, rather than require a private or commercial pilot certificate with UAS type rating, because many of the requirements for private and commercial pilots are not necessary for the types of operations that would be permitted under this rule. Moreover, the FAA wants to maintain a distinction between an unmanned aircraft operator certificate and the airman certificates issued under parts 61, 63 and 65.75 As such, 74 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A). 75 Parts 61, 63, and 65 currently apply to all airman certificates, which include small UAS airmen. However, under this proposed rule, these parts would no longer apply to small UAS airmen. Thus, the distinction discussed in this paragraph would segregate experience acquired while operating a small UAS from experience acquired while operating a manned aircraft.
97 proposed § 61.8 would prohibit activities under this rule from being used to meet part 61 requirements. Activities would include any training, certification, or flights associated with small UAS under proposed part 107. This proposal is consistent with the FAA's statement in the 2013 Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations Final Rule that ''regulations do not currently permit the time acquired while operating [a UAS] to be logged to meet aeronautical experience requirements for FAA [manned-aircraft] certification.''76 Additionally, that rule did not extend an exception from a flight time standard to graduates of training programs designed to qualify a military pilot solely for operation of UAS to qualify for a reduced flight time.77 The FAA considered proposing to require an individual to obtain a commercial pilot certificate with a UAS type endorsement before operating a small UAS. Issuance of such a certificate would require that the applicant obtain a Class II airman medical certificate, pass an aeronautical knowledge test, and demonstrate flight proficiency and aeronautical experience with a certificated flight instructor. However, given the lower level of public risk posed by small UAS operations, the FAA decided that imposing such requirements would be unduly burdensome to small UAS operators. Moreover, as explained in further detail in preamble section III.E.2.iii.a below, the FAA believes that the training, testing, proficiency and experience requirements for obtaining a commercial pilot license have limited relevance to the nature of small UAS operations. The FAA invites public comment on its proposal to create a new category of airman certificate for small UAS operators. 76 78 FR 42324 (July 15, 2013). 77 Id.
98 2. Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate '' Eligibility & Issuance This rule would establish the eligibility requirements to apply for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating and specify when a certificate would be issued. Military and former military pilots would be able to apply based on experience operating unmanned aircraft in the United States Armed Forces. i. Minimum Age Proposed § 107.61 would establish the eligibility requirements for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. First, an applicant would need to be at least 17 years of age. This minimum age is consistent with existing FAA minimum age requirements for the Sport Pilot, Recreational Pilot, and Private Pilot airman certificates '' the base-level certificates authorizing pilots to operate aircraft while not under the supervision of an instructor. Because this rule would permit commercial small UAS operations, the FAA considered setting the minimum age at 18 years, consistent with the Commercial Pilot Certificate requirements which permit carrying persons or property for compensation or hire. However, the FAA determined that the higher age limit was not necessary because the proposed operational limitations will create an environment that minimizes risk to persons and property. The FAA notes that the minimum age necessary to apply for an airman certificate to operate a glider or a balloon category aircraft is 16 years old. The FAA invites comments on whether the minimum age necessary to apply for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate should similarly be reduced to 16 years old in the final rule. The FAA also
99 invites comments as to whether reducing the minimum applicant age to 16 years old would further enable academic use of small UAS. ii. English Language Proficiency A person would need to be able to read, speak, write and understand the English language to be eligible for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. This requirement is consistent with all other airman certificates issued by the FAA.78 The English language has generally been accepted as the international standard for aircraft operations by ICAO. However, this proposed rule would create an exception for people who are unable to meet one of the English language requirements due to medical reasons, as is the case for other airman certificates. Such a person would still be eligible for a certificate; however, the FAA would be able to specify limitations on that person's small UAS operator certificate to account for the medical condition. For example, if an applicant is unable to communicate using speech then the FAA may impose a limitation that the operator may not conduct a small UAS operation requiring more than one person. iii. Pilot Qualification The third proposed requirement to obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating would be to pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test. To ensure that a pilot is qualified to control an aircraft, the FAA generally requires that the applicant for a pilot certificate demonstrate the following three things: (1) aeronautical knowledge; 78 See, e.g., 14 CFR 61.83(c).
100 (2) flight proficiency (i.e. that the applicant has the requisite piloting skills); and (3) aeronautical experience.79 For the reasons stated below, the FAA has determined that a flight proficiency demonstration and aeronautical experience should not be required for issuance of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. Instead, the FAA proposes to require that applicants for this certificate simply demonstrate their aeronautical knowledge by passing an initial knowledge test and then passing a recurrent knowledge test every 24 months thereafter. a. Flight Proficiency and Aeronautical Experience As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the FAA currently requires applicants for a pilot certificate to demonstrate that they have the requisite flight proficiency and aeronautical experience to properly control the flight of an aircraft. These existing regulations are intended to ensure that an aircraft can take off safely and arrive back on the ground: (1) with everyone on board the aircraft unharmed; (2) without harming people on the ground; and (3) without interfering with other users of the NAS. The first consideration for requiring a flight-proficiency demonstration and aeronautical experience (to prevent possible harm to people on board the aircraft) does not apply to small UAS operations because if a small unmanned aircraft was to crash, there would be no one on board the aircraft to be harmed by that crash. The second consideration for these requirements (to prevent harm to people on the ground) is addressed by the operating requirements of this rule, which limit the operation of the small unmanned aircraft to a confined area and require the operator to ensure that the aircraft will pose no 79 See, e.g., 14 CFR 61.105-61.109.
101 hazard to people on the ground if there is a loss of positive control. An operator does not necessarily need special operating skills or aeronautical experience to ensure that the aircraft will not pose a hazard to people on the ground. For example, if an operator plans to fly the small unmanned aircraft in a residential area, the operator could approach the people who live in that area prior to the operation, inform them of the details of the operation, and ask them to either stay out of the area or stay indoors during the operation. Doing this would ensure the safety of people on the ground but would not require the use of special operating skills or aeronautical experience. The third consideration for requiring a flight-proficiency demonstration and aeronautical experience (to avoid interference with other users of the NAS) is mitigated by the fact that a small unmanned aircraft is generally: (1) relatively easy to control; (2) highly maneuverable; and (3) much easier to terminate flight than a manned aircraft. Specifically, the control station for a small UAS is typically less complex than the interface used to control the flight of a manned aircraft. Many small UAS control stations currently consist of a basic two-joystick interface where one joystick controls the aircraft's altitude and the other joystick controls the aircraft's speed and direction. Other control stations utilize basic programs, such as smart-phone or tablet applications, to control the small unmanned aircraft. These programs are generally easy to learn and utilize. By contrast, the flight deck interface used to control a manned aircraft requires coordinated use of flight control inputs, interpretation of aircraft instrumentation, and onboard equipment operation. Some of this equipment includes communication and sophisticated navigation equipment. A manned-aircraft pilot must learn to properly use all of these flight-deck-interface components in order to control the flight of the manned aircraft.
102 In addition, because a small unmanned aircraft is highly maneuverable and easy to land, an operator who finds the small unmanned aircraft to be difficult to control would still be able to easily land the aircraft. For instance, in the two-joystick control station example provided above, the operator could land a small unmanned rotorcraft simply by pressing the altitude joystick down until the rotorcraft descends to the ground. By contrast, a manned aircraft pilot would need to go through a significantly more complex process that includes adjusting aircraft attitude with flight controls, reducing engine power, and scanning for other traffic, in order to land the aircraft on the ground after takeoff. There are two additional considerations for not requiring a flight proficiency demonstration or aeronautical experience for small UAS operators. First, unlike the pilot of a manned aircraft, the small UAS operator has the option to sacrifice the small unmanned aircraft in response to an emergency. Second, as discussed previously, proposed §§ 107.19(b) and 107.39 would require the operator to control the confined area of operation in order to ensure that the small unmanned aircraft will not pose a hazard to people on the ground in an emergency situation. Other operating rules proposed in this NPRM, such as the prohibition on operating within restricted areas without permission, the requirement to give way to manned aircraft, and the 500 feet AGL height limitation, would also mitigate the risk that a small unmanned aircraft interferes with other users of the NAS or poses a hazard to people on the ground. Because the considerations underlying the current flight proficiency demonstration and aeronautical experience requirements have, at best, a limited applicability to small UAS operations that would be subject to this proposed rule, the FAA proposes not to
103 require that applicants for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating demonstrate flight proficiency or aeronautical experience. The FAA invites comments on whether these applicants should be required to demonstrate flight proficiency and/or aeronautical experience. If so, what flight proficiency and/or aeronautical experience requirements should the FAA impose? The FAA also invites comments as to the costs and benefits of imposing these requirements. b. Initial Aeronautical Knowledge Test Turning to the remaining component of airman certification (aeronautical knowledge), the FAA proposes to require that applicants for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating pass an initial knowledge test to demonstrate that they have sufficient aeronautical knowledge to safely operate a small UAS. The FAA proposes a knowledge test rather than a required training course in order to provide applicants with flexibility as to the method that they use to acquire aeronautical knowledge. For example, some individuals who wish to become small UAS operators may also hold a pilot certificate, and those individuals would already have acquired extensive aeronautical knowledge in order to obtain a pilot certificate. Other individuals may be able to acquire the necessary knowledge through self-study. Still other individuals may choose to use a commercial training course designed to provide them with the knowledge necessary to pass the initial knowledge test. In any case, passage of a knowledge test would ensure that the applicant has demonstrated the aeronautical knowledge necessary to safely operate a small UAS regardless of how the applicant happened to acquire that knowledge. The FAA invites
104 comments as to whether other requirements, such as passage of an FAA-approved training course, should be imposed either instead of or in addition to the proposed knowledge test. c. Areas of Knowledge Tested on the Initial Knowledge Test This proposed initial knowledge test would test the following areas of knowledge. First, the knowledge test would test whether the applicant knows the regulations applicable to small UAS operations. By testing the applicant's knowledge of the applicable regulations, the proposed initial knowledge test would ensure that the applicant understands what those regulations require and does not violate them through ignorance. Second, the initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands how to determine the classification of specific airspace and what the requirements are for operating in that airspace. To comply with the proposed airspace operating requirements, a small UAS operator would need to know how to determine the classification of the airspace in which he or she would like to operate. Third, the initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands flight restrictions affecting small unmanned aircraft operations. The proposed initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant knows how to determine which areas are prohibited, restricted, or subject to a TFR in order to comply with the proposed flight restrictions in §§ 107.45 and 107.47. Fourth, the initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands how to clear an obstacle during flight. As discussed previously, proposed § 107.37(b) prohibits a person from creating a collision hazard with, among other things, a ground structure. The proposed initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands what types of
105 small unmanned aircraft maneuvers would create a collision hazard with a ground structure. Fifth, the initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands the effects of weather and micrometeorology (weather on a localized and small scale) on small unmanned aircraft operation. Knowledge of weather is necessary for safe operation of a small unmanned aircraft because, due to the light weight of the small unmanned aircraft, weather could have a significant impact on the flight of that aircraft. For example, space around buildings, smokestacks and trees, which is safe during clear weather, could easily become hazardous in a windy situation. Accordingly, the proposed initial knowledge test would test whether an applicant understands the effect that different types of weather have on small unmanned aircraft performance and how to react to that weather. The proposed knowledge test would also test whether an applicant has knowledge of official sources that he or she can use to obtain weather information and predictions in order to plan the operation of the small UAS. Sixth, the proposed knowledge test would test whether an applicant understands how to calculate the weight and balance of the small unmanned aircraft to determine impacts on performance. In order to operate safely, operators need knowledge and understanding of some fundamental aircraft performance issues, which include load balancing and weight distribution as well as available power for the operation. Seventh, the operator of a small UAS may be presented with an emergency situation during an operation. Accordingly, the proposed initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands how to properly respond to an emergency.
106 Eighth, the proposed initial knowledge test would test the applicant's understanding of aeronautical decision-making/judgment and crew resource management. Even though this proposed rule would limit the flight of a small unmanned aircraft to operations at or below 500 feet AGL, some manned aircraft will still operate in the same airspace as the small unmanned aircraft. Accordingly, the small UAS operator would need to understand the aeronautical decision-making and judgment that manned-aircraft pilots engage in so that he or she can anticipate how the manned aircraft will react to the small unmanned aircraft. The small UAS operator would also need to understand how to function in a team environment (this is known as crew resource management) because this proposed rule would permit the use of visual observers to assist the small UAS operator and would place the operator in charge of those observers. Ninth, the proposed initial knowledge test would test the applicant's understanding of airport operations and radio communication procedures, which would include standard terminology. While this proposed rule would limit small UAS operations in the vicinity of an airport, there are some instances where these operations would be permitted. For example, this proposed rule would allow a small unmanned aircraft to operate in Class B, C, or D airspace if the operator obtains prior ATC authorization. In order to operate safely near an airport, the operator would need to have knowledge of airport operations so that the small unmanned aircraft does not interfere with those operations. The operator would also need to have knowledge of radio communication procedures so that the operator can communicate with ATC.
107 Lastly, the proposed initial knowledge test would test whether the applicant understands the physiological effects of drugs and alcohol. Many prescription and over-the-counter medications can significantly reduce an individual's cognitive ability to process and determine what is happening around him or her. Accordingly, an operator needs to understand how drugs and alcohol can impact his or her ability to safely operate the small UAS. The FAA invites comments on the proposed areas of knowledge to be tested on the initial knowledge test. The FAA also invites comments as to whether the initial knowledge test should test any other areas of knowledge. If so, what additional areas of knowledge should be tested? What would be the costs and benefits of testing these other areas of knowledge? d. Administration of the Initial Knowledge Test Knowledge tests currently administered to prospective pilots under 14 CFR part 61 are created by the FAA and administered by FAA-approved knowledge testing centers. A knowledge testing center is a private entity that has received FAA approval to administer airman knowledge tests. These centers are all certificated and regularly evaluated to ensure that the testing center meets FAA certification requirements. There are currently about 650 knowledge testing center spread throughout the country. The FAA proposes to apply its existing knowledge development and administration framework to knowledge tests that would be administered to prospective small UAS operators. Under this framework, the initial knowledge test would be created by the FAA and administered by an FAA-approved knowledge testing center. Just as it does now, the FAA will specify the minimum grade
108 necessary to pass the knowledge test,80 and applicants who take the test will be issued an airman knowledge test report showing the results of the knowledge test. To ensure that the knowledge test is properly administered, this proposed rule would also impose the following requirements. First, proposed § 107.69 would prohibit an applicant from cheating or engaging in unauthorized conduct during a knowledge test. This would include: (1) copying or intentionally removing a knowledge test; (2) giving a copy of a knowledge test to another applicant or receiving a copy of the knowledge test from another applicant; (3) giving or receiving unauthorized assistance while the knowledge test is being administered; (4) taking any part of a knowledge test on behalf of another person; (5) being represented by or representing another person for a knowledge test; and (6) using any material not specifically authorized by the FAA while taking a knowledge test. Cheating or engaging in unauthorized conduct during a knowledge test in violation of proposed § 107.69 would be grounds for suspending or revoking the certificate or denying an application for a certificate. In addition, a person who engages in unauthorized conduct would be prohibited from applying for a certificate or taking a knowledge test for a period of one year after the date of the unauthorized conduct. Second, to ensure that the person taking the knowledge test is correctly identified, proposed § 107.67 would require an applicant for a knowledge test to have proper identification at the time of the application. To ensure correct identification, the applicant for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate would have to have his or her identification verified in person just like any other applicant for an FAA-issued airman certificate. The 80 See 14 CFR 61.35(b).
109 proposed requirements for proper identification would be the same as the identification requirements currently imposed on applicants who wish to take a knowledge test.81 Specifically, an applicant's identification would need to include the applicant's: (1) photograph; (2) signature; (3) date of birth, which shows the applicant meets or will meet the proposed age requirements for an operator certificate; and (4) the applicant's current residential address if the permanent mailing address is a post office box number. Finally, proposed § 107.71 would address circumstances in which an applicant wishes to retake a knowledge test after failure. To ensure that an applicant receives additional training after failing a knowledge test, the FAA currently requires an applicant who fails a knowledge test to receive additional training from a flight instructor and an endorsement from that instructor indicating that the instructor has determined that the applicant is now proficient to pass the test.82 However, as discussed previously, this proposed rule would not require any specific form of training or studying in order to pass a knowledge test. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to require that a person who fails a knowledge test wait 14 calendar days before retaking the knowledge test. This 14-day waiting period would provide sufficient time for an applicant who fails a knowledge test to obtain additional training of his or her choice. The FAA also considered whether to offer an option for the knowledge test to be administered online. However, in examining this approach the FAA ultimately determined that there would be significant risk in the integrity of a knowledge test becoming compromised if that test was to be administered outside of a controlled environment. This 81 The current knowledge-test identification requirements can be found at 14 CFR 61.35(a)(2). 82 14 CFR 61.49(a).
110 could be accomplished through someone copying and circulating the test questions, using unauthorized materials to take the test, or even taking the test for another person. Using the identity of another person to take the knowledge test may also allow an applicant to manipulate the security vetting procedures that take place once the applicant's identity is verified. In addition, the FAA determined that it would be more difficult to safeguard the personally identifiable information (PII) of a test-taker that would be collected online rather than in-person at a knowledge testing center. Accordingly, the FAA has decided against proceeding with an online test-taking option. The FAA invites comments on whether the small UAS aeronautical knowledge test should have an option for online test-taking and, if so, what safeguards should be implemented to protect the integrity of the small UAS knowledge test, assure the FAA of the identity of the test taker, and protect the test-taker's PII that would be provided online. The FAA also invites comment on different UAS testing location options that might provide the lowest cost option for individuals, while protecting the integrity of the test and the information provided as part of the test-taking process. e. Recurrent Aeronautical Knowledge Test i. General Requirement and Administration of the Recurrent Knowledge Test The FAA also proposes to require small UAS operators to pass a recurrent aeronautical knowledge test after they receive their operator certificate. The FAA proposes this requirement because this proposed rule would not require small UAS operators to regularly conduct small UAS operations, and consequently, some operators may conduct small UAS operations infrequently and may not fully retain some of the knowledge that
111 they acquired in order to pass the initial knowledge test. The FAA also notes that even operators who regularly conduct small UAS operations may not fully retain pieces of knowledge that they do not use during their regular operations. For example, a small UAS operator who conducts operations only in Class G airspace may not retain the knowledge that he or she needs ATC authorization in order to conduct operations in Class B, C, or D airspace. Some aeronautical knowledge that the small UAS operator learned for the initial knowledge test may also become outdated over time. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to require that the operator pass a recurrent knowledge test every 24 months. The FAA proposes 24 months as the appropriate recurrent testing frequency because that is the frequency of the recurrent flight review that pilots currently complete under 14 CFR 61.56. This requirement has been in place for approximately 40 years. Based on the FAA's experience with the existing 24-month flight review cycle, a recurrent knowledge test that is given every 24 months would ensure that the small UAS operator properly maintains the pertinent aeronautical knowledge. The FAA invites comments on this proposed requirement. The FAA also proposes that the recurrent aeronautical knowledge test be administered using the same framework as the initial aeronautical knowledge test. Specifically, under this proposed rule, the recurrent knowledge test would be created by the FAA and administered by FAA-approved knowledge testing centers. An applicant would be required to have proper identification in order to take the test, and he or she would be required to wait 14 days after failure before retaking the knowledge test. A certificate
112 holder or applicant83 would also be prohibited from cheating or engaging in unauthorized conduct during the recurrent knowledge test. Just as with the initial knowledge test, the FAA invites comments on whether the small UAS recurrent aeronautical knowledge test should have an option for online test-taking and, if so, what safeguards should be implemented to protect the integrity of the small UAS knowledge test, assure the FAA of the identity of the test taker, and protect the test-taker's PII that would be provided online. ii. Recurrent Test Areas of Knowledge Under this proposed rule, the recurrent knowledge test would test the following areas of knowledge. First, the knowledge test would test the operator's knowledge of the regulations that govern small UAS operation to ensure that his or her knowledge is up to date regarding all aspects of small UAS operations permitted under the certificate, as the operator may not encounter all of these aspects in his or her regular operation. In the example provided earlier, an operator who regularly conducts small UAS operations in Class G airspace may not retain the knowledge concerning regulations governing operation in other classes of airspace. Second, the recurrent knowledge test would test the operator's knowledge of airspace classification and operating requirements, obstacle clearance requirements, and flight restrictions. This is because: (1) airspace that the operator is familiar with could become reclassified over time; (2) the location of existing flight restrictions could change 83 As discussed in more detail further in the preamble, proposed § 107.75 would allow military or former military UAS operator applicants to take the recurrent test instead of the initial test in order to obtain an FAA-issued unmanned aircraft operator certificate.
113 over time; (3) new ground-based obstacles could be created as a result of new construction; and (4) some operators may not regularly encounter these issues in their regular operations. Third, the recurrent knowledge test would ensure that the operator has the latest knowledge concerning sources of weather and airport operations. This is because the official sources of weather could change over time. Market turnover could also affect a change in airport operations as new airports are built and old airports are demolished or repurposed. The FAA notes that airports can also change their operations in response to changes in operating environment by, for example, changing the approaches that manned aircraft use to line up for a landing. The recurrent knowledge test would ensure that the small UAS operator is familiar with the latest sources of weather and the latest information concerning airport operations. Fourth, the recurrent knowledge test would test the operator's knowledge of emergency procedures, crew resource management, and aeronautical decision-making/judgment. A small UAS operator may not encounter any of these situations over a 24-month operating period because: (1) an emergency situation may not present itself; (2) the operator may be involved in operations that do not use visual observers; and (3) the operator may be involved in operations that do not take place in the vicinity of any manned aircraft. Accordingly, including these areas of knowledge on the recurrent knowledge test would ensure that the operator retains knowledge on these areas even if he or she does not regularly encounter them in his or her small UAS operations.
114 iv. Issuance of an Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate with Small UAS Rating Proposed § 107.63 specifies that the FAA will issue the certificate to an airman eligible under § 107.61 if the airman submits an application including an airman knowledge test report showing that he or she passed the initial aeronautical knowledge test required for the certificate. The certificate will not have an expiration date, and once issued, it will remain valid until surrendered, suspended, or revoked. The FAA invites comments as to whether this certificate should expire after a certain period of time. If so, when should the certificate expire? The method of submission of the application is discussed further in section III.E.5.i of this preamble. The FAA notes that, as discussed in that section, all applicants for an airman certificate will be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 46111 to determine whether they pose a security threat. An applicant will not be issued an unmanned aircraft operator certificate until the TSA determines that the applicant will not pose a security threat. v. Not Requiring an Airman Medical Certificate The FAA also considered whether to require an applicant seeking an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating to obtain an airman medical certificate as part of the application process. With certain exceptions, under 14 CFR part 61, the FAA currently requires an airman medical certificate for a student pilot certificate, a recreational pilot certificate, a private pilot certificate, a commercial pilot certificate, and an airline
115 transport pilot certificate.84 Flight instructors are also required to have a valid medical certificate when required to act as pilot in command. The primary reason for medical certification is to determine if the airman has a medical condition that is likely to manifest as subtle or sudden incapacitation that could cause a pilot to lose positive control of the aircraft, or impair the pilots ability to ''see and avoid.'' The FAA has determined that traditional FAA medical certification may not be warranted for small UAS operators subject to this proposed rule mainly because small UAS operators and visual observers are operating within a ''confined area of operation,'' and subject to other operational limitations, discussed previously in this preamble. This is because the proposed visual-line-of-sight requirement for the operator and/or visual observer to be able to see the aircraft's direction and attitude of flight in the proposed rule is preferable to a vision standard. Even with normal vision it is foreseeable that a small unmanned aircraft may be so small that the operational space must be reduced to meet the operational requirements proposed in this rule. As such, prescriptive medical standards may not be as critical as they are for individuals exercising pilot privileges and therefore are not proposed under this action. Rather, the FAA is proposing that operators self-certify, at the time of their airman application, that they do not have a medical condition that could interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. As proposed in § 107.61(d), an applicant for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating would be ineligible for the certificate if 84 14 CFR 61.23(a).
116 he or she knows or has reason to know of any physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. The FAA also proposes, in § 107.63(a), that the applicant be required to make a certification to that effect. Both of these proposed requirements are similar to the regulatory provision of § 61.53(b), which prohibits operations during medical deficiency for individuals conducting operations that do not require a medical certificate. FAA also considered proposing to require a medical certificate for a visual observer, but decided not to propose this requirement for the same reason a medical certificate for an operator is not being proposed. The FAA, however, does invite public comment as to whether an FAA medical certificate should be required. The FAA also invites comments as to the costs and benefits of requiring an airman medical certificate for an operator or visual observer. 4. Military Equivalency This proposed rule would allow pilots with military experience operating unmanned aircraft to take the recurrent knowledge test in lieu of the initial knowledge test in order to be eligible for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. The U.S. Armed Forces use many types and sizes of UAS in combat and non-combat operations, both in the United States and abroad, and have done so for many years. During that time, many servicemen and women have been trained to operate UAS. The FAA has established special rules for current or former military pilots allowing them to be issued FAA pilot
117 certificates based on their military flight experience and passing a military knowledge check.85 Accordingly, the FAA is proposing to allow current or former military operators of unmanned aircraft to take a more limited recurrent aeronautical knowledge test rather than the initial aeronautical knowledge test to obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. They may not rely on that experience if they were subject to certain disciplinary action described in § 107.75(a). The FAA also considered whether to allow individuals who have been conducting UAS operations under a COA as a non-military UAS operator to take a recurrent test instead of an initial test in order to obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. However, the FAA decided not to include this provision in the proposed rule because: (1) there is no formally recognized recordation system for non-military COA pilots as there is for military pilots; and (2) non-military COA pilots are currently subject to different requirements than military COA pilots for operations above 400 feet AGL. The FAA invites comments on whether non-military COA pilots should be permitted to take the recurrent knowledge test instead of the initial knowledge test in order to obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate. 5. Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate: Denial, Revocation, Suspension, Amendment, and Surrender This rule would establish specific instances for when an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating can be denied, revoked, suspended, amended, or 85 See 14 CFR 61.73.
118 surrendered. This rule would allow the FAA to deny, suspend, or revoke the certificate for reasons including security risk posed by the applicant, drug or alcohol offenses, refusal to submit to an alcohol test or furnish the results. Certificate holders would also be able to voluntarily surrender certificates. i. Transportation Security Administration Vetting and Positive Identification The FAA will deny an application for a certificate or take certificate action if the TSA determines that a person poses a security threat. Specifically, under 49 U.S.C. 46111, once an unmanned aircraft operator certificate application is received, the FAA will verify compliance and the accuracy of the application and provide the applicant's information to TSA for security vetting prior to certificate issuance. Under this proposed rule, the FAA would transmit a student pilot's biographic information for security vetting to TSA and issue an unmanned aircraft operator certificate only after receiving a successful response from TSA. However, if the TSA determines that an airman certificate applicant poses a security risk, section 46111 requires the FAA to deny the application for a certificate or amend, modify, suspend, or revoke (as appropriate) any part of an airman certificate based on the TSA's security findings. The FAA may issue certificates to individuals who have first successfully completed a security threat assessment (STA) conducted by the TSA.86 TSA would conduct STAs of applicants for a UAS certificate and notify the applicant and/or the FAA when the STA is complete. The STA would consist of a check of intelligence-related databases, including Interpol and international databases, terrorist watch lists, and other 86 See 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(D).
119 sources relevant to determining whether an individual poses or may pose a threat to transportation security, and that confirm the individual's identity. A successful STA is generally valid for five years, but may be revoked during that time if TSA's recurrent vetting reveals that the individual poses or may pose a security threat. Congress requires TSA to recover the costs of vetting and credentialing services through user fees.87 The fees for vetting UAS certificate applicants would cover TSA's costs for enrolling, processing, and replying to the application, as well as the costs of conducting the intelligence-related checks themselves. TSA is developing a process, through rulemaking, by which TSA's vetting fees can be collected from applicants during the application process, as TSA currently does in other vetting and credentialing programs, and used to cover the cost of the security screening. Thus, while this rulemaking projects that these costs are currently governmental costs, these costs would be passed on to individuals in the future. As a result of the processes that go into the issuance of an airman certificate, the FAA estimates that it could take about 6 to 8 weeks after receipt of an application for the FAA to issue an applicant an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. The FAA invites comments with suggestions for how this period could be reduced. The FAA also notes that the TSA will continue to examine certificate holders after FAA issuance of a certificate. In addition, in order for the TSA to be able to make the security assessments specified in 49 U.S.C. 46111, the agency must be sure of the identity of the person that it is 87 See 6 U.S.C. 469.
120 assessing. Otherwise, a person who poses a security threat could evade TSA scrutiny simply by using someone else's identity. To address this issue, the FAA currently requires all applicants for a pilot certificate to apply in person and present positive identification at the time of application.88 The identification must include an official photograph of the applicant, the applicant's signature, and the applicant's residential address, if different from the mailing address.89 Acceptable methods of identification currently include, but are not limited to, U.S. driver's licenses, government identification cards, and passports.90 Because positive identification of the applicant is necessary for TSA to be able to determine whether the applicant poses a security threat, this proposed rule would require an applicant for a small unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating to submit the application to a Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), a designated pilot examiner (DPE), an airman certification representative (ACR) for a pilot school, a certificated flight instructor (CFI), or other persons authorized by the Administrator. The person accepting the application submission would be required to verify that the identity of the applicant matches the identity that is provided on the application. This proposed rule would allow a DPE, an ACR for a pilot school, or a CFI to accept an application and verify the identity of the applicant because to do otherwise would severely limit the number of locations where an applicant for a certificate could submit his or her application. This is because of the limited number of FSDOs and qualified personnel in each FSDO needed to accept the anticipated number of application submissions each year. There are only 81 FDSOs in the United States, which are only open 5 days per week 88 FAA Order 8900.1, vol. 5, ch. 1, sec. 3, para. 5-54; FAA Order 8900.2, ch. 7, sec. 2, para. 25, pg. 7-36. 89 Id. 90 Id.
121 (excluding Federal holidays). However, there are an approximate combined total of 100,000 DPEs, ACRs, and CFIs potentially available to accept an application 7 days per week. Though there is no fee required to submit an application to a FSDO, there may be a nominal processing fee charged by the authorized FAA representative, none of which goes to the FAA. The FAA believes that this nominal fee (estimated average of $50), if charged by the FAA representative, would offset the average cost of travelling to a FSDO as well as the delay in submitting the application (measured possibly in weeks) due to having to make an appointment with the FSDO during the work week. DPEs represent the FAA, and are already required to positively identify an applicant for certification when the applicant takes the practical test for the certificate. ACRs are also currently required to positively identify the student/applicant for airman certification as part of the responsibility of the part 141 flight school with which the ACR is affiliated. CFIs are currently required to verify a pilot-certificate applicant's identity pursuant to TSA regulations codified at 49 CFR 1552.3(h)(1). That section requires a flight school91 to endorse a pilot logbook verifying that a student is a U.S. citizen and presented identification prior to flight training, which likely would be at the same time that a person would apply for a student pilot certificate. Because DPEs, ACRs, and CFIs already have experience verifying an applicant's identity, this proposed rule would allow these persons to accept an application for an 91 TSA defines a flight school as any pilot school, flight training center, air carrier training facility, or flight instructor certificated under 14 CFR parts 61, 121, 135, 141, or 142. 49 CFR 1552.1(b).
122 unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating and verify the identity of the applicant. Sections 61.193, 61.413, and 183.23 would be revised accordingly. The FAA has also considered allowing knowledge testing centers to verify an applicant's identity and accept an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate. However, the FAA is proposing to limit positive identification and acceptance of an application to those persons who are either: (1) already authorized to accept and sign airman applications (FAA personnel, DPEs, and ACRs); or (2) are already required to verify identity under the TSA's regulations (CFIs). Knowledge testing centers do not fit into either of these categories, and thus, this proposed rule would not allow them to accept airman applications. The FAA invites comments on whether knowledge testing centers should be allowed to accept airman applications. ii. Drugs and Alcohol Violations Proposed § 107.57 would authorize the FAA to deny a certificate application or take other certificate action for violations of Federal or State drug laws. Certificates could also be denied, suspended or revoked for committing an act prohibited by § 91.17 or § 91.19 '' which are discussed in section III.D.6 of this document. Specifically, proposed § 107.59 specifies that certificate action could be taken for: (1) failure to submit for a blood alcohol test or to release test results to the FAA as required by § 91.17; or (2) carriage of illegal drugs in violation of § 91.19. This proposal mirrors current regulations that apply to all airman certificates.92 92 See 14 CFR 61.15(a) and (b), 63.12, and 65.12.
123 iii. Change of Name The FAA recognizes that individuals who hold airman certificates may change their names. Accordingly, the regulations governing pilot certificates currently issued under part 61 allow the holder of a pilot certificate to change the name on a certificate by submitting appropriate paperwork to the FAA.93 This proposed rule would provide operators with the same opportunity in § 107.77(a). Specifically, proposed § 107.77(a) would allow a person holding an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating to change the name on the certificate by submitting a name-change application to the FAA accompanied by the applicant's: (1) operator certificate; and (2) a copy of the marriage license, court order, or other document verifying the name change. After reviewing these documents, the FAA would return them to the applicant. iv. Change of Address To ensure that the FAA has an airman certificate holder's proper contact information, part 61 currently requires the holder of a pilot, flight instructor, or ground instructor airman certificate who has made a change in permanent mailing address to notify the FAA within 30 days of making the address change.94 Failure to do so prohibits the certificate holder from exercising the privileges of the airman certificate until he or she has notified the FAA of the changed address.95 Because this regulatory provision helps ensure that the FAA is able to contact airman certificate holders, proposed § 107.77(c) would 93 14 CFR 61.25. 94 14 CFR 61.60. 95 Id.
124 extend the existing change-of-mailing-address requirement to holders of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. v. Voluntary Surrender of Certificate The FAA also recognizes that some individuals who obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating may decide to stop serving as a small UAS operator. Accordingly, proposed § 107.79 would allow a holder of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate to voluntarily surrender it to the FAA for cancellation. However, the FAA emphasizes that cancelling the operator certificate pursuant to § 107.79 would mean that the certificate no longer exists, and the individual who surrendered the certificate would need to again go through the entire certification process (including passing the initial aeronautical knowledge test) if he/she subsequently changes his/her mind. Accordingly, proposed § 107.79(b) would require the individual surrendering the certificate to include the following signed statement (or an equivalent) in his or her cancellation request: I voluntarily surrender my unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating for cancellation. This request is made for my own reasons with full knowledge that my certificate will not be reissued to me unless I again complete the requirements specified in §§ 107.61 and 107.63. F. Registration As mentioned earlier, the FAA's statute prohibits a person from operating a civil aircraft that is not registered,96 and this proposed rule would codify this statutory requirement. The registration of aircraft and the assignment of an identifying registration number to be displayed on the aircraft are primary foundation blocks in the regulatory 96 49 U.S.C. 44101(a).
125 structures that provide for safe and orderly aircraft activity within the NAS. The registration number provides a quick call-sign for communications between air traffic control and aircraft in flight. It also provides a link to information about the aircraft and the owner responsible for its operations. This information may assist the FAA and law enforcement agencies to respond to inappropriate behavior, to share safety information, respond to emergency situations, and populate data fields for studies that track trends and help shape future management decisions. Part 47 of 14 CFR currently governs the registration process applicable to aircraft that are not registered under the laws of a foreign country and that meet one of the following ownership criteria: · The aircraft is owned by a citizen of the United States; · The aircraft is owned by a permanent resident of the United States; · The aircraft is owned by a corporation that is not a citizen of the United States, but that is organized and doing business under U.S. Federal or State law and the aircraft is based and primarily used in the United States; or · The aircraft is owned by the United States government or a state or local governmental entity.97 This proposed rule would not apply to UAS operations that have certain international ownership components. This would exclude any aircraft whose ownership fails to meet the criteria for registration under part 47. Because this proposed rule would 97 14 CFR 47.3. This limitation on the applicability of part 47 stems from a statute (49 U.S.C. 44103), which allows the FAA to only register aircraft that meet the above criteria.
126 apply only to aircraft that are eligible for registration under part 47, the FAA proposes to satisfy the statutory aircraft-registration requirement by requiring all small unmanned aircraft subject to this proposed rule to be registered pursuant to the existing registration process of part 47. The FAA also proposes to make a single change to part 47 to accommodate small unmanned aircraft registration. Specifically, small unmanned aircraft, which can easily be obtained for as low as several hundred dollars, are significantly smaller assets than manned aircraft, which can cost hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. Because small unmanned aircraft are small assets, the FAA proposes to exempt small unmanned aircraft which have not previously been registered anywhere from the regulatory requirements of § 47.15, which were designed to apply to large-asset manned aircraft. Thus, under this proposed rule, a small unmanned aircraft would generally be registered as follows. The aircraft's owner would send the following items to the FAA: (1) an Aircraft Registration Application providing information about the aircraft and contact information for the aircraft owner; (2) evidence of ownership (such as a bill of sale); and (3) the $5.00 registration fee. If the application and supporting materials satisfy the criteria of part 47, the FAA would then assign a registration number (''N'' number) to the aircraft and issue a Certificate of Aircraft Registration to the applicant. If the aircraft was last previously registered in the U.S., once the new application has been sent to the Registry, its second copy (pink copy) may be used to operate the aircraft for a reasonable time while the application is being processed and the new certificate issued.
127 The FAA also notes that a Certificate of Aircraft Registration issued under part 47 currently expires every three years.98 This is because ownership of the aircraft may change hands or the aircraft owner could move after registering. A requirement to periodically reregister the aircraft increases the likelihood that the FAA's registration database contains the latest information concerning each registered aircraft. The aircraft owner can easily reregister the aircraft by submitting to the FAA: (1) an application for registration renewal containing updated information about the aircraft and its owner; and (2) a $5.00 reregistration fee.99 Because the current three-year registration expiration provision in part 47 would increase the likelihood that the FAA's registration database contains the latest information on small unmanned aircraft and their owners, the FAA proposes to retain this requirement for small unmanned aircraft registration. In addition, the FAA notes that because most manned aircraft are type-certificated, the FAA currently possesses a significant amount of information about each aircraft type (as a result of the type-certification process) that it can use to supplement information in an individual registration application. This results in the current registration requirements of part 47 asking for a minimal amount of information for most manned aircraft. However, small unmanned aircraft, which would not be type-certificated under this proposed rule, come in a variety of forms, many of which are not currently standardized. This situation is likely to continue as the small UAS market will continue broad innovation until designs emerge that are well balanced against the tasks found to be best served by this segment of aviation. To enable the FAA to both identify particular aircraft against a stated 98 See 14 CFR 47.40. 99 Id.
128 description as well as to identify and share safety related information as it develops, the FAA invites comments as to whether small unmanned aircraft owners should be required to provide additional information during the registration process. The FAA anticipates that the additional information requirement imposed on small unmanned aircraft could be similar to the requirements imposed on amateur-built aircraft under 14 CFR 47.33(c), as amateur aircraft pose the same lack-of-standardization issues as a small UAS. G. Marking 1. Display of Registration Number Subpart C of 14 CFR part 45 currently requires an aircraft to display its registration number on the aircraft. This requirement is intended to allow aircraft identification for oversight purposes. The number must generally be: (1) painted on the aircraft or affixed to the aircraft by some other permanent means; (2) have no ornamentation; (3) contrast in color with the background; and (4) be legible.100 To increase the likelihood of aircraft identification during flight, part 45, Subpart C specifies highly visible surfaces on the aircraft where the aircraft registration number must be displayed. Those surfaces differ based on the type of aircraft that is used. For example, a rotorcraft is required to display its registration number horizontally on the fuselage, boom or tail.101 Conversely, a fixed wing unmanned aircraft is generally required to display its registration number on either the vertical tail surfaces or the sides of its fuselage.102 100 14 CFR 45.21(c). 101 14 CFR 45.27(a). Section 45.27(a) also allows the number to be displayed on both surfaces of the cabin, but an unmanned aircraft will not have a cabin. 102 14 CFR 45.25(a).
129 To ensure maximum visibility, Subpart C also specifies a minimum size for the registration number display.103 For fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, the registration number display must generally be at least 12 inches high.104 Characters in the display must also be: (1) generally two thirds as wide as they are high; (2) formed by solid lines that are one-sixth as thick as the character is high; and (3) spaced out so that the space between the characters is at least one-fourth of the character width.105 Because some aircraft subject to part 45 may be small, § 45.29(f) allows aircraft that are too small to comply with the size requirements to display the registration number on the aircraft in as large a manner as practicable.106 This proposed rule would require a small unmanned aircraft to display its registration number in the manner specified in Subpart C of part 45. For unmanned aircraft that are not too small to comply with the display-size requirements discussed above, this proposed rule would require compliance with all of those requirements. This is because small unmanned aircraft present the same identification and oversight concerns as manned aircraft. For example, if a bystander was to observe a small unmanned aircraft being flown in a dangerous manner, the FAA would be able to determine the aircraft's owner if the bystander is able to see the aircraft's registration number. Because the current requirements in Subpart C of part 45 are intended to provide for the maximum visibility of an aircraft's registration number, compliance with those requirements would greatly increase the probability of a small unmanned aircraft being identified during a small UAS operation. 103 14 CFR 45.29(f). 104 14 CFR 45.29(b)(1) and (3). 105 14 CFR 45.29(c)-(e). 106 See 14 CFR 45.29(f).
130 The FAA acknowledges that some small unmanned aircraft may be too small to comply with the minimum-display-size requirements of part 45. However, as mentioned previously, part 45 already contains a provision, § 45.29(f), that would address this issue by allowing the too-small aircraft to simply display its registration number in as large a manner as practicable. Accordingly, the size of the small unmanned aircraft would not be a barrier to compliance with the provisions of Subpart C of part 45. The FAA also notes that, as discussed above, the registration-display-location requirements of part 45, Subpart C are specific to different types of aircraft.107 Under this proposed rule, the FAA would expect small unmanned aircraft to comply with the display-location provisions that apply to the specific type of small unmanned aircraft being used. For example, rotorcraft small unmanned aircraft would be expected to comply with the display-location provisions that are applicable to rotorcraft. Conversely, fixed-wing small unmanned aircraft would be expected to comply with the provisions that are applicable to fixed-wing aircraft. The FAA invites comments on whether a small unmanned aircraft should be required to display its registration number in accordance with Subpart C of part 45. If compliance with Subpart C should not be required, what standard should the FAA impose for how a small unmanned aircraft displays its registration number in order to fulfill its safety oversight obligation regarding small unmanned aircraft operations? The FAA invites comments with supporting documentation on this issue. 107 See, e.g., 14 CFR 45.25(a) and 45.27(a).
131 2. Marking of Products and Articles The FAA also considered requiring small unmanned aircraft to comply with the marking of products and articles requirement of Subpart B of part 45. This subpart requires the manufacturer of an aircraft or aircraft component to attach a fireproof identification plate to the aircraft and/or component containing the manufacturer's name, model designation, serial number, and, if applicable, the type certificate. The purpose of these requirements is to allow the FAA to trace the pertinent aircraft and/or aircraft parts back to the manufacturer if an issue arises with the aircraft and/or aircraft parts. The FAA does not believe that requiring small unmanned aircraft manufacturers to comply with the requirements of Subpart B of part 45 would be cost-justified. Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, the FAA may ''propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that [the regulation's] benefits justify its costs.''108 As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, the FAA's primary safety concerns with regard to small UAS operations are: (1) the ability to ''see and avoid'' other aircraft with no pilot on board; and (2) the operator losing positive control of the small unmanned aircraft. Here, both of these safety concerns would be mitigated by the other provisions of this proposed rule. Accordingly, the FAA does not believe that the safety benefits of requiring small UAS manufacturers to install fireproof plating with their identification information would be sufficient to justify the costs of doing so. The FAA invites comments, with supporting documentation, as to the costs and benefits of mandating compliance with Subpart B of part 45. The FAA also invites 108 Executive Order 13563, section 1(b) (summarizing and reaffirming Executive Order 12866).
132 comments, with supporting documentation, on whether alternative methods of small-UAS manufacturer marking should be required. H. Fraud and False Statements Currently, the U.S. criminal code prohibits fraud and falsification in matters within the jurisdiction of the executive branch.109 The FAA too may impose civil sanctions in instances of fraud and falsification in matters within its jurisdiction.110 Similarly, in § 107.5(a), this proposed rule would prohibit a person from making a fraudulent or intentionally false record or report that is required for compliance with the provisions of this proposed rule. Proposed § 107.5(a) would also prohibit a person from making any reproduction or alteration, for a fraudulent purpose, of any certificate, rating, authorization, record, or report that is made pursuant to proposed part 107. Finally, proposed § 107.5(b) would specify that the commission of a fraudulent or intentionally false act in violation of § 107.5(a) could result in the suspension or revocation of a certificate or waiver issued by the FAA pursuant to this proposed rule. This proposed civil sanction would be similar to the sanctions that the FAA currently imposes on fraudulent and false statements pursuant to §§ 61.59(b), 67.403(c), and 121.9(b). 109 18 U.S.C. 1001 110 The FAA has exercised this power in 14 CFR 61.59, 67.403, 121.9, and 139.115, which currently impose civil prohibitions on fraud and false statements made in matters within the FAA's jurisdiction.
133 I. Oversight 1. Inspection, Testing, and Demonstration of Compliance The FAA's oversight statutes, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44709 and 46104, provide the FAA with broad investigatory and inspection authority for matters within the FAA's jurisdiction. Under section 46104, the FAA may subpoena witnesses and records, administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence at a place in the United States that the FAA designates. Under section 44709, the FAA may ''reinspect at any time a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, design organization, production certificate holder, air navigation facility, or agency, or reexamine an airman holding a certificate issued [by the FAA].'' This rule would codify the FAA's oversight authority in proposed § 107.7. Proposed § 107.7(b) would require the operator, visual observer, or owner of a small UAS to, upon FAA request, allow the FAA to make any test or inspection of the small unmanned aircraft system, the operator, and, if applicable, the visual observer to determine compliance with the provisions of proposed part 107. Section 107.7(a) would require an operator or owner of a small UAS to, upon FAA request, make available to the FAA any document, record, or report required to be kept by the provisions of proposed part 107. This would include the operator's unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating and the certificate of aircraft registration for the small UAS being operated.
134 2. Accident Reporting The FAA notes that UAS is a relatively new industry and that operators of small UAS may not have prior experience with aviation regulations or FAA oversight. In addition, because of the newness of the small UAS industry, the FAA currently does not have the oversight experience with small UAS that it has with manned aircraft operations. Accordingly, to ensure proper oversight of small UAS operations, this proposed rule, in § 107.9, would require a small UAS operator to report to the FAA any small UAS operation that results in: (1) any injury to a person; or (2) damage to property other than the small unmanned aircraft. The report would have to be made within 10 days of the operation that resulted in injury or damage to property.111 After receiving this report, the FAA may conduct further investigation to determine whether any FAA regulations were violated. The FAA emphasizes that this proposed reporting requirement would be triggered only during operations that result in injury to a person or property damage. The FAA invites comments as to whether this type of accident-reporting should be required. The FAA also invites suggestions for alternative methods of ensuring compliance with the regulations governing small UAS operations. The FAA specifically invites comments as to whether small UAS accidents that result in minimal amounts of property damage should be exempted from the reporting requirement. If so, what is the threshold of property damage that should trigger the accident reporting requirement? 111 The proposed 10-day timeframe to submit a report is similar to the 10-day timeframe that is currently required by the NTSB for accident reporting. See 49 CFR 830.15(a).
135 J. Section 333 Statutory Findings As mentioned previously, in order to determine whether certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS pursuant to section 333 of Public Law 112-95, the Secretary must find that the operation of the UAS would not: (1) create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public; or (2) pose a threat to national security. The Secretary must also determine whether small UAS operations subject to this proposed rule pose a safety risk sufficient to require airworthiness certification. 1. Hazard to Users of the NAS or the Public Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 requires the Secretary to determine whether the operation of the UAS subject to this proposed rule would create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public. As discussed in the Background section of this preamble, due to their extremely light weight, small UAS could pose a significantly smaller public risk than do manned aircraft. Two primary safety concerns associated with small UAS operations are: (1) the ability to ''see and avoid'' other aircraft with no pilot on board; and (2) the operator losing positive control of the small unmanned aircraft. Here, both of these safety concerns would be mitigated by the other provisions of this proposed rule. Specifically by requiring operations to be conducted within visual line of sight; limiting maximum gross weight of the small unmanned aircraft to be below 55 pounds; limiting the operating altitude to below 500 feet AGL; requiring operators to be certificated; defining the area of operation; and prohibiting operations over any person not directly participating in the operation, the risk
136 associated with this group of aircraft would be significantly reduced when compared with other categories of aircraft that weigh more, fly higher, and faster. Accordingly, the Secretary proposes to find that small UAS operations subject to this proposed rule would not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public. We invite comments on this proposed finding. 2. National Security Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 also requires the Secretary to determine whether the operation of UAS subject to this proposed rule would pose a threat to national security. Proposed part 107 would expand small UAS operations in the NAS to include commercial operations. Under proposed part 107, these operations would be subject to specific requirements, such as being able to operate only during daylight and only within visual line of sight of the operator and, if applicable, a visual observer. The small unmanned aircraft would also have to be registered with the FAA and display its FAA-issued registration marking prominently on the aircraft. In addition, the operator of the small unmanned aircraft would be required to obtain an FAA-issued unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. The process for obtaining this certificate would include the same TSA-review procedures that are currently used under 49 U.S.C. 46111 in order to screen out airman-certificate applicants who pose a security risk. Because the above provisions would limit the security risk that could be posed by small UAS operations subject to this proposed rule, the Secretary proposes to find that
137 these small UAS operations would not pose a threat to national security. We invite comments on this proposed finding. 3. Airworthiness Certification Finally, section 333(b)(2) of Public Law 112-95 requires the Secretary to determine whether small UAS operations subject to this proposed rule pose a safety risk sufficient to require airworthiness certification. The Secretary has determined that airworthiness certification should not be required for small UAS subject to this proposed rule due to their low-risk operational characteristics. Specifically, as mentioned previously, because of the other provisions in this proposed rule, the risk associated with small UAS subject to this proposed rule is significantly reduced. The FAA emphasizes that, under this proposed rule, the operator would not need to determine design conformity or reliability probabilities when evaluating the airworthiness of small UAS. Instead, the operator would need to make a determination of whether the small UAS is in a safe condition during flight operations and ground operations conducted for the purpose of flight. During preflight and post flight inspections, a small UAS operator should look for simple inspection items such as dents, corrosion, mis-alignment, loose wires, binding controls, loose fasteners, and excessive wear. This simple but not all-inclusive list will identify most problems that could impact the airworthiness and reliability of the aircraft. Another inspection method unique to small UAS that would be governed by this proposed rule would be a check of the control link. This check can be accomplished by using the control station to verify proper flight control deflection prior to flight. The check
138 can also be used to ensure the flight controls deflect freely, without binding. Like the aforementioned inspection items, this too is a simple visual inspection that should not require any specialized training. Because the proposed airworthiness provisions discussed above would sufficiently ensure that the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation and because the other provisions of this rule would ensure that the risk posed by small unmanned aircraft is significantly smaller than public risk posed by other groups of aircraft, the Secretary finds, pursuant to section 333(b)(2) of Public Law 112-95, that airworthiness certification would be unnecessary for small UAS subject to this proposed rule. We invite comments on this finding. IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses A. Regulatory Evaluation Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Public Law 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-4) requires agencies
139 to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this proposed rule. Readers seeking greater detail can read the full regulatory evaluation, a copy of which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking. In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this proposed rule: (1) has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is an economically ''significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866; (3) is ''significant'' as defined in DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) would have a significant positive economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) would not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and (6) would not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold identified above. These analyses are summarized below. 1. Total Benefits and Costs of this Rule This proposed rule reflects the fact that technological advances in small unmanned aircraft systems (small UAS) have led to a developing commercial market for their uses by providing a safe operating environment for them and for other aircraft in the NAS. In time, the FAA anticipates that the proposed rule would provide an opportunity to substitute small UAS operations for some risky manned flights, such as photographing houses, towers, bridges, or parks, thereby averting potential fatalities and injuries. It would also lead to
140 more efficient methods of performing certain commercial tasks that are currently performed by other methods. For any commercial operation occurring because this rule is enacted, the operator/owner of that small UAS will have determined the expected revenue stream of the flights exceeds the cost of the flights' operation. In each such case this rule helps enable new markets to develop. The FAA identified how the proposed rule would improve the safety of the NAS when small UAS are operated in place of a hazardous manned operation or a laborer working at heights. The estimated out-of-pocket cost for a small UAS operator to be FAA-certified is less than $300. As this proposal enables new businesses to be established, the private sector benefits would exceed private sector costs when new entrepreneurs earn a profit. As more profitable opportunities increase, so will the social benefits. Therefore, each new small UAS operator will have determined that their expected benefits exceed their costs. In addition, if the use of a small UAS replaces a dangerous non-UAS operation and saves one human life, that alone would result in benefits outweighing the costs of this proposed rule. The costs are shown in the table in the ''Cost Summary'' section below. 2. Who is Potentially Affected by this Rule? Manufacturers and operators of small unmanned aircraft systems. 3. Assumptions · Because the commercial small UAS industry is not yet established and may evolve differently from current expectations, the FAA determined that a five-year time frame of analysis would be appropriate.
141 · The base year is 2014. · The FAA uses a seven percent discount rate for the benefits as prescribed by OMB in Circular A-4.112 · Since the year that the proposed rule is published is unknown, the FAA uses Year 1 as the current year so that the first discounting occurs in Year 2. · In the small UAS future fleet forecast, the FAA assumes that 20 percent of the fleet would retire or leave the fleet every year.113 · Because only one operator is required to operate a small UAS, the FAA assumes that there would be one qualified FAA-approved operator per registered and operating small UAS. Even though 20 percent of the small UAS equipment leaves the fleet each year, the FAA expects that small UAS operators, once tested and certificated, would remain employable and some would take jobs as small UAS operators in the following years of the analysis interval. Also, operators would incur a cost for recurrent knowledge testing every 24 months. This will be explained in detail in the ''Costs'' section below. · The FAA assumes that the failure rate of applicants114 taking the small UAS initial and recurrent knowledge based test would be 10 percent.115 However, applicants 112 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 113 A copy of the forecast can be found in the rulemaking docket. The FAA notes that a small UAS could incur a cost for registration and then retire or leave the fleet during the analysis interval. The FAA also notes that our small UAS forecast may be understated if operators choose to own more than one FAA-registered aircraft (for example, as a backup in case one aircraft is disabled). To account for this possibility, as a sensitivity analysis, if there were an additional 20 percent increase in our small UAS forecast, then the costs in Table 7 and Table 10, found in the regulatory evaluation accompanying this NPRM, would increase by 20 percent. The FAA requests comments, with supporting documentation, on this sensitivity analysis. 114 The FAA notes that a person first must apply to become a small UAS operator. During the application process, this analysis will refer to a person applying to become a small UAS operator as an applicant. After the applicant has successfully passed the application process, this analysis will refer to the person as a small UAS operator.
142 and operators who fail are assumed to pass the knowledge test on the second attempt. · Since this proposed rule allows knowledge test centers (KTC) to administer small UAS operator initial or recurrent knowledge tests, the FAA assumes that the KTC would collocate themselves with a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE), Certificated Flight Instructor (CFI) or Other Designated Authority to validate an applicant's identity, accept the knowledge test results and the small UAS operator application for review and submission to the FAA AFS-760 Airman Certification Branch for processing. · The cost to administer an FAA approved small UAS knowledge test, including compliance fees, to a small UAS applicant or operator is $150.116 · The FAA estimates that a small UAS operator applicant would need to travel 19 miles one way to reach their closest KTC location.117 · The 2014 published IRS variable cost mileage rate of $0.235 per mile is used to estimate the cost of Vehicle usage.118 · The FAA assigns the hourly value for personal time to equal $25.09 for Year 1.119 115 The FAA has not yet created or administered the knowledge test proposed in the NPRM. However, the weighted average failure rate for all categories of airman taking knowledge tests in 2013 was 10%. See Appendix 3 of the regulatory evaluation accompanying this NPRM for details. 116 http://www.catstest.com/airman-testing-exams/recreational-private-pilot.php 117 See ''Travel Expense'' section for methodology and source information. 118 http://www.irs.gov/2014-Standard-Mileage-Rates-for-Business,-Medical-and-Moving-Announced
143 · The FAA assigns the hourly value for travel time to equal $24.68 for Year 1.120 · The FAA assigns the hourly value of FAA or KTC clerical time to $20.06 by calculating the mean for a Level 2 (FG 5/6) Clerical Support person from the Core Compensation Plan Pay Bands, effective January 12, 2014 working in the Washington D.C. locality.121 The FAA then divides the mean of the annual salaries by 2,080 for an hourly rate. · The FAA assigns the value of $28.00 as the estimate for the FAA's cost to register an aircraft. This estimate is based on an internal cost model developed in September 2014 by the FAA civil aviation registry to use for managerial estimates. · The FAA uses a $50 fee to validate the identity of an applicant. The FAA requests comments, with supporting documentation, on each of these assumptions and data values. 119 Source: Revised Departmental Guidance on The Valuation of Travel time in Economic Analysis (published June 9, 2014). Per this guidance, median Household income divided by 2,080 hours is used to establish a wage rate (see Table 3). This wage rate, as noted in this guidance, serves as an approximate value for leisure time. Consistent with this guidance wage rates are augmented by 1.2 percent per year to reflect projected annual growth of real median household income. Year 1 (2012$) wage rates estimates are calculated as $24.50*1.0122=$25.09; Year 2 as $24.50*1.0123=$25.39; Year 3 as $24.50*1.0124=$25.70; Year 4 as $24.50*1.0125=$26.01; and Year 5 as $24.50*1.0126=$26.32. 120 Source: Revised Departmental Guidance on The Valuation of Travel time in Economic Analysis (published June 9, 2014)-Local Travel (Business). Per this guidance future Travel Time Saving estimates are also augmented by 1.2 percent per year to reflect projected annual growth of real median household income. Year 1 (2012$) travel time savings estimates are calculated as $24.10*1.0122= $24.68; Year 2 as $24.10*1.0123=$24.98; Year 3 as $24.10*1.0124=$25.28; Year 4 as $24.10*1.0125=$25.58; and Year 5 as $24.10*1.0126=$25.89. See table 4. 121https://my.faa.gov/content/dam/myfaa/org/staffoffices/ahr/program_policies/policy_guidance/hr_policies/hrpm/comp/comp_ref/media/core_salary_with_conversion.xls.
144 4. Benefit Summary The potential benefits from this proposed rule would arise from improved safety and from opening up new commercial aviation activities. The FAA currently does not permit commercial activity involving small UAS due to the potential hazards they could pose to other aircraft and to the civilian population. This proposed rule would allow certain types of unmanned aerial observational operations to replace manned aerial observational operations that are currently being conducted under potentially hazardous conditions. The proposed rule would also allow small UAS to replace laborers inspecting high towers or in certain other hazardous locations. This proposed rule would allow the creation and development of new industries able to operate with minimal potential risks to operators and the public. Specifically, with respect to the potential safety benefits from substituting small unmanned aircraft for aerial photography, the FAA reviewed 17 aerial aviation photography accidents and incidents that occurred between 2005 and 2009. Of these accidents, the FAA determined that a small UAS could have substituted for the manned operation in two cases. If the use of a small UAS replaces a dangerous non-UAS operation and saves one human life, that alone would result in benefits outweighing the costs of this proposed rule. The potential benefits would be driven by the market and small UAS airspace availability. In the Regulatory Evaluation, the FAA explores only four of the many potential small UAS markets this proposal could enable. The four potential small UAS markets are:
145 1. Aerial photography, 2. Precision agriculture, 3. Search and rescue/law enforcement, and 4. Bridge inspection. The FAA estimates that the proposed rule could not only enable numerous new industries, but also provide safety benefits and create a safe operating environment. The FAA has not quantified the specific benefits due to a lack of data. The FAA invites commenters to provide data that could be used to quantify benefits of this proposed rule. 5. Cost Summary Several provisions in the proposed rule would impose compliance costs on potential commercial small UAS operators. However, the FAA assumes that commercial small UAS operators would incur these costs only if they anticipated revenues that would more than offset these costs. The business decision to enter a previously non-existent market is borne by each operator who knowingly chooses to operate a small UAS within the regulated environment of this proposal. In the Regulatory Evaluation, the FAA estimates these costs by provision. As summarized in the following table, the FAA estimates the total cost of the proposed rule for the 5 year period of analysis.
146 TOTAL AND PRESENT VALUE COST SUMMARY BY PROVISION (Thousands of Current Year Dollars) Total Costs 7 % P.V. Type of Cost (000) (000) Applicant/small UAS operator Travel Expense $151.7 $125.9 Knowledge Test Fees $2,548.6 $2,114.2 Positive Identification of the Applicant Fee $434.3 $383.7 Owner Small UAS Registration Fee $85.7 $70.0 Time Resource Opportunity Costs Applicants Travel Time $296.1 $245.3 Knowledge Test Application $108.9 $90.2 Physical Capability Certification $20.0 $17.7 Knowledge Test Time $1,307.1 $1,082.9 Small UAS Registration Form $220.5 $179.7 Change of Name or Address Form $14.9 $12.3 Knowledge Test Report $154.9 $128.5 Pre-flight Inspection Not quantified Accident Reporting Minimal cost Government Costs TSA Security Vetting $1,026.5 $906.9 FAA - sUAS Operating Certificate $39.6 $35.0 FAA '' Registration $394.3 $321.8 Total Costs $6,803.1 $5,714.0 * Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding. B. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination (IRFA) The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-354) (RFA) establishes ''as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
147 subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA. The FAA believes that this proposed rule would have a significant impact on a substantial number of entities. Therefore, under section 603(b) of the RFA, the initial analysis must address: · Description of reasons the agency is considering the action. · Statement of the legal basis and objectives for the proposed rule. · Description of the record keeping and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule. · All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule. · Description and an estimated number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply. · Describe alternatives considered.
148 1. Description of reasons the agency is considering the action The FAA is proposing to amend its regulations to adopt specific rules to allow the operation of small unmanned aircraft system (small UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). These changes would address the operation of small UAS, certification of their operators, registration, and display of registration markings. The proposed requirements would allow small UAS to operate in the NAS while minimizing the risk they may pose to manned aviation operations and the general public. If the proposed rule were adopted, operators would be permitted to participate in certain commercial activities from which they are currently prohibited. The proposed requirements are intended to enable the opportunity for the private sector to develop commercial small UAS businesses and facilitate legal and safe operations. Currently commercial activity using a small UAS is prohibited by federal regulation unless the civil aircraft has an airworthiness certificate in effect and operations are approved by the FAA on a case by case basis via an exemption from the pertinent regulations. 2. Statement of the legal basis and objectives for the proposed rule This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-95). Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 directs the Secretary of Transportation to determine whether ''certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace system.'' If the FAA determines, pursuant to section 333, that certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate
149 safely in the NAS, then the FAA must ''establish requirements for the safe operation of such aircraft systems in the national airspace system.''122 This rulemaking is also promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (2), which charge the FAA with issuing regulations: (1) to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, protecting and identifying aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) charges the FAA with prescribing regulations that the FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security. Finally, the model-aircraft component of this rulemaking is promulgated pursuant to Public Law 112-95, section 336(b), which clarifies that the FAA's existing authority, under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b) and 44701(a)(5), provides the FAA with the power to pursue enforcement ''against persons operating model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.'' 3. Description of the record keeping and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule. The FAA's statute123 prohibits a person from serving as an airman without an airman certificate. This proposed rule would create a new airman certificate for small UAS operators to satisfy the statutory requirement. The airman certificate would be called an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating, and in order to obtain it, a 122 Pub. L. 112-95, section 333(c). In addition, Public Law 112-95, section 332(b)(1) requires the FAA to issue ''a final rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that will allow for civil operation of such systems in the national airspace system, to the extent the systems do not meet the requirements for expedited operational authorization under section 333 of [Public Law 112-95].'' 123 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A).
150 person would have to: (1) take and pass an aeronautical knowledge test; and (2) submit an application for the certificate. To take and pass an aeronautical knowledge test, a person would have to: (1) apply to take the test at an FAA-approved Knowledge Testing Center; (2) spend time taking the test; and (3) obtain an airman knowledge test report showing that he or she passed the test. After passing a knowledge test, the person would then apply for the certificate by: (1) filling out and submitting an application for the certificate, which would include a certification stating that the applicant is physically capable of safely operating a small UAS; and (2) attaching a copy of the airman knowledge test report to the application. This proposed rule would also require a small UAS operator to report to the FAA any accident that results in: (1) any injury to a person; or (2) damage to property other than the small unmanned aircraft. The FAA's statute also prohibits the operation of an aircraft that is not registered.124 Consequently this proposed rule would require owners of a small unmanned aircraft to register that aircraft with the FAA. The owner of a small unmanned aircraft can do this simply by sending the following items to the FAA: (1) an Aircraft Registration Application providing information about the aircraft and contact information for the aircraft owner; (2) evidence of ownership (such as a bill of sale); and (3) the $5.00 registration fee. 124 49 USC 44101.
151 4. All federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule The FAA is unaware that the proposed rule will overlap, duplicate or conflict with existing federal rules. 5. Description and an estimated number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply The FAA believes that the proposed rule would enable numerous new industries, while maintaining a safe operating environment in the NAS. Because the commercial small UAS industry is not yet established and legal operation of commercial small UAS in the NAS constitutes a new market, available data for these operations is sparse. Accordingly, the FAA has not quantified number of small entities to which the proposed rule would apply because the FAA cannot reasonably predict how the market will develop for individual commercial uses of small UAS. With respect to the potential operator costs, the FAA assumes that each operator would be a new entrant into the commercial market and that each operator would have one small UAS. The following table shows the proposed rule's estimated out-of-pocket startup and recurrent direct compliance costs for a new small UAS operator or owner.
152 Small UAS Operator Startup and Recurrent Costs (Current Dollars) Cost Type of Cost Initial Recurrent Applicant/small UAS operator Travel Expense $9 $9 Knowledge Test Fees $150 $150 Positive Identification of the Applicant Fee $50 - Total applicant/small UAS operator $209 $159 Owner Small UAS Registration Fee $5 $5 Total Owner $5 $5 Total $214 $164 * Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding. The FAA does not believe that $214 per operator would be a significant negative economic impact to small entity operators because $214 is relatively inexpensive to be licensed for operation of a commercial vehicle. The FAA expects this proposed rule would be a significant positive economic impact because it enables new businesses to operate small UAS for hire and would stimulate a manufacturing support industry. The FAA believes that most, if not all, of these new commercial activities would be conducted by operators of small UAS who are small business entities. Therefore, the FAA believes that this proposed rule would have a positive significant impact on a substantial number of entities.
153 6. Alternatives considered The FAA considered both more costly and less costly alternatives as part of its NPRM. The FAA rejected the more costly alternatives due to policy considerations and undue burden that would be imposed on small UAS operators. The less costly alternatives and the FAA's reasons for rejecting those alternatives in the NPRM are discussed below. · Allowing knowledge testing centers to verify ID and accept airman applications. The FAA decided, as part of its proposal, to limit positive identification and acceptance of an application to those persons who are either: (1) already authorized to accept and sign airman applications (FAA personnel, DPEs, and ACRs); or (2) are already required to verify identity under the TSA's regulations (CFIs). Knowledge testing centers do not fit into either of these categories, and thus, after considering the alternative of allowing them to accept airman applications, the FAA decided not to include this alternative in the NPRM. · Allowing individuals who have been conducting UAS operations under a COA as a non-military UAS operator to take a recurrent test instead of an initial test in order to obtain an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. However, the FAA decided not to include this provision in the proposed rule because: (1) there is no formally recognized recordation system for non-military COA pilots as there is for military pilots; and (2) non-military COA pilots are currently subject to different requirements than military COA pilots for operations above 400 feet AGL.
154 Therefore this proposed rule would have a significant positive economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The FAA solicits comments regarding this determination. C. International Trade Impact Assessment The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-39), as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465), prohibits Federal agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA invites comments on the inclusion of foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft in this new framework. In particular, FAA invites comments on foreign experiences with differing levels of stringency in their UAS regulation. The FAA recognizes that several other countries have adopted different standards with regard to the commercial operation of UAS in their respective airspaces. Data from their experiences regarding safety outcomes and economic activity could form the basis for studying the effect of these different regulatory approaches.
155 D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a "significant regulatory action." The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value of $151.0 million in lieu of $100 million. This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply. E. Paperwork Reduction Act The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor may it impose an information collection requirement unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This action contains the following proposed information collection requirements: · submission of an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating; · submission of an application to register a small unmanned aircraft; and
156 · reporting any accident that results in injury to a person or damage to property other than the small unmanned aircraft. Below, we discuss each of these information-collection requirements in more detail. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted these proposed information collection amendments to OMB for its review. 1. Obtaining an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating Summary: The FAA's statute125 prohibits a person from serving as an airman without an airman certificate. This proposed rule would create a new airman certificate for small UAS operators to satisfy the statutory requirement. The airman certificate would be called an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating, and in order to obtain it, a person would have to: (1) take and pass an aeronautical knowledge test; and (2) submit an application for the certificate. To take and pass an aeronautical knowledge test, a person would have to: (1) apply to take the test at an FAA-approved Knowledge Testing Center; (2) spend time taking the test; and (3) obtain an airman knowledge test report showing that he or she passed the test. After passing a knowledge test, the person would then apply for the certificate by: (1) filling out and submitting an application for the certificate, which would include a certification stating that the applicant is physically capable of safely operating a small UAS; and (2) attaching a copy of the airman knowledge test report to the application. The above requirements would not result in a new collection of information, but would instead expand an existing OMB-approved collection of information that is approved under 125 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A).
157 OMB control number 2120-0021. This collection of information governs information that the FAA collects to certificate pilots and flight instructors. The above requirements would increase the burden of this already-existing collection of information. Use: The above requirements would be used by the FAA to issue airman certificates to UAS operators in order to satisfy the statutory requirement that an airman must possess an airman certificate. Estimate of Increase in Annualized Burden (there are 7,896 unique applicants): * Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding. 2. Registering a small unmanned aircraft Summary: The FAA's statute 126 prohibits the operation of an aircraft unless the aircraft is registered. Pursuant to this statutory prohibition, this proposed rule would require small unmanned aircraft to be registered with the FAA using the current registration process found in 14 CFR part 47. In order to register a small unmanned aircraft with the FAA, the aircraft's owner would have to submit to the FAA an Aircraft Registration Application providing information about the aircraft and contact information for the aircraft owner. This registration would need to be renewed every three years. 126 49 U.S.C. 44101.
158 The above requirements would not result in a new collection of information, but would instead expand an existing OMB-approved collection of information that is approved under OMB control number 2120-0042. This collection of information governs information that the FAA collects in order to register an aircraft. The above requirements would increase the burden of this already-existing collection of information. Use: The above requirements would be used by the FAA to register small unmanned aircraft in order to satisfy the statutory requirement that an aircraft must be registered in order to operate. Estimate of Increase in Annualized Burden: * Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding. 3. Accident Reporting Summary: To ensure proper oversight of small UAS operations, this proposed rule would require a small UAS operator to report to the FAA any small UAS operation that results in: (1) any injury to a person; or (2) damage to property other than the small unmanned aircraft. After receiving this report, the FAA may conduct further investigation to determine whether any FAA regulations were violated. This proposed requirement would constitute a new collection of information. However, the FAA emphasizes that this
159 proposed reporting requirement would be triggered only during operations that result in injury to a person or property damage. Use: The above requirements would be used by the FAA to ensure proper oversight of small UAS operations. A report of an accident that resulted in an injury to a person or property damage may serve to initiate an FAA investigation into whether FAA regulations were violated. Annualized Burden Estimate: There is one page of paperwork associated with reporting an accident. The FAA calculated the probability of an accident by dividing the accident rate for general aviation pilots by the total number of hours and estimated that an accident would occur .001% of the time. Applying .001% to the small UAS in the analysis interval shows that the probability of an accident where property damage, injury, or death occurs is negligible; therefore the FAA estimates that there are no costs for this provision.
160 4. Total Annualized Burden Estimate The total annualized burden estimate of the information-collection requirements associated with this proposed rule is as follows: * Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding. The agency is soliciting comments to '-- · Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; · Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden; · Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and · Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are to respond, including by using appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology. Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information collection requirement to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section at the beginning of this preamble by [INSERT DATE 60 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE
161 FEDERAL REGISTER]. Comments also should be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer for FAA, New Executive Office Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20053. F. International Compatibility and Cooperation In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices that correspond to these proposed regulations. Additionally, Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have no effect on international regulatory cooperation. G. Environmental Analysis FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The
162 FAA has determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary circumstances. H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying 14 CFR regulations in a manner affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. Because this proposed rule would limit small unmanned aircraft operations to daylight hours only, it could, if adopted, affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. The FAA, therefore, specifically requests comments on whether there is justification for applying the proposed rule differently in intrastate operations in Alaska. V. Executive Order Determinations A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have Federalism implications.
163 B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it would not be a ''significant energy action'' under the executive order and would not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. VI. Additional Information A. Comments Invited The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit only one time. The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed after
164 the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in light of the comments it receives. B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the Internet by'-- 1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or 3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this rulemaking. All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule, including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from the Internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item (1) above. List of Subjects 14 CFR Part 21 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Recording and recordkeeping requirements.
165 14 CFR Part 43 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 14 CFR Part 45 Aircraft, Signs and symbols. 14 CFR Part 47 Aircraft, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 14 CFR Part 61 Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, Drug abuse, Recreation and recreation areas, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Teachers. 14 CFR Part 91 Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 14 CFR part 101 Aircraft, Aviation Safety. 14 CFR part 107 Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Signs and symbols, Small unmanned aircraft, Unmanned aircraft. 14 CFR part 183 Airmen, Authority delegations (Government agencies).
166 The Proposed Amendment In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations as follows: PART 21'--CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS 1. The authority citation for part 21 is revised to read as follows: Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101 note, 40105, 40113, 44701-44702, 44704, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303; Sec. 333 of Pub. L. 112-95. 2. Amend § 21.1 by revising paragraph (a) introductory text to read as follows: § 21.1 Applicability and definitions. (a) Except for aircraft subject to the provisions of part 107 of this chapter, this part prescribes'-- * * * * * PART 43'--MAINTENANCE, PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE, REBUILDING, AND ALTERATION 3. The authority citation for part 43 is revised to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44703, 44705, 44707, 44711, 44713, 44717, 44725. 4. Amend § 43.1 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
167 § 43.1 Applicability. * * * * * (b) This part does not apply to'-- (1) Any aircraft for which the FAA has issued an experimental certificate, unless the FAA has previously issued a different kind of airworthiness certificate for that aircraft; (2) Any aircraft for which the FAA has issued an experimental certificate under the provisions of §21.191(i)(3) of this chapter, and the aircraft was previously issued a special airworthiness certificate in the light-sport category under the provisions of §21.190 of this chapter; or (3) Any aircraft subject to the provisions of part 107 of this chapter. * * * * * PART 45'--IDENTIFICATION AND REGISTRATION MARKING 5. The authority citation for part 45 is revised to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40103, 40113-40114, 44101-44105, 44107-44111, 44504, 44701, 44708-44709, 44711-44713, 44725, 45302-45303, 46104, 46304, 46306, 47122. 6. Add § 45.9 to subpart B to read as follows: § 45.9 Small unmanned aircraft systems. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, this subpart does not apply to aircraft subject to part 107 of this chapter. PART 47'--AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION 7. The authority citation for part 47 is revised to read as follows:
168 Authority: 4 U.S.T. 1830; Pub. L. 108-297, 118 Stat. 1095 (49 U.S.C. 40101 note, 49 U.S.C. 44101 note); 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113-40114, 44101-44108, 44110-44113, 44703-44704, 44713, 45302, 46104, 46301. 8. Amend § 47.15 by revising paragraph (a) introductory text to read as follows: § 47.15 Registration number. (a) Number required. An applicant for aircraft registration must place a U.S. registration number (registration mark) on the Aircraft Registration Application, AC Form 8050-1, and on any evidence submitted with the application. There is no charge for the assignment of numbers provided in this paragraph. This paragraph does not apply to an aircraft manufacturer who applies for a group of U.S. registration numbers under paragraph (c) of this section; a person who applies for a special registration number under paragraphs (d) through (f) of this section; a holder of a Dealer's Aircraft Registration Certificate, AC Form 8050-6, who applies for a temporary registration number under § 47.16; or an owner of a small unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds that has not previously been registered anywhere. * * * * * PART 61'--CERTIFICATION: PILOTS, FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS, AND GROUND INSTRUCTORS 9. The authority citation for part 61 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701-44703, 44707, 44709-44711, 45102-45103, 45301-45302. 10. Amend § 61.1 by revising paragraph (a) introductory text to read as follows:
169 § 61.1 Applicability and definitions. (a) Except as provided in part 107 of this chapter, this part prescribes: * * * * * 11. Add § 61.8 to read as follows: § 61.8 Inapplicability of unmanned aircraft operations. Any action conducted pursuant to part 107 of this chapter or Subpart E of part 101 of this chapter cannot be used to meet the requirements of this part. 12. Revise § 61.193 to read as follows: § 61.193 Flight instructor privileges. (a) A person who holds a flight instructor certificate is authorized within the limitations of that person's flight instructor certificate and ratings to train and issue endorsements that are required for: (1) A student pilot certificate; (2) A pilot certificate; (3) A flight instructor certificate; (4) A ground instructor certificate; (5) An aircraft rating; (6) An instrument rating; (7) A flight review, operating privilege, or recency of experience requirement of this part;
170 (8) A practical test; and (9) A knowledge test. (b) A person who holds a flight instructor certificate is authorized to accept an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating and verify the identity of the applicant in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator. 13. Revise § 61.413 to read as follows: § 61.413 What are the privileges of my flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating? (a) If you hold a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating, you are authorized, within the limits of your certificate and rating, to provide training and endorsements that are required for, and relate to'-- (1) A student pilot seeking a sport pilot certificate; (2) A sport pilot certificate; (3) A flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating; (4) A powered parachute or weight-shift-control aircraft rating; (5) Sport pilot privileges; (6) A flight review or operating privilege for a sport pilot; (7) A practical test for a sport pilot certificate, a private pilot certificate with a powered parachute or weight-shift-control aircraft rating or a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating;
171 (8) A knowledge test for a sport pilot certificate, a private pilot certificate with a powered parachute or weight-shift-control aircraft rating or a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating; and (9) A proficiency check for an additional category or class privilege for a sport pilot certificate or a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating. (b) A person who holds a flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot rating is authorized to accept an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating and verify the identity of the applicant in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator. PART 91'--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES 14. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 1155, 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-47531, 47534, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11). 15. Amend § 91.1 by revising paragraph (a) introductory text and adding paragraph (e) to read as follows: § 91.1 Applicability. (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), and (e) of this section and §§ 91.701 and 91.703, this part prescribes rules governing the operation of aircraft within the United States, including the waters within 3 nautical miles of the U.S. coast. * * * * *
172 (e) Except as provided in §§ 107.27, 107.47, 107.57, and 107.59 of this chapter, this part does not apply to any aircraft or vehicle governed by part 103 of this chapter, part 107 of this chapter, or subparts B, C, or D of part 101 of this chapter. PART 101'--MOORED BALLOONS, KITES, AMATEUR ROCKETS AND UNMANNED FREE BALLOONS 16. The authority citation for part 101 is revised to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101 note, 40103, 40113-40114, 45302, 44502, 44514, 44701-44702, 44722, 46308, Sec. 336(b), Pub. L. 112-95. 17. Amend § 101.1 by adding paragraph (a)(5) to read as follows: § 101.1 Applicability. (a) * * * (5) Any model aircraft that meets the conditions specified in § 101.41. For purposes of this part, a model aircraft is an unmanned aircraft that is: (i) Capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (ii) Flown within visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and (iii) Flown for hobby or recreational purposes. * * * * * 18. Add subpart E, consisting of §§ 101.41 and 101.43, to read as follows:
173 Subpart E '' Special Rule for Model Aircraft § 101.41 Applicability. This subpart prescribes the rules governing the operation of a model aircraft that meets all of the following conditions as set forth in section 336 of Public Law 112-95: (a) The aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; (b) The aircraft is operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide community-based organization; (c) The aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified through a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety program administered by a community-based organization; (d) The aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft; and (e) When flown within 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the aircraft provides the airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic facility is located at the airport) with prior notice of the operation. § 101.43 Endangering the safety of the National Airspace System. No person may operate model aircraft so as to endanger the safety of the national airspace system.19. Add part 107 to read as follows: PART 107''SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
174 Subpart A'--General Sec. 107.1 Applicability. 107.3 Definitions. 107.5 Falsification, reproduction or alteration. 107.7 Inspection, testing, and demonstration of compliance. 107.9 Accident reporting. Subpart B'--Operating Rules 107.11 Applicability. 107.13 Registration, certification, and airworthiness directives. 107.15 Civil small unmanned aircraft system airworthiness. 107.17 Medical condition. 107.19 Responsibility of the operator. 107.21 Maintenance and inspection. 107.23 Hazardous operation. 107.25 Operation from a moving vehicle or aircraft. 107.27 Alcohol or drugs. 107.29 Daylight operation. 107.31 Visual line of sight aircraft operation. 107.33 Visual observer. 107.35 Operation of multiple small unmanned aircraft systems. 107.37 Operation near aircraft; right-of-way rules. 107.39 Operation over people. 107.41 Operation in certain airspace. 107.45 Operation in prohibited or restricted areas. 107.47 Flight restrictions in the proximity of certain areas designated by notice to airmen. 107.49 Preflight familiarization, inspection, and actions for aircraft operation. 107.51 Operating limitations for small unmanned aircraft. Subpart C'--Operator Certification 107.53 Applicability. 107.57 Offenses involving alcohol or drugs. 107.59 Refusal to submit to an alcohol test or to furnish test results. 107.61 Eligibility. 107.63 Issuance of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. 107.65 Aeronautical knowledge recency. 107.67 Knowledge tests: General procedures and passing grades. 107.69 Knowledge tests: Cheating or other unauthorized conduct. 107.71 Retesting after failure.
175 107.73 Initial and recurrent knowledge tests. 107.75 Military pilots or former military pilots. 107.77 Change of name or address. 107.79 Voluntary surrender of certificate. Subpart D'--Small Unmanned Aircraft Registration and Identification. 107.87 Applicability. 107.89 Registration and identification. Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101 note, 40103(b), 44701(a)(5); Sec. 333 of Pub. L. 112-95. Subpart A'--General § 107.1 Applicability. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part applies to the registration, airman certification, and operation of civil small unmanned aircraft systems within the United States. (b) This part does not apply to the following: (1) Air carrier operations; (2) Any aircraft subject to the provisions of part 101 of this chapter; (3) Any aircraft conducting an external load operation; (4) Any aircraft towing another aircraft or object; or (5) Any aircraft that does not meet the criteria specified in § 47.3 of this chapter.
176 § 107.3 Definitions. The following definitions apply to this part. If there is a conflict between the definitions of this part and definitions specified in § 1.1 of this chapter, the definitions in this part control for purposes of this part: Control station means an interface used by the operator to control the flight path of the small unmanned aircraft. Corrective lenses means spectacles or contact lenses. Operator means a person who manipulates the flight controls of a small unmanned aircraft system. Small unmanned aircraft means an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds including everything that is on board the aircraft. Small unmanned aircraft system (small UAS) means a small unmanned aircraft and its associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the small unmanned aircraft) that are required for the safe and efficient operation of the small unmanned aircraft in the national airspace system. Unmanned aircraft means an aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. Visual observer means a person who assists the small unmanned aircraft operator to see and avoid other air traffic or objects aloft or on the ground. § 107.5 Falsification, reproduction or alteration. (a) No person may make or cause to be made'--
177 (1) Any fraudulent or intentionally false record or report that is required to be made, kept, or used to show compliance with any requirement under this part. (2) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose, of any certificate, rating, authorization, record or report under this part. (b) The commission by any person of an act prohibited under paragraph (a) of this section is a basis for denying an application for certificate, or suspending or revoking the applicable certificate or waiver issued by the Administrator under this part and held by that person. § 107.7 Inspection, testing, and demonstration of compliance. (a) An operator or owner of a small unmanned aircraft system must, upon request, make available to the Administrator: (1) The operator's unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating; (2) The certificate of aircraft registration for the small unmanned aircraft system being operated; and (3) Any other document, record, or report required to be kept by an operator or owner of a small unmanned aircraft system under the regulations of this chapter. (b) The operator, visual observer, or owner of a small unmanned aircraft system must, upon request, allow the Administrator to make any test or inspection of the small unmanned aircraft system, the operator, and, if applicable, the visual observer to determine compliance with this part.
178 § 107.9 Accident reporting. No later than 10 days after an operation that meets the criteria of either paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, an operator must report to the nearest Federal Aviation Administration Flight Standards District Office any operation of the small unmanned aircraft that involves the following: (a) Any injury to any person; or (b) Damage to any property, other than the small unmanned aircraft. Subpart B'--Operating Rules § 107.11 Applicability. This subpart applies to the operation of all civil small unmanned aircraft systems to which this part applies. § 107.13 Registration, certification, and airworthiness directives. No person may operate a civil small unmanned aircraft system for purposes of flight unless: (a) That person has an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating issued pursuant to Subpart C of this part and satisfies the requirements of § 107.65; (b) The small unmanned aircraft being operated has been registered with the FAA pursuant to subpart D of this part; (c) The small unmanned aircraft being operated displays its registration number in the manner specified in subpart D of this part; and
179 (d) The owner or operator of the small unmanned aircraft system complies with all applicable airworthiness directives. § 107.15 Civil small unmanned aircraft system airworthiness. (a) No person may operate a civil small unmanned aircraft system unless it is in a condition for safe operation. This condition must be determined during the preflight check required under § 107.49 of this part. (b) The operator must discontinue the flight when he or she knows or has reason to know that continuing the flight would pose a hazard to other aircraft, people, or property. § 107.17 Medical condition. No person may act as an operator or visual observer if he or she knows or has reason to know that he or she has a physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small unmanned aircraft system. § 107.19 Responsibility of the operator. (a) The operator is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to the operation of the small unmanned aircraft system. (b) The operator must ensure that the small unmanned aircraft will pose no undue hazard to other aircraft, people, or property in the event of a loss of control of the aircraft for any reason. § 107.21 Maintenance and inspection. An operator must:
180 (a) Maintain the system in a condition for safe operation; and (b) Inspect the small unmanned aircraft system prior to flight to determine that the system it is in a condition for safe operation. § 107.23 Hazardous operation. No person may: (a) Operate a small unmanned aircraft system in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another; or (b) Allow an object to be dropped from a small unmanned aircraft if such action endangers the life or property of another. § 107.25 Operation from a moving vehicle or aircraft. No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft system - (a) From a moving aircraft; or (b) From a moving vehicle unless that vehicle is moving on water. § 107.27 Alcohol or drugs. A person acting as an operator or as a visual observer must comply with the provisions of §§ 91.17 and 91.19 of this chapter. § 107.29 Daylight operation. No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft system except between the hours of official sunrise and sunset.
181 § 107.31 Visual line of sight aircraft operation. With vision that is unaided by any device other than corrective lenses, the operator or visual observer must be able to see the unmanned aircraft throughout the entire flight in order to: (a) Know the unmanned aircraft's location; (b) Determine the unmanned aircraft's attitude, altitude, and direction; (c) Observe the airspace for other air traffic or hazards; and (d) Determine that the unmanned aircraft does not endanger the life or property of another. § 107.33 Visual observer. If a visual observer is used during the aircraft operation, all of the following requirements must be met: (a) The operator and the visual observer must maintain effective communication with each other at all times. (b) The operator must ensure that the visual observer is able to see the unmanned aircraft in the manner specified in §§ 107.31 and 107.37. (c) At all times during flight, the small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough to the operator for the operator to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. (d) The operator and the visual observer must coordinate to do the following:
182 (1) Scan the airspace where the small unmanned aircraft is operating for any potential collision hazard; and (2) Maintain awareness of the position of the small unmanned aircraft through direct visual observation. § 107.35 Operation of multiple small unmanned aircraft systems. A person may not act as an operator or visual observer in the operation of more than one unmanned aircraft system at the same time. § 107.37 Operation near aircraft; right-of-way rules. (a) Each operator must maintain awareness so as to see and avoid other aircraft and vehicles and must yield the right-of-way to all aircraft, airborne vehicles, and launch and reentry vehicles. (1) In order to maintain awareness so as to see other aircraft and vehicles, either the operator or a visual observer must, at each point of the small unmanned aircraft's flight, satisfy the criteria specified in § 107.31. (2) Yielding the right-of-way means that the small unmanned aircraft must give way to the aircraft or vehicle and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. (b) No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. § 107.39 Operation over people. No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft over a human being who is:
183 (a) Not directly participating in the operation of the small unmanned aircraft; or (b) Not located under a covered structure that can provide reasonable protection from a falling small unmanned aircraft. § 107.41 Operation in certain airspace. (a) A small unmanned aircraft may not operate in Class A airspace. (b) A small unmanned aircraft may not operate in Class B, Class C, or Class D airspace or within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport unless the operator has prior authorization from the Air Traffic Control (ATC) facility having jurisdiction over that airspace. § 107.45 Operation in prohibited or restricted areas. No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft in prohibited or restricted areas unless that person has permission from the using or controlling agency, as appropriate. § 107.47 Flight restrictions in the proximity of certain areas designated by notice to airmen. No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft in areas designated in a Notice to Airmen under §§ 91.137 through 91.145, or § 99.7 of this chapter, unless authorized by: (a) Air Traffic Control (ATC); or (b) A Certificate of Waiver or Authorization issued by the FAA. § 107.49 Preflight familiarization, inspection, and actions for aircraft operation. (a) Prior to flight, the operator must:
184 (1) Assess the operating environment, considering risks to persons and property in the immediate vicinity both on the surface and in the air. This assessment must include: (i) Local weather conditions; (ii) Local airspace and any flight restrictions; (iii) The location of persons and property on the surface; and (iv) Other ground hazards. (2) Ensure that all persons involved in the small unmanned aircraft operation receive a briefing that includes operating conditions, emergency procedures, contingency procedures, roles and responsibilities, and potential hazards; (3) Ensure that all links between ground station and the small unmanned aircraft are working properly; and (4) If the small unmanned aircraft is powered, ensure that there is enough available power for the small unmanned aircraft system to operate for the intended operational time and to operate after that for at least five minutes. (b) Each person involved in the operation must perform the duties assigned by the operator. § 107.51 Operating limitations for small unmanned aircraft. An operator must comply with all of the following operating limitations when operating a small unmanned aircraft system:
185 (a) The airspeed of the small unmanned aircraft may not exceed 87 knots (100 miles per hour) calibrated airspeed at full power in level flight; (b) The altitude of the small unmanned aircraft cannot be higher than 500 feet (150 meters) above ground level; (c) The minimum flight visibility, as observed from the location of the ground control station must be no less than 3 statute miles (5 kilometers); and (d) The minimum distance of the small unmanned aircraft from clouds must be no less than: (1) 500 feet (150 meters) below the cloud; and (2) 2,000 feet (600 meters) horizontally away from the cloud. Subpart C'--Operator Certification § 107.53 Applicability. This subpart prescribes the requirements for issuing an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. § 107.57 Offenses involving alcohol or drugs. (a) A conviction for the violation of any Federal or State statute relating to the growing, processing, manufacture, sale, disposition, possession, transportation, or importation of narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant or stimulant drugs or substances is grounds for: (1) Denial of an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating for a period of up to 1 year after the date of final conviction; or
186 (2) Suspension or revocation of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. (b) Committing an act prohibited by § 91.17(a) or § 91.19(a) of this chapter is grounds for: (1) Denial of an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating for a period of up to 1 year after the date of that act; or (2) Suspension or revocation of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. § 107.59 Refusal to submit to an alcohol test or to furnish test results. A refusal to submit to a test to indicate the percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood, when requested by a law enforcement officer in accordance with § 91.17(c) of this chapter, or a refusal to furnish or authorize the release of the test results requested by the Administrator in accordance with § 91.17(c) or (d) of this chapter, is grounds for: (a) Denial of an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating for a period of up to 1 year after the date of that refusal; or (b) Suspension or revocation of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. § 107.61 Eligibility. Subject to the provisions of §§ 107.57 and 107.59, in order to be eligible for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating under this subpart, a person must:
187 (a) Be at least 17 years of age; (b) Be able to read, speak, write, and understand the English language. If the applicant is unable to meet one of these requirements due to medical reasons, the FAA may place such operating limitations on that applicant's certificate as are necessary for the safe operation of the small unmanned aircraft; (c) Pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of knowledge specified in § 107.73(a); and (d) Not know or have reason to know that he or she has a physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small unmanned aircraft system. § 107.63 Issuance of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating. An applicant for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating under this subpart must make the application in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator. (a) The application must include: (1) An airman knowledge test report showing that the applicant passed an initial aeronautical knowledge test, or recurrent aeronautical knowledge test for those individuals that satisfy the requirements of §107.75; and (2) A certification signed by the applicant stating that the applicant does not know or have reason to know that he or she has a physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small unmanned aircraft system.
188 (b) The application must be submitted to a Flight Standards District Office, a designated pilot examiner, an airman certification representative for a pilot school, a certified flight instructor, or other person authorized by the Administrator. The person accepting the application submission must verify the identity of the applicant in a manner acceptable to the Administrator. § 107.65 Aeronautical knowledge recency. A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft system unless that person has completed one of the following, within the previous 24 calendar months: (a) Passed an initial aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of knowledge specified in § 107.73(a); or (b) Passed a recurrent aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of knowledge specified in § 107.73(b). § 107.67 Knowledge tests: General procedures and passing grades. (a) Knowledge tests prescribed by or under this part are given at times and places, and by persons designated by the Administrator. (b) An applicant for a knowledge test must have proper identification at the time of application that contains the applicant's: (1) Photograph; (2) Signature;
189 (3) Date of birth, which shows the applicant meets or will meet the age requirements of this part for the certificate sought before the expiration date of the airman knowledge test report; and (4) If the permanent mailing address is a post office box number, then the applicant must provide a current residential address. (c) The minimum passing grade for the knowledge test will be specified by the Administrator. § 107.69 Knowledge tests: Cheating or other unauthorized conduct. (a) An applicant for a knowledge test may not: (1) Copy or intentionally remove any knowledge test; (2) Give to another applicant or receive from another applicant any part or copy of a knowledge test; (3) Give assistance on, or receive assistance on, a knowledge test during the period that test is being given; (4) Take any part of a knowledge test on behalf of another person; (5) Be represented by, or represent, another person for a knowledge test; (6) Use any material or aid during the period that the test is being given, unless specifically authorized to do so by the Administrator; and (7) Intentionally cause, assist, or participate in any act prohibited by this paragraph.
190 (b) An applicant who the Administrator finds has committed an act prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section is prohibited, for 1 year after the date of committing that act, from: (1) Applying for any certificate, rating, or authorization issued under this chapter; and (2) Applying for and taking any test under this chapter. (c) Any certificate or rating held by an applicant may be suspended or revoked if the Administrator finds that person has committed an act prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section. § 107.71 Retesting after failure. An applicant for a knowledge test who fails that test may not reapply for the test for 14 calendar days after failing the test. § 107.73 Initial and recurrent knowledge tests. (a) An initial aeronautical knowledge test covers the following areas of knowledge: (1) Applicable regulations relating to small unmanned aircraft system rating privileges, limitations, and flight operation; (2) Airspace classification and operating requirements, obstacle clearance requirements, and flight restrictions affecting small unmanned aircraft operation; (3) Official sources of weather and effects of weather on small unmanned aircraft performance;
191 (4) Small unmanned aircraft system loading and performance; (5) Emergency procedures; (6) Crew resource management; (7) Radio communication procedures; (8) Determining the performance of small unmanned aircraft; (9) Physiological effects of drugs and alcohol; (10) Aeronautical decision-making and judgment; and (11) Airport operations. (b) A recurrent aeronautical knowledge test covers the following areas of knowledge: (1) Applicable regulations relating to small unmanned aircraft system rating privileges, limitations, and flight operation; (2) Airspace classification and operating requirements, obstacle clearance requirements, and flight restrictions affecting small unmanned aircraft operation; (3) Official sources of weather; (4) Emergency procedures; (5) Crew resource management; (6) Aeronautical decision-making and judgment; and (7) Airport operations.
192 § 107.75 Military pilots or former military pilots. (a) General. Except for a person who has been removed from unmanned aircraft flying status for lack of proficiency or because of a disciplinary action involving any aircraft operation, a U.S. military unmanned aircraft pilot or operator or former U.S. military unmanned aircraft pilot or operator who meets the requirements of this section may apply, on the basis of his or her U.S. military unmanned aircraft pilot or operator qualifications, for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with small UAS rating issued under this part. (b) Military unmanned aircraft pilots or operators and former military unmanned aircraft pilots or operators in the U.S. Armed Forces. A person who qualifies as a U.S. military unmanned aircraft pilot or operator or former U.S. military unmanned aircraft pilot or operator may apply for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating if that person'-- (1) Passes a recurrent aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of knowledge specified in § 107.73(b); and (2) Presents evidentiary documents that show: (i) The person's status in the U.S. Armed Forces; (ii) That the person is or was a U.S. military unmanned aircraft pilot or operator. § 107.77 Change of name or address. (a) Change of Name. An application to change the name on a certificate issued under this subpart must be accompanied by the applicant's:
193 (1) Operator certificate; and (2) A copy of the marriage license, court order, or other document verifying the name change. (b) The documents in paragraph (a) of this section will be returned to the applicant after inspection. (c) Change of address. The holder of an unmanned aircraft operator certificate issued under this subpart who has made a change in permanent mailing address may not, after 30 days from that date, exercise the privileges of the certificate unless the holder has notified the FAA of the change in address using one of the following methods: (1) By letter to the FAA Airman Certification Branch, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125 providing the new permanent mailing address, or if the permanent mailing address includes a post office box number, then the holder's current residential address; or (2) By using the FAA website portal at www.faa.gov providing the new permanent mailing address, or if the permanent mailing address includes a post office box number, then the holder's current residential address. § 107.79 Voluntary surrender of certificate. (a) The holder of a certificate issued under this subpart may voluntarily surrender it for cancellation. (b) Any request made under paragraph (a) of this section must include the following signed statement or its equivalent: ''I voluntarily surrender my unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating for cancellation. This request is made for my own
194 reasons, with full knowledge that my certificate will not be reissued to me unless I again complete the requirements specified in §§ 107.61 and 107.63.'' Subpart D'--Small Unmanned Aircraft Registration and Identification. § 107.87 Applicability. This subpart prescribes the rules governing the registration and identification of all civil small unmanned aircraft to which this part applies. § 107.89 Registration and identification. (a) All small unmanned aircraft must be registered in accordance with part 47 of this chapter. (b) All small unmanned aircraft must display their nationality and registration marks in accordance with the requirements of subpart C of part 45 of this chapter. PART 183'--REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 20. The authority citation for part 183 is revised to read as follows: Authority: 31 U.S.C. 9701; 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44702, 45303. 21. Amend § 183.23 by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) and adding paragraph (d) to read as follows: § 183.23 Pilot examiners. * * * * * (b) Under the general supervision of the appropriate local Flight Standards Inspector, conduct those tests;
195 (c) In the discretion of the appropriate local Flight Standards Inspector, issue temporary pilot certificates and ratings to qualified applicants; and (d) Accept an application for an unmanned aircraft operator certificate with a small UAS rating and verify the identity of the applicant in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator. Issued under the authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101 note; and Sec. 333 of Pub. L. 112-95, in Washington, DC, on February 15, 2015. Anthony R. Foxx, Secretary of Transportation. Michael P. Huerta, Administrator.
Packet and Sales Equality
FCC restrictions on joint sales agreements: Yet another FCC rule without basis in evidence or economics | Truth on the Market
Recently, Commissioner Pai praised the introduction of bipartisan legislation to protect joint sales agreements (''JSAs'') between local television stations. He explained that
JSAs are contractual agreements that allow broadcasters to cut down on costs by using the same advertising sales force. The efficiencies created by JSAs have helped broadcasters to offer services that benefit consumers, especially in smaller markets'.... JSAs have served communities well and have promoted localism and diversity in broadcasting. Unfortunately, the FCC's new restrictions on JSAs have already caused some stations to go off the air and other stations to carry less local news.
The ''new restrictions'' to which Commissioner Pai refers were recently challenged in court by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), et. al., and on April 20, the International Center for Law & Economics and a group of law and economics scholars filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in support of the petition, asking the court to review the FCC's local media ownership duopoly rule restricting JSAs.
Much as it did with with net neutrality, the FCC is looking to extend another set of rules with no basis in sound economic theory or established facts.
At issue is the FCC's decision both to retain the duopoly rule and to extend that rule to certain JSAs, allwithout completing a legally mandated review of the local media ownership rules, due since 2010 (but last completed in 2007).
The duopoly rule is at odds with sound competition policy because it fails to account for drastic changes in the media market that necessitate redefinition of the market for television advertising. Moreover, its extension will bring a halt to JSAs currently operating (and operating well) in nearly 100 markets. As the evidence on the FCC rulemaking record shows, many of these JSAs offer public interest benefits and actually foster, rather than stifle, competition in broadcast television markets.
In the world of media mergers generally, competition law hasn't yet caught up to the obvious truth that new media is competing with old media for eyeballs and advertising dollars in basically every marketplace.
For instance, the FTC has relied on very narrow market definitions to challenge newspaper mergers without recognizing competition from television and the Internet. Similarly, the generally accepted market in which Google's search conduct has been investigated is something like ''online search advertising'' '-- a market definition that excludes traditional marketing channels, despite the fact that advertisers shift their spending between these channels on a regular basis.
But the FCC fares even worse here. The FCC's duopoly rule is premised on an ''eight voices'' test for local broadcast stations regardless of the market shares of the merging stations. In other words, one entity cannot own FCC licenses to two or more TV stations in the same local market unless there are at least eight independently owned stations in that market, even if their combined share of the audience or of advertising are below the level that could conceivably give rise to any inference of market power.
Such a rule is completely unjustifiable under any sensible understanding of competition law.
Can you even imagine the FTC or DOJ bringing an 8 to 7 merger challenge in any marketplace? The rule is also inconsistent with the contemporary economic learning incorporated into the 2010 Merger Guidelines, which looks at competitive effects rather than just counting competitors.
Not only did the FCC fail to analyze the marketplace to understand how much competition there is between local broadcasters, cable, and online video, but, on top of that, the FCC applied this outdated duopoly rule to JSAs without considering their benefits.
The Commission offers no explanation as to why it now believes that extending the duopoly rule to JSAs, many of which it had previously approved, is suddenly necessary to protect competition or otherwise serve the public interest. Nor does the FCC cite any evidence to support its position. In fact, the record evidence actually points overwhelmingly in the opposite direction.
As a matter of sound regulatory practice, this is bad enough. But Congress directed the FCC in Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to review all of its local ownership rules every four years to determine whether they were still ''necessary in the public interest as the result of competition,'' and to repeal or modify those that weren't. During this review, the FCC must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its decision.
So what did the Commission do? It announced that, instead of completing its statutorily mandated 2010 quadrennial review of its local ownership rules, it would roll that review into a new 2014 quadrennial review (which it has yet to perform). Meanwhile, the Commission decided to retain its duopoly rule pending completion of that review because it had ''tentatively'' concluded that it was still necessary.
In other words, the FCC hasn't conducted its mandatory quadrennial review in more than seven years, and won't, under the new rules, conduct one for another year and a half (at least). Oh, and, as if nothing of relevance has changed in the market since then, it ''tentatively'' maintains its already suspect duopoly rule in the meantime.
In short, because the FCC didn't conduct the review mandated by statute, there is no factual support for the 2014 Order. By relying on the outdated findings from its earlier review, the 2014 Order fails to examine the significant changes both in competition policy and in the market for video programming that have occurred since the current form of the rule was first adopted, rendering the rulemaking arbitrary and capricious under well-established case law.
Had the FCC examined the record of the current rulemaking, it would have found substantial evidence that undermines, rather than supports, the FCC's rule.
Economic studies have shown that JSAs can help small broadcasters compete more effectively with cable and online video in a world where their advertising revenues are drying up and where temporary economies of scale (through limited contractual arrangements like JSAs) can help smaller, local advertising outlets better implement giant, national advertising campaigns. A ban on JSAs will actually make it less likely that competition among local broadcasters can survive, not more.
Commissioner Pai, in his dissenting statement to the 2014 Order, offered a number of examples of the benefits of JSAs (all of them studiously ignored by the Commission in its Order). In one of these, a JSA enabled two stations in Joplin, Missouri to use their $3.5 million of cost savings from a JSA to upgrade their Doppler radar system, which helped save lives when a devastating tornado hit the town in 2011. But such benefits figure nowhere in the FCC's ''analysis.''
Several econometric studies also provide empirical support for the (also neglected) contention that duopolies and JSAs enable stations to improve the quality and prices of their programming.
One study, by Jeff Eisenach and Kevin Caves, shows that stations operating under these agreements are likely to carry significantly more news, public affairs, and current affairs programming than other stations in their markets. The same study found an 11 percent increase in audience shares for stations acquired through a duopoly. Meanwhile, a study by Hal Singer and Kevin Caves shows that markets with JSAs have advertising prices that are, on average, roughly 16 percent lower than in non-duopoly markets '-- not higher, as would be expected if JSAs harmed competition.
And again, Commissioner Pai provides several examples of these benefits in his dissenting statement. In one of these, a JSA in Wichita, Kansas enabled one of the two stations to provide Spanish-language HD programming, including news, weather, emergency and community information, in a market where that Spanish-language programming had not previously been available. Again '-- benefit ignored.
Moreover, in retaining its duopoly rule on the basis of woefully outdated evidence, the FCC completely ignores the continuing evolution in the market for video programming.
In reality, competition from non-broadcast sources of programming has increased dramatically since 1999. Among other things:
Today, over 85 percent of American households watch TV over cable or satellite. Most households now have access to nearly 200 cable channels that compete with broadcast TV for programming content and viewers.In 2014, these cable channels attracted twice as many viewers as broadcast channels.Online video services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, and Hulu have begun to emerge as major new competitors for video programming, leading 179,000 households to ''cut the cord'' and cancel their cable subscriptions in the third quarter of 2014 alone.Today, 40 percent of U.S. households subscribe to an online streaming service; as a result, cable ratings among adults fell by nine percent in 2014.At the end of 2007, when the FCC completed its last quadrennial review, the iPhone had just been introduced, and the launch of the iPad was still more than two years away. Today, two-thirds of Americans have a smartphone or tablet over which they can receive video content, using technology that didn't even exist when the FCC last amended its duopoly rule.In the face of this evidence, and without any contrary evidence of its own, the Commission's action in reversing 25 years of agency practice and extending its duopoly rule to most JSAs is arbitrary and capricious.
The law is pretty clear that the extent of support adduced by the FCC in its 2014 Rule is insufficient. Among other relevant precedent (and there is a lot of it):
The Supreme Court has held that an agency
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.
In the DC Circuit:
the agency must explain why it decided to act as it did. The agency's statement must be one of 'reasoning'; it must not be just a 'conclusion'; it must 'articulate a satisfactory explanation' for its action.
And:
[A]n agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it abruptly departs from a position it previously held without satisfactorily explaining its reason for doing so.
Also:
The FCC 'cannot silently depart from previous policies or ignore precedent' . . . .''
And most recently in Judge Silberman's concurrence/dissent in the 2010 Verizon v. FCC Open Internet Order case:
factual determinations that underly [sic] regulations must still be premised on demonstrated '-- and reasonable '-- evidential support
None of these standards is met in this case.
It will be noteworthy to see what the DC Circuit does with these arguments given the pending Petitions for Review of the latest Open Internet Order. There, too, the FCC acted without sufficient evidentiary support for its actions. The NAB/Stirk Holdings case may well turn out to be a bellwether for how the court views the FCC's evidentiary failings in that case, as well.
The scholars joining ICLE on the brief are:
Babette E. Boliek, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine School of LawHenry N. Butler, George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Law & Economics Center, George Mason University School of Law (and newly appointed dean).Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University School of LawStan Liebowitz, Ashbel Smith Professor of Economics, University of Texas at DallasFred McChesney, de la Cruz-Mentschikoff Endowed Chair in Law and Economics, University of Miami School of LawPaul H. Rubin, Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Economics, Emory UniversityMichael E. Sykuta, Associate Professor in the Division of Applied Social Sciences and Director of the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, University of MissouriThe full amicus brief is available here.
Science!
First warm-blooded fish found -- Science & Technology -- Sott.net
(C) NOAA Fisheries, Southwest Fisheries Science CenterSouthwest Fisheries Science Center biologist Nick Wegner holds a captured opah, the first-ever warm-blooded fish..
The car-tire-size opah is striking enough thanks to its rotund, silver body. But now, researchers have discovered something surprising about this deep-sea dweller: It's got warm blood.That makes the opah (Lampris guttatus) the first warm-blooded fish every discovered. Most fish are exotherms, meaning they require heat from the environment to stay toasty. The opah, as an endotherm, keeps its own temperature elevated even as it dives to chilly depths of 1,300 feet (396 meters) in temperate and tropical oceans around the world.
"Increased temperature speeds up physiological processes within the body," study leader Nicholas Wegner, a biologist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries' Southwest Fisheries Science Center in La Jolla, California told Live Science. "As a result, the muscles can contract faster, the temporal resolution of the eye is increased, and neurological transmissions are sped up. This results in faster swimming speeds, better vision and faster response times."
The result, Wegner said, is a fast-swimming fish with an advantage for hunting slow, cold-blooded prey. [See Photos of the Gigantic Warm-Blooded Opah (Moonfish)]
Undersea moon
The opah, also known as the moonfish, has relatively small red fins decorating its large, round body, which can grow up to 6 feet (1.8 meters) long. These fins, which flap rapidly as the fish swims, turn out to be important in generating body heat for the opah.
"The opah appears to produce the majority of its heat by constantly flapping its pectoral fins which are used in continuous swimming," Wegner said.
Researchers first suspected that something might be strange about the opah after analyzing a sample of the fish's gill tissue. According to the new study, published today (May 14) in the journal Science, the blood vessels in the tissue are set up so that the vessels carrying cool, oxygenated blood from the gills to the body are in contact with the vessels carrying warm, deoxygenated blood from the body to the gills. As a result, the outgoing blood warms up the incoming blood, a process called counter-current heat exchange.
"There has never been anything like this seen in a fish's gills before," Wegner said in a statement. "This is a cool innovation by these animals that gives them a competitive edge. The concept of counter-current heat exchange was invented in fish long before [humans] thought of it."
To confirm that these special gills helped the opah stay toasty, the researchers tagged a number of moonfish with temperature monitors and tracked the fish as they dove. The fish spend most of their time at least 150 feet (45 m) below the ocean surface. No matter how deep they dive, however, their body temperature stays about 9 degrees Fahrenheit (5 degrees Celsius) warmer than the surrounding water. Fat deposits around the gills and muscles help insulate the fish, the researchers found.
Built for speed
Warm blood gives deep-sea fish a boost, according to Wegner. The opah's muscles and nervous system likely function faster than an equivalent fish with cold blood. Other deep-diving fish, such as tuna and some sharks can shunt blood to certain body parts to keep them warm during deep dives. But these fish have to swim up out of the depths frequently to prevent their organs from shutting down.
In contrast, the opah can stay deep for long periods of time.
"Nature has a way of surprising us with clever strategies where you least expect them," Wegner said in a statement. "It's hard to stay warm when you're surrounded by cold water, but the opah has figured it out."
Next, Wegner told Live Science, he and his colleagues want to study Lampris immaculatus, the opah's southern cousin. This fish, the southern opah, lives in colder waters than the northern opah, so it would be harder to keep warm, Wegner said '-- but even more beneficial.
Haiti
Hollande promises to pay 'moral debt' to former colony Haiti | World news | The Guardian
French president Fran§ois Hollande is welcomed by the President of Haiti, Michel Martelly upon his arrival in Haiti. Photograph: Hector Retamal/AFP/Getty Images
Fran§ois Hollande on Tuesday became the first president of France to make a formal state visit to Haiti, where bountiful resources and brutal plantation slavery made it the European nation's most profitable colony before an independence uprising more than two centuries ago.
Related:Hollywood help comes to Haiti, trying to avoid pitfalls of donor-knows-best
For Haiti's government and business community, the visit is a welcome opportunity to encourage more investment and highlight progress made since a devastating 2010 earthquake obliterated much of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.
But for some in impoverished Haiti, Hollande's presence is a reminder of the debilitating costs of the successful slave revolt that made Haiti the world's first black republic in 1804.
Crippled by an international embargo enforced by French warships, Haiti agreed in 1825 to pay France an ''independence debt'' of 150m gold francs to compensate colonists for lost land and slaves. Although the indemnity was later reduced to 90m gold coins, the debt crippled the Caribbean nation, which did not finish paying it off to French and American banks until 1947.
''We Haitians know that a big reason why we are suffering today is because we were forced to pay France for our freedom. If we were not punished for our independence long ago, we would have had a better time,'' water seller Jean-Marc Bouchet said on a dusty, unpaved street in Port-au-Prince.
About 200 chanting protesters and a heavy police presence greeted Hollande when he arrived at the Champ de Mars plaza in downtown Port-au-Prince with Haitian president Michel Martelly. He and Martelly laid a wreath at a statue of Toussaint Louverture, a hero of Haiti's revolution.
''We can't change history, but we can change the future,'' said Hollande, who promised Martelly that France would finance a large-scale program to modernize Haiti's education system
''There is a moral debt that exists,'' said Hollande, but he dodged the thorny issue of reparations which some in Haiti have demanded.
''You're not asking for aid, you want development,'' he told Haitians. ''You're not asking for welfare, you want investment.''
Over the last week, Hollande has been touring the region, stopping at French Caribbean islands and in Cuba, which he left on Tuesday after saying France would be a ''faithful ally'' as Havana reforms its centrally planned economy.
Behind metal barricades, Gymps Lucien, a Haitian law school student who was protesting Hollande's one-day stop, said the French president was not welcome unless he brought billions in reparations for slavery and the debt for independence.
''We believe French reparations should go to schools, hospitals, roads!'' he shouted. ''Our kids should have a better life.''
The small band of demonstrators gathered near a larger crowd of quiet observers. One of those, Giles Jean Sava, an unemployed father of seven, said that he disagreed with the protest and that Haitians should welcome Hollande. ''Perhaps the French president can bring jobs,'' he said.
Though then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy made a five-hour stop in Haiti weeks after the 2010 earthquake, it was an informal trip and not a state visit with the full ceremony that accompanied Hollande's arrival.
Related:France's debt of dishonour to Haiti | Isabel Macdonald
Over the years, French administrations have acknowledged the historic wrong of slavery in Haiti and other former colonies. In 2001, the French government recognised slavery and the slave trade as a crime against humanity.
But French leaders, like those of other former colonial powers, consistently have dismissed assertions they need to pay any kind of financial reparations. France did cancel all of Haiti's $77m debt during Sarkozy's administration.
During his speech Tuesday, Martelly described the indemnity Haiti was forced to pay as a ''grand injustice,'' but added that ''no reparation can change what happened years ago''.
On Sunday, Hollande acknowledged his country's historic role in the Atlantic slave trade as he helped inaugurate a $93m slavery memorial in Guadeloupe. During that visit, he made mention of France's ''debt'' to Haiti, but French officials stressed he was referring to a ''moral debt,'' not a financial one. They say it echoes comments he made in 2013 when Hollande said France's ''debt'' to Africa ''cannot be the subject of a transaction''.
Two years ago, leaders of more than a dozen Caribbean countries launched an effort to seek compensation from France, Britain and the Netherlands for what they say is the lingering legacy of the Atlantic slave trade.
VIDEO-CLIPS-DOCS
VIDEO-Students disgusted after finding bugs in cafeteria food | KFOR.com
CONROE, Texas '' School cafeteria food has never been known for being gourmet, but what one Texas student found in her food has her mother demanding answers.
''It was kind of strange and gross that we had actually seen it and that it happened to us,'' said Falyn Evans.
Evans says she was sitting next to her friend at lunch when she went to take a bite of broccoli and found something unusual.
''There's no way they could've missed, picking up a handful of broccoli like they do with their gloves on and not seen these ginormous bugs,'' said Melissa Evans, Falyn's mother.
In an email to parents, school administrators said they were ''notified this morning of complaints regarding food in the cafeteria. Any concerns are taken very seriously and Conroe ISD's child nutrition department is addressing the situation.''
Some parents say the problem has already been fixed at home.
''She will be taking lunches. She will not be eating it anymore, at all,'' said Melissa Evans.
A separate incident in Virginia is causing some dissension at a school district in King and Queen County.
''Two boys are coming home daily with migraines because they can't eat what's on their plates at school,'' said Beth Paulette to WTVR.
Paulette says her sons took pictures of the charred cafeteria food.
Pizza, ribs and hamburgers are almost unrecognizable after being burnt.
''It looked so unappetizing, I could not bring myself to try it at all,'' said Precious Jackson, a ninth grader.
The school superintendent said the head of food services was suspended, but refused to comment further.
However, that employee says the situation is not her fault.
''My cafeteria employees have always been told if you're not going to eat it, don't serve it to the students,'' said Suzanne Gilberton.
Gilberton says the superintendent put someone in charge of the high school's cafeteria a few months ago, but she says that person is not properly trained.
She also said several emails proved that she reached out to the superintendent but was told that she did not have any authority over the new manager.
See a mistake? Report a typo here.
VIDEO-Jury reaches sentencing decision in Boston Marathon bomber case
Convicted Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was sentenced to death Friday after a Boston jury's third day of deliberations.
Tsarnaev showed little expression as he heard the sentence, and the courtroom was solemn throughout the proceedings.
The 21-year-old was convicted last month of killing three people and injuring 264 others by detonating homemade bombs at the Boston Marathon finish line on April 15, 2013. Three days later, he and his 26-year-old brother shot a police officer to death, carjacked a Chinese businessman and hurled bombs at police, triggering a day-long lockdown of most of the Boston area as police searched for Tsarnaev.
Read MoreBoston Marathon bomber Tsarnaev guilty on all counts
Tsarnaev will remain in custody, with a formal sentencing in the coming months. He will become the youngest person on federal death row.
An appeals process could take years before Tsarnaev is killed by lethal injection.
VIDEO-Chris Matthews: Republicans Treat Amtrak Trains Like Hispanics | Video | RealClearPolitics
Chris Matthews: Republicans Treat Amtrak Trains Like HispanicsPlease enable Javascript to watch this video
Chris Matthews says Republicans who don't have rail lines in their home districts treat Amtrak like they treat Latino voters: "We don't have enough in our district to worry about them."
VIDEO-President Putin scores 8 goals at ice-hockey game - YouTube
This is a rush transcript from "On the Record," May 13, 2015. This copy may not be in its final form and may be updated.
GRETA VAN SUSTEREN, FOX NEWS HOST: Tonight, we are live at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial. This memorial features two 300-foot long marble walls. These walls bear the names of more than 20,000 officers.
Each has been killed in the line of duty dating back to the first known death in 1791. In just the year 2014, 51 officers died. We are back now with U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson. Sir, last week, you were up in New York. An officer was slain.
JEH JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Yes. Officer Brian Moore. I was in New York and I decided to go out to Long Island to his wake and it is kind of what I was saying before. Any time you go to a cop's wake or right after -- the precinct after a shooting, they are all there they all show up.
It's like a big family. It was quite moving. Officer Moore was not married. He was only 25. I understand he had something like 10 police officers in his family including his dad. He was an officer's officer.
SUSTEREN: You know, it's tough tonight to look at the families as they get off the buses because they are coming to honor the mothers and fathers and other relatives who have died. It's very sad to see their loss.
JOHNSON: Yes, it is. We can't possibly know what it's like. No words that I could offer and I know this from my experience in the Defense Department and now there are no words you can offer to console. But the message that we continually need to deliver is we'll always be there for you as a family. Whether it's the Department of Homeland Security or the NYPD, we will always be there for you as a family years from now.
SUSTEREN: You know, many police are saying to me tonight the feelings are bruised. They are feeling a little bit like the American people don't quite understand the difficulty of their jobs.
JOHNSON: Well, I think it's important to remember that a police officer, a federal law enforcement officer is public safety. They are there to on a moment's notice to protect our lives, potentially risk their own lives for somebody they don't even know. And they do that every single day. Whether living or our fallen, it's heroes that we're honoring here today.
SUSTEREN: We just think about last night when that train crashed. Maybe some were supposed to be off duty, ready to go. They don't ask anything. They just go.
JOHNSON: They don't ask anything. As you know they don't get lavish pay, but they are prepared to put their lives on the line at a moment's notice.
SUSTEREN: Which brings me the other issue of ISIS in this country because our front line of defense for ISIS many times is the police officer, law enforcement. They are the ones who are called out to fight or the FBI or any law enforcement.
JOHNSON: That's becoming more and more the case given how the global terrorist threat is evolving. That is correct.
SUSTEREN: What do you say to them?
JOHNSON: Be vigilant. Be aware. Be ready. And in the Department of Homeland Security, what we're doing more and more is what we call vertical information sharing, vertical intelligence sharing with state and local law enforcement.
We want people in local law enforcement to see what we're seeing in terms of the latest intelligence picture. And so our intelligence unit in DHS spends a lot of time with state, local law enforcement, police chief, sheriffs.
Director Comey and I had a video teleconference with police chiefs across the country last week to share with them the picture they are seeing. We think that's more and more important.
SUSTEREN: What about the other day talking about the lone wolf. How do the police even begin to fight that lone wolf and factor in the Internet where you have people who do the unthinkable that become recruited for ISIS and they want to act alone here in the United States? How do you possibly fight against that?
JOHNSON: It very definitely presents a more challenging picture because of the prospect of an independent actor who is not recruited overseas, not trained overseas, doesn't accept orders overseas and comes to this country.
We have systems in place to try to track that but, if it's somebody who simply inspired by something they read on social media or in the internet and decides to commit an act of violence on their own, that's much harder detect.
And what I have been saying is that very often the cop on the beat may be the first one to actually find out about a potential terrorist attack, but the overall message that I think is important to convey is that we are continuing to urge the public to come to events like this, large public gatherings.
No one should be running and hiding in a free society where we have the right to associate, the right to travel. We want to continue to encourage the American public to come to large public events like this, to honor our fallen heroes.
We had VE day celebrations last weekend, thousands of people on the mall. It's important to continue to encourage the public to come to events like this.
SUSTEREN: Some communities feel that they are not getting a fair shake from the police.
JOHNSON: Well, that is something that is a continuing challenge. I believe that our law enforcement community is incredibly strong, incredibly resilient. It knows how to learn from lessons of the past and we'll move on. You can't have a community without public safety we move often and learn from lessons. Tonight, we honor our fallen heroes.
SUSTEREN: You are going to speak to them and honor them. I should tell you right over your soldier another bus has arrived with more family members. It seems endless how many relatives. It's just endless.
JOHNSON: You will see thousands of people out here tonight. It's a remarkable ceremony. I remember from last year this is one of the more moving things I did as secretary of Homeland Security. So I'm pleased to be back here to give an address.
SUSTEREN: It's fun to see them in uniform. They look very proud, don't they? Those police officers and they should be proud.
JOHNSON: I just have a great time looking at the patches to find out where people are from and then eventually I find somebody from my hometown out here.
SUSTEREN: Which is?
JOHNSON: Right now Montclair, New Jersey.
SUSTEREN: OK, if there are any police officers in Montclair, New Jersey, watching he is looking for you. Anyway, Mr. Secretary, thanks very much and good luck in your speech tonight. Thank you, sir.
JOHNSON: Thank you.
on-the-record
On the Record, hosted by Greta Van Susteren, airs on Weekdays at 7PM ET on Fox News Channel.
VIDEO-Stephanopoulos Apologizes On-Air: I Made a 'Mistake' | MRCTV
[See NewsBusters for more.] After coming under heavy criticism for donating $75,000 to the foundation of Bill and Hillary Clinton, George Stephanopoulos on Friday made an on-air apology. Addressing the revelation that he failed to inform viewers or his bosses at ABC, Stephanopoulos conceded on Good Morning America, "I should have made additional disclosures on air when we covered the foundation and I now believe directing personal donations to that foundation was a mistake." The former Bill Clinton operative spun the donations, saying, "Even though I made them strictly to support work done to stop the spread of AIDS, help children and protect the environment in poor countries, I should have gone the extra mile to avoid even the appearance of a conflict." He added, "I apologize to all of you for failing to do that."
VIDEO-Nearly 200 scientists warn of cellphone health risks -- Health & Wellness -- Sott.net
Biological and health scientists from Russia and Iran to the USA are calling on the UN, the World Health Organization and national governments to develop strict regulations concerning devices and cellphones that create electromagnetic fields.The scientists are from 39 nations and have authored 2,000 peer-reviewed papers on the health and biological effects of non-ionizing radiation, which is part of the electromagnetic field spectrum. In a letter, they say that devices like cellphones pose risks of cancer, genetic damage, changes in reproductive system, and learning and memory deficits.
"Putting it bluntly they are damaging the living cells in our bodies and killing many of us prematurely,"said Dr. Martin Blank, from the Department of Physiology and Cellular Biophysics at Columbia University, in a video message.
"We have created something that is harming us, and it is getting out of control. Before Edison's light bulb there was very little electromagnetic radiation in our environment. The levels today are very many times higher than natural background levels, and are growing rapidly because of all the new devices that emit this radiation."
One example that was cited is the cellphone. Blank pointed to a study which showed that as cellphone usage has spread widely, the incidence of fatal brain cancer in younger people has more than tripled.The scientists see the unregulated use of radio frequency radiation in cellphones and Wi-Fi as developing into a public health crisis. Blank said biologists and scientists are not being heard from committees that set safety standards, that safety limits are much too high and that biological facts are being ignored.
"They are not protective," he added. "We are really all part of large biological experiment without our informed consent. To protect ourselves, our children, and our ecosystem, we must reduce exposure by establishing more protective guidelines."
Scientists are appealing to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) to "convene and fund an independent multidisciplinary committee to explore the pros and cons of alternative to current practices that could substantially lower human exposure to RF and ELF fields."
They request that the deliberations be "transparent and impartial," and involve industry players in the field. However, scientists believe industry "should not be allowed to bias the process or conclusions." Once completed, the analysis would offer the UN and WHO a guide for precautionary action.
Questions have surfaced about the safety of EMF among the scientific community and with the public, but it is largely absent from national debate despite the ubiquitous use of devices, particularly in the United States.
"...In the United States, where non-industry-funded studies are rare, where legislation protecting the wireless industry from legal challenges has long been in place...to suggest it might be a problem - maybe, eventually, a very public-health problem - is like saying our shoes might be killing us," wrote journalist Christopher Ketchum in a 2010 GQ article called "Warning: Your Cell Phone May Be Hazardous to Your Health."
Ketchum said a 2008 study sponsored by the International Agency for Research on Cancer in France reported that after a decade of cellphone use, the chances of getting a brain tumor - specifically on the side of the head where you use the phone - go up as much as 40 percent for adults.
VIDEO-Pentagon hunts for ISIS on the Secret Internet - CNNPolitics.com
Iraqi soldiers fire their weapons toward ISIS group positions in the Garma district, west of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, on Sunday, April 26. Pro-government forces say they have recently made advances on areas held by Islamist jihadists. Iraqi security forces control pockets of territory in Anbar, a vast desert province that stretches from the borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the western approaches to Baghdad.
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A member of the Afghan security forces stands at the site where a suicide bomber on a motorbike blew himself up in front of the Kabul Bank in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on April 18. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. The explosion killed at least 33 people and injured more than 100 others, a public health spokesman said.
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Iraqi counterterrorism forces patrol in Ramadi, Iraq, on April 18. Iraqi special forces maintained control of the provincial capital after days of intense clashes with ISIS left the city at risk.
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Thousands of Iraqis cross a bridge over the Euphrates River to Baghdad, as they flee Ramadi, Iraq, on Friday, April 17. The city of Ramadi has been embroiled in clashes with ISIS militants.
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People leave their hometown of Ramadi on April 15. ISIS' offensive in Ramadi shows its resilience despite months of U.S.-led airstrikes and its recent defeat in the northern city of Tikrit.
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Security forces arrive to Ramadi to join the battle against ISIS on April 15. The aim of the ISIS militant group is to create an Islamic state across Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria.
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Kurdish Peshmerga forces help Yazidis as they arrive at a medical center in Altun Kupri, Iraq, on April 8.
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A Yazidi woman mourns for the death of her husband and children by ISIS after being released south of Kirkuk on April 8.
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Security forces in Tikrit chant slogans against the ISIS militant group on Friday, April 3. They had just reopened the main gate of their base, which was closed for months while ISIS occupied the city.
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People in Tikrit inspect what used to be a palace of former President Saddam Hussein on April 3.
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A member of Iraq's security forces beats a suspected ISIS member who was captured in Tikrit on Wednesday, April 1.
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On April 1, Shiite militiamen celebrate the retaking of Tikrit, which had been under ISIS control since June. The push into Tikrit came days after U.S.-led airstrikes targeted ISIS bases around the city.
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Iraqi security forces and Shiite militiamen prepare to attack ISIS militants in Tikrit on Tuesday, March 31. Ousting ISIS from Tikrit was an important step for the coalition, which is trying to thwart the extremist group's quest to grow its caliphate.
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Iraqi security forces launch a rocket against ISIS positions in Tikrit on Monday, March 30.
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An Iraqi soldier searches for ISIS fighters in Tikrit on March 30.
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Smoke billows after a mortar shell hit an Anbar governorate building in Ramadi, Iraq, on Wednesday, March 11. ISIS launched a coordinated attack on government-held areas of the western Iraqi city.
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Iraqi Shiite fighters cover their ears as a rocket is launched during a clash with ISIS militants in the town of Al-Alam, Iraq, on Monday, March 9.
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Displaced Assyrian women who fled their homes due to ISIS attacks pray at a church on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, on Sunday, March 1. ISIS militants recently abducted at least 220 Assyrians in Syria.
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A Kurdish marksman looks over a destroyed area of Kobani on Friday, January 30, after the city had been liberated from the ISIS militant group. The Syrian city, also known as Ayn al-Arab, had been under assault by ISIS since mid-September.
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Smoke billows in Kirkuk as Kurdish Peshmerga fighters take position against ISIS militants on January 30.
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Kurdish people celebrate in Suruc, Turkey, near the Turkish-Syrian border, after ISIS militants were expelled from Kobani on Tuesday, January 27.
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Collapsed buildings are seen in Kobani on January 27 after Kurdish forces took control of the town from ISIS.
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Junko Ishido, mother of Japanese journalist Kenji Goto, reacts during a news conference in Tokyo on Friday, January 23. ISIS would later kill Goto and another Japanese hostage, Haruna Yukawa.
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ISIS militants are seen through a rifle's scope during clashes with Peshmerga fighters in Mosul, Iraq, on Wednesday, January 21.
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An elderly Yazidi man arrives in Kirkuk after being released by ISIS on Saturday, January 17. The militant group released about 200 Yazidis who were held captive for five months in Iraq. Almost all of the freed prisoners were in poor health and bore signs of abuse and neglect, Kurdish officials said.
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Smoke billows behind an ISIS sign during an Iraqi military operation to regain control of the town of Sadiyah, about 95 kilometers (60 miles) north of Baghdad, on Tuesday, November 25.
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Fighters from the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish People's Protection Units join forces to fight ISIS in Kobani on Wednesday, November 19.
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A picture taken from Turkey shows smoke rising after ISIS militants fired mortar shells toward an area controlled by Syrian Kurdish fighters near Kobani on Monday, November 3.
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Iraqi special forces search a house in Jurf al-Sakhar, Iraq, on Thursday, October 30, after retaking the area from ISIS.
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ISIS militants stand near the site of an airstrike near the Turkey-Syria border on Thursday, October 23. The United States and several Arab nations have been bombing ISIS targets in Syria to take out the militant group's ability to command, train and resupply its fighters.
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Kurdish fighters walk to positions as they combat ISIS forces in Kobani on Sunday, October 19.
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A U.S. Air Force plane flies above Kobani on Saturday, October 18.
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Heavy smoke rises in Kobani following an airstrike by the U.S.-led coalition on October 18.
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Cundi Minaz, a female Kurdish fighter, is buried in a cemetery in the southeastern Turkish town of Suruc on Tuesday, October 14. Minaz was reportedly killed during clashes with ISIS militants in nearby Kobani.
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Turkish police officers secure a basketball stadium in Suruc on October 14. Some Syrian Kurds were held there after crossing from Syria into Turkey. Tens of thousands of people fled Kobani to escape ISIS.
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Kiymet Ergun, a Syrian Kurd, celebrates in Mursitpinar, Turkey, after an airstrike by the U.S.-led coalition in Kobani on Monday, October 13.
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Alleged ISIS militants stand next to an ISIS flag atop a hill in Kobani on Monday, October 6.
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In this photo released by the U.S. Air Force on Saturday, October 4, a U.S. Navy jet is refueled in Iraqi airspace after conducting an airstrike against ISIS militants.
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A Kurdish Peshmerga soldier who was wounded in a battle with ISIS is wheeled to the Zakho Emergency Hospital in Duhuk, Iraq, on Tuesday, September 30.
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Syrian Kurds wait near a border crossing in Suruc as they wait to return to their homes in Kobani on Sunday, September 28.
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Tomahawk missiles, intended for ISIS targets in Syria, fly above the Persian Gulf after being fired by the USS Philippine Sea in this image released by the U.S. Navy on Tuesday, September 23.
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Syrian Kurds fleeing ISIS militants wait behind a fence in Suruc on Sunday, September 21.
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A elderly man is carried after crossing the Syria-Turkey border near Suruc on Saturday, September 20.
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A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter launches mortar shells toward ISIS militants in Zumar, Iraq, on Monday, September 15.
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Kurdish Peshmerga fighters fire at ISIS militant positions from their position on the top of Mount Zardak, east of Mosul, Iraq, on Tuesday, September 9.
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Kurdish Peshmerga forces stand guard at their position in the Omar Khaled village west of Mosul on Sunday, August 24.
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Kurdish Peshmergas fight to regain control of the town of Celavle, in Iraq's Diyala province, on August 24.
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Displaced Iraqis receive clothes from a charity at a refugee camp near Feeshkhabour, Iraq, on Tuesday, August 19.
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Peshmerga fighters inspect the remains of a car that reportedly belonged to ISIS militants and was targeted by a U.S. airstrike in the village of Baqufa, north of Mosul, on August 18.
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Kurdish Peshmerga fighters fire at ISIS in Khazair, Iraq, on Thursday, August 14.
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Aziza Hamid, a 15-year-old Iraqi girl, cries for her father while she and some other Yazidi people are flown to safety Monday, August 11, after a dramatic rescue operation at Iraq's Mount Sinjar. A CNN crew was on the flight, which took diapers, milk, water and food to the site where as many as 70,000 people were trapped by ISIS. But only a few of them were able to fly back on the helicopter with the Iraqi Air Force and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters.
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Thousands of Yazidis are escorted to safety by Kurdish Peshmerga forces and a People's Protection Unit in Mosul on Saturday, August 9.
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Thousands of Yazidi and Christian people flee Mosul on Wednesday, August 6, after the latest wave of ISIS advances.
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A Baiji oil refinery burns after an alleged ISIS attack in northern Selahaddin, Iraq, on Thursday, July 31.
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A Syrian rebel fighter lies on a stretcher at a makeshift hospital in Douma, Syria, on Wednesday, July 9. He was reportedly injured while fighting ISIS militants.
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New army recruits gather in Najaf, Iraq, on Wednesday, June 18, following a call for Iraqis to take up arms against Islamic militant fighters.
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Kurdish Peshmerga forces, along with Iraqi special forces, deploy their troops and armored vehicles outside of Kirkuk, Iraq, on June 12.
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Children stand next to a burnt vehicle during clashes between Iraqi security forces and ISIS militants in Mosul on Tuesday, June 10.
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Civilians from Mosul escape to a refugee camp near Irbil, Iraq, on June 10.
A little Friday humor. NATO just held a summit in Turkey, which ended with the assembled foreign ministers drunkenly butchering We Are the World karaoke-style. Enjoy!
VIDEO-The escort indicator: Wall Street is booming again'--commentary
"Chelsea" moved to Manhattan 10 years ago from Canada specifically to be an escort. She's about to celebrate her 30th birthday. "After I was done with school, this was my plan. And I'll do it until I'm done doing it." She charges $1,000 an hour for her services and has a lot of interaction with traders.
"It's the market here in New York so that's what you're dealing with '-- Wall Street guys," Chelsea said. "They've got money and they want sex."
Read MoreBoom! Viagra may help cure malaria
When Chelsea moved to the city, the stock market was rising '-- but not all of her customers were. "I worked for an agency back then. Most of the calls were from coked-up traders. They couldn't get it up half the time, so I'd just sit there naked and do blow with them. It wasn't hard '..." she laughed. Chelsea eventually got tired of giving part of her earnings to the agency and now works independently.
At her rate, Chelsea only works about five times a week and brings in over $200,000 a year. By contrast, other escorts charge just $400 an hour, focusing instead on a high-volume business.
"It's all about building a client base," Chelsea said. "I really don't have to market myself anymore."
During the financial collapse, things got a little slow for Chelsea and her friends, but since then, profits have been booming again. The markets have an indirect effect on the escort industry.
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"Business has been good," Chelsea said. "I can tell you firsthand that bonus season was great this year. Sometimes my guys like to talk about their jobs and stuff. They all got paid this January and February and then spent their money."
I spoke with a couple of Chelsea's friends who are also escorts and they all agreed. "The job description is part escort and part therapist," "Sierra" said. "So it's just good to know what's going on with the markets." Sierra is Chelsea's friend and business partner. Sometimes they go out on calls together.
During my 15 years working on Wall Street, I saw my share of people partaking in this service. I wouldn't say it was commonplace, but it definitely wasn't uncommon place either. I copped to some of this behavior in my book. And, I can say it's a lot easier to make a call to an escort service with a wad of cash in one pocket and a bag of blow in the other.
"Finance guys are my best and worst customers," Chelsea continued. "When I get a new client, it's 50/50 on whether or not he works on Wall Street. The younger guys want you to be there 15 minutes ago and usually just want to party. They're super aggressive and terrible in bed." Chelsea also said that some of her older clientele from Wall Street are very respectful and she works twice as hard for them. "It's all about making a connection with them."
"Most of them are Type A '-- big egos," Chelsea said of her Wall Street clients. "But when I get them naked, they're just as vulnerable as the rest of the guys."
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Chelsea doesn't take financial advice from clients but says she already has a few hundred thousand dollars saved up in some mutual funds for retirement.
"Some of them talk about their jobs and the markets," she said. "They very often open up and talk about real stuff like their kids or wives. Or what drama they're dealing with at work. I just listen."
I also spoke with "Holly," an escort from Vancouver who flies into New York City for her clientele. "I'm here every couple of months," she said. She and I decided to meet for a quick dinner before one of her appointments when she was in town. "I've got a retirement date '-- it's November of this year." She'll be 29 and has over $100,000 saved. After we ordered an appetizer I asked her about working with Wall Street guys. "I see them occasionally, but they're no better or worse than anyone else."
Holly charges $1,000 an hour with a two-hour minimum for her services and spends countless hours flying from city to city. "Last time I was in town, a Wall Street guy canceled on me last minute and then next morning he showed up and paid me anyway."
Among the several women I spoke with, it seems, escorts and Wall Street have a love / hate relationship. They do love the fact that their phone continues to ring, but sometimes hate the person on the other end of the call. While I realize it's impossible to debate the morality of this topic one way or the other without factoring in all of the other harm that might occur from this industry, it's really just like the stock market. It's all about supply and demand.
